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INTRODUCTION: Literature and “Interregnum”: Globalization, War and the Crisis of Sovereignty 
in Latin America 
  
 Literature and “Interregnum” looks at late 20th- and early 21st-century literary responses 
to neoliberal-administered globalization and its impact on the conceptual vocabularies of 
political and aesthetic modernity in Latin America’s Southern Cone and Mexico. The book 
endeavors to establish dialogues between literature and a range of theoretical perspectives, 
including Continental philosophy (Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, 
Nancy, Agamben, Schürmann, Thayer), political thought (Hobbes, Marx, Benjamin, Schmitt, 
Gramsci, Jameson, Laclau, Rancière, Virno, Galli), psychoanalysis (Freud, Lacan), and sociology 
of globalization (Harvey, Sassen). Through juxtaposition of the methods and sensibilities proper 
to these traditions of inquiry I explore two related hypotheses.  
 The first is that the violent impact of neoliberal-administered globalization in Latin 
America that begins in the 1980s culminates, at the end of the millennium, in the suspension or 
exhaustion of certain principles of political and aesthetic modernity, foremost among which are 
the regulatory state, political sovereignty (that of the national state or the People), and the 
modern conceptualization of the subject as autonomous, self-conscious origin that assigns itself 
its own laws. I describe this crisis of the conceptual vocabulary of modernity as an interregnum 
in which, in the words of the Italian political philosopher Antonio Gramsci, “the old [order] is 
dying and the new cannot be born.” To be perfectly clear, I do not argue that sovereignty and 
its political manifestations (the state, the nation, the national popular) have disappeared from 
our contemporary topography. However, what were once the foundations or first principles of 
modern social organization have more recently been subjugated to new economic and 
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technological rationales and forces that appear to be incapable of serving as new organizing 
principles. One of the important consequences of interregnum for this book is found in Galli’s 
meditations on “Global War” (Galli 2010): the conceptual vocabularies of political and aesthetic 
modernity are no longer capable of explaining or regulating the contradictions produced by 
capitalist modernization. Thus the modern concepts of sovereignty and subject—to name two 
central ideas—may well obscure what is going on in our world today rather than shedding light 
on things.  
 But if the metaphysics of the subject and the Hobbesian-Schmittian tradition of 
sovereignty are helpful today primarily to the extent that they illustrate what does not work in 
the world, some explanation is required for the fact that I continue to rely here on a number of 
modern thinkers whose conceptual vocabularies remain useful in my view: Kant and Hegel (to 
an extent), as well as Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud, and other more recent thinkers who 
engage with these four. There is no contradiction, as I see it, in asserting that Hobbes and 
Schmitt have been rendered more or less useless today (they remain or become useful 
precisely in their uselessness) whereas Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud remain altogether 
useful. This is because these latter are all antifoundational thinkers whose thought not only 
interrogates the conditions of possibility for modern forms of experience but which also seeks 
out the ways in which the forms and structures of modernity have always been more unstable 
that modern thought would care to acknowledge.  
 The second hypothesis is that the in-between time of interregnum announces the 
exhaustion of the modern idea of “literature,” or the aesthetic ideology of literature that had 
prevailed from the Romantics through the rise of testimonio literature in Latin America during 
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the 1980s and 90s. This claim will require considerable explanatory work, since I am by no 
means suggesting that a clear and definitive break exists between the literary history of 
modernity and the contemporary novels I study here. On the contrary, it could be said 
unequivocally that, in terms of literary style or technique, there is nothing (or almost nothing) 
in these works that has not already been done or said in the time of literary modernism. If there 
is something different in these works that would distinguish them from literary predecessors it 
cannot be explained as innovation; indeed, as Brett Levinson has stated with respect to Bolaño, 
it may be that what these works share is a radical skepticism about the very concept of the 
new, the novel (Levinson 2009, 178). The exhaustion of “literature” does not mean that the 
literary simply goes away either. On the contrary, one thing that opens up at the end of the 
millennium in Latin America has to do with alternative ways of thinking about literature and 
literary language, or perhaps another side of what we call literary modernity. In the works that I 
examine this includes different manners of literary confrontation with the loosening of bonds 
and pacts (social, epistemological, semantic), as well as with what appears today as the absence 
or impossibility of what Aristotle calls arkhē: that philosophical ground or first principle that 
would provide the solid foundation for thought and action. Each chapter of this book traces a 
tension at work between endeavors to revitalize the personal and collective projects that make 
up our world on the one hand, and literary exploration of how the ties that constitute social 
fabric are prone to coming undone on the other hand—and of what this loosening of principial 
logic might itself have to say to us.  
 What I call the crisis of sovereignty takes several forms, but in each case it is defined by 
the displacement or suspension of modern political forms and concepts together with the fact 
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that no new principle has emerged to replace them. The experience of economic and 
technological globalization in late 20th century Latin America is defined specifically by such 
phenomena as: the retreat of the national-popular and the withering of contestatory and 
utopian political imaginaries; the privatization of the regulatory and welfare state models; 
mediatization as technological unification of the planet; the decline of industrial capitalism and 
the formal subsumption of intellectual work into the capitalist economy in the time of post-
Fordism; and the rise of narco-capitalism as post-ideological configuration of power. While each 
of these contexts contributes to destabilizing the conceptual vocabularies of political and 
aesthetic modernity, no new ordering principle has risen to fill the empty place once occupied 
by the sovereign subject of modernity. The formal dynamics of this situation bear some 
resemblance to what classical juridical thought called interregnum: a gap or lag time in 
between the death of the old sovereign and the coronation of his replacement.  
 I look at these forms of crisis through selective readings of a series of end-of-millennium 
Latin American novels by César Aira, Marcelo Cohen and Sergio Chejfec (Argentina), Diamela 
Eltit (Chile), and Roberto Bolaño (Chile-Mexico-Cataluña). My interest in these works has less to 
do with how social, economic and political contexts are represented as plot content and more 
to do with how those contexts and their attendant conflicts are “translated” into the formal 
dynamics of literary narrative. There is thus a Lukacsian sense to this book even if the works I 
look at do not belong to the realist tradition. The recoding of history as literary form provides 
occasions for reconsidering modern conceptualizations of aesthetic experience, mood, 
temporality, politics, ethical experience, as well as of literature itself as social institution. Allow 
me now to provide some clarifications about what I am calling the crisis of sovereignty.  
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The crisis of sovereignty in Latin America can be traced back at least as far as the 
transitions from military dictatorship to representative democracy during the 1980s and 90s. 
Those shifts, accompanied by powerful recodifications of earlier histories of political violence 
and radicalism, seek to provide neoliberal reform with both a sense of necessity and moral 
legitimacy. During the so-called “Washington Consensus” of the 1980s and 90s, the 
democratically-elected transitional regimes of the Southern Cone preside over the privatization 
of public services and industries together with the dismantling of the regulatory state, which 
served as mediator between the local/national and global capital for much of the 20th century. 
While the privatization of the Welfare State model may be the most salient landmark for 
thinking the crisis of sovereignty in Latin America, other contributing factors include: (1) tele-
technological mediatization, through which old configurations of space and time according to 
the parameters of the nation are superseded by transnational mediatic networks and real-time 
technologies that facilitate the virtual elimination of geographic distance as an obstacle for 
production and commerce, culminating in the tendential integration of the planet to meet the 
needs of global capital; (2) new patterns of displacement and migration in response to drug-
related violence and changing labor markets, which in turn have the effect of destabilizing 
national borders and providing a mobile (and often highly vulnerable) labor force for global 
capital and its preference for flexibility and relocation; (3) the proliferation of narcotrafficking 
and the drug wars, which in the past half-decade have destabilized the social and political order 
in Mexico while threatening the state’s tradition role as guarantor of the social pact.  
The dismantling of the forms, institutions, and conceptual vocabulary of political 
modernity today poses urgent problems for our understanding of recent Latin American 
6 
 
history, in part because this understanding remains reliant on epistemological categories and 
concepts that belong to the history of modernity. For example, the advent of neoliberal 
hegemony, or what I will call “Consensus,” in Argentina, Chile, and elsewhere in Latin America 
during the 1980s turns out to be difficult to reconcile with the sociological concept of societal 
transition, because that concept presupposes a linear and progressive model of history that 
enables “before” and “after” to be plotted like geometric points on a single, continuous line. 
The durability of neoliberal hegemony, meanwhile, relies in part on the powerful projection of a 
new temporality in which history is now inevitably approaching its end—which is to say, both 
the culmination of its prior stages and its ultimate goal which has mediated all prior stages. 
Under the bright light of neoliberal hegemony any situation that remains out of adjustment 
with neoliberal consensus—any and all conflict, dissensus, or disorder—tends to be seen, as 
Hegel puts it in the Philosophy of Right, as a form whose shape of life has grown old. As Derrida 
shows in Specters of Marx, the neoliberal account of the end of history performs a peculiar 
empirico-theoretical balancing act (Derrida 1994, 62-63). On one hand it turns to empirical 
history for confirmation of its fundamental thesis: in societies throughout the world today old 
ideological projects have been discarded in favor of a new social logic according to which 
decisions over how to allocate limited goods and resources have become increasingly complex 
and are now best left to experts or to the impersonal mechanisms of the market. Empirical 
evidence today seems to confirm that the world is finally coming around to the liberal teleology 
of history, having concluded that any concerted effort to produce a “just” or “equitable” 
distribution of social and economic resources through political means is ultimately doomed to 
promote inefficiency—or worse. When ideological conflicts do flare up, meanwhile, neoliberal 
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apologists tend to explain them as residual forms whose historical actuality has been exhausted 
and which, having yet to hear the good news, are sadly out of step with the times. Such scenes 
of conflict and antagonism appear today like ghosts lingering after their time has passed, or like 
farcical reenactments of tragic scenes. 
 The German political theorist Carl Schmitt famously defined sovereignty as the right to 
decide between friend and foe, or between when constitutional law is in effect and when it is 
suspended. The concept of sovereignty posits a subject who decides as the origin of the 
sociopolitical order. In recent years Schmitt’s account of sovereignty has been challenged by 
thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, who in Rogues (2005) argues that the seemingly self-evident 
distinction between the sovereign state and its improper doubles (i.e., the famous category of 
“rogue state”) has become manifestly unstable in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. On a 
similar note, the Italian political philosopher and Schmitt scholar Carlo Galli has proposed that, 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent US response, the political 
vocabulary of modernity finds itself unable to account for the ways in which power, force, and 
security (and thus also insecurity) play out in the world today (Galli 2010). Although Galli coins 
the term “Global War” to describe this new situation, war today is no longer what it once was: a 
conflict between sovereign states represented by uniformed armies or, on occasion, between 
an invading army and a local guerrilla force dedicated to the defense of a homeland. Just as the 
meaning of war is no longer confined to conflicts between sovereign states over territory it also 
ceases to be calibrated by temporal parameters of beginning and end, declaration and 
armistice. Galli’s account of global war necessitates a rethinking of strife and insecurity beyond 
traditional associations with armed conflict organized by sovereign occasionalism.1 Global war 
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is synonymous with an ever-expanding array of threats to security and order in our world; but 
not all of these threats can be assigned a clear bellicose intention, i.e., to capture territory or 
overthrow a given political order. I propose that what Galli calls global war thus emerges as an 
improper name for a situation that marks a limit for the political vocabulary of modernity; it 
brings together various forms of violence, strife and potential disorder arising in the context of 
(and not infrequently as a reaction to) technological and economic globalization.  
 For Schmitt the logic of sovereignty presupposes the autonomy of the political as a 
sphere whose rationale is freed from all external concerns and authorities: morality, economics, 
culture, religion, nature, etc. Neoliberal-administered globalization, by contrast, is synonymous 
with the subjugation of the political beneath economy and the logic of the market—the very 
antithesis of what Schmitt understood as the autonomy of the political. Political sovereignty 
relinquishes its modern role as undisputed arbiter of social organization for reasons that have 
everything to do with an array of economic, technological, and geopolitical trends discussed by 
scholars of globalization such as David Harvey, Fredric Jameson, and Saskia Sassen. This is not 
to say that the state has ceased to matter today or that it has been replaced, for better or 
worse, by some new organizing principle. Modern forms and figures of sovereignty are still with 
us today, and in some cases they may be even more repressive than ever. But the state is now 
obliged to redefine its role in order to accommodate forces and logics that transcend the 
national arena, and which in many cases are not easily assigned a specific geopolitical location 
or a clear form of agency—and which thus appear to fall outside of occasionalist accounts of 
causality. This latter point is crucial, for it clarifies why we cannot speak simply and comfortably 
of a new configuration of sovereignty in the world today. If the sovereign is the one who 
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decides on the state of exception (in the juridical domain) or on the friend/enemy distinction (in 
the external political context), neoliberal-administered globalization inaugurates a new 
situation in which such determinations are always already mediated by real or perceived 
economic facticity and technological rationality. By the same token the economic principles of 
liberalism, predicated on the minimization of political interference in the social, turn out to be 
equally valid in republican democracy as in authoritarian dictatorship. The specificity of the 
political—democratic or undemocratic—makes little difference as far as contemporary liberal 
theory is concerned.  
 The occasionalist logic of modern political sovereignty experiences a short circuit today. 
Decisions continue to be made, of course, but they do not refer back to their own principial 
authority or to an originary decision that could be presumed to have legitimated the terms 
under which particular phenomenal decisions are made.2 The logic of sovereignty may indeed 
remain in effect within the political and juridical spheres but its hegemony over all spheres of 
life has been suspended. The secular theology of political sovereignty has been subjugated to 
the logic and requirements of transnational capital. The essence of the market, meanwhile, is 
its impersonal, automatic nature; and in the eyes of liberalism that is precisely what makes it 
the only legitimate arbiter of socioeconomic distribution. But this also means that the market 
cannot replace the modern sovereign in the same way that the sovereign once stepped in and 
filled the place of God. The mimetic account that guarantees a certain resemblance between 
God and man also sustains the occasionalist logic of political sovereignty. But that connection 
cannot be reproduced in the shift from the sovereign national state to the “invisible hand” of 
the market, whose legitimacy as decision-making mechanism relies precisely on its being 
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essentially unlike human decision-making.  
 The subjugation of the political logic of sovereignty to abstract or imperceptible forces 
that are no longer capable of being regulated by national states leaves a void at the heart of the 
social today. This void has yet to be filled by some new figure or principle that could carry out 
the explanatory and ordering operations once performed by the logic of political sovereignty. In 
writing this book I have been tempted to thematize this subjugation of the political—and of its 
principial role vis-à-vis the social pact—as interregnum. Interregnum is a juridical concept 
invented by Roman law to designate a finite interval between the death of the old sovereign 
and the coronation of his replacement. In such a time between orders, the legal decrees of the 
old regime were suspended in anticipation of the enactment of new laws. By the same token, 
and as Giorgio Agamben describes in State of Exception, the tradition of interregnum was 
shaped by the specter of social upheaval, either through invasion by an opportunistic enemy or 
from inside via insurrection. In the event of the sovereign’s death Roman law provided for a 
temporary strengthening and fuller manifestation of the repressive apparatuses of the state, to 
be authorized by the Senate under declaration of iustitium, for which Agamben offers the 
translation “when the law stands still, just as [the sun does in] the solstice” (Agamben 2005, 
41). Under iustitium Roman civic law was suspended, its administrative apparatuses dissolved, 
and leading officials—and at times even common citizens—were directed to defend the state 
using whatever means necessary. Over time iustitium gradually lost its association with the 
threat of disorder and came to be associated with public mourning of the deceased monarch: a 
pause for remembrance and reflection before returning to the business of everyday life. 
Through this genealogy of interregnum Agamben traces a gradual domestication and 
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smoothing-over of a crack in the foundation of the political logic of sovereignty. A similar fault 
line in modern political reason is exposed, in my view, with the global reordering associated 
with transnational capitalism.  
 In the late 1920s and early 30s the Italian political thinker Antonio Gramsci appropriates 
the term “interregnum” to describe something quite different from the classical Roman political 
practice of a declared hiatus of juridical order intended to protect the state from external and 
internal threats. As Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out Gramsci’s appropriation of the concept of 
interregnum provides a name for what Lenin described as a revolutionary situation: a crisis of 
representation in which the ruling class has become incapable of ruling and the ruled no longer 
desire to be represented (Bauman 2012, 49). For Gramsci interregnum names the weakening of 
the power of the ruling class at a time when its ideas and codes have ceased to be hegemonic 
and when the established social order, if it is to be upheld, must therefore be sustained through 
force alone. As Gramsci puts it,  
That aspect of the modem crisis which is bemoaned as a “wave of materialism” 
is related to what is called the “crisis of authority.” If the ruling class has lost its 
consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading” but only “dominant,” exercising coercive 
force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached 
from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe 
previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and 
the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms 
appear. (Gramsci 1992, 275-76)  
 If interregnum can provide a viable term for describing the subjugation of political 
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sovereignty to the logic of the market and the ebbs and flows of global capital, then we would 
be compelling the term to perform double duty. It would on one hand designate a crisis of the 
political, a time in which the occasionalist logic of political modernity has been suspended but 
in which the principial figure of the sovereign has not been replaced by any substitute figure. At 
the same time interregnum would also name an epistemological problem that arises in the 
context of this void: today we lack adequate concepts to account for and reckon with the forces 
that are reshaping our world or tearing it apart. The political reason of modernity appears to be 
losing its explanatory power and we are in need of new concepts to account for how power is 
deployed in the world today. Bauman himself proposes that our contemporary situation might 
be understood as an interregnum:  
The old order founded until recently on a…“triune” principle of territory, state, 
and nation as the key to the planetary distribution of sovereignty, and on power 
wedded seemingly forever to the politics of the territorial nation-state as its sole 
operating agency, is now dying. Sovereignty is no longer glued to either of the 
elements of the triune principle and entities; at the utmost, it is tied to them but 
loosely and in portions much reduced in size and contents. The allegedly 
unbreakable marriage of power and politics is, however, ending in separation 
with a prospect of divorce. Sovereignty is nowadays, so to speak, unanchored 
and free-floating. Criteria of its allocation tend to be hotly contested, while the 
customary sequence of the principle of allocation and its application is in a great 
number of cases reversed. (Bauman 2012, 49-50)  
 I have no real quarrel with this assessment of the dying nature of the old order or with 
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the assertion that the phenomenal manifestation of power in the world today tends to invert 
the traditional sequencing of principial reason and its phenomenal application. To paraphrase a 
familiar image of frontier law, power today is inclined to shoot first and ask questions (or 
appeal to principles) later. But it seems to me that the epistemological insufficiency just 
invoked also strongly implies that “interregnum” would turn out to be an inadequate concept 
for what Bauman is describing or for what I am attempting to think with this book. Interregnum 
is a juridical term that serves to designate either a temporary hiatus between orders (in the 
Roman tradition) or a crisis of representation in which the authority of the ruling class is no 
longer legitimated through the universal acceptance of its ideas (the revolutionary situations of 
the 19th and 20th centuries). Although interregnum for Lenin and Gramsci signifies a gap or a 
crisis that could potentially give rise to revolution, it is a temporal term whose concept projects 
the eventual closing-up of this gap and the inauguration of a new sovereign order, even if its 
configuration turns out to be radically different from those of its predecessors. The concept of 
interregnum thus belongs to the imperial history of sovereignty and serves to guarantee the 
continuity of that political reason despite its momentary interruptions and crises. The problem I 
am looking at, however, is not juridical in nature. On the contrary it obtains with the inability of 
the juridical sphere to guarantee the social pact today. Nor for that matter does the gap 
produced by the subjugation of political sovereignty today belong within the imperial history of 
modern political forms in its conservative and radical variations. On the contrary, it marks the 
exhaustion of that history and announces, as Alberto Moreiras puts it, the need to fashion a 
new critical and theoretical vocabulary (Moreiras 2012, 10). In light of these complications, I 
have opted for the imperfect solution of leaving “interregnum” in the title of my book while 
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placing it, as Derrida would say, under erasure.3 
 For this book one important consequence of the societal transformation that 
accompanies neoliberal globalization is that literature has now relinquished the position it 
occupied during much of the 19th and 20th centuries in Western societies. Today literature no 
longer embodies and transmits universal truths such as those attributed to it by Matthew 
Arnold (“the best which has been thought and said in the world”). By the same token, literature 
is no longer widely regarded as a potential medium for the production of a national subject, as 
was the case in Latin America from the time of Sarmiento through the popularization of 
testimonio as the staging and production of revolutionary subjectivity.4 This decline is not due 
only to the fact that people today are reading less than ever before and turning instead to other 
media for entertainment. At a more fundamental level this shift reflects a transformation of the 
social pact and its organizing logic.  
  Near the end of the 18th century the concept of political sovereignty was reconfigured in 
conjunction with the birth of a new political subject called “the People.” The democratic 
revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th century Europe abolished the old principal of 
authority, which was grounded in the idea that the monarch’s rule was theologically ordained, 
and established a new form of legitimacy based on a pair of complementary premises: first, 
that power has been vested in the state through the will of the people; and second, that the 
state provides the basis through which the people can cultivate and realize its historical destiny. 
The first premise postulates an archaic moment of consent of the governed, while the second 
premise projects a future time in which the people will asymptotically become identical to 
itself—through education and reflection, and through the self-making of work. In both cases it 
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is culture—and, as the nineteenth century wore on, increasingly literature—that provides the 
groundwork for these two premises: in the first case by producing an archive in which the 
people can see itself as the subject of its own history; and in the second case by providing the 
foundation for the liberal education through which the essential character of the people can be 
realized, i.e., by cultivating the good judgment and freedom of thought that are the basic 
requirements for modern citizenship.  
 Today we are living out the demise of the aesthetic ideology of modernity that began 
with the publication of Schiller’s Aesthetic Education (1795). Aesthetic experience was 
understood by Schiller and the Jena Romantics in Europe, and by Echeverría and Rodó in Latin 
America, as a privileged site of reflection that enjoys immunity from any external imperative, 
such as the imperatives or constraints stemming from other spheres (religion, politics, 
economics, and so on). If literature has always been more or less detached from everyday 
realities, that can only be to its benefit as far as Schillerian aesthetic ideology is concerned, 
because detachment is just another name for the autonomy by virtue of which aesthetic 
education becomes the site where human freedom is cultivated. Today, meanwhile, it would 
seem that literature and aesthetic experience are no longer able to sustain this historical claim 
to autonomy as fields capable of assigning themselves their own laws.  
 To see why we must consider how capitalist globalization beginning in the 1970s 
coincides with a momentous shift in the way labor as such is conceptualized and experienced. 
Labor in the global economy is no longer organized according to the principles of producing 
durable objects; although such production still happens, manual labor has become increasingly 
automated has lost its paradigmatic status.5 The factory as paradigm of modern capitalism has 
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been replaced by the office, and manual labor has been supplanted by intellectual work 
involving the manipulation of symbols and by affective labor whose aim is to provide feelings: 
“service with a smile,” as Hardt and Negri wryly note. In a global economy dominated by service 
and information industries labor is increasingly oriented toward producing performances or 
experiences that constitute an end in themselves.6 
 In her 2007 essay “Literaturas postautónomas” Ludmer begins with the assertion that 
the formal subsumption of culture within capitalist production thematized by Jameson, Hardt 
and Negri, and Virno signals the exhaustion of the Schillerian project of grounding political 
democracy in aesthetic experience. In its place Ludmer proposes a new category that she calls 
literatura post-autónoma. Autonomous literature acquired its specificity through its own self-
positing as privileged epistemological lens through which non-literary reality could be seen and 
assessed critically from a distance. Post-autonomous literature coincides with the awareness 
that the boundaries between literature and other spheres have become unstable and porous. If 
literature can no sustain the (in)difference that was its mark of distinction for Schiller, then it is 
also unable now to deliver on the promise of generating critical knowledge of the social; its own 
mechanisms have now become part of what drives the organization of social relations and the 
production of commodities for the market. 
 Ludmer finds evidence of the shift from autonomy to post-autonomy in what she sees 
as the diminishing capacity of literary language to generate meaning or insight through 
tropological innovation. She finds in contemporary Southern Cone literary works an entropic 
dispersal of the aesthetic tensions, resistances and opacities which once distinguished literary 
uses of language from other discourses. As she puts it, “el sentido (o el autor, o la escritura) 
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queda sin densidad, sin paradoja, sin indecibilidad, ‘sin metáfora’, y es ocupado totalmente por 
la ambivalencia: son y no son literatura al mismo tiempo, son ficción y realidad” (Ludmer 2007, 
np). Post-autonomous literature has been evacuated of the “density,” the limit and the distance 
once named by the sublime and metaphor respectively; or else it is a literature that more or 
less purposively abstains from these aesthetic forms of mediation. Ludmer is not claiming that 
literary discourse has suddenly become transparent like some idealized Habermasian view of 
communicative discourse. Post-autonomous literature finds itself without an unsayable, 
without paradox and without metaphor not because it is more transparent or literal than its 
predecessors, but because metaphoricity, which Aristotle understood as the essence of 
intelligence (perceiving likeness in difference), has now been subsumed within the production 
process as new paradigm. To put this in language that is slightly different from Ludmer’s, it is no 
longer possible for literature to perform the old task of sublimation, of elevating a common 
object to the level of the idealized Thing, and thereby filling the gap left by the Thing’s 
withdrawal. One exemplary instance of sublimation in the Latin American tradition can be 
found in the concluding pages of Rulfo’s Pedro Páramo, in what appears to the dying cacique as 
the rarified and radiant image of Susana San Juan, in which her “boca abullonada” acts as a 
placeholder of absence, of the unpresentable sublime which the cacique is finally unable to 
dominate.7 In post-autonomy, meanwhile, the old tropological toolbox of autonomous 
literature’s epistemological privilege—fable, symbol, myth, allegory, paradox, metaphorics, 
sublimation, and so on—is for Ludmer no longer capable of creating bridges between 
representation and the real. This is the case not because the distance between representation 
and its objects is now too great to be traversed, but because the distance has shrunk and now 
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asymptotically approaches its own vanishing. In Ludmer’s words, “todo lo cultural [y literario] 
es económico y todo lo económico es cultural [y literario],” while “la realidad [si se la piensa 
desde los medios, que la constituirían constantemente] es ficción y…la ficción es la realidad” 
(Ludmer 2007, np). 
 Ludmer’s claims have struck some as too monolithic, either because she appears to 
lump all contemporary literary phenomena under a single socio-economic rubric, or because 
the conceptualization of postautonomía implies a homogenization of the historical present 
without accounting for possible distinctions between how the planetary phenomena that 
define it—globalization, post-industrial capitalism, the crisis of the modern state form, and so 
on—are experienced in the developed world as opposed to, say, Latin America (or, for that 
matter, between the Southern Cone and the Andes). Furthermore, insofar as she thematizes a 
critical turn away from traditional hermeneutic practices of interpretation in favor of attention 
to affect, Ludmer could be accused of having produced a new critical model that fits all too well 
with the logic of neoliberalism and the marketplace. As Charles Hatfield, Eugenio di Steffano 
and Emilio Sauri have argued, the critical abandonment of interpretation and meaning in favor 
of affect can only lead to affirmations of “difference” as the unquestionable ground on which 
all affect must be understood insofar as affect is specific to the subject who experiences it. The 
critical abandonment of interpretation and truth could never yield anything other than a 
reaffirmation of the logic of the market.8   
 Whatever its flaws, I propose that we tentatively accept Ludmer’s concept of literatura 
postautónoma as a working account of at least one dominant tendency in contemporary 
literary production, one which literary critical practices must account for regardless of location. 
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However, it seems to me that Ludmer’s theory is unable to account for the complexity of what 
is in play in modern thinking about aesthetic experience, and that her understanding of the 
literary and its limitations today is derived from the most conservative (Schillerian and 
Arnoldian) accounts of the aesthetic. One important consequence of her gloss on aesthetic 
autonomy is that the concept of post-autonomía remains incomplete, since it is constitutively 
unable to ask what it might have in common with modern understandings of the aesthetic. 
Thus, for example, the distinction between autonomy and post-autonomy would be unable to 
engage with the distinction that Paul de Man draws between Kant’s thinking about the 
aesthetic and Schiller’s appropriation of Kant for his conceptualization of the “aesthetic state.”9 
I return to this discussion in the second chapter.  
 Literature and “Interregnum” is divided into five chapters that are traversed by a 
handful of common themes: mediatization and technics as altering our awareness of history 
and as contributing to the dismantling of the public sphere (Chapters One, Two, Three and 
Four); post-Fordism or flexible accumulation and the disappearance of the national popular and 
utopian imaginaries (Chapters One, Three and Four); neoliberal-administered globalization and 
the emergence of new forms of violence (Chapters One, Three and Five); gender, 
precariousness and “feminization” of labor (Chapters Three, Four and Five); literary returns to 
realism (Chapters Three and Four); and literary returns to the (neo) avant garde (Chapters One, 
Two and Five).  
 The first two chapters look at debates in Latin Americanist circles concerning literature, 
mass media, technics, history, and politics. Three general questions help to orient the 
discussion. The first concerns how mediatization—or the tendential unification of the planet 
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through increasingly powerful telecommunicational networks—affects our understanding of 
aesthetic activity and reflection. This question asks not only about how contemporary literary 
production is affected by globalization but also about how the institutional status and role of 
literature, qua exemplary form for the modern production of citizenship, is undergoing 
transformation today. The second question focuses on the well-known idea popularized by 
Fredric Jameson among others, that globalization and postmodernism contribute to the loss of 
our capacity to experience history as such. The third question has to do with how mediatization 
reconfigures the parameters for politics in a time when public discourse is increasingly obliged 
to adapt itself to an endogenous logic and a temporality defined by brevity and repeatability: 
the sound bite, the news cycle, and so on. In Chapter One I look at the Argentine writer Marcelo 
Cohen’s 1989 novel El oído absoluto as an allegory of post-dictatorship Argentina. Cohen’s 
novel portrays a space in which the utopian imaginaries of prior generations have been 
supplanted by charismatic pseudo-populist neoliberal reformers, and thereby sets out to 
explore a situation resembling Fredric Jameson’s account of postmodernism: a time in which 
even those domains previously considered to be beyond the reach of capitalism (nature and the 
unconscious) have now been colonized by the logic of commodification (Jameson 1991). El oído 
absoluto shares with Jameson and Martin Heidegger an interest in exploring connections 
between the experience of historicity on the one hand, and mood and the “tonalities” of 
thought on the other.10 Cohen’s novel portrays the time of neoliberal-administered 
globalization as something akin to what Heidegger describes as a toneless tone, or “the distress 
of the absence of distress” (Heidegger 1999, 75). But while the novel identifies a certain range 
of tonalities as characteristic of the time of late capitalism it also investigates how mood can 
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give rise to a revitalized experience of history through a confrontation with the absence or 
impossibility of principial ground or arkhē. For Cohen, I propose, it is through literary language 
that the (non)ground of history has a chance of showing itself to us or making itself heard.  
 Continuing with the literary thematization of mass media technics, Chapter Two 
explores a stark contrast between celebratory accounts of mediatization and the emergent 
economic crisis in Argentina in the work of César Aira. I look at how Aira’s 2001 novel La villa 
highlights a disjunction between new forms of accumulation (financial speculation, 
privatization, intensified production of surplus labor) and the intensification of inequality 
brought about by neoliberal economic reform. I also take up critical discussions of Aira’s poetics 
and his tendency to incorporate the imagery and rhythm of televisual programming into his 
prose. Following Sandra Contreras and Graciela Speranza, I explore how this literary 
incorporation of the temporality of the news cycle and other televisual topoi serves as impetus 
for the renewal of avant garde artistic procedures that may be akin to Marcel Duchamp’s 
invention of the “Readymade.” At a time when all social spheres have been conceived as 
domains reserved for specialized knowledge, literary appropriation of mass media technics may 
provide a way of revitalizing literary practice and reestablishing it as a common practice. In the 
language of the French political philosopher Jacques Rancière, we could say that Aira’s turn to 
mass media technics provides a way of opening the space of literature once again to its 
fundamentally democratic and impersonal anonymity. I explore how Aira’s novel initiates a 
rethinking of technics while questioning familiar distinctions between the human and 
technology. Drawing on reflections on technics and humanism by Heidegger, Blanchot, Derrida, 
Stiegler, and Samuel Weber, I read Aira’s novel as an attempt to think both with and against 
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mediatization understood simultaneously as an ideology of full inclusion/full coverage and as 
uncanny double of literary language itself. 
 The third and fourth chapters look at Argentine and Chilean literary responses to the 
paradigmatic shift from industrial capitalism to post-Fordist service economy. In both contexts I 
explore novels that participate in a contemporary “return” to the realist tradition in Latin 
America. This turning back is more akin to citation than to reenactment: these novels engage 
with the social context of the working poor and their travails, but literary discourse here is 
characterized by highly self-aware forms of lyricism instead of the detached indexicality 
characteristic of the 19th century realist novel. In the third chapter I look at the Chilean writer 
Diamela Eltit’s 2002 novel Mano de obra, a literary reflection on post-dictatorship Chile in 
which new forms of power and subjugation invented by neoliberalism are allegorized through 
narrative emplotment. The story is set in a mega-supermarket which provides the spatialized 
metonym of a historical event: the transition from national economy regulated by the state to 
unregulated free-market economy. Whereas Eltit has become renowned in Chile and beyond 
during the 1980s and 90s for a self-aware prose reminiscent of neo-avant garde movements, 
Mano de obra is largely devoid of the linguistic play and formal experimentation that 
characterized her earlier novels. Where literary form does call attention to itself, however, is in 
the chapter headings drawn from socialist and anarchist journals produced by the Chilean labor 
movement of the early 20th century. These headings remain somewhat enigmatic, since the text 
offers no explanation about where the titles come from. Each, however, is accompanied by a 
place name and a date, and thus it becomes clear that the headings are taken from some 
historical archive. What is most striking in this formal mechanism is the juxtaposition between, 
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on the one hand, a series of orphaned signifiers that point to the existence of a forgotten 
history, and the contemporary scene of the supermarket on the other hand, a space seemingly 
devoid of history in which everything from produce to the bodily motions of the employees are 
supervised and commodified under the corporate logic of the (super)market. Following Walter 
Benjamin and Eric Santner, I propose that the formal composition of Eltit’s novel initiates a 
reflection on natural history understood as the afterlife of culture, or as a residual space in 
between social history and nature. The concept of natural history helps shed light on Eltit’s 
literary response to the production of precarity in the time of neoliberal-administered 
globalization; it calls attention to a materiality in language that allows us to catch glimpses of 
the traces of alternative histories. It does not present us with those histories themselves, as 
testimonial literature would claim to do, but instead alludes to them in order to illuminate a 
dawning sense that the present order is not all.  
 In the fourth chapter I turn to the work of Sergio Chejfec, including his 2000 novel Boca 
de lobo. Akin to Eltit’s Mano de obra, Chejfec’s novel enacts a self-consciously anachronistic 
return to the subject matter of the realist tradition. Chejfec’s novel recounts an old romantic 
relation between the narrator and a female factory worker. Narrated in the historical present, a 
time tenuously defined by the retreat of radical labor politics and the transformation of 
industrial capitalism into service economy, Chejfec’s and Eltit’s works are similarly engaged in 
the difficulties associated with thinking about history today, at a time defined by the retreat of 
the national popular and its institutional support (industrial capitalism as paradigmatic form of 
production, the regulatory state, organized labor movements, etc.) and when social antagonism 
has been increasingly difficult to articulate. At a formal level Chejfec’s Boca de lobo has 
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something important in common with Balzac’s project as described by Lukács. Whereas the 
Comédie humaine bore witness to the constructions of industrial capitalism in France during the 
Second Republic, Boca de lobo takes stock of the abandonment of the factory as paradigmatic 
form of capitalist production.  
 The fifth and final chapter looks at a number of themes taken up in previous chapters: 
globalization; the neoliberal dismantling of the regulatory State; the “feminization” of labor and 
generation of precariousness as element of accumulation and reproduction of capitalist 
production; and the return to avant garde or neo-avant garde figures and procedures. Turning 
to Roberto Bolaño’s posthumous novel 2666 I look at how the geopolitics of globalization along 
the Mexican-US border interacts with literary modernity and its concerns about history and 
revolution or rupture. Aira and Eltit take up the idea of the avant garde together with its 
characteristic gestures in order to revitalize literary poetics at a time when many writers and 
critics have expressed complaints about megapublishers now dominate the Hispanic literary 
field, with prospects for artistic innovation thereby subjugated to commercial interests. In 
Bolaño’s case, however, the gesture toward the avant garde proves much more difficult to 
read. The turn is highly ironic as it ultimately calls into question one of the defining goals of that 
modern tradition: the use of art or aesthetic experience to interrupt the organizing logic of 
bourgeois social order. Bolaño’s novel diagnoses a new situation in which aesthetic interruption 
appears to have been rendered ineffective, either because its experimentalism has become 
uncannily similar to the cultural logic of commodity production or because power is no longer 
as reliant as it once was on the ability of a ruling class to establish its ideas as universal or 
hegemonic. In an arguably post-hegemonic or post-ideologically world it is no longer certain 
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that the avant garde could produce the same explosive, revolutionary awakenings that were its 
object from the time of the Romantics through the Chilean neo-avant garde (Colectivo Acciones 
de Arte) of the 1970s and 80s. My reading of Bolaño’s posthumous novel is not simply 
apocalyptic, however, and I propose that his text retains a certain skepticism about the break 
with modernity that I have just described. Indeed, if matters were clear cut in this regard then 
we could rightly call attention to the way in which the novel in fact reproduces avant-garde 
rupturalism on another register while claiming that all rupturalist impetus has been exhausted. 
Alongside this skepticism about the continued viability of avant-garde generated aesthetic 
interruption, I locate in 2666 an effort to take seriously the question of literature precisely 
insofar as it presents something that may prove refractory to (and thereby potentially renders 
unstable) all ontological modes of inquiry based on the postulation of essence (ti esti: “what is 
it?”). In dialogue with reflections by Derrida on literature and the secret, and by Heidegger and 
Nancy on ontology, I propose that Bolaño’s exploration of the Free Trade Zone along the 
Mexico/US border gives shape to a new interrogation of the philosophical, ethical, and political 
question of world. Against standard accounts of globalization as homogenizing all differences 
and muting of the voice of history, I find in Bolaño’s meditations on the “hell” that is Ciudad 
Juárez an attempt to think the groundless ground that Heidegger calls world, and thereby to 
open up new ways of hearing the voice of history in our troubled times. 
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Tonalities of Literature in Post-Dictatorship Argentina: Mood and History in Post-Utopian Times 
 
 In a well-known formulation Fredric Jameson defines postmodernity as an epochal shift 
coinciding with the tendential colonization of the planet by transnational capital.11 The 
postmodern is what obtains when even those regions previously considered beyond the reach 
of commodification—nature and the unconscious—are now found to have been assimilated 
into the equivalential logic of exchange. By the same token, the old nature/culture dichotomy 
must be reexamined today to account for what Jameson describes as the “dilation of [the 
cultural] sphere, an immense and historically original acculturation of the Real” (Jameson 1991, 
x). Whereas nature used to embody the idea of a pure origin or pure difference in contrast to 
human artifice—an origin of which culture was the copy or emulation—that old opposition has 
now been destabilized through the deterritorializing drive of capital. Capitalism’s absorption of 
its putative outside through acculturation constitutes the late modern and cultural analogue of 
what Marx characterized as the technological subsumption of traditional social forms and 
practices into capitalist production. 
Jameson’s use of “acculturation” to describe the displacement of industry by culture as 
the driving logic of capitalist production and accumulation covers a wide range of social 
phenomena. For the purposes of this chapter salient examples can be found in the privatization 
of public spaces, industries and resources under neoliberalism, and in the capitalization of 
endangered natural environments in the entertainment industry together with adaptation of 
commodity production to the environmental movement (theme parks, ecotourism, Fair Trade). 
Similarly, localities are encouraged to cultivate unique geographical and cultural “identities” to 
attract flows of transnational capital. By the same token, political discourse in the age of mass 
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media is obliged to adapt to the technical capabilities and temporality of media coverage 
(telegenic demeanor, ability to generate and manage sound bites, news cycles, etc.). The 
growth of cable TV and Internet fosters the emergence of niche markets that enable consumers 
to choose their source of information about the world based on ideological compatibility. 
Whereas the media’s historical role in modern societies was to present the truth irrespective of 
its compatibility with power, that mandate is now subjugated to marketing concerns in a 
context where consumers are predisposed to prefer information sources that will confirm 
preexisting belief structures. In all of these examples, the line between civic and political life 
and the entertainment industry has become more blurry than ever.  
For Jameson one of the defining features of postmodernity is that time, a primary 
source of modern preoccupations and desires, is supplanted by space. Our world today is 
shaped by a prevailing deafness to history and by the waning of affects and intensities, most 
notably the aspirations associated with utopian social and political projects. We have lost our 
capacity to experience the present as part of a historical process whose direction remains to be 
determined; we no longer see the world we live in as a contingent configuration of structures, 
relations, and meanings that could at some point be susceptible to transformation. Like 
ideology for Althusser, Jamesonian globalization is a process without subject, which is to say 
that we experience it as something that “just happens,” and which is therefore pointless to 
oppose. By the same token, we no longer look to the future for the outline of a possible world 
whose reality we could have a hand in bringing into existence; the utopian imaginary has been 
consined to the dustbin of history along with planned economies. In the absence of any 
substantive challenge to the primacy of the market it is difficult to envision the future as 
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anything other than a timeless expanse in which the present extends itself ad infinitum.  
 The thought of newness, together with the aspirations and the uneasiness it evokes, 
was a formative component of 19th and 20th century modernity from Baudelaire through the 
1960s. Postmodernism in turn is synonymous with the sense that, for better or for worse, we 
have arrived at the end of history and its ideologically driven cycles of destruction and renewal. 
Newness may not have disappeared entirely from the world, but the capacity to experience or 
imagine it has been subsumed within the logical circuitry of commodity production and 
consumer demand, for which novelty is as important—if not more so—than utility. Consumer 
desire is the desire of the new. Within this reconfiguration of historical temporality as the time 
of commodity upgrading, newness acts as a simulacrum that promises contemporaneity while 
also shielding us from the fact that within the timeframe of Jamesonian postmodernity there 
can be nothing truly new under the sun. 
 These transformations pose substantial difficulties for critical thought, especially if we 
still hold to the view that one of thinking’s tasks is to grapple with the contingency of the 
present and of the prevailing logic of social organization. One of the consequences of the 
ascendancy of transnational capital and neoliberal privatization is that resistance to capital 
becomes difficult to imagine. The problem is not just that the old forms of opposing the 
unchecked expansion of capitalism—Marxian-inspired revolution, national populism or even 
the modern State—have been rendered obsolete or integrated into capitalism. In its relentless 
expansion, global capital has succeeded in divesting itself of any identifiable point of origin. Its 
expansive drive can no longer be attributed to the geopolitics of imperialism or the cultural 
dissemination of the American way of life, as was the case in Latin America from the time of 
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Sarmiento through the 1970s. Its impulses are now everywhere and thus it emanates from 
nowhere in particular. In sync with the exhaustive defeat of all political alternatives to free-
market capitalism, neoliberalism works to ensure that any conceivable alternative to the 
market could only come into view at the expense of its own legibility: as anachronism, naïveté 
or just plain madness. 
In Argentina the impact of this epochal reinscription is intensified by the ways in which 
histories of radical contestatory movements and political violence of the 1960s and 70s are 
erased or rewritten in the aftermath of the brutal military dictatorships of the 1970s and 80s. 
One of the emergent narratives during the transition to democracy is the “theory of the two 
devils” (teoría de los dos demonios). According to that account, a military takeover was the 
logical consequence of the misguided calculations of political radicalism of the 1970s. The 
repressive tactics employed by the junta were excessive and immoral, to be sure, but they were 
nonetheless a predictable response to the moral failures committed in the name of social 
transformation. While the extreme Left and far Right were engaged in fratricidal conflict in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, the majority of Argentines were innocent civilians who found 
themselves caught in the crossfire and forced to pay for the poor judgment and crimes 
committed by the two extremes. This narrative, prevalent in the discourse of the democratically 
elected government of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-89) as well as the influential 1984 ¡Nunca Más! 
Human Rights report produced by National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons 
(CONADEP), enacts a series of powerful erasures and rewritings. First, it supports a problematic 
moral and tactical equivalence between the armed guerilla movements, the far-right 
counterinsurgency and the military state, together with their respective forms of violence.12 
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Second, in focusing on political violence and disorder as the sufficient cause that explains 
dictatorship this narrative renders illegible the question of what interests might have supported 
and benefitted from the systematic illegal repression—much of which was directed against the 
Argentine labor movement during the mid-1970s—together with the deregulation of the 
Argentine banking system under the Minister of Economy José Martínez de Hoz following the 
1976 military takeover. This effacement of the question of economic interest and of who 
benefitted from the “national reorganization” undertaken under military rule, becomes even 
more complicated in the decades following the transition when it becomes possible to ask how 
social transformation of 1976-83 (“el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional”) might have 
contributed to paving the way for the full implementation of neoliberal reform under the 
presidency of Carlos Menem (1989-99). The third erasure at work in the “dos demonios” 
narrative resides in the ideology of innocence and neutrality, through which many in Argentina 
sought to rationalize and justify their inaction in the face of state terrorism—based on fear, 
indifference, or outright complicity with the repressors—is retroactively sanctioned as a moral 
virtue. The theory of the two devils is the late modern cognate of the fable of “primitive 
accumulation” through which, according to Marx, political economy produced an idealized 
account of the origins of modern capitalism. The ultimate moral of the interpretive fable of the 
warring devils is that any attempt to alter the fundamental coordinates of the capitalist system 
will inevitably provoke state repression in its primal, indiscriminate fury.13 
 Early experimentation with neoliberal economic theory in Chile and Argentina during 
1970s was fully interconnected with the routinization of state of emergency decrees whose 
ostensible purpose was to put an end to disorder stemming from political violence. The 
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complex and interrelated histories of political conflict and soico-economic transformation poses 
significant problems for sociologically-informed understandings of “transition.”14 During the 
1980s and 1990s democracy becomes synonymous with its neoliberal articulation as a 
transparent electoral process coupled with privatization and unfettered economic opportunity 
in the private sector. In many cases the democracy-market equivalency is bolstered by the 
specter of the return of the military should the prevailing order find itself threatened—either 
by contestatory politics or economic crisis. The myriad of potentially conflicting senses of 
“freedom” within the democratic tradition is effectively reduced to a strict homology between 
democracy and economic opportunity for capitalists under the hegemony of consensus.  
But does the new configuration of sensibility under the cultural logic of late capitalism 
and neoliberal-administered globalization truly differ from other moments in the history of 
ideological struggle for hegemony? Don’t all ideologies and hegemonic procedures involve 
some particular (a leader, an idea or a name) that is effectively able to minimize its contingency 
and particularity in order to pass itself off as the truth of the social, as a universal with which all 
parts can identify and in which each discovers its own freedom?15 Perhaps a key distinction 
between the cultural logic of late capitalism and the ideological formations proper to other 
historical contexts can be found in the specificity of erasures enacted in the time of 
postdictatorship. The retreat of ideological antagonism under heavy stigmatization together 
with the widely proclaimed end of history, coincide with the emergence of “Consensus” as the 
unassailable telos of all politics.16 Whatever parallels it may evoke with the history of hegemony 
politics “Consensus” is not just another name for the universal status claimed by all hegemons. 
For the ideology of consensus, the conception of politics as an open field of engagement and 
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contention in which the shared lexicon of the community is open to contestation, is closed off 
and replaced by an administrative rationale in which conflict and disagreement—the very 
possibility of democratic politics—are recoded as existential threats to the social order. The 
possibility of politics as such recedes behind the specters of anarchy and war. Consensus is the 
ideologeme of the end of ideology. 
 The double inscription that binds democracy with the free market serves as a powerful 
tool for ideological legitimation today. In Jameson’s analysis the modern principle of separation 
of spheres is eclipsed as culture expands beyond its own particularity to assert itself as the 
paradigmatic modality of commodity production as well as the driving force behind the 
incorporation of formerly residual zones into the capitalist global system. To the extent that 
consensus functions as the new hegemon of neoliberal postdictatorship the sociological 
concept of transition becomes fraught with an inconsistency that cannot easily be remedied. In 
principle transition ought to be synonymous with going across or over (trans-, transitio), with a 
passage from one order or era to another. But the terms under which Southern Cone 
transitions to democracy took place were carefully calculated to block any further possibility for 
transformation.  
 In Argentina most of the 1976-83 junta leaders were tried and convicted during the 
historic trials organized by the newly-elected President Raúl Alfonsín in 1985. In the wake of 
that legal watershed moment, however, the Alfonsín administration was weakened by ongoing 
battles with inflation, recession and monetary depreciation. In response to growing resentment 
and pressure from the military, including several barrack mutinies led by lower-ranking military 
officers, Alfonsín authored two laws intended to curtail future legal prosecutions: the 1986 Ley 
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de Punto Final [Full Stop Law], which imposed a time limit on legal proceedings; and the 1987 
Ley de Obediencia Debida [Law of Due Obedience], which assured that subordinates in the 
military ranks would not be tried for crimes for which they could reasonably claim to have been 
“following orders.”17 In May 1989, six months prior to the end of his term, record-levels of 
inflation and currency depreciation led Alfonsín to transfer power to his successor, Carlos 
Menem.  
 In pointing out how political weakness in the transitional regime curtailed the pursuit of 
legal redress for wrongs suffered under dictatorship, I do not wish to diminish the symbolic 
importance of the trials or ignore the fact that this moment would later provide the pretext for 
a new round of legal prosecutions under the Kirchner administration in the early 2000s. But for 
the purposes of this chapter it is important to note that for many Argentines during the mid- to 
late 1980s the symbolic importance of the trials had likely been overshadowed by pragmatic 
concessions to a still-strong and politically independent military. It would be fair to say that, in 
view of the patent institutional weakness of its new democratic government, the prevailing 
mood in Argentina was deeply pessimistic concerning the ability of any democratic regime to 
guarantee order, not to mention justice.18 Transition in Argentina coincides with the inscription 
of new principle that establishes free-market capitalism as the sine qua non for democracy and 
freedom while imposing ideological barriers against any serious reflection on the processes 
through which “Consensus” imposed itself in the first place. The transition thus paradoxically 
coincides with and reinforces the impossibility of any further trans-. 
 This chapter examines matters related to postmodernity, history, mood, and thought 
through a reading of the Argentine novelist Marcelo Cohen’s El oído absoluto (1989).19 Two 
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general lines of questioning inform my reading of the text. The first is an exploration of what 
Jameson’s theorization of “the cultural logic” of late capitalism has in common with Cohen’s 
literary reflections on Latin American post-dictatorship societies. Jameson notes that his 
analyses and conclusions are relevant for a specific cultural context, that of late 20th century 
North America, and that his findings are not necessarily generalizable. If “culture” could be 
shown to display a similarly universalizing tendency in the Southern Cone beginning in the 
1980s and 90s, would Jameson’s conceptual and analytical vocabulary offer a productive 
toolbox for reading post-dictatorship Southern Cone novels?   
 The controversial position famously staked out by Jameson just a few years before the 
publication of Cohen’s novel, of Latin American literature (or “Third World literature” in 
general) as governed by the paradigm of national allegory (Jameson 1986), arguably runs up 
against its expiration date during the time of neoliberal consensus, when national-popular 
sovereignty relinquishes its potency as political signifier and organizational principle for the 
social. Jameson’s claims about national allegory depend on the assertion of a fundamental 
distinction between “First” and “Third” world contexts: whereas in the developed world the 
public (politics) is now privatized (recoded as stories about inner life, psychology, etc.), in the 
periphery the private and the political have not yet been decisively separated. The Third World 
novel thus presents in overt, legible form what can only appear in coded form in the First 
World; the Third World lays bare the unconscious of the First World. By way of contrast, the 
time of Consensus would mark the definitive effacement of the First/Third distinction that 
sustains Jameson’s concept of national allegory. 
 All of this, however, should not lead us to conclude too hastily that the paradigm of 
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national allegory can simply be relegated to the dustbin of history. On my reading Cohen’s 
novel offers a new approach to allegory, one that could provide the basis for an interesting 
response to the way in which Jameson’s essay has been read—and frequently dismissed—by 
his critics, i.e., allegory as extended metaphor or as construction of a framework of signification 
in which personal circumstances reflect national (colonial or postcolonial) realities. Those 
schemata arguably have some explanatory power for earlier moments in Latin American literary 
history, but they are incapable of playing anything more than a residual role in post-
dictatorship literature. If the concept of national allegory has anything at all to say to El oído 
absoluto it would require us to listen for another sense in the term allegory, a sense first 
theorized by Walter Benjamin in the context of baroque literary responses to secularization.  
Allegory in that early modern context provides a name for a certain excess in literary language; 
it names a tendency for signification to miss its presumptive target, attesting thereby to the 
way in which classical forms of transcendence have been destabilized. The dystopian theme at 
work in Cohen’s novel provides a critical reassessment of late capitalist modernization in all of 
its deafening banality, but it also enacts a return to and rewriting of an earlier utopian history of 
Latin American modernization. In between these two contexts, El oído absoluto anticipates the 
impending epochal foreclosure of modernity together with the inability of a new order to take 
its place. In other words, it presents itself as an early diagnosis of interregnum in 
postdictatorship Southern Cone. 
The other line of questioning that I alluded to above looks at philosophical 
considerations of the interrelatedness of history, thought, mood and world. I begin with a short 
discussion of Heidegger’s reflections on mood, historicity, world and facticity in Being and Time 
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(1927) and later works, which together generate an evolving account of the reciprocal 
determination of being, thinking and feeling. The mutual implication of world and thinking in 
Heidegger is activated by the rise of particular moods or attunements. I am interested in how a 
shift in Heidegger’s thinking about mood, from the ahistorical Stimmung of Being and Time to 
the historicized Bestimmungen of later writings, could help to move critical debate about late 
modernity or postmodernity beyond the commonplace image of the postmodern as a time 
characterized either by uncritical jubilance, boundless despair, or by the waning of all affect and 
mood altogether. 
PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE AND THE DARKENING OF THE WORLD: THINKING, MOOD AND ATTUNEMENT 
 Ever since Archimedes, Western thought has held to the view that substantive 
transformation of the world must begin by postulating an external point from which the world 
could be grasped as totality. The possibility of thinking the world as totality presupposes 
thought’s capacity to posit for itself a locus external to the whole it seeks to grasp. This 
transcendent point has received various names in the history of Western thought: the One for 
the pre-Socratics, Nature in the Latin tradition, God in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the 
humanistic idea of Man, Enlightenment notions of progress and emancipation as well as the 
People and Revolution. To accept Jameson’s account of postmodernism as the subsumption of 
nature and the unconscious within commodity logic is to acknowledge the withdrawal of any 
possible outside from which the world could be grasped as a whole and/or transformed. 
 Martin Heidegger would seem to have anticipated this problem when he describes 
thought and action as always already situated within a prior, constitutively irretrievable 
understanding of being. There can be no thought and no action that is not already framed by a 
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network of significant relations, a framework of reference with and against which thought and 
action move. All thinking and action take place within a prior determination of how truth is 
disclosed and what is to be understood when we say that something is. As thinking and 
speaking beings we are “born” into a specific predetermination of “being,” of what truth in its 
disclosure must look like. This preontological structure is by no means simply imposed on us. 
Precomprehension only happens insofar as there is thought and action; it would make no 
sense, in Heidegger’s terms, to speak of animals as possessing precomprehension. While 
precomprehension must be posited as the a priori of thought and action, it takes effect only 
when we think and act in the world. To complicate things further, this a priori structure is itself 
inaccessible to knowledge; if we can ever catch glimpse of what conditions thought and action, 
it can only be through what Being and Time calls mood [Stimmung]. Stimmung is not just the 
specific emotional state of an individual. We come closer to capturing its sense when we speak 
of what is “in the air” at a given moment or when we distinguish between the respective 
generational “moods” of, say, the Roaring Twenties, the Great Depression and the 1980s in the 
US. In Being and Time, however, Stimmung is not analyzed as a mood that shifts from one 
moment to the next but instead names the factical tonality of human experience in general 
insofar as it is characterized by the temporality of “care” [Sorge]. The connection between 
precomprehension of being and mood is illustrated in Heidegger’s seminar on Hölderlin’s 
Germanium held in winter 1934-35:   
A world never allows itself to be opened and then stuck back together beginning 
from a multitude of perceived objects reassembled after the fact; rather it is that 
which in advance is most originally and inherently manifest, within which alone 
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such and such a thing may come to meet us. The world’s opening movement 
comes about in the fundamental mood [Grundstimmung]. The power to 
transport, integrate, and thus open, that a fundamental mood possesses is 
therefore a power to found, for it places Dasein upon its foundations facing its 
abysses. (Heidegger 1976, 140-41; as quoted in Haar 1992, 163)  
 Thinking cannot separate itself from the archaic precomprehension of being without 
which no understanding of beings would be possible. In concrete terms, there can be no 
understanding between Dasein and world, and no mutual understanding among interlocutors 
and no grasping of beings as beings, unless there is already axiomatic agreement on the status 
of certain fundamental terms such as the word is. That “we always already move about in an 
understanding of being” means that thinking, in asking about the being or essence of beings 
and things, can find no approach to its object that is not already compromised by a certain tilt 
of thought (Heidegger 1962, 25). By the same token, this a priori structure would seem to be 
irretrievable to analysis insofar as it conditions every attempt to ask questions about the nature 
of things. Thinking automatically reproduces the specific form of precomprehension from which 
it arises whenever and wherever it operates. Precomprehension is thus the shadowy un-
thought that silently accompanies and shapes thought and its representations at every turn, 
not unlike the way in which primary repression informs both unconscious and conscious 
processes in Freud. 
 Thinking can thus never hope to strip away the predetermination of being from which it 
emerges in order to gain access to the world “as it truly is.” What could better illustrate this 
point than the fact that the as such (“as it truly is”) is itself the product of a certain 
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precomprehension, one that understands truth according to a self-evident distinction between 
(deceptive) appearances and truth or essence. Thought presupposes and reproduces the 
precomprehension from which it arises. But this circularity need not lure us to the solipsistic 
conclusion that thought must give up on the question of truth or that thinking is restricted to 
reconfirming what it already knows. Whenever and wherever deliberation happens, thinking 
has already been exposed to what Being and Time terms the facticity of existence. Facticity, 
synonymous with “thrownness” [Geworfenheit], refers to existential finitude that both 
conditions Dasein’s being in the world as a being-with-others while also limiting Dasein’s 
capacity to master its own existence as subject.  
 While Heidegger insists that thinking has no access to the primordial determinations 
that silently shape the configuration of our experience of the world, Stimmung [mood, 
ambiance, climate, sentiment] names an experiential register in which we can gain a liminal 
awareness of the world in its facticity.20 Certain emotions can prompt us to pause and step back 
from our routinized, calculating ways of relating to the world. A privileged example in Being and 
Time occurs in the analysis of anxiety, a negative affect characteristically disassociated from any 
determinate object. Whereas fear and hatred are always fear and hatred of something specific, 
anxiety has no proper object; or rather, says Heidegger, its “object” is precisely the nothing, or 
the void around which the world as a network of significant relations is structured. With the 
onset of anxiety our everyday concerns and responsibilities, whose imperatives we ordinarily 
obey without question, are suddenly interrupted. With the onset of anxiety we lose our footing 
in the world and become acutely aware of the fragile contingency lurking beneath everything 
that we ordinarily accept as possessing the solidity of what is permanent and necessary. Michel 
40 
 
Haar’s account of how anxiety prepares an experience of facticity is illuminating: 
Mood does not think the totality, but rather makes it come about, emerge more 
originarily than representation, which proceeding by construction or 
assemblage, can only think after the fact. Mood makes thought possible as an 
event of being. When anxiety results in the negation of beings as a whole, the 
negation is not a thought in the sense of a representation, but rather an 
experience. Mood initiates into the very principle of thought as the experience of 
being, an experience which is that of a dispossession or a decentering of Dasein. 
By itself, thought is incapable of producing essential negation, that is, the 
principle of all negation, the Nothing. (Haar 153)  
 Anxiety as Heidegger understands it is not the subjective experience envisioned by 
existentialism. The extreme negativity of factical dispossession displaces the philosophical 
conception of subject that has been understood since Descartes as the source or origin of its 
own representations. As “essential negation” anxiety both bears witness to the negation of the 
domain of things and their demands, and it clears the way for an experience of the nothing, the 
structuring void that marks the absence of an arkhē or ground for being. As Haar clarifies in the 
passage just cited, mood differs from thinking in that it discloses as experience whereas 
thought traffics in the coin of representation. Mood does not think (represent) the world as 
totality but instead “makes it come about” as a totality of significant relations that in turn 
provides the framework within which thought and representation take place; and, to be clear, 
mood makes this totality come about insofar as it brings us to the verge of its collapse qua 
totality of meaning. Disclosure for Heidegger is not synonymous with production, which 
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presupposes a producer or subject. The experience of anxiety registers the “factical totality” of 
being, or the way in which being is given before thinking can assume a position of mastery 
(judgment, understanding) over it. Stimmung, Haar adds, “leads back to an already-there, to a 
past which was never present” (Song of the Earth, 14). Whereas the philosophical tradition 
from the Presocratics onward has tended to understand this radical anteriority as nature, one 
of the important contributions of Heidegger’s analysis of Stimmung is found in his assertion 
that the “step back” imposed by anxiety constitutes a potential point of departure for thinking, 
an opportunity for thought to project itself beyond the time and place in which it finds itself 
and toward the limits of the established coordinates that shape what can be said and thought 
at a given juncture in the history of being. With the onset of anxiety, the imperatives, truth 
claims and rhythm imposed by the structures of everyday life show signs of wavering. In 
bracketing off accustomed ways of looking at and ordering our world, anxiety imposes a step 
back away from our familiarized forms of interacting with the world. It clears the way for an 
experience of the world as enigma, as something anterior and irreducible to the sum of beings 
and objects apprehended by calculative, technoscientific reason.  
The suspension of everyday concerns and common sense that is prompted in anxiety 
may provide a first step in opening up a new path for thought. In order to see why, we must 
bear in mind that for Heidegger being is not a transcendental substrata for beings, nor is it 
synonymous with the permanence of presence in any form. In Heidegger’s thought being is to 
be thought as a finite conditioning of what is present; it names an always specific and 
contingent opening or mode of disclosure through which our world—along with the things and 
beings in it—becomes present and sensible. Being is not prior to the event of disclosure 
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through which a given epoch or people come to experience the world in a distinctive manner. 
What we could call, for lack of a better term, the “passive” sense of mood—mood as mark of 
the irretrievable anteriority of being—is thus already inscribed by a kind of “activity” or re-
mark: mood as participating in bringing forth a unique way of allowing beings to disclose 
themselves. Mood names the double affection through which being takes hold of thought and 
action while also remaining in need of human hands and voice in order to come into existence. 
Being and the historicity of thought, the historicity of modes of revealing, turn out to be 
inseparable. The effect or the mark participates in bringing about its own cause as projected, 
finite being. 
 Being is never quite where or what we think it is, precisely because it “is” the secret 
origin of thinking itself, the silent call to which thinking will have been a response.21 The 
experience of anteriority that comes to us through anxiety brings about a double awareness: 
that for thought there is no way into being as such, but neither is there any way out. Thinking 
cannot grasp what is both prior to and constitutive of its representations. It cannot think its 
own origin in the world, the call to which it is itself a response. But thinking is likewise unable to 
disown its debts and separate itself from the specific ways in which it is enjoined to wonder and 
ask question about things. We are always already within being even when we have turned away 
from it or forgotten it. This double awareness, which is also a double constraint, does not 
resolve the problem identified earlier concerning the inaccessibility of an Archimedean point 
for thought and action today. If anything it intensifies the problem by indicating that it is not 
simply the product of a particular historical moment.  
 Following the publication of Being and Time and beginning in the 1930s, Heidegger 
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turns his focus from anxiety to various specific moods that he regards as belonging to a given 
epoch in the history of being. While the structure of what he calls Bestimmung [attunement] is 
very similar to that of Stimmung or mood, and while the law of precomprehension of being 
remains in effect, the turn to Bestimmung facilitates a more far-reaching exploration of the 
historicity of the relation between thought and being—not according to the discipline of 
historiography but in relation to what Heidegger had come to view as the historial nature of 
being. All thought as such has been attuned [bestimmt] to its world in a specific way, prepared 
or tuned in by the “voice” [Stimme] of being itself. Certain dispositions or moods seem to 
belong characteristically to a given time and place and its specific way of experiencing being. 
Thus the quasi-ahistorical Stimmung of which Heidegger speaks in the 1920s becomes 
Bestimmung, the historial determination of an epochal tone, climate or appointment.22 For 
instance, speechless astonishment before the sheer fact of being was a fundamental 
characteristic of Greek thinking. Hyperbolic doubt—and its calculated conversion into 
certainty—in turn sets the prevailing tone for the modern rationalist tradition beginning with 
Descartes. Meanwhile, the link between wonder and questioning has all but disappeared from 
our modern, disenchanted world. As the epoch of metaphysics comes to a close with Hegel, 
Nietzsche and the rise of modern techno-scientific reason, terror attests to a new sense of 
unease arising with the retreat of old authoritative points of reference (God, the Monarch, even 
the humanist concept of Man). Alongside terror Heidegger also identifies a strange disposition 
that he calls the distress of the absence of distress: a flat, almost toneless mood corresponding 
to our turn away from the vacated site of transcendence and toward the nihilistic certainty that 
the human subject is the source of all truth in the world. As Haar puts it, “the true distress of 
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thought is not a localized, ephemeral aporia, but the collapse of established signposts, 
indetermination taking hold of being in its entirety” (153).  
 The shift from Stimmung to Bestimmung helps set the stage for a clarification in 
Heidegger’s thinking regarding the historicity of being. This shift can be located in the Beitrage 
Zur Philosophie (1936-38; translated into English as Enowning: Contributions to Philosophy 
[Heidegger 1999]) and is also evident in many of the collected essays published under the title 
The Question Concerning Technology (Heidegger 1977). As we have already seen, mood, 
thinking, world-disclosure and the historicity of being are profoundly interrelated themes in 
Heidegger’s thought. Mood brings us to experience a debt that representational thinking can 
never grasp sufficiently: the silent, radical anteriority of Dasein’s exposure to a world. 
Attunement, meanwhile, names the way in which perception and thought are configured by a 
given epoch and by the prevailing modes of disclosure that characterize it; at the same time, 
attunement also participates in constituting a given epoch and its modality of thinking and 
acting. The Greek experience of being is not only reflected in speechless astonishment; it is this 
wonder that prepares a specific way of asking questions about the world. Mood as hearing, as 
responding to the voice of being, is also attunement as first orientation toward being.   
 The tenor of thinking’s attunement is wont to fluctuate, not only from one epoch to 
another but within any given epoch itself. For example, in the modern epoch that is 
inaugurated with the Cartesian cogito, the introduction of radical skepticism is calculated to 
culminate dialectically in the certitude of techno-scientific truth. But the self-assuredness of 
scientific certainty does not define the modern era in univocal fashion. The self-confidence 
secured by rational scientific certainty is obliged to compete with the uncertainties that stem 
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from the retreat of old authoritative reference points. Self-certainty is confronted by an 
emergent feeling of terror that reflects a dawning awareness of crisis or failure within the 
project of modernity, a sense of unease that modernity with all its resources has proven 
incapable of dispelling.  
 A new danger shows itself in the ruins of metaphysical system-thinking, where technics 
finds itself virtually alone in the world today. We no longer have recourse to “God,” “Reason,” 
“Man” or any other transcendental point of reference that could check the advance of 
technology or mediate instrumentalist representations of the world that Heidegger calls Gestell 
[“enframing”]. Gestell discloses our world today as the order of “standing reserve” or a totality 
of objects available for consumption. The unchecked supremacy of technological ordering 
introduces a new species of intonation into the world today: a vague, nearly accent-less mood 
for which Heidegger reserves the paradoxical phrase “distress of lack of distress” (Heidegger 
1999, 75). Self-assured and unquestioning, this flattened-out tone attests to a world that has 
already been mapped and calculated in its entirety. This borderline tone is unable to open any 
new experience of the world as a step back from self-evident everydayness—as enigma, 
wonder, mystery, surprise. Because it has already disavowed the void, it also has no capacity to 
disrupt the self-evident necessity of what goes without saying. This distress-of-no-distress is 
always already mutating into its opposite: self-assured effervescence as the complete absence 
of distress. Analogous to what Jameson describes as the “exhilaration” that accompanies the 
cultural subsumption of the real, the “distress of lack of distress” is one mood among others 
and at the same time it anticipates the anaesthetization of mood as such.  
What could provide a better description of the affective climate of neoliberalism than 
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the tangled web of terror and distress-of-no-distress found in Heidegger? As Wendy Brown 
argues in a recent interview, critical understanding of neoliberalism should be wary of the 
standard association of postmodernism with critical and leftist despair. The entrenchment of 
neoliberal consensus cannot be explained by the idea that, with the retreat of traditional 
contestatory political imaginaries, utopianism has been replaced by despondency. Would that 
things were so easy. The pathos of despair is still too modern in its tonality. In its place, Brown 
proposes that neoliberalism should be understood in terms of a softer and more insidious 
underlying “quotidian nihilism” (Brown 2010, np). Quotidian nihilism takes root in a general 
sense of directionlessness and pointlessness that prevail in a world that has been thoroughly 
disenchanted and purged of any idealizable future. Neoliberalism in turn, argues Brown, wants 
to be understood as a kind of response to quotidian nihilism. Positioning itself against this 
radically de-idealized image of the world, neoliberalism offers a minimally compensatory 
message of practical and moral authority by telling us what to do, think and feel. According to 
neoliberalism we must now finally come around to the pragmatic position of seeing ourselves 
as specimens of human capital who need to “appreciate [and actualize our] own value by 
making proper choices and investing in proper things” (Brown, np). The advantage of Brown’s 
account over standard views of postmodernity as a simple emptying out of all affective capacity 
is that hers retains an ability to account for the proliferation of neoliberal consensus in terms of 
the minimal friction it is able to sustain in relation to globalized capital. Even as it presides over 
the entombment of modern utopian imaginaries, neoliberalism continues to draw interest on 
resistance to deterritorialization.  
 In this light it would seem worthwhile to look more closely at how tonality contributes 
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to Heidegger’s meditations on the historicity of thinking. For one, tone is easily misconstrued as 
the antithesis of content or meaning, as in the commonplace distinction between what one 
says and how one says it. According to that view, tone would be mere window dressing for the 
true concerns of thought, which reside in the domain of ideas. But as we know from 
experience, how a matter is voiced can be just as significant as the meaning of the words, if not 
more so. Tone is frequently the conduit through which circulates what has not been said, and 
tenor frequently indicates what is really at stake in a given statement or question. Heidegger’s 
emphasis on tone marks a departure from the hermeneutic tradition for which words are like 
vessels containing meanings that await interpretation. Tone certainly calls for interpretation 
too, but not because its significance lies hidden beneath the surface. If thinking owes a debt to 
tone that it cannot easily repay—because mood is prior to all accounting and all 
representation—is this not because its sense is to be found in the air rather than in the 
surface/depth dichotomy to which the hermeneutic tradition is bound? 
 Attunement for Heidegger designates an opening or receptivity to the anteriority of a 
call: the call of being in which being is immanent to the call itself. Whereas idealist traditions 
understand consciousness as self-affective, attunement provides a way to think thought (and 
action) as deriving from a site that precedes the distinction between self-conscious subject and 
object. By the same token, whereas philosophy often categorizes thought as an abstract, 
spiritual domain, consideration of attunement supports attention to material and corporeal 
registers—the throat, larynx and ear— that as corporeal supplements are irreducible to the 
abstractions of thought. No doubt the focus on voice and hearing also reflects Heidegger’s 
efforts to distance himself from the traditional privilege accorded to the visual in the 
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philosophical tradition, a privilege evident both in the etymological roots of the term theory 
and in the colloquial association of knowledge with sight.23  
 The turn from what to how, from content to tone, risks reintroducing erroneous 
assumptions about the conceptual stability of mood and tone. Tone and mood are not 
homogeneous entities (a tone or mood: astonishment, anxiety, etc.). On the contrary, tone as 
such is irreducibly multiple. Its multiplicity is evident both in Heidegger’s account, where 
epochal determination typically coincides with multiple Bestimmungen, and in the conceptual 
status of tone in music theory. Not unlike words in post-Saussurean linguistic theory, the sense 
of any given musical tone is determined not in a vacuum or in a one-to-one relation to an idea, 
image or meaning. Sense arises through the differential links that a particular intonation 
sustains with other, contiguous tones. As Peter Fenves (1993) observes, tone, which derives 
from the Greek tonos [chord], implies reverberation—for instance, the vibration of a string or a 
vocal cord, as well as indistinct noise or din (the Latin don and the German Ton). The 
phenomenon that is tone in fact destroys any possibility of a stable core of self-identity. Tone 
describes an occurrence that is always differing with respect to itself. In that light, no tone 
could remain in possession of its own sense. It first emerges phenomenally as differing, both 
within itself qua vibration and outside itself as variation on all other possible tones. 
 In the second part of this chapter I turn to Marcelo Cohen’s 1989 novel El oído absoluto, 
using these considerations of mood, thinking and history to illuminate Cohen’s reflections on 
the cultural, economic and political reorganization of Southern Cone societies in the time of 
post-dictatorship. Written during the author’s extended exile in Barcelona (1975-96), the novel 
registers the exhaustion of a long history of utopian imaginaries in Latin America. The demise of 
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the utopian tradition was initiated with the interruption of revolutionary projects of the 1960s 
and 70s under military dictatorship, and was then hastened by new forms of technological and 
economic globalization in the 1980s and 90s that culminated in neoliberal Consensus. While 
Cohen’s novel was published prior to the neoliberal reforms initiated under Menem it could be 
said to anticipate privatization in uncannily prescient fashion. Cohen’s novel allegorizes this 
transformation by portraying the formal subsumption of the utopian horizon of modernity 
within a new social configuration defined by the mediatization of the real. The utopian 
emancipatory promise now appears as its simulacrum: a theme park in which the social order is 
constituted through mediatic representation. In portraying the dystopian side of this 
postmodern simulacrum, Cohen’s novel also seeks to revitalize the prospects for narrative 
processes in a world where contestatory politics and struggle against liberal domination have 
been rendered anachronistic.  
 While Jameson’s theorization of postmodernity offers a helpful point of departure for 
reading the novel, especially when it comes to questions about how memories and wounds play 
a role in the formation of post-dictatorship topographies marked by the formal subsumption of 
the real (nature and the unconscious) within the cultural logic of transnational capitalism, it 
may be that we reach the limit of Jameson’s usefulness at those points where Cohen’s novel 
attests to a certain unease that arises in view of the instability of modern institutions in the 
time of post-dictatorship. These institutions include the modern state as mediator between the 
national and the global, the public sphere as domain of collective decision-making and 
representation, and the national popular as political signifier of emancipation in Latin America. 
Cohen’s novel, written in the years prior to neoliberal reform under Menem, provides an early 
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assessment of the profound transformation of Argentine society during post-dictatorship, 
anticipating how neoliberal privatization reforms will facilitate the retreat of the political and 
the creation of a technocratic order of administration. The void left in the wake of privatization 
is filled by a mediatic façade of neopopulism, which displays all the characteristic appearances 
of populism (the charismatic leader, the public spectacle, disdain for intellectual elites in favor 
of popular sentimentality, and so on) while divesting itself of any social and economic reformist 
intentions that might threaten neoliberal Consensus.  
 Before I turn to a detailed discussion of El oído absoluto, a brief excursus into Cohen’s 
published reflections on questions having to do with scientific and philosophical approaches to 
the relation between cognition and what we call reality will help to set the stage for my reading 
of Cohen’s novel. In a more recent collection of essays published under the title ¡Realmente 
fantástico! (2003), Cohen develops a sustained consideration of the relation between literature 
and the unmediated real that can shed additional light on the concerns of this chapter. An 
interesting tension is woven into that discussion. On one hand Cohen asserts that the 
distinction between what we call reality and mind has never been less certain. He bases this 
claim not on the insights found in post-structuralist literary theory and psychoanalysis but on 
Erwin Schröedinger’s contributions to quantum theory in physics (more on that shortly). On the 
other hand, our contemporary world presents new configurations of power and violence for 
which the conceptual framework of modern thought does not appear to be helpful in 
explaining. Thus the internal conflict within Cohen’s 2003 essay anthology: one of the key 
discoveries in twentieth century thought has to do with the fact that traditional distinctions 
between thinking and being, intellect and world, have turned out to be less clear and stable 
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than previously understood, while our global situation today exposes a new reality for which 
old forms of thought lack sufficient explanatory power. Let us look first at a claim by Cohen that 
would call into question the old philosophical view of the separation between thought and 
being:  
Recordemos un momento a Spinoza—dando un rodeo para evitar a Kant. El 
mundo se nos da todo de una vez, no uno existente y otro percibido. Es llamativo 
que muchos de los grandes físicos contemporáneos (Erwin Schrödinger entre 
otros) hayan insistido, bien en que la mente y la materia están hechas de los 
mismos elementos. Bien en que la sustancia última de todo lo que existe son 
elementos infinitivamente divisibles, al borde de lo insubstancial. (Cohen 2003, 
134) 
The second sentence is taken more or less verbatim from the third chapter of 
Schrödinger’s 1958 book Mind and Matter (Schrödinger 1992), designed as a popular 
presentation of the intricacies of quantum mechanics, in which the physicist calls into question 
the subject/object distinction on which traditional theories of causality are based: “the world is 
given to me only once, not one existing and one perceived” (Schrödinger 1992, 126).24 Ever 
since Plato the metaphysical tradition has conceived of the difference between thought and the 
external world as a distinction between representation and being. Our perceptions, intuitions 
and concepts may be near to or far from the truth, but they are never anything more than 
copies of an original that philosophy calls being. For Schrödinger, meanwhile, the distinction 
between thought and being is a product of the mind itself. To see why, let us recall that the 
concept of substance understood as substans/substare is analogous to the concept of subject 
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understood as subyectum, i.e., that which lies beneath appearances and logically precedes 
them as a cause precedes an effect. Since Aristotle substance has referred to the matter (hyle) 
that is presumed to exist prior to form. The Latin substantia (material, being, essence) in turn 
derives from substans and substare (to stand firm, to be under or to be present). Substance, in 
other words, belongs to a conceptual distinction between sensible form and the inert matter 
that receives this form. But if, as modern theoretical physics has proposed, what metaphysics 
calls substance should turn out to be composed of elements that occupy an intermediate state 
between the substantial and the insubstantial—such as the one-dimensional wriggly objects 
postulated by string theory as the basic building blocks of our universe—then not only must 
there be a point in the analysis of matter where the material/immaterial or matter/form 
dichotomy ceases to be valid, but the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible (or, 
more generally, the non-sensible) likewise becomes unstable. Thus Schrödinger’s thesis leads 
unavoidably to the following paradox: on one hand, the philosophical theme of the originary 
separation of thinking from being is nothing more than an illusion perpetrated by thought; on 
the other hand, thinking must therefore possess a capacity for illusion and self-deception that is 
not present in what we call the world outside of thought.  
 While Schrödinger’s phrase “the world is given to me only once” is meant to dispel the 
idea of two worlds—the real (unmediated) world and the (mediated) represented world of 
human perception and thought—Cohen’s translation brings us close to the discussion of anxiety 
and Stimmung in the early Heidegger. Heidegger, as we recall from the beginning of this 
chapter, asserts that “a world never allows itself to be opened and then stuck back together 
beginning from a multitude of perceived objects reassembled after the fact; rather it is that 
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which in advance is most originally and inherently manifest.” World disclosure as Heidegger 
understands it is something that happens all at once and in the manner of a sudden realization 
that, among the totality of beings and objects at hand, something more was also already there 
shaping our perception and understanding of the totality. 
 Cohen’s turn to Schrödinger’s popularized account of modern theoretical physics serves 
rhetorically to bolster and depolemicize the view that traditional conceptual distinctions 
between intellectual and material processes, the ideal and the real, the internal and the 
external, and so on, are not as clear cut as they once seemed—and that it is not just the 
nihilistic purveyors of postmodernist relativism who are saying so. The counterintuitive ideas 
presented by Schrödinger still have the potential to raise the hackles of self-appointed 
defenders of reason today. Consider the following excerpt taken from an article on string 
theory from the Science section of the New York Times in 2003: 
The suggestion that nature is ultimately composed of tiny strings has led to a 
revolution in our view of the universe. String theory has led theorists to the idea 
that space and time are illusions. Nature is like the three-dimensional image on a 
two-dimensional bank card, a hologram. Physicists hope that in the end string 
theory will help explain how this picture of multi-dimensional reality we call a 
universe is constructed. (Overbye 2004, np)  
 As Louis Menand wryly remarks—and as Jonathan Kandell’s obituary for Jacques 
Derrida, published in the same newspaper of record just a few months prior to the Overbye 
article, would seem to confirm—had this popularized discussion of the “illusory” nature of what 
we call time and space been written by a theoretical humanist instead of a science reporter 
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summarizing the current state of the field in theoretical physics, the New York Times would 
undoubtedly have had a field day in ridiculing the author, and would surely have capitalized on 
the opportunity to cast a new round of aspersions on the distressing state of affairs in 
Humanistic scholarship today (Menand 2005, 10).  
 In the same 2003 anthology Cohen also proposes that our contemporary world 
generates phenomena and tendencies for which the conceptual vocabulary and epistemological 
tools of modernity cannot easily account. While he does not go into detail, one could think of 
Carlo Galli’s account of global war as marking a crisis for the political geometry of modernity or 
of Etienne Balibar’s analysis of globalization as producer of newly differentiated spaces 
comprising “life zones”—where global capital creates new order and new opportunities for 
growth, prosperity—in contrast to “death zones,” where disorder reigns, atrocities go 
unsanctioned, and the debilitating effects of inequality and precarity proliferate unchecked. 
Such divisions can be found between hemispheres or within specific countries or even cities. 
The “death zones” discussed by Balibar are not simply cut off from global capital. The 
conditions that prevail there are generated by global capital; capitalist production is not absent 
but rather transformed, in Balibar’s words, into a production for the elimination of bare life 
(Balibar 2003, 128). One important question raised by Balibar in his discussion of “life zones” 
and “death zones” concerns the status of new forms of violence that are unleashed in the 
“death zones”:  what role, if any, does such violence play in the production and reproduction 
processes of globalization? Does destruction possess a “rational” or functional capacity vis-à-vis 
neoliberal administered accumulation? Or are the forms of violence found in the Rwandan 
genocide, Brazilian favelas, Argentine villas miserias and Ciudad Juárez to be understood simply 
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as “senseless” byproducts of the reconfiguration of global economies today?  
  The final, eponymous essay in Cohen’s ¡Realmente fantástico! raises similar questions 
about globalization and violence, which in turn generates tension in contrast to his dismantling 
of the division between thought and being. The passage in question is worth citing at length:  
Así es el hoy de buena parte del mundo: una excepcionalidad de la sinrazón, una 
forma descriptible pero indefinible: el fracaso de las categorías de la razón, los 
proyectos de dominio de lo real y las previsiones de las ideologías; la imaginación 
hecha tumor. Algo sólo accesible a la descripción paciente y detenida o del rodeo 
por la fantasía. Para siempre reacio a los esfuerzos del relato confiado en las 
tensiones dramáticas que se resuelven y los cabos atados, este salvajismo letal, 
suicida, y sin embargo vivo y autoorganizado, esta barbaridad inmanejable pero 
autogestionada como el cerebro de una especie nueva, desnuda de golpe las 
falsedades de las estéticas exotistas y el cuento maravilloso, del grotesco 
colorista, de la comedia negra de costumbres, y la inutilidad de las 
comprensibles poéticas de denuncia; pero también dice que la literatura 
prospectiva de nuestro siglo se ha vuelto inadecuada. Una vida sobrenatural 
para nosotros se gesta en esa vida que nos contiene. La forma que cobre en el 
futuro sólo podría vislumbrarse en escrituras turbulentas, de combinaciones 
arrítmicas y sosiegos amenazados. Invenciones humildes, que la habiten 
aceptando que a poco serán asimiladas y a la larga descartadas, cuando se 
alcance un nuevo equilibrio. Toda vida tiene la ocasión de procesar el mal con 
que ha nacido; pero librémonos de eslóganes como El futuro está aquí o Esto es 
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el futuro. El futuro empieza ahora, de nuevo, y es infinito. (Cohen 2003, 171)  
  “Una excepcionalidad de la sinrazón”: the state of exception, as Agamben and others 
have proclaimed, is rapidly becoming the norm in many parts of the world, generating a 
proliferation of seemingly irrational violence for which modernity’s juridical structures prove 
inadequate. By the same token, what Cohen calls “description” takes flight and leaves 
“definition”—or the conceptual work of the understanding and reason—behind. The problem is 
not simply that the violence of globalization is more extensive or extreme than violence 
associated with other epochs (though that may in fact be the case); nor is it simply that the 
(juridical, political, epistemological, artistic) resources available for mediation prove unable to 
“do justice” to these new forms of violence. Globalization and its attendant crises also attest to 
the exhaustion or failure of modern projects for dominating the real, foremost among which is 
the modern state form. The problem at issue here is at once social and political, epistemological 
and aesthetic. It cannot be one without being the others, because in the Kantian tradition the 
aesthetic experience (description) ought to lead eventually to a reaffirmation of sense 
(definition) and provide a bridge between the pure reason of conceptual thought and the 
practical reason of ethics and politics.  
 We thus encounter a seemingly unresolvable conflict here. On one hand, we are dealing 
with processes and phenomena of large-scale destruction (not only of traditional social forms 
but of entire populations that are reduced to the status of disposability) that can only strike the 
understanding as una sinrazón: as senseless, irrational and unjustifiable. On the other hand, 
Cohen tells us, this process shows clear signs of being self-organized and self-directed, like a 
pathological fantasy that has begun producing real effects in the world or like an alien organism 
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reproducing itself without limit in the world. The conflict is similar to the question raised by 
Balibar concerning the rationality or irrationality of globalization’s worst forms of violence. 
Balibar offers a potential response to the question: violence is irrational in economic terms 
insofar as it destroys potential sources and producers of wealth; but it is rational (analyzable) 
when and where it constitutes a local response, albeit a pathological one, to the disorder 
produced by globalization, or where it provides new opportunities for development and 
accumulation, as in Naomi Klein’s notion of disaster capitalism. Cohen’s essay, meanwhile, 
leaves the contradiction intact, inviting the reader to take it up.  
 On what basis, then, does Cohen claim that traditional narrative forms are also unable 
to grasp what is at stake in the violence of globalization?25 How is that the Boom novel, to take 
one example, generated narrative strategies capable of offering a response to the violence 
associated with the national state and its modernizing projects but which would be 
constitutively incapable of registering or diagnosing what is at stake in the violence of 
globalization or global war? In fact all language proves inadequate when it comes to capturing 
or conveying the kinds of limit experiences of which Borges (the joy and terror of unmediated 
relation to the universal in “El Aleph”), García Márquez (the massacre of striking banana 
workers and subsequent repression and forgetting of the event in Cien años de soledad) and 
Cohen himself write. Indeed, it is precisely the misfit between narrative and the real—and the 
uncanny return of the real within narrative processes—that becomes the primary object of 
literary reflection in Borges and the Boom novelists. Cohen is of course well aware of this point, 
and the distinction he is making should be understood in terms of an emerging epistemological 
and ethical dissymmetry between literature as institution and interregnum. Just as globalization 
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and global war name for Galli a break with the conceptual vocabulary of modernity and 
describe (without defining, in Cohen’s terms) a new situation in relation to which our 
conceptual vocabulary is incapable of generating understanding or offering a solution (dominio 
sobre lo real), Cohen is proposing that modern conceptualizations of literature as a privileged 
vehicle for producing knowledge of the other as well as self-betterment are now incapable of 
accounting for the forms of violence and other “morbid symptoms” that manifest in our world 
today, in excess of the restraining capabilities of the modern state and its accompanying 
concept of sovereignty. In place of the privileged forms of literary modernity, Cohen suggests 
that the only literary approaches adequate to the task of engaging with the problem of 
interregnum are turbulent narrative discourses comprised of “arrhythmic combinations” and 
“threatened calm.” The key point is that all narrative practices today must come to terms with 
their own mortality, their inevitable assimilation by the market and conversion into brand 
names. As Roberto Bolaño puts it in Nocturno de Chile, “la rutina matiza todo horror” (Bolaño 
2000, 142).  
 While I do not wish to conflate what Cohen has to say about the crisis of sovereignty in 
his 2003 essay with a novel written more than a decade earlier, the seismic shifts experienced 
in the Southern Cone during the first years of post-dictatorship—of globalization mediated by 
rapid advancements in digital technology and a growing mass media industry, together with 
their clear impact on lived experience and the public sphere—were, as a 1993 essay by Beatriz 
Sarlo confirms, already producing the first disorienting effects of interregnum in the late 1980s. 
In that light, it may be possible to read El oído absoluto as generating what might be termed, 
following Enrico Mario Santí, a prophetic analysis of its world. In Cohen’s novel it is the recourse 
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to science fiction that serves to diagnoses the invisible or subterranean historical forces that are 
in the process of reshaping sensibilities—or ways of thinking, feeling and experiencing—
together with social relations. The 1989 novel detects what the 2003 essay anthology is now in 
a position to diagnose: the emergence of a world which the aesthetic and political conceptual 
vocabularies of modernity no longer possess the explanatory power they once wielded, and in 
which the organizing structures of modernity have been dismantled or weakened to such a 
degree that it is no longer easy to distinguish between order and disorder, between war and 
peace, between criminality and legality, between the smooth functioning of the system and 
dysfunction, and so on. With that in mind, let us turn now briefly to Sarlo’s essay before moving 
on to El oído absoluto.  
 In her essay “Aesthetics and Post-politics: From Fujimori to the Gulf War” Sarlo 
discusses the growing sway of mass media throughout Latin America during the 1980s. She 
reads El oído absoluto as a prescient diagnosis of the ways in which mass media accelerates the 
transformation of the horizons for political activity in post-dictatorship societies. In particular 
she sees the rise to dominance of television over print media as facilitating the replacement, 
during the first decade of postdictatorship, of a political tradition grounded in the public sphere 
(debates, demonstrations, etc.) with a new order. 26 In this new order the public sphere has 
been reduced to a domain of simulacra dominated by sound bites delivered by charismatic 
neopopulist leaders like Menem and Fujimori, while substantive decisions are entrusted to 
technocratic specialists working behind the scenes. The Enlightenment idealization of the active 
citizen who participates in shared deliberations and decision making processes is thereby 
supplanted in mediatized society by the passive television spectator who participates only in a 
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simulacrum of politics that is indistinguishable from the entertainment industry and the logic of 
consumption in which one’s decision-making horizon is reduced to a choice between TV 
channels or brands on the supermarket shelf.  
 At the same time Sarlo also takes issue with “anti-foundationalist” critical-theoretical 
traditions whose approaches she views as out of tune with the urgent concerns faced by many 
in Latin America today. What is needed, in Sarlo’s view, is not more skeptical interrogation of 
first principles but instead a return to the kind of foundations provided by the humanistic 
tradition, which in her view provide the only sustainable buttress against the corrosive nihilism 
of the market. A return to humanistic values, perhaps most notably those of aesthetic 
experience, is the only hope for combating the frenetic replacement of signs with simulacra and 
the conversion of active citizens into passive consumers.  
 One potential problem with Sarlo’s call for a return to the cultural and aesthetic values 
of the humanist tradition is that her position presupposes a clear and stable distinction 
between works that foster critical reflection versus works that are devoid of critical potential. 
Such normative distinctions, while problematic in and of themselves, can say nothing about a 
different prospect: that the difference itself between works possessing critical potential and 
those devoid of it may have been rendered inoperative by our current situation, in which 
culture has become the paradigmatic form of capitalist production. Assuming one could ever 
draw a meaningful and stable distinction between those works that possess a certain aesthetic 
quality and those that do not, it is difficult to see how such a distinction could address the fact 
that production in the time of late capitalism is now organized precisely around the kinds of 
critical tools whose development has been associated with aesthetic experience since Schiller. 
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 The distinction between bad and good value, between valuation by the market and 
critical evaluation conducted by intellectuals and artists, is in the end a false choice. Whether it 
derives from aesthetic experience or critical thought, cultural value cannot provide an antidote 
to the forces of commodification because as value forms they share the same origin as the 
system they claim to be combating. Both are grounded in the predication of a subject that is 
understood as source and foundation for production and/or for judgment. Both, by the same 
token, remain deaf to whatever might escape the onto-theological determination of essence or 
being through the question ti esti [“What is it?”]. In making a determination about the essence 
of literature and critical thought as “value,” Sarlo abandons any thought of a literary experience 
that does not originate in a reflective, productive subject.  
 Cohen’s novel, by contrast, invites us to consider how values-thinking engages in a 
cover-up. The presupposition behind Sarlo’s position—that the ability to distinguish between 
good and bad value forms is a necessary prerequisite for politics and civic life—effectively 
blocks any exploration into the possibility that both literature and ethical and political life may 
in fact take place in the absence of any first principle or arkhé, or in other words that the 
absence of arkhé might indeed constitute a condition of possibility for political action, ethical 
responsibility and aesthetic experience. In El oído absoluto it is the experience of unease 
alluded to above, together with the trope of falling—with the accompanying implication of a 
ground fraught with fissures—that indicate where Cohen’s text would part ways with Sarlo’s 
culturalism. Mood and the figure of the misstep—the trope of tripping—together open up a 
space for an other thinking that would interrogate the limits of the two dominant forms of 
thought today: the representative logic of the state and the equivalential logic of market. This 
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other thinking would begin with the recognition that both of these logics are governed by a 
nihilistic core that they seek to evade through appeals to value. Unlike Sarlo, this other thinking 
would not go so far as to define itself as the overcoming of nihilism. Not only would that be 
asking too much of thought today, it may well provide a formula for nihilism’s further 
entrenchment—if one accepts the Heideggerian premise that the modern subject in all of its 
manifestations belongs entirely to the phenomenon that Nietzsche calls European nihilism and 
therefore that the subject can offer no traction against nihilism’s advance. What this other 
thinking could offer, it seems, would be a new way of looking at the question of ground today. 
Whereas the philosophical tradition has always held to the necessity of a ground for thinking 
and acting in the world (and Sarlo’s return to aesthetic value is one manifestation of that view), 
Cohen’s novel proposes a thought of being in juxtaposition to the nothing. The nothing, which 
is not synonymous with nihilism, would comprise the other side of being, which is to say that 
being is already there in the abyssal non-ground of the nothing. In what follows I further 
develop this rough outline through a reading of the novel.  
 The setting of El oído absoluto is Lorelei, a fictive city with a literary name situated 
somewhere in Latin America.27 Cohen’s portrait of the city of Lorelei resonates with a long 
history of utopian thinking about modernization in Latin America. Lorelei was founded by a 
charismatic Costa Rican crooner named Fulvio Silvio Campomanes, whom the narrator refers to 
as “nuestro Moises tecnológico.”28 True to the utopian tradition, Lorelei’s exact location is a 
closely guarded secret. In a world beset by a plague of insecurity brought about by inequality, 
bellicose conflict and natural disasters, Lorelei offers the promise of an earthly paradise in 
which violence, domination and suffering have been eliminated and replaced by harmony and 
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happiness. For most of the world Lorelei is an idealized destination to which every citizen 
enjoys the right to visit once in his or her life. For a small minority, however, it serves as a 
reeducation center for disciplining non-conformists who have been classified under the sinister 
heading of indefinición social. It is their histories of antisocial behavior that have brought the 
novel’s protagonists, Lino and Clarisa, along with their circle of friends to Lorelei, based on 
pasts that are never fully explained but alluded to through occasional references to mood 
disorders, drug use, sexual promiscuity, and political dissidence.  
 Over the course of the novel Lorelei takes shape as a place devoid of history, in which 
nature has been transformed into a totality of commodities. It is a post-historical world that has 
been technologically produced in its entirety and where nearly all aspects of life are 
administered biopolitically by the city council: from the periodic autobiographical reports 
required of its inhabitants to the popular bracelets that detect and announce the wearer’s 
mood so as to moderate non-productive affective states. By the same token Lorelei provides a 
setting for a time dominated by the image. While Campomanes’s neopopulist kitsch embodies 
one aspect of this regime of the image, the city’s mediatic self-presentation displays another 
important feature. Through the resources of an always active media machine, Lorelei projects 
itself—to the world, no doubt, but just as importantly to itself and its residents—as an idyllic 
island surrounded by a world eternally at war with itself. It presents itself as a post-political 
space that enjoys immunity from the all-too-apparent politics of the surrounding world, whose 
invasions, civil wars and natural disasters are reported endlessly by the Lorelei media networks. 
A giant laser apparatus, the Columna Fraterna, remains busy reinscribing the firmament (once 
seen as register of the transcendent or permanent beyond) with an endless stream of news 
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stories that serve to juxtapose the harmonic order of the city in contrast to the disorder and 
antagonism that reign outside Lorelei. This late modern utopian self-projection is a continuation 
of the Hegelian philosophy of history, for which development [Entwicklung] comprises the 
teleological structure of all history from the infancy of the human race to the emergence of the 
modern State as testament and tutor of the modern subject in its emergent self-consciousness. 
In Lorelei this Hegelian narrative appears to reach its completion in a contemporary image that 
might be found in Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man: utopia signifies the 
horizonal structure of a world beyond ideological conflict that has freed itself from a long 
history of flawed mediations by the state into the affairs of individuals. Lorelei as utopia rests 
on the liberal association of freedom with the absence of interference. By the same token, it is 
the promise of the market as putting an end to the long history of dependency and 
underdevelopment that has plagued Latin America since colonial times.  
 The media stream produced by the Columna fraterna is a simulated production process 
that serves to instill in the residents of Lorelei a sense of being fully contemporary with the 
surrounding world, as well as being up to date on the ever-efficient administration of the city, 
while also safe from the unending wars that rage outside the city walls. The mediatic 
production of space in Lorelei takes on a Hobbesian tenor: the outside is seen by the inside as a 
savage domain troubled by natural disasters, war and insecurity, which in turn sustains a 
competing but complementary image of the inside as proper, secure space that is at one with 
itself. The unchanging climate of Lorelei is dedicated to the ceaseless reproduction of 
sameness, of technologically administered self-certainty and order as the self-evident ends of 
all human activity. At the same time, this mediatic inscription process obscures from view the 
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fact that, in a world that has been entirely produced, the outside is no longer conceivable as 
anything but the specular reflection of the inside. Politics has not vanished from Lorelei, 
however; it has simply been reformulated as a biopolitical program for which life stories, moods 
and states of mind have become new terrain for the expansion of power. The end of history in 
Cohen’s novel thus comes into view as a theme park populated by simulacra and administered 
biopolitically through the standardization of social conduct, desires and drives. 
 Meanwhile the sinister side of utopia, or the revelation of utopia as dystopia, is 
displayed in more ways than one and through a range of intonations. For one, it is disclosed in 
the relentless production of images, both in the unending stream of “breaking news” inscribed 
by the Columna fraternal and in Campomanes’s saccharine, crooner-like renditions of 
charismatic populism. The sinister is also manifest in the suppression of any activity perceived 
as a threat to the vast mirror of harmony and consensus that prevails in Lorelei. While the 
mediatic apparatus ensures that the (external) threat of disorder is never far from the minds of 
Lorelei’s guests and inhabitants, it is the prospect of the internal enemy that sets the city 
council and its repressive apparatuses in motion. An element of soft discipline is illustrated in 
the pulseras anticóleras [literally, “anti-anger bracelets”]: trendy, mass-marketed bracelets that 
train their wearers to block out undesirable moods by emitting an unpleasant, high-pitched 
whine whenever a certain level of agitation is surpassed. Later in the novel we find the return 
of the repressive state apparatus following Campomanes’s unexplained disappearance and 
amidst rumors of a conspiracy by his assistants; in the process it becomes increasingly difficult 
to discern what is real and what imaginary or the product of paranoia. But in Lorelei the mere 
fact that one is paranoid does not necessarily mean they aren’t out to get one.29 Harder forms 
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of discipline and repression are displayed in the relentless surveillance to which Lorelei’s 
involuntary residents are subjected and in the “Dirty War” style repressive tactics that ensue 
following the assassination of Campomanes and the state of emergency decree issued by the 
junta that replaces him. The blurring of boundaries between reason and paranoia, truth and 
illusion is amplified by the occasional irruption of the old “lexicon of terror” in otherwise 
innocuous contexts.30 For example, the phrase “darse máquina” (Cohen 1989, 50), formerly a 
metonym for torture, is used in Cohen’s novel to convey something far more banal, 
synonymous with “to worry.” The association of certain moods that according to social norms 
ought to be repressed (anxiety, etc.) with torture is neither purely allegorical—negative affect 
or its suppression is not being compared to torture—but nor is it simply arbitrary. What this 
recycling of the trope illuminates is not historical continuity but displacement: the context of 
the 1970s, of political radicalism and the repressive state, is substituted by the private concern 
of mood swings in a time when the available spaces for contestatory politics have all but 
vanished.  
 Alongside this parody of celebratory accounts of free market capitalism, Cohen’s novel 
offers a deeper insight into Latin American modernity. As I indicated earlier, a critical vantage 
point concerning the history of development is brought into focus through an interruption of 
the traditional association of allegory with the nation and its history. In the old schema the life 
stories and interactions between individual characters served as mirrors for the nation and its 
histories. The private was publicized, as Jameson puts it (Jameson 1986, 69), in the sense that 
there could be no literary exploration of inner life that was not already mediated by the history 
of social conflict and of political attempts to organize those relations in colonial and 
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postcolonial contexts. Jameson’s claim has the Latin American novel grounded in the structure 
of allegorical reference up until and including the “Boom” novel, in which the past is defined as 
national history and the future is mediated by the nation qua promissory structure. Past and 
future, as seen through the nation, provide explanatory points of reference and temporalizing 
images for narrative processes, no matter how personal they may have seemed. For El oído 
absolute the allegorical frame of reference may still be there, but whereas allegory formerly 
provided a temporalizing image that would unify past, present and future under a single sign, in 
Cohen’s novel allegory opens onto a void of signification. Although  the lived experience of the 
personal and private domains are still mediated by power relations, any attempt to read the 
novel as allegory must confront the fact that what used to be called the public has now been 
subsumed within the logic of commodity production and consumption, while the personal 
registers—moods, affect, “mental health”—have become a primary interface for the expansion 
and intensification of biopolitical power and its hold on life.  
 The first part of El oído absoluto offers glimpses into the daily routines of Lino and 
Clarisa—both of whom have been sent to Lorelei as involuntary participants in its “reeducation” 
program—interspersed with commentaries on their feelings of unease vis-à-vis the governing 
apparatus of Lorelei. The story is narrated by Lino, and El oído absoluto may well represent the 
novel he claims to be in the process of writing. The lives of these two protagonists are 
complicated by the unexpected arrival of Clarisa’s idiosyncratic father, Lotario, from whom she 
has been estranged ever since he left her mother when Clarisa was a child. A major portion of 
the novel is devoted to Lotario’s recollections as he divulges key aspects of his past, including 
his escape from Eastern Europe as a young man just before the start of WWII (the remainder of 
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his family would die in Nazi concentration camps) and his passionate youthful affair with a 
stage actress, Eugenia, while living as a refugee in Portugal during the early years of the war, up 
until he emigrated to Argentina. When the young Lotario (who then went by the name León) 
finally succeeded in procuring two much-sought safe passages out of WWII Europe, Eugenia 
surprisingly declined his invitation to join him. After he had established himself in Argentina, 
married and had a child (Clarisa), Lotario learned belatedly from a mutual friend that Eugenia 
had committed suicide shortly after the end of the war. Some two decades later, meanwhile, 
the tranquility of Lotario’s family was interrupted by the appearance of a ghost: one day a 
woman arrived claiming to be Eugenia; not only did she bear a striking physical resemblance to 
his old lover, she was also familiar with details of his past that he had only revealed to her. The 
“ghost” turns out to be Eugenia’s sister, Margarita, in whom Eugenia had confided everything 
having to do with León, and who in the process found herself falling in love with a man she only 
knew through her sister’s recounting of the stories told to her by León.31  
 Lotario’s autobiographical narrative offers an array of important considerations for 
Cohen’s literary concerns. One has to do with memory as both ground and supplementary limit 
for subjectivity. Lotario/León’s recollections of his own history are supplemented by Eugenia in 
at least two ways. During their time together, Eugenia’s presence stimulates León to remember 
and share aspects of his past in Eastern Europe before the war. In the wake of those 
conversations Eugenia begins to serve as a kind of prosthetic memory for León, an archive of 
recollections from his past that he himself represses just as quickly as he recounts them to 
her.32 She becomes both his memory archive and the symbolic guardian of all that he had lost 
through displacement, destruction, genocide and forgetting.  
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Other important thematic connections that emerge from Lotario’s narrative include: 
love, betrayal, and deception (“Toda traición es un a priori,” writes Lino, “un suplemento al 
hecho de nacer y al ámbito del destino” [285]); the uncertain relation between perception and 
the real (in her farewell letter to León, Eugenia asserted that “percibir un objeto cuesta la 
exacta pérdida del objeto” [206])33; and acting as mode of truth disclosure (“Eugenia hacía 
todos los papeles, a los murmullos de la madrugada se los tragaba el calor y en la ventana se 
dibujaba el escenario que ella había elegido…Pero ojo, no estoy diciendo que yo me lo 
imaginara, al escenario. Digo que aparecía ahí…Tangible, ¿eh?” [193]; “lo que me permitía ver 
las historias en la ventana era el amor y no la persuasión de la actriz” [194]; “una muchacha que 
dibujaba el mundo en una ventana” [218]). After recounting how he momentarily fell for 
Margarita’s ruse, Lotario follows with an assertion posing the question of whether her action 
should be understood as deception or apparition: “para que un fantasma existe basta que 
alguien lo vea y sea capaz de describirlo, de compararlo con otra cosa, de darle 
una…configuración” (218).  
Interspersed with Lotario’s recollections we read of an emerging drama in Lorelei 
concerning the unexplained disappearance of Campomanes, the city’s ever-visible and ebullient 
neo-populist leader. When he uncharacteristically fails to make a single public appearance over 
the course of several days, rumors begin to circulate that he is suffering from an illness or has 
succumbed to some unknown cause. Finally it is revealed that he has been assassinated by his 
own council, whose members then come together to constitute the ruling junta of a new 
dictatorship. The final part of the novel is set in the time of another declared state of 
exception.34 In the midst of this uncertainty, Lotario leaves town in the middle of the night 
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without so much as an explanation. By all appearances his departure repeats his earlier flight 
from and abandonment of Clarisa.  
 Cohen’s literary treatment of the utopian tradition comprises a parody of triumphalist 
accounts of free-market capitalism and neoliberal reform as antidotes to Latin America’s long 
history of inequality, political violence and tyranny. Neoliberal utopia, Cohen’s novel suggests, 
is at best a world that has been entirely produced and more probably the promotion of new, 
potentially more insidious forms of domination. Within this parody the novel also registers the 
retreat of the utopian imaginary from the landscape of post-dictatorship Latin America. The 
traces of this withdrawal are embodied in Lino and Clarisa’s friend Tristán, whose involuntary 
stay in Lorelei is attributed to his former political activity and who, following the declared state 
of emergency, seeks—albeit unsuccessfully—to foment an uprising among the city’s underclass 
of socialmente indefinidos.  
 In Postmodernism Jameson describes the present conjuncture of globalization and post-
industrial or cultural capitalism as a time in which our attunement to history is replaced by a 
certain tonelessness. The historical specificity of the present is defined by an inability to 
experience its own rootedness in history. We have lost the ability to conceive of history as a 
contingent process open to transformation, and we have come to experience history not as 
process without subject (Althusser) but as a set of teleolgically programmed developmental 
stages that culminates in the neoliberal present. By the same token we have lost sight of the 
reciprocal relation implicating praxis with history. History does not “just happen”; it is the 
consequence of human practices. As individuals, however, we are not free to choose among an 
unlimited range of historical projects, because we are shaped a priori—in what we can do, think 
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and imagine—by the moment into which we are born. Cohen’s novel provides a register of the 
history of the present (mapping how the experiences of dictatorship shape and continue to 
resonate in the transformation to neoliberal democracy) while also attempting to think what a 
revitalized relation to history might look like—or sound like. This literary reactivation of our 
attunement to history does not place the novel fully within the utopian tradition, but it does 
give evidence of a literary desire not to be for the present. Cohen’s narrative seeks a step back 
that would situate its own meter out of sync with the tempo according to which neoliberal 
Consensus and late capitalist production reinforce one another. Critical focus on historicity and 
mood or attunement in the novel must therefore be augmented by attention to the trope of 
falling out of step with the prevailing cadence of our time.  
 While critical commentaries by Sarlo and others have noted that Cohen’s novel adopts a 
critical view toward the cultural logic of postmodernity—the proliferation of consumer society, 
the role of mass media in desensitizing and anaesthetizing its public through overexposure, the 
rise of neopopulism as simulation of politics—criticism of El oído absoluto has yet to deal 
sufficiently with the fact that the novel is not satisfied with a standard critique of globalization 
either. The text more or less explicitly rejects a Sarloian project of rescuing modern 
conceptualizations of art and literature in order to use those traditions as a buttress against the 
deterritorializing forces of postmodernity. That culturalist dream came and went with Lotario.  
 
THE MOODS OF HISTORY 
 Cohen’s novel can be read as a collection of anecdotes, images and aphorisms providing 
points of departure for reflecting on various features of post-dictatorship society. Take, for 
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example, the dazzling theory of music proposed by Clarisa’s father. Lotario, who is something of 
an autodidact, asserts that music embodies a kind of prosthetic memory in which we find “la 
presencia de lo perdido” (292). For Lotario music provides a substitute for Eugenia, who herself 
embodied an external memory archive of his familial past and of the losses and displacements 
that both inform and disrupt his past. Why music? Unlike other arts, its medium is not a 
substance (metal, stone, paint and canvas, paper, etc.) but the invisible, impalpable play 
between sound and silence, vacillation and stillness, emergence and retreat. Unlike non-
performative arts, the occurrence of music coincides with its fading away; at the moment we 
first become aware of it, the musical event is already receding into oblivion. It is precisely in 
light of its ephemerality, ironically, that Lotario can assert that music sustains a quasi-atemporal 
existence in the minds of the aficionado. Music’s freedom from substance places it in the 
privileged position of being the mode of artistic production in which absence as such can 
become “present.” 
These ideas are explored in greater depth through Lotario’s musings about the acoustic 
dynamics of music, and about what in fact constitutes musicality in a particular arrangement of 
sound images. A distinguishing feature of modern Western music is the presence of chords, 
which Lotario likens to moods. A chord [acorde] is an aesthetic agreement [acorde] comprising 
three or more distinct notes heard simultaneously as if they were components of a single, 
complex intonation. A succession of chords, to the extent that the ear finds the series to be 
harmonious, generates what he calls an accord [acorde]: a musically harmonious totality that is 
greater than the sum of its parts. 
Creo que todos tenemos algo de la materia de la música. [...] El temperamento 
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mismo está hecho de acordes. Cada acorde es un estado de ánimo, y uno unido a 
otro...forman el carácter de una persona.... Pero un acorde...es un conjunto 
armónico de notas. Do menor es do más mi bemol más sol, y por eso no puede 
definirse con un solo adjetivo. Y a mí me parece que con los sentimientos pasa lo 
mismo. (134) 
 Each chord, again, represents the conjuncture of a multiplicity of singular notes that are 
articulated simultaneously and harmoniously. While the ear hears the chord as a single 
intonation each chord in fact contains a multiplicity of notes. The contribution that each note 
makes to intonation is determined differentially, not unlike the value of the signifier in 
Saussure’s structural linguistics. The sense of a given note—re, for instance—is established by 
the invisible and inaudible differences that locate it within a larger scale—in this example, 
between do and mi—while also distinguishing it from all other notes. The event that Lotario 
calls harmony cannot, then, be accounted for by any individual note nor can it be explained by 
a conjuncture of notes. The agreement or accord derives also from the inaudible differences, 
the gaps and silences that define the sense of each note without ever themselves becoming 
present or audible.  
“Realismo es que una obra...cambie con cada grupo que la interpreta, con cada persona 
que le escucha. Para mí es larga, para Fulano corta, para un violinista acelerada, otro la 
ralentiza...Siempre es la misma pieza, y siempre distinta...Y también mi vida es distinta ahora 
que ayer, aunque sea la misma vida (229).” Surprisingly Lotario asserts that music constitutes 
the only true realism. How so? Clearly he is not claiming that music is more adept than other 
forms of art at imitating or producing resemblances with the world outside of music. To be 
74 
 
sure, music imitates nothing. Perhaps Lotario’s judgment of music as the true realism derives 
from the idea that music has to do with presentation in its purest sense: presentation of the 
possibility of presentation itself.35 By the same token music provides a template for thinking the 
common origin of the sensible and the intelligible, being and thought. Any given performance 
of a musical piece will by definition differ from all other interpretations of the “same” work; to 
perform a piece, in contrast to a mere recital, is to interpret it. Moreover, the singular nature of 
musical performance attests to what we might call a tragic character of its presentation: while 
every musical act bears the stamp of uniqueness and wants to be heard as if for the first time—
i.e., there is no “Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony” as such, there are only the myriad of 
interpretations—the price any sound must pay for becoming audible is that it must resign itself 
to the loss of all singularity, and for several reasons: through the possibility of its technological 
duplication; through the acoustic law of its immediate dissipation; and because, in making itself 
recognizable to a listener as music it must adopt the established conventions of a given 
tradition (even if it also alters those conventions). The singular nature of musical performance is 
subject to something akin to what Jacques Derrida calls the law of iterability that inscribes 
repeatability at the origin (Derrida 1988). No event and no singularity without the possibility of 
being repeated and hence without the possibility of the death of the singular through 
duplication and routinization. In order to win the chance of a good hearing music must suspend 
all guarantees of fidelity to an original intention and deliver itself over not only to the possibility 
of repetition but also to the ear of the other—which just happens to be structured like an echo 
chamber. What Lotario calls realism is not about imitation or representation but about 
presentation understood as giving sensible form to the structuring and organization of 
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experience. 
 As we might surmise from the title of the novel, the physiology of the ear plays a central 
role in the aesthetic theory described by Lotario. In Spanish el oído refers to the inner ear—and, 
by extension, to musical sensibility—in contrast to la oreja as outer ear or auricle. Nonetheless 
the questions of hearing and attunement that are interwoven throughout Lotario’s long 
discourse on music clearly resonate with the anatomical structure of both inner ear and auricle. 
And what is an ear? For one, its structure provides both a conduit and a boundary between 
inside and outside, amplifying faint sounds while protecting the delicate, sensitive interior 
structure from sensory extremes. The physiological structure of the ear, with its helixes, folds, 
canals, anvil and tympanum, comprises an intermediate zone where outside and inside cannot 
be rigorously distinguished. If the eyes have been construed as the organ of domination 
through which intelligence masters the sensible, the ear—the only sensory organ that cannot 
fully close itself off—is a site where perception remains exposed to the world and to the other. 
The eponymous “absolute ear” (also known as perfect or absolute pitch in English) names an 
innate ability to detect the exact tone or key of a given sound. In Heideggerian terms an oído 
absoluto would name an immediate attunement to the voice of being.  
In describing his musical affinities Lotario confesses that he always wanted not just to 
possess such an inner ear but to be this “germen de la afinación universal” [germ of universal 
tuning or completion]. His wish coincides with a certain understanding of art that prevails 
throughout modernity. Lotario embodies an aesthetic imaginary for which art would fill in the 
gaps and heal the fissures that arise in our interactions with the real. Art apotropaically 
incorporates the terrifying void into its own mechanics—not unlike the physiological structure 
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of the ear—and it thereby provides a saving passage to solid ground. Aesthetic experience, as 
Lotario theorizes it, provides a space in which the rifts and wounds that accompany the 
organization of social life can be sutured and healed through symbolic production and aesthetic 
experience.  
 In thematizing this aesthetic ideology through Lotario’s discourse the novel also invites 
us to consider where such a foundation begins to display fissures today. The problem with 
Lotario’s take on music is not that its viewpoint is logically inconsistent or that it engages in self-
deception. A highly sophisticated aesthetic ideology, it is keenly aware that what it refers to as 
the completion of a system (afinación) is still inhabited by gaps, silences and excesses. It may be 
that the distance Cohen’s novel puts between itself and the aesthetic ideology it paraphrases 
through Lotario can be located in the distinction between how each discourse (Lotario’s music 
theory and the novel itself) understands its respective relation to its own limits. The aesthetic 
theory outlined by Lotario claims to interpret and regulate its gaps and surpluses through its 
own devices. Lotario understands silence and forgetting as integral moments in the production 
of rhythm and aesthetic harmony; harmony thereby names the system’s capacity to recover 
those gaps and excesses and to put them to work. His theory of music thus constitutes a total 
system from which nothing could escape. 
In counterpoint to Lotario’s account of aesthetic modernity Cohen’s novel advances a 
thought of writing as anti-foundational and anti-systemic practice. The proper task of writing, 
according to Lino—the ostensible author of the story we are reading—consists in seeking out 
disparate moments, moods and insights that precisely do not fit into the systematic production 
of harmonious totalities. The point is not to integrate those gaps and excesses into a system but 
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rather to allow them to occasion an irruption that would disrupt the rhythms through which 
accumulation and power legitimate themselves in our world. These instances of excess, misfit 
and disjuncture would thereby momentarily arrest or derail the self-production of such 
systems. As Lino puts it, “hay momentos, si uno los descubre, que son extraordinarias averías 
en la red eléctrica que nos alimenta, y en el desconcierto que acuñan se puede atisbar la 
anticuada audacia del vértigo” (11). The difference between the two aesthetic attitudes I am 
describing—those associated with Lotario and Lino respectively—can be found in a shift in 
tonality, in which afinación as “completion” gives way to afinación as the “attunement” 
conferred by desconcierto [disconcertedness, uncertainty].  
The important distinction here is not between tonalities but between different 
understandings of tone as such. The nominal desconcierto evokes disorder, confusion, discord, 
agitation—all of which could well be symptoms of the times in which Lino is living, indicative of 
the feeling that things are going badly with the world today but without necessarily knowing 
why or how one would begin to set things right. In desconcierto we can also hear the transitive 
verb desconcertar (to upset, to bewilder, to disconcert) and the reflexive verb desconcertarse 
(to dislocate; to suffer a breakdown, as in a mechanism that no longer functions), which might 
contain one of the names for the task of disruption that counter-foundational literature sets for 
itself. In the same vein, by breaking the term desconcierto down it may be that we find a 
response to the aesthetic ideology to which Lotario gives voice: des-concierto as the 
antifoundational reply to the gran concierto of Lotario’s dream of a total aesthetic system.  
 The “averías” passage cited above echoes a description found on the preceding page of 
a misstep and fall suffered by Lino as he is crossing a field with Clarisa:  
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Entre los mensajes en el cielo y esa música agraviante el tiempo se acalambró, 
agobiado por las perversas simetrías de Lorelei. Yo sentí tal furia que en una 
decisión impensada pero justa me caí de bruces. Al levantarme estaba 
enchastrado y Clarisa me llevaba cincuenta metros de ventaja; pero mientras 
echaba a correr pasó algo y supe que ciertas caídas, mejor las más torpes, son 
sutiles anuncios de regeneración. (10) 
Taken from the first pages of the novel, these two scenes set the stage for a literary 
response to the prevailing rhythm and temporality of life in Lorelei and, by extension, in post-
dictatorship Argentina. The possibility of uncovering an alternative to the prevailing social 
rationality of post-dictatorship resides in a pair of tropes designating something that finds itself 
out of step with a prevailing rhythm or flow: avería [breakdown or short circuit] and caída [fall; 
caerse de bruces: to fall flat on one’s face]. There is a critical temptation to conclude that this 
tropology of interruption and misstep can be deployed directly against the logic informing the 
organization of social relations and the appropriation and administration of time and labor 
under neoliberalism. Such a conclusion would reconfirm a modern understanding of literature 
and its capacity to intervene in the social: to affect social consciousness, and hence the 
possibility of politics, through aesthetic experience. Cohen’s novel would thereby provide a 
template for literary neo-avant garde responses to consumerism, mass media, privatization, the 
state of exception, and so on. But it seems to me that such a critical extension of credit would 
ultimately prove difficult to sustain as a reading of this novel, both because it would require us 
to forget what the text is also telling us about the aesthetic ideology that prevailed from Schiller 
to the Boom—which has now been fully absorbed within the logic of late capitalism—as well as 
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for reasons that could just as easily be derived from intuition as from empirical analysis: today 
there is no longer any good reason to suspect that interruption—of daily patterns, rhythms or 
sensibilities, for example—should by itself be capable of posing a challenge to global capital or 
to the neoliberal state and its repressive apparatus.  
 A more promising approach can be found, I propose, by turning once again to 
Heidegger’s thinking about Stimmung and Bestimmung. I want to argue that the tropology of 
the breakdown and the false step in Cohen’s novel present alternative possibilities in the 
interaction between thinking and its attunement to what Heidegger calls “the voice of being” 
[die Stimme des Seins] (Heidegger 1958, 89). Attunement for Heidegger names a radical 
anteriority that denies reason the possibility that it could constitute its own ground as the 
rationalist tradition would have it. Reason cannot constitute its own ground because any 
thinking worthy of the name—that is, any thinking that does more than simply apply logical 
rules in automatic fashion; or again, any thinking that asks about the nature of what is—is by 
definition already a response to something that precedes it, albeit without making itself known 
as this or that being. This something is not a thing or an essence but a call whose origin remains 
shrouded in darkness. Thinking, for Heidegger, is called forth as a response to and engagement 
with the enigmatic existence of a world. It is something like the structure of this relation 
between thinking and radical anteriority, which precedes any ontology, that is alluded to in the 
double trope of the misstep and the fall—in which Lino finds himself suddenly devoid of 
ground, having lost his footing on what previously seemed to be solid ground.  
 The motifs of interruption and loss of ground in El oído absoluto thus point to the 
relation between literature and thinking, and not literature and a social or political referent. 
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Not only do technics and capital jointly preside over the disenchantment of our modern world, 
they also unleash a powerful operation of reinscription that obscures and naturalizes the traces 
of their own machinations in the world. As Michel Haar puts it, the time of unrestrained 
technics marks the accomplishment of “the most radical and most ancient metaphysical 
project, namely disclosing an immutable presence lacking nothing and revealing the first and 
ultimate causes” (Haar 1993, 1). Disenchantment is always already re-enchantment through the 
projection of a self-evident certainty that goes without saying. Anti-foundational writing in El 
oído absoluto aims to expose the gaps covered over by this projected semblance of a 
harmonious whole that has rid itself of fissures, conflict and dissensus. The aim of such a 
literary project is not political in any ordinary sense of the term; rather, it is to initiate a pause 
and a step back that might in turn give rise to a new way of thinking. This anti-foundational 
writing would seek to renew the possibility of experiencing the world in its enigmatic 
emergence—an experience that remains incompatible with the technical and capitalist 
projection of a world in which nothing and no one would be excluded. 
 Some clarification is called for here about the status of “tone” in what I am describing as 
anti-foundational writing. First, tone can never be reduced to a symptom or reflection of the 
times in which we live. As noted earlier, tonality orients thinking and places it in a position to be 
able to ask fundamental questions; in this respect tone names the sense of thinking itself. The 
tonality of thought or writing is not a formal packaging of ideas; it is thought in its inseparability 
from sense. Second, the disjunctive moments I am discussing cannot be produced and 
orchestrated in a calculating manner by an author or a reader. Beyond all calculation, these 
moments of interruption or missteps take place—if and when they happen—through dynamic 
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processes of relation, exchange and movement. To speak of anti-foundational writing is 
potentially misleading, then, since the term risks creating a rigid conceptual opposition based 
on authorial agency, opposing the intentions of writers like Cohen to those of other writers. 
This is far from what I have in mind. My purpose is to describe a shift in literary experience 
stemming from a profound and sweeping reorganization of the coordinates for thinking and 
acting in the world today, a shift that compels us to call into question the very stability of the 
disciplinary object known as “literature.” Such transformations cannot be understood as the 
projected accomplishment of a specific writer or work.  
 As I hinted at in the earlier discussion of mood, and especially the peculiar late modern 
“distress of the absence of distress,” El oído absoluto attests to an experience of radical 
desublimation in the time of postdictatorship. Old libidinal investments and shared dreams—
revolution, social justice, and emancipation of the national popular, for instance—have been 
cut short by dictatorship and disarticulated through the social, economic and political 
reconfiguration of Southern Cone societies to meet the demands of global capital. Within the 
order of post-dictatorship the only sites readily available for new libidinal investment and 
sublimation appear to be simulacra, devoid of any contestatory political potential and which 
serve only to bolster neoliberal ideology through the image of a world from which nothing is 
absent. Tristán’s failed attempt at initiating popular insurrection following the assassination of 
the charismatic leader seems consistent with the diagnosis of a general desublimation of life in 
the time of postdictatorship, while Campomanes’s charismatic neopopulism illustrates how 
desublimation is in turn repackaged as charismatic neopopulism devoid of any political content.   
No reading of Cohen’s novel can avoid grappling with the questions of love and the 
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lovers, which includes Lino and Clarisa as well as the doublings found in the León/Lotario and 
Eugenia/Margarita pairs. In view of the prevailing desublimation I have been describing, what 
can be said of love in El oído absoluto? Does love survive the desublimating effects of the 
transitional stigmatization of radical politics and neoliberalism’s “quotidian nihilism”? Does it 
continue to provide the basis for any thought of community? Does it still name the being of 
community as asserted by both the Judeo-Christian (“God is love”) and the Latin American 
Marxian militant traditions? Let us consider for a moment Che Guevara’s quasi-messianic 
portrait of the “new man” that would emerge from the experience of the Cuban revolution as 
its vanguard subject in his essay on “El socialismo y el hombre en Cuba”:  
Déjeme decirle, a riesgo de parecer ridículo, que el revolucionario verdadero 
está guiado por grandes sentimientos de amor. Es imposible pensar en un 
revolucionario auténtico sin esta cualidad. Quizás sea uno de los grandes dramas 
del dirigente; éste debe unir a un espíritu apasionado una mente fría y tomar 
decisiones dolorosas sin que se contraiga un músculo. Nuestros revolucionarios 
de vanguardia tienen que idealizar ese amor a los pueblos, a las causas más 
sagradas y hacerlo único, indivisible. No pueden descender con su pequeña dosis 
de cariño cotidiano hacia los lugares donde el hombre común lo ejercita.” 
(Guevara 2003, 15)  
In Guevara’s theorization of militant subjectivity love forms the nexus for a series of 
contradictions.36 Militant subjectivity must know both how to incorporate and find a balance 
between passionate feeling and cold, detached calculation, both of which have their place and 
time for militancy. The militant must be capable of idealizing those in whose name it is selflessly 
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prepared to give its own life, regardless of how abject and dismal their conditions may be. 
Although it knows itself to occupy the forefront, the position of consciousness of objective 
conditions, in the struggle against imperialism the militant subject cannot allow its heart to feel 
that any kind of hierarchy separates the vanguard and the people. Love for the people cannot 
be dispensed like medicine, a little at a time and only when needed; it must become second 
nature and flow abundantly beyond the measures of calculative reason. But while absolute love 
must be the guiding principle of militant subjectivity, this subject must also be prepared to 
annihilate life in order to accomplish the objective goals of the revolutionary struggle. While 
love in “El socialismo y el hombre en Cuba” is the site where such internal contradictions take 
shape, the theory of militancy also turns to the vital, unifying force of love in order to disarm 
these contradictions and reconcile the antagonistic forces at work in them. Love, for Guevara’s 
theory of militancy, is the promise of reconciliation between passionate spontaneity and 
detached calculation, amity and enmity, creation and destruction, life and death. And it is in 
this sense that love constitutes the originary condition of possibility for community for the Latin 
American militant left.  
 Can the lovers and love still provide the principle for community in the time of post-
dictatorship? Or does Cohen’s novel indicate that the lovers embody features and tendencies 
that are irreducible to, if not indeed irreconcilable with, the communitarian imaginaries that 
were disrupted in the decades prior to the writing of El oído absoluto? Guevara’s account 
notwithstanding, wouldn’t love in fact be too rebellious, too fugitive and therefore 
inassimilable to the disciplinary demands of militant subjectivity or any community conceived in 
the light of plenitude, wholeness and communion?  
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 The case of Lotario/León helps to illustrate the ambiguities concerning love as a name—
perhaps the name—for being together or shared existence. As we have already seen, the 
relation between León and Eugenia takes the form of a radical supplementation prior to any 
subject. In their example the subject qua unity of self-presence is deferred and differed, its 
ideal identity ruined by the fact that the very process that ought to symbolize its unity—the 
reflection on and recounting of one’s past to the other, who in turn recognizes the identity of 
the “I” who speaks and the “I” who is spoken through remembrance—in fact coincides with the 
forgetting or expulsion of memory into a prosthetic structure. It is Eugenia’s hearing—and, as 
we learn later, her subsequent repeating—that sustains the possibility of subjectivity for León, 
and it is her “betrayals” that in turn mark its necessary limit.   
But would this repetition—and Lotario points out that Eugenia did in fact tell her sister 
everything—truly have been seen as a betrayal of confidence and intimacy? Lotario clarifies to 
Clarisa and Lino that he could only recount the stories about his past to Eugenia because of 
their shared love, which according to him presupposed a mutual understanding.  
Si se lo conté no fue para que nos entendiéramos sino porque nos entendíamos. 
En el amor el entendimiento está antes que cualquier otra cosa, en la cabeza y 
en las manos…Y en el corazón…Todo el resto se hace; es un proceso simple, 
posterior. El entendimiento es una sacudida, verse a uno mismo entero en 
alguien que está enfrente; pero no verse la cara sino la médula, lo decisivo, lo 
que no se rompe ni se gasta, lo que uno tiene de milagro. Entonces los amantes 
se muerden, se husmean, se amansan, se aprietan, siempre están con fiebre 
buscando en el otro eso que cada uno creyó ver…Y separarse les arruina el 
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alma…Porque nadie se resigna a que esté lejos ese nudo de su vida empotrado 
en otro cuerpo. (Cohen 1989, 197-98) 
In view of this singular and primordial pact of precomprehension, it is certainly plausible 
that Eugenia’s subsequent retelling of the stories to her sister would be considered—at least by 
León—a violation of the pact. But then again, as Lino later asserts in the context of Lotario’s 
sudden and unexplained departure, it may also be that betrayal shares an originary, 
supplementary relation to every event of creation, every act whereby some being comes into 
existence—including love: “toda traición es un a priori, un suplemento al hecho de nacer y al 
ámbito del destino, cuya sola amplitud de movimientos consiste en elegir un objeto” (285).  
  Does the shared being that is love then constitute a template for communion in which 
incompleteness and difference are supplanted and overcome in the unity of the couple? Does 
love illustrate a dialectical process of identity and difference in which being or subject 
appropriates its own becoming in order to realize its potential for being? Or does love attest to 
an originary condition of in-completion that nonetheless lacks nothing and would therefore not 
be completable in principle? Love, then, as the name for a condition of exposure to the world 
and to the other; love as marking the site of a cut that, like the ear, can neither be closed off 
nor opened up and assumed as the property of a subject?37   
 In contrast to its idealization in the Guevarian theory of militantism and the charismatic 
neopopulist leader, love in Lino and Clarisa’s case seems to offer a far more modest response to 
the distress of the absence of distress of postdictatorship. “El amor,” writes Lino, “es apenas un 
placer de estar al lado, sin opciones, sin posición relativa, sin tácticas de corrección, con muy 
poco descanso” (67). This simple description signals a departure from any theory of love as 
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ground or first step toward some overarching goal. The shared existence of love is irreducible to 
opposition (“sin posición relativa”) and calculation (“sin tácticas de corrección”) because those 
are modalities of the subject, whereas love takes place in the facticity (“sin opciones”) that 
precedes any subject.  
 Cohen’s text enacts a refusal of two possible approaches to our contemporary scene. It 
rules out a cynical, nihilistic embrace of the productionist ideology according to which the 
transition from state to market frees us from antagonism, disorder and terror. It likewise rejects 
the reactive—and equally nihilistic—attempt to beat back the incursion of global technics and 
capital via a salvage operation that would restore literature to the leading role granted it by 
Arnold, Rodó and others. What is left in the wake of this literary deconstruction of “transition” 
is an attempt to bring transition into view via as an experience of groundlessness. To 
paraphrase Paul Bové, it is a literary attempt to be of—but not for—the time of globalization as 
interregnum, as experience of the suspension of the old signifying regimes together with an 
opening onto something new—but what? For Cohen, literature can only open itself to this 
vertiginous moment through what the text terms “perseverance.” It can open itself to the 
impossibility of arkhē that is disclosed today, but it cannot do more; it cannot provide answers 
or resolution concerning the questions that inevitably arise on such tenuous ground. 
Perseverance would call for resolve in the face of darkening of the world, preparing itself for 
the incalculable leap of beginning anew.
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Mediatization and the Literary Neo-Avant Garde in Argentina 
 
One can say that when the astronauts set foot on the 
moon, the moon as moon disappeared. It no longer rose or 
set. It is now only a calculable parameter for the 
technological enterprise of humans. 
      —Martin Heidegger, “Seminar in Le Thor 1969”38 
  
In recent years Latin Americanist cultural criticism has turned its attention to mass 
media in an effort to understand how mediatization affects inner life (perception, imagination, 
thought), social relations (ways of representing being-in-common and envisioning alternatives 
to the historical present), as well as the production, dissemination and archiving of knowledge. 
The German media theorist Friedrich Kittler characterizes the late 19th century and 20th century 
as a time of increasing media differentiation. Differentiation names a departure from an era 
dominated by a single medium (historically speaking this was print) to a new era of 
heterogeneity in which the formerly dominant medium is obliged to compete with new 
media—visual, sound, electronic and digital—each of which appears to be more adept than 
print at capturing key aspects of late modernity. By the same token, since the 1960s media 
theory has developed an account of how electronic media—and, more recently, digital media—
facilitate the technological unification of the planet through the surpassing of traditional 
spatiotemporal limits associated with geography, geopolitics, and culture. For better or for 
worse, mediatization has been seen as inaugurating a new era of communicational 
immediacy.39 It thus both parallels and supports the economic and political integration of all 
parts of the world in a global capitalist system.   
Among Latin Americanist scholars the work of Néstor García Canclini, Jesús Martín-
Barbero, Carlos Monsiváis, Nelly Richard, Beatriz Sarlo and others has contributed to 
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broadening our understanding of how visual and auditory media (photography, film, radio, 
television) have reshaped old notions about literature and cultural production that had evolved 
in societies dominated by print media. Edmundo Paz-Soldán and Debra Castillo’s edited 
anthology Latin American Literature and Mass Media (2002) offers critical assessments of how 
narrative processes have been informed by—and respond to—the written word’s 
relinquishment of its privileged status to the ever-growing sway of visual and auditory media. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the infusion of mass media into Argentine politics begins 
with the transitional elections of 1983 and is fully consummated under Menem, the master of 
televisual neo-populism, beginning in 1987.40 
The consequences of the shift from print-dominated society to a society of 
differentiated media in Latin America can be further explored through a distinction between 
what Angel Rama described as the “lettered city” (Rama 1998) on the one hand, and the new 
configurations of space and time that obtain with the rise of radio, film, television and Internet 
on the other. The lettered city was a real or virtual site, typically located within the 
geographical space of the city and administered by a “priestly caste” of intellectuals. Employed 
in legal, religious, and pedagogical institutions, the administrators of the lettered city were 
charged with controlling access to the law by enforcing the primacy of the written word. This 
meant both upholding the relation between word and sovereign right, and mediating between 
imperial center (whose authority was constituted through the written word) and periphery, 
much of which was still dominated by oral traditions. In contrast to the centralized, vertical 
structure of the lettered city, the new media network are decentralized and horizontal, with 
direct access in principle open to all. The shift from one media paradigm to another—from an 
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arcane, self-enclosed city-within-the-city to the diffuse network of visual and audio media 
whose transmissions infiltrate every moment and corner of our daily lives—has generated 
optimistic as well as skeptical analyses. This mediatic transformation is welcomed by some as 
the avatar of the end of exclusion, while others regard it skeptically as the sinister spread of a 
new regime of surveillance and/or simulacra that tend to produce passivity and indifference 
among its consumers. By the same token, the shift from print hegemony to differentiation 
obligates contemporary criticism to reevaluate its own interpretive practices—most of which 
were formed through training in the analysis of written texts. There is no reason for us to take it 
for granted that the old hermeneutic methods and concepts that were developed to 
understand the textuality of print culture can be relied on in the same way to navigate the 
differentiated, image-based media culture of today.  
 Beatriz Sarlo takes an especially pessimistic view of the mediatization of Latin America 
societies, asserting that its saturation of all spheres of contemporary life (work, leisure, art, 
politics, and so on) has debilitating effects on the possibilities for autonomous thinking and 
acting. In Sarlo’s view the relentless and all-permeating flow of mediatic images effectively 
numbs the sensibilities and disables any capacity for ethical deliberation or political judgment. 
One implicit point of departure for her critique is the view, first introduced by Marshall 
McLuhan in Understanding Media (McLuhan 1964), that mass media is synonymous with the 
implosion of space and the acceleration of time. Whereas McLuhan saw in electronic media the 
promise of a communicative immediacy that would enable consumers to transcend cultural 
divisions and geographical distances to form new virtual communities, for Sarlo mass media 
technics carries a much more dismal prognosis. Unlike print media, in which the distance 
90 
 
separating mediatic representation from its referent is always patent, the mediations 
performed by television technology (to take the most prominent example) are far more difficult 
to identify and distinguish from the reality that the medium purports to represent. The well-
known difficulties faced by viewers in trying to separate the two realms, tends to instill 
resignation in the viewer, leading to erosion of the ethical and political basis of modern 
communal life. Mass media generates neither the stable representations found in print media 
nor the communicative immediacy imagined by McLuhan. Rather, it produces simulations of 
social and natural reality, which in turn contribute to a prevailing suspicion that the real as such 
has been supplanted by the simulacrum. Sarlo advances a critique of this process in her essay 
“Aesthetics and Post-Politics,” some aspects of which I have already discussed in previous 
chapter. The complicity between television, neo-populist demagoguery and the neoliberal state 
is illustrated in Sarlo’s characterization of mass media as fostering the displacement of the sign 
by the simulacrum in contemporary social relations. Here Sarlo’s critique relies on one of 
McLuhan’s fundamental insights, albeit without sharing McLuhan’s optimism: electronic media 
enacts the subsumption of content in form, message in medium. For mass media the medium is 
the message. For Sarlo an important consequence of the electronic collapsing of content into 
form is that form ceases to embody the critical and emancipatory promise it held much of 
modernity. 
Political symbols have changed, and if they were never really “symbols of 
reason,” the latest Latin American examples allow us to foresee the triumph of 
the simulacrum above all other modalities of symbolization. The symbols of the 
public sphere, along with its discursive genres, are replaced by a scenography 
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that is no longer even a stage but rather stage-craft, constructed by and, above 
all, for the mirror of the mass media. (Sarlo 1993, 253) 
 Mass media claims as its primary advantage over other media its ability to provide “full 
coverage” of a given situation; it has the potential to provide insight in real time into all angles 
and perspectives, and it thereby proffers more or less unrestricted and immediate access to the 
real. The mediatic filtering and distribution of information through ever-evolving story lines is, 
however, essentially a self-reflexive process.41 The rise of mass media coincides with a new 
truth regime that bolsters its power through the cultivation of sensationalist self-reflexivity, 
which in turn feeds viewer demands for more news. Taken to its extreme, this desire for the 
new cares little about what truth value its content might possess. It becomes absorbed entirely 
in the search for novelty; it is a desire for what is newest of all, for what is only now breaking 
through the horizon of the present. In this light, mediatic consumerism is commodity fetishism 
par excellence. It is the fetish of contemporaneity itself: of being fully current in one’s 
information, software and hardware, and so on.  
In modern Western societies media has always understood itself as a branch of civil 
society charged with calling attention to issues of public concern, no matter how inconvenient 
its subject matter might prove for power. The media thereby prepares an informed public to 
take under consideration matters that affect all. In the time of televisual media, meanwhile, the 
old dichotomy between event and mediatic representation has collapsed. Alongside the 
tendency of televisual media to focus on itself (its technologies, production processes, 
programming, stars, etc.), our perception of what constitutes an event has been irreversibly 
transformed. The old idea of an event—something new happens in the world that affects the 
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world and its inhabitants and causes them (or should cause them) to take notice—is substituted 
by new criteria: an event is something that will draw or has drawn media attention. Whereas an 
event was traditionally understood as a material occurrence that does not depend on 
mediation—indeed, something worthy of the name event should in some sense precisely defy 
mediation—in the new televisual mediatic regime, there can be no event prior to the arrival of 
the camera. 
Sarlo worries that public discourse, informed and directed by the mediatic truth regime, 
will no longer be able to engage in debates about a social reality that is separate from the sites 
and conduits wherein media discourse is produced, transmitted and received. As the public 
becomes increasingly reliant on mass media for information and even for its opinions, and as 
this dependency becomes infused with desire for immediacy for its own sake, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to distinguish public space and politics from the logic of the market.   
 The phenomenon of mediatic spectacle plays a major role in inaugurating what Sarlo 
calls “post-politics,” a time in which technocratic knowledge emerges as the authoritative locus 
into which all collective decision-making must be translated in order to acquire legitimacy. The 
transfer of what used to be topics for collective debate and decision-making in the public 
sphere into problems to be resolved by technical expertise imposes a limit on any project 
aiming at a radical transformation of social relations. Neoliberal order is in this sense both self-
referential and obscurantist: 
If politics needs to compare options (what is more: needs to produce options), 
technology without politics presents itself as the only option. If political choices 
are increasingly complex and, consequently, difficult to communicate to public 
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opinion, technology pretends to dispense with the need for public opinion 
because it presents its reasons as the only viable ones. This imaginary suture of 
the split between society and politics when technology takes the place of politics 
is itself a technologically produced simulation of knowledge, a simulacrum that 
does not explain but rather points to itself. (Sarlo 1993, 255; my emphasis)  
These remarks echo the self-referential logic discussed in the previously cited passage (“by 
and…for the mirror of the mass media”) from Sarlo’s essay. The mediatic spectacle, 
characterized by a specular movement of self-presentation returning infinitely to itself, works in 
coordination with neoliberal post-politics to institute a new technocratic order, and it likewise 
collaborates in obscuring the violence of this order’s genesis.42  
 Before we accept as self-evident the idea that we are today living in the wake of a 
technologically-driven rupture, however, it might be worthwhile to pause and ask whether 
Sarlo’s critical account of new media does not also herald the return of the same old subject: 
the subject of metaphysics. Sarlo’s description of the formal logic of mass media production 
and transmission, as producing of and for itself, bears an uncanny resemblance to the 
philosophical subject described by Descartes as the origin of its own representations. As Jean-
Luc Nancy puts it in The Experience of Freedom: 
In the ontology of subjectivity, being is posited as the subjectum of 
representation, in which, by this fact, the appearing of all things is converted. 
The essence of being is to “appear to itself” [s’apparaître] in such a way that 
nothing is, unless supported in its phenomenality by the subject. (Nancy 1993, 4) 
Against Sarlo’s critique one could argue that modern conceptualizations of public space 
94 
 
and the political could never be fully accounted by the Enlightenment framework of rational 
discourse and collective decision making in which Sarlo wants to ground the ideas of producing 
and comparing options. The association between politics, public space, and shared decision-
making belongs to a tradition of thinking about sovereignty for which legal and political orders 
have their origin in the structure of exception or in a decision that exceeds the scope of what 
can be debated and judged within the codified sphere of law. In constituting or suspending a 
given legal or political order, the sovereign decision paradoxically both does and does not 
belong to the totality to which it gives rise. Sarlo avoids engaging with the problem of 
sovereignty and decisionism here, in my view, because such considerations could pose 
problems for the clear and stable distinction she wants to establish between the time of 
neoliberal populism and mass media technics on the one hand, and earlier versions of the 
modern state together with older distinctions between technology, aesthetics and ethics on the 
other. By the same token, elision of the problem of sovereignty enables Sarlo to embrace what 
turns out to be a reactive solution—the revival of aesthetic and political modernity—that has in 
fact already been rendered inoperative.  
 Let us now turn and look closely at the formal link Sarlo draws between mass media and 
neoliberal technocratic order. She claims that these two historical tendencies are able to 
bolster their authority today through their self-reflexive structures and that neither form ever 
truly moves away from that self-reflexive mode in order to refer outside itself—to non-
technocratic reason or to a concrete, pre-mediatic reality. Her assessment proves to be 
problematic, however, because it does not ask about what might be specific and new to mass 
mediatic production or about what these tendencies might share with the history of 
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technological forms in general. While I am proposing that Sarlo ignores the possibility of certain 
formal connections between mass media and an older history of technological thinking, her 
claim that the current situation in Latin America is defined principally by its newness (“post”) 
minimizes the ways in which prior state forms (such as the populist state) also employed mass 
media as an instrument for interpellation and social control (Barbero 1993 and Kraniauskas 
2007).43  
Sarlo’s critical take on mass media is premised on the assumption that the present 
constitutes a break that definitively separates mass media technics from older technological 
phenomena. She then goes on to equate this ostensibly new situation with the essence of mass 
media technics: it is new because we know that mass media technics is essentially different 
from previously dominant modalities of circulating information and publicizing discussions 
concerning the social whole. It seems to me that Sarlo attributes too much stability to the 
phenomenon she is seeking to understand while relinquishing any question about what mass 
media might share with older technological forms. Her critique of mass media technics is too 
metaphysical in not being metaphysical enough.44 In ignoring the possibility that mass media 
technics reproduces certain aspects of earlier traditions, Sarlo’s critique ends up assuming a 
thoroughly metaphysical position concerning technics.  
 If Sarlo’s understanding of mass media technics is grounded in the same presuppositions 
that gave rise to modern philosophical systems, does her critique still enable us to understand 
mass media and neoliberalism as instituting a definitive break with modernity? My position is 
that it does not. What Sarlo calls “post-politics” is in fact onto- and political theology under a 
different name. But that does not mean that nothing changes with the advent of mediatization. 
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We have indeed witnessed the subjugation of the political: to the mediatic apparatus that 
purports to “cover” politics, and likewise—as I will argue in the next two chapters—to the logic 
of global capital under neoliberal globalization. Instead of post-politics, then, which implies 
either too much change (rupture) or not enough (the “post” itself is a product of modernity and 
its way of determining historical time), I have proposed the idea of interregnum as a way of 
working through a global transformation of historical import among the effects of which include 
a rendering inoperative of the conceptual vocabulary with which we seek to understand this 
event. Mediatization effectively places “politics” under erasure; it introduces a situation for 
which the term’s traditional meaning is suspends or destabilized, but in which no new term is 
readily available to take its place.  
These points will be developed through a reading of César Aira’s 2001 novel La villa in 
the dual context of Argentina’s early 21st century socio-economic crisis and the increasing 
presence of televisual media. First, however, a brief overview of Aira’s literary project as a 
whole will help to contextualize what I will say about La villa. With a few notable exceptions, 
literary criticism—especially outside of Argentina—has been somewhat reticent in turning its 
attention to Aira’s work.45 This seeming critical reticence when it comes to Aira’s work has been 
explained by one critic as a reaction to the author’s “hyperloquacious” literary production 
which, in yielding an average of two to three novels per year over the last decade or more, may 
offer comparatively little time for critical reflection (Laddaga 2005). As Sandra Contreras puts it, 
Aira’s relentless novelistic production has helped foster the critical impression of a writer who 
is indifferent or even hostile to the traditional temporalities of literary production, which since 
the 19th century has been organized by desire for the singular great Work (Contreras 2002). In 
97 
 
his manic pace of writing and his much-publicized refusal to reread and revise what he has 
written, Aira would seem to come close—too close for critical comfort—to adopting the 
indifferent velocity of mass production. Critical misgivings may be reinforced by Aira’s tendency 
to incorporate—thematically and stylistically—the machinery of mass culture in his novels. As 
Contreras puts it, in Aira’s writing “el valor de la distancia (distancia crítica de la literatura, 
distancia temporal o distancia de la calidad poética del texto) se convierte, vía la banalidad del 
presente y la televisión, en efecto devaluado de inmediatez” (124). Aira’s writing thus mimics 
the effacement of all distance and deliberative time that Sarlo associates with postmodern 
media culture, while embracing the simulacra of televisual immediacy. In her Fuera de campo: 
Literatura y arte argentinos después de Duchamp, Graciela Speranza, meanwhile, makes an 
invaluable contribution to furthering critical understanding of Aira’s debt to the avant garde. 
 The engagement with mass culture writ large in Aira’s writing proves to be more 
complicated than first meets the eye, however. In distinction from the position staked out by 
Sarlo, for whom modernist aesthetics and mass media are the products of antithetical 
sensibilities and attunements, Contreras and Speranza, in their more nuanced critical 
approaches, describe the intertwining of literature and mass culture in Aira’s novels as a 
strategic intervention that is of the same spirit as Duchamp’s artistic deployment of the Ready-
made. Aira’s inscription of the technological effects and sensibility of television and other forms 
of mass culture into the narrative form of the novel organizes an effort to reactivate artistic 
processes at a time when literary techniques have become routinized and when art is thus in 
danger of being reduced to a purely technical process, or as Contreras puts it, “una mera 
producción de obras a cargo de quienes sabían y podían producirlas” (Contreras 2002, 15). As 
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Speranza sees it, meanwhile, Duchamp’s development of the Ready-made as procedure linking 
artistic form with innovation and history, provides the only hope for art in a world increasingly 
dominated by the logic and the exigencies of capital.46   
 Aira’s appropriation of mass media should be examined in the context of a sweeping 
and profound transformation of literary institutions in recent decades, and particularly the 
emergence of a small group of megapublishers (Planeta, Alfaguara, etc.) that play a major role 
in deciding what kinds of literature gets published and what does not. A number of Latin 
American writers have argued that publishing decisions made by megapublishers are governed 
by the sole criteria of what will sell; and since literary markets (in the Spanish-speaking world 
but also beyond it in the case of translation) are predisposed to publishing works that follow 
recognizable, easily-marketed stylistic conventions such as magical realism, the rise to 
dominance of multinational corporations in the publishing industry has resulted in significant 
restrictions on what kinds of literature can appear today; while innovation may still be possible 
when it comes to well-established writers, for those who are still trying to make a name for 
themselves the odds would seem to be stacked against innovation. In that context, Aira’s 
tendency to venture outside literature and to the most formulaic and repetitive of all cultural 
genres—TV melodrama—raises an interesting question: is he simply catering to commercial 
forces by producing an easily recognizable brand that can be readily consumed, or should his 
experimentations with literary form and seemingly irreconcilable cultural modalities (print and 
electronic media, “high” and “low” culture) be seen as an effort to reintroduce vitality into 
literary production at a time when literary creativity is in danger of being reduced to matters of 
technical expertise and formulaic reproductions of best-sellers from the Boom generation? 
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 Aira has written extensively about his approach to narrative innovation; the topic 
appears in essays as well as in his novels. His descriptions of his own writing practice take shape 
as a complex interweaving of playfulness and seriousness. If one follows either tendency far 
enough one inevitably find oneself on the opposing side, as if his account were a Mobius strip. 
Consider for example Aira’s iconoclastic explanation of his attitude toward literary taste in his 
1995 essay “La innovación,” where he irreverently professes to embrace the production of bad 
literature. Such a bald assertion in an essay purported to present the author’s views on 
something as revered as artistic creativity no doubt proves troubling for Aira criticism, 
especially considering that many of his readers readily admit to struggling over how seriously to 
take his novels and what to make of the evident qualitative discrepancy between the “good” 
Aira novels and the “bad” ones. As critics and scholars we would like to think that our training 
prepares us to deal with significant qualitative variations within the literary corpus of a writer. 
Of course we minimize or ignore the lesser works and focus on those that offer richer material 
for analysis and enhanced opportunities for aesthetic enjoyment. What could be more obvious? 
And yet what if such an approach turned out to be the wrong way to read Aira? What if in 
reading Aira in this well-established way, criticism renders itself blind to the source of that 
strange uniqueness we call “Aira,” and condemns itself to misreading him as just another writer 
in a history whose critical gold standard has always been the Work? What we call “bad” 
literature, Aira’s essay proceeds to clarify in Nietzschean genealogical key, is whatever fails to 
heed established canons of good taste and value. By implication, “good” literature would be 
nothing more than writing that in one way or another coincides with—and thereby validates—
what has already been sanctioned by the prevailing regime of valuation.47 In other words, what 
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counts as “good” literature is more often than not a work that has not yet broken with the 
reproduction of the Same. What is worse, the “good” today is increasingly the path reserved for 
artisanal production whose telos is the market. Artisan work must—and with good reason—
conform to the idea of the good if it hopes to legitimate its own activity: producing a saleable 
commodity. The lone remaining chance for an artistic program seeking to avoid such a 
conformist destiny, meanwhile, is for Aira to be found in embracing a form of the bad that 
could lead to something more than just specular opposition with the good: a badness beyond 
good and bad, or a badness that would lead beyond valuation as such. Only thus, through an 
abandonment of taste and aesthetic value, can literary innovation lead to something truly 
promising: not the bad but the new.48 
 Considering Aira’s much-discussed tendency to incorporate the iconography of 
contemporary mass culture in his novels, it may come as a surprise that Aira situates himself 
unequivocally on the side of literary modernity rather than postmodernity. He emphasizes the 
influence of the avant garde on his work, most notably Marcel Duchamp’s conceptualization of 
the readymade as a repeatable method for creating art. Aira claims to have developed an 
analogous technique, a narrative procedimiento or a procedure for emplotment that can be 
repeated indefinitely to generate any number of novels, and which therefore tends toward 
automaticity. A true procedimiento is a method that can be deployed by almost anyone; once 
initiated, the method—like a machine—effectively writes itself. By all appearances the specific 
procedure developed by Aira is surprisingly simple: it consists of little more than what he calls 
una huida en adelante, a “flight forward” in writing that has little concern for thematic 
consistency and plot development; it imposes an absolute proscription against reading or 
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revising what has already been written, and as Speranza reminds us it thereby remits the 
possibility of artistic innovation to the domain of chance—which, in Aira’s view, may be the 
only domain in which it is still possible to think something other than the calculative, 
equivalential logic of capital. Aira’s procedure is a program for writing anti-Works, for a writing 
whose point of departure is its abandonment of any notion of the creative process as 
perfection of itself over time. In lieu of return, rewriting and cultivation, the “flight forward” is 
compelled to make up for any perceived shortcomings in yesterday’s writing in today’s 
production. The result is the characteristic Aira novel: full of digressions that seem to lead 
nowhere and narrative threads that are left in an inconclusive state; erudite and serious 
reflections on pressing social, aesthetic and epistemological concerns interspersed with 
implausible and absurd developments; and a persistent rejection of classical notions of 
emplotment as a sequential process culminating in a climactic moment and governed by a 
logical unity. Here we have an additional layer to the paradox outlined earlier: with Aira there 
can be no novelty, no literary historical rejuvenation and thus no literary event without 
repetition, without the repeatability afforded by the formulaic procedimiento.  
 Aira locates the hallmark of modern literary sensibility in Baudelaire’s invocation of the 
new in the eighth and final canto of his poem “Le voyage,” a veritable manifesto of literary 
modernism:   
O Death, my captain, it is time! let us raise the anchor!  
This country wearies us, O Death! Let us make ready!  
If sea and sky are both as black as ink,  
You know our hearts are full of sunshine. 
Pour on us your poison to refresh us! 
Oh, this fire so burns our brains, we would 
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Dive to the depths of the gulf, Heaven or Hell, what matter? 
If only to find in the depths of the Unknown the New! 
One would be hard pressed to find a clearer embodiment of disdain for the historical present 
and its prevailing regime than Baudelaire in relation to mid-19th century French bourgeois 
culture. For Aira there are at least four important points to take from Baudelaire’s poetic 
announcement of the new as literary absolute: the effort to think innovation as irreducible to 
any specular relation of opposites (new and old, high and low, good and bad); the association of 
newness with an exploration of the decadence of the present and, moreover, with the 
experience of negative, non-productive moods such as boredom; the dissociation of innovation 
from subjectivity and individuality; and, finally, the link between the new, the unknown, and 
the real understood as refractory to established epistemological methods. All of these 
Baudelairean motifs find points of correspondence in Aira’s literary vocabulary.  
 The Flowers of Evil situates the motif of novelty within a complexity that belies any 
simple antithesis of the new with its other: the old, canonical, traditional, etc. Despite what the 
ship-faring metaphor would seem to be saying, novelty is not to be won by setting out to 
conquer new territories nor can it be explained as the simple negation or overcoming of the 
present. The new, as Baudelaire thinks it, precisely disrupts the presentist conception of time, 
or time understood as a sequence of moments in which one present displaces another and so 
on ad infinitum. When Baudelaire sets out in search of the new it is not to a future present that 
he turns but conversely to what is already growing old and becoming past in the present: the 
decadence and decrepitude of civilization that is exemplified with the social and cultural 
ascendancy of the bourgeoisie. It is to the present as what “Le Voyage” calls an “oasis of horror 
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in a desert of boredom” that literature must turn, according to Baudelaire, if it hopes to find 
novelty. As Walter Benjamin no doubt intuited, for Baudelaire the historical present of the 
French Second Empire was infused with traces of both the past (in the sense that bourgeois 
hegemony was the decadent, anachronistic reenactment of aristocratic privilege) and the 
future (which must be sought not in the utopian projections of a new time but in the fissures 
whereby the present is exposed as being out of joint). The key distinction at stake in 
Baudelaire’s invocation of the new, then, is that it calls for a displacement of what Benjamin 
calls the “empty, homogeneous time” of Liberalism’s progress-oriented philosophy of history 
and of what Heidegger describes as the presentist focus of metaphysics, in which history is 
conflated with the sum of objects available to be represented (and used).   
 Benjamin discovers in the Baudelairean gesture of turning toward boredom an avatar of 
his own critical practice of exposing the atrophy that is latent in the liberal conceptualization of 
history as progress. While Benjamin emphasizes the revolutionary potential of boredom vis-à-
vis the historical temporality of capitalism, for Aira the link between decrepitude and the new is 
what determines literary innovation as a transformation of the real, where the real is 
understood as materiality that remains refractory to epistemic processes of signification and 
rationalization. This helps explain why the customary association of innovation with a future 
present would be inadequate: such an equivalency could only reinforce the established 
coordinates of the present—namely, the characteristically modern understanding of time as 
sequential progression leading from past to present to future.49 In the context of modernity any 
innovation worthy of the name would have to begin by suspending or breaking with the 
sequential and progressive ordering of past, present and future presents.  
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 It may be that innovation in Aira’s sense shares a structural resemblance to what I am 
calling interregnum, not because the call for innovation necessarily corresponds with the 
historical crisis of sovereignty in the context of neoliberal-administered globalization, but 
because both concepts enact a pause or step back that thinks itself as the first step toward a 
possible radical transmutation of the real. For Aira the verb “to innovate” turns out to be 
defective insofar as its grammatical structure presupposes a subject who could say: “I 
innovate.” To innovate is to transform a given field in a sufficiently radical way so as to leave no 
space untouched, no ground remaining for a subject understood as the permanent presence of 
what lies underneath (subjectum). Innovation, if and when it happens, attests to the fact that 
even the arkhē is no longer the same as itself. “Si innovo,” clarifies Aira, “tendrá que decirlo 
otro, y en otro momento” (Aira 1995, 27). The logic is profoundly Borgesian: if Pierre Menard 
inadvertently demonstrates how the intention to repeat pure and simply (recall that Menard 
did not want to be like Cervantes, he wanted to be Cervantes) engenders not the sameness it 
yearns for but rather transformation at the limits of what can be calculated, it is only Menard’s 
reader—the one who eulogizes him posthumously in writing “Pierre Menard, autor del 
Quijote”—who puts a finger on what it is that constitutes the true novelty in Menard’s return to 
Cervantes. Of course it is nothing other than the word “historia” that emerges as orphaned, 
mutating letter of the Quijote.  
 Menard’s desire to be Cervantes notwithstanding, Aira asserts that innovation requires 
that the would-be innovator kill off all of the masters he or she has ever had. Innovation calls 
for symbolically putting to death not just the masters we can do without but precisely those 
one is condemned to love (27). Such a parricidal act is tantamount to a kind of suicide: the 
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masters we are fated to love are those around whom our own selves have taken shape. Thus 
the antinomy between innovation and subject becomes even more entrenched. Innovation, if 
and when it happens, begins with a “leap,” a departure from the known and from familiar 
ground into the unknown, which for literature is what Alberto Moreiras calls “the unguarded 
possibility of the real” (Exhaustion of Difference, 213).  Literary innovation and world history 
obey similar laws when it comes to thinking the event. Aira illustrates this point ironically with a 
joke about a Norman peasant heard to remark one day to his fellow peasant: “Did you hear the 
news? Today is the beginning of the Middle Ages!” (27). Innovation corresponds not to the 
visible and intelligible but to those aspects of any historical present that can only be deciphered 
a posteriori. 
 But in the name of what, and to what end, would innovation recommend this leap? To 
answer this question we must grapple with an apparent contradiction: innovation calls for a 
departure from the certainty of familiar ground, and yet innovation cannot be the result of 
calculative intentionality. Its possibility begins there where the trajectories of calculation and 
intention reach their limit. But how is one to know where calculation ends and the leap begins? 
Would a blind leap necessarily be free from calculation and intention? Even prior to any 
consideration of where one expects to land, how could the leap as such be purified of all 
subjective calculation? The answer would seem to be that it cannot, but that the trajectory 
assumed in leaping asymptotically approaches the limit of calculation. As the joke suggests, the 
leap must be taken in the name of time and history, a history whose demureness borders on 
silence. One implication of this discussion is that there can be no time and no history without 
innovation; the very fact that there is something called history is conclusive proof that 
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innovation happens. Recall that for Aira the event of innovation, if and when it happens, 
accommodates no witnesses and admits no agents. Innovation can only be ascertained after 
the fact and from the new terrain it discloses. Thus the subjective structure of intentionality 
does not preclude innovation, and perhaps all innovation necessarily takes off from a 
calculative point of departure; but what will have been innovation must necessarily break in 
some way with the calculative programming from which it began. As Borges never ceased 
reminding us, innovation is structured by a law of errancy that short circuits the causal logic of 
intentionality. Innovation is always already differing from itself, from whatever intentions might 
have been present at its first impulses. Artistic innovation is necessarily an impersonal affair 
that is “in the air” and not the property of any individual writer or artist. Any new move or 
invention that could be assigned to a subject could never be anything more than the 
voluntarism of artistic intention.   
 Newness, as we have seen with the prominence of Baudelaire in Aira’s discussions of 
literature, begins with a return to the familiar, to what is so familiar that it has grown old or 
become boring. Boredom for Aira, meanwhile, is synonymous with the hollowing out of all 
content and the emergence of pure form.50 One might consider, for example, how the 
experience of reading a novel is transformed when one loses interest in the plot or becomes 
fatigued—but instead of putting the book down one continues reading, with the eye beginning 
to act on its own accord, like an automaton. In the monotony with which the eye continues to 
consume words, sentences and paragraphs that have now ceased to generate sequentially-
accumulating meaning, we approach a literary experience of language as such, of language in 
its non-negatable materiality. Of course I am describing what can happen in the reading 
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process, whereas Aira is concerned with what constitutes innovation in writing; and yet in Aira’s 
thought the writing/reading distinction is not as clear and stable as one might expect. Let us 
recall once again that the thought of innovation does not leave any room for a subject: just as I 
do not decide to innovate (or if I do, such a decision cannot guarantee the outcome or provide 
the sufficient cause for any innovative effect), the “I” can never provide the measure of 
innovation. The event of innovation, if and when it happens, is structured by a paradoxical 
temporality that resembles the future perfect tense. We can never say with certainty that there 
is or will be innovation, but only that it will have been—if it happens at all. Innovation entails a 
relation between times that is irreducible to sequentially progressive models. It thus 
paradoxically names both a relation—the identification of a before and an after—and a non-
relation, insofar as the true measure of the event is that continuity between the old and the 
new will have been broken.  
Lo nuevo es lo real. O mejor dicho, lo nuevo es la forma que adopta lo real para 
el artista vivo, mientras vive. Igual que lo nuevo, lo real es lo imposible, lo previo, 
lo inevitable, y a la vez: lo inalcanzable. El salto del arte no llega nunca a él; ha 
llegado, parte de él, pero no lo sabe, no puede saberlo, ni decirlo. Es el discurso 
de la lengua incomprensible, misteriosa. (32)  
 The new is the real, or it is the form that the real adopts in and for art. But does that 
equation not also announce that the real would no longer be the real, at least not the real 
understood in the Freudian and Lacanian traditions as resistance to or excess of symbolization? 
Or does the adoption of form in this context also entail what Samuel Weber describes as the 
unraveling of form (Weber 1996, 9-35)? Aira’s association of the new with the real takes shape 
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as an accumulation of contradictions: the new, like the real, is the impossible and the 
unobtainable; it is the inaugural and the unavoidable; the leap that is innovation’s only chance 
can never hope to arrive at what is truly new; and yet it has always already arrived and in fact it 
begins with the new, albeit without ever knowing it; it is the discourse of a language turned 
mysterious and incomprehensible. This contradictory accumulation of propositions 
reformulates the paradox found in Baudelaire’s projection of the new in the out-of-jointness of 
the present with respect to itself, in those interstices of the present where one feels most at 
odds with oneself and with the times (boredom for Baudelaire, anxiety for Heidegger). 
 Some of the difficulties associated with the linking of the new (innovation) and the real 
can be further illuminated by clarifying that for Aira, as for Roman Jakobson, the impetus 
toward realism or verisimilitude is the goal of all art regardless of period, culture or style. By the 
same token, what counts as “realistic” in visual arts as well as literature is never natural but 
always coded in one way or another.51 Not only must one learn to read the code, but in 
becoming familiar with it one must also assume the risk of internalizing the convention too 
much, at which point one ceases to see it as conventional. To lose sight of conventionality 
altogether would result in a loss of the distinction between referent and representation, which 
is to say that one would be unable to experience art as art. The condition of possibility of 
reading (familiarization with conventions) is thus also, at least potentially, the condition of 
reading’s impossibility. Art qua realism always hangs in the tenuous balance between 
codification of the real and naturalization of convention. This balancing act provides one way of 
explaining Aira’s association of innovation and the real.  
Nos lanzamos a lo desconocido (a lo que pueda resistir a la prueba del 
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conocimiento) en la busca imposible de lo nuevo. Y lo nuevo es lo que hacen los 
otros. El otro es nuestra megalomanía, y a la vez nuestro eclipse. La luz de esta 
astronomía es la lengua. Pero la lengua ha caído en manos del otro, y el otro la 
aleja hacia lo nuevo, la luz se proyecta hacia lo nuevo donde no podemos ser 
sino una mancha de sombra. No me entenderás…susurra en su huida. La lengua 
se precipita hacia ese fondo en el que se deja de ser lengua, se hace 
incomprensible. El salto a lo incomprensible es el mismo salto a lo real, a la 
experiencia irreductible al pensamiento. (Aira 1995, 31)  
 The real for Aira is not the name for a substance but for an encounter with the unknown 
that resists capture by our epistemological apparatuses. Its heading therefore also 
accommodates what becomes of discourse or symbolic production (literature, art, etc.) when it 
leaves the hands of the author and enters into circulation in public space (the space of 
publication, reading, the archive, etc.). The condition of possibility for making discourse legible 
and accessible is also the absolute delimitation of intention; to innovate is to expose the text to 
the fatality of the real. The leap into the unknown or into the real would thus be a way of 
describing the experience of literary language as it leaves the hands of its paternal guarantor 
and enters into circulation among readers. The real in Aira’s vocabulary provides a general 
name for the unthought of any present, while the new in turn names the attempt to think or 
expose this unthought in and through a transformation of the coordinates of what is thinkable 
and sayable.  
 As Willy Thayer has argued, the historical self-determinations of the avant garde—as 
critique of representation, as rupture or interruption, as new beginning—may no longer be 
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sustainable in the time of neoliberal-administered globalization, when the market has (at least 
arguably) become the unsurpassable horizon for thought and action.52 This is not to say that 
avant garde or neo-avant garde gestures are not being produced today. What it does imply is 
that the vanguard act may be unable, at least by itself, to alter the fundamental coordinates of 
our world today. In a situation where the state of exception has become the norm and where 
decision-making power has been transferred from the political to the economic, it is no longer 
clear to what extent the kinds of ideology critique associated with the avant garde can still hope 
to play a transformative role today. We can only expect so much from the critique of 
representation today, says Thayer; though such critiques have not suddenly become 
unimportant, we can no longer expect the insight or attunement they might provide to 
generate the sufficient conditions for social transformation or revolution. By the same token, 
the neoliberal regime of globalization renders the old geopolitical coordinates for social 
transformation obsolete. Politics at the national and international level does not thereby lose 
all significance, but it can no longer be expected to provide what it did throughout the history 
of modernity: a katechon against the global forces of transnational capital, whose ebbs and 
flows today can longer be controlled or regulated by the state. Thus we are faced with a new 
globalization in which the possibilities for interruption and transformation have been deferred 
and rendered uncertain; it is no longer clear how—or even if—a break with the hegemony of 
the global market could be brought about. What is clear is that culture, including literature, can 
no longer offer a pure and critical space outside the logic of capital that could be used against 
capital. On the contrary, like the factory in the 19th century, culture in the new millennium is 
the privileged terrain and the paradigm for all commodity production as such. In this context, 
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the historical avant garde with its call for rupture and radical newness has been rendered 
inoperative today.  
 In turning to Aira now I want to allow the questions and limits indicated by Thayer with 
respect to the avant garde in the time of neoliberalism to linger. I am not interested in 
proposing that Aira offers anything like a solution to or exit from the impasse just described. On 
the contrary, Aira’s understanding of literary history and the possibility of innovation militates 
against any hasty attempt to formulate an answer to this situation, insofar as it is difficult to 
imagine a response that would not fall into the trap of voluntarism that Aira is careful to avoid. I 
want to propose that Aira is aware of the kind of problem identified by Thayer and that La villa 
responds to this quandary by seeking to make the impasse its own—that is, to write from the 
site of this question without either celebrating it or reifying it as the inevitable, as the eternal 
present of all future Latin Americanist reflection. 
 Aira has become well-known for his literary appropriations of mass media, and this 
tendency is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in his 2000 novel La villa. In the time of 
neoliberal globalization, when the electronic and digital technology associated with new media 
increasingly hold sway over perception, thought and imagination, what if anything distinguishes 
Aira’s literary appropriations of mass media (its rhythm, techniques, lexicon, etc.) from the 
technical form itself? What could prevent Aira’s work from becoming a mere effect of—if not 
an apologist for—neoliberal-administered globalization? For Contreras what keeps Aira’s work 
from collapsing into the well from which it draws is that, in borrowing literary elements from 
mass media, Aira’s text also introduces mutations that call attention to an imperfect fit 
between what we might call the donor and recipient contexts. The borrowing and application 
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of mass media to literature only succeeds partially; something is left out of place or time, 
sticking out or out of beat with the dominant rhythm. “Se trata, siempre, de recetas de cómo 
hacerlo. Sólo que las recetas son únicas e inejemplares….o los métodos son directamente 
imposibles….o los procedimientos dejan de operar….Impráctico, inejemplar, y a desatiempo—lo 
definen una inadecuación y un desfasaje temporal en relación con el resultado—el 
procedimiento en Aira siempre es anacrónico” (Contreras 2002, 18). Aira’s turn to mass media 
technics for literary procedures resembles what John Johnstone calls “mediality,” or a tendency 
in contemporary literature to inscribe “within its own language the effects produced by other 
media” (Johnstone in Tabbi and Wutz 1997, 175). Mediality in Aira generates a literary effect 
(Contreras calls it desfasaje temporal, a temporal discrepancy or phase difference) that is 
neither fully consistent with the temporality of mass media nor the simple continuation of 
traditional literary procedures. Mediality introduces an excess or an imbalance—akin, perhaps, 
to a sense of jet lag [desfasaje horario]—that cannot be made proper to either time, either 
tradition or contemporaneity.  
 Of course the premise that literature borrows its rhetoric, images, rhythm, tonalities 
and lexicon from other social discourse in order to generate its own artistic procedures is not 
altogether new. As Roberto González Echeverría famously argued in Myth and Archive 
(González Echeverría 1990) similar discursive appropriative strategies can be found throughout 
the history of the Hispanic novel. As Ricardo Gutiérrez Mouat points out, literary appropriations 
of mass culture—with either celebratory or critical intentions—have been going on in Latin 
America since at least the 1960s (Paz Soldán and Castillo 2001). What is perhaps new when it 
comes to Aira is the feeling that literature or art in general is no longer able to orient itself in 
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relation to a beyond, a transcendent point outside the here and now that would serve as 
literature’s object of desire and/or as its justification. With Aira it may be that we no longer 
have to do with a literary affirmation of transcendence but with an exploration of the 
possibilities that open up for literature following the exhaustion of modern forms of 
transcendence—that is to say, the possibilities that obtain with overexposure. As we will see, 
the feeling that the beyond has been subsumed within the here and now constitutes the 
starting point for Aira’s unsettled and unsettling reflections on literature in the time of mass 
media technics.  
 Josefina Ludmer’s discussion of “post-autonomous” literature draws on Aira as an 
exemplar of how the contemporary novel handles the distinction between reality and fiction, 
rhetoric and reference. As we saw in the introduction Ludmer’s sketch of autonomous 
literature hinges on her claim that a shift has taken place today in the literary economy of 
tropes. The critical reliance on tropes to mark the difference between autonomy and post-
autonomy is not arbitrary. For one, literature has always been the site where tropological 
language has been produced and been allowed to flourish. By the same token the presence of 
tropes provides one way of explaining why literary language is not transparent but must be 
interpreted. Finally, critical and interpretive practice has provided a compelling account of why 
aesthetic experience can serve as a foundation for modern civic life: learning to interpret art is 
a proving ground for the critical judgment required of citizens in a democracy. But in focusing 
on what she believes is a shift in tropological economies Ludmer thereby reduces literature to 
rhetoric and signification while blocking any consideration of what Paul de Man would call 
“material” elements in literary language.53 By the same token she does not consider that 
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distinction between an “autonomous” economy in which tropes produce meaning and a “post-
autonomous” economy in which tropes refer only to themselves, or to the becoming-
indistinguishable of rhetoric and reference, may well be impossible to determine and sustain. 
After all, tropical language has never not referred to itself. Similarly, if we could remove 
altogether the signifying and referential functions of language we would be left with something 
altogether unintelligible. When it comes to literature the distinctions between reference, 
signification, and self-reference are necessarily rendered unstable.54 For all of the interesting 
and important points that it raises, what is missing from Ludmer’s argument in my view is a 
consideration of how literary language never ceases producing in excess of what is needed for 
signification, and how this language thereby opens the door to short-circuits within the 
economics of signification and interpretation. 
 To develop this point about the irreducibility of literary language to tropology and 
signification I now turn briefly to Gilles Deleuze’s discussion of literary serialization in his 1969 
book Logic of Sense (Deleuze 1993), after which I will show how all of this connects with Aira. 
Literary serialization refers to the textual production of multiple chains of signifiers—names, 
words, figures, themes, and so on—in which the members of a given series correspond with 
others of their kind; at the same time each set of signifiers generates relations with other sets 
or series. As a result of serialization each particular signifier turns out to be overdetermined by a 
multiplicity of relations or forces. Serialization provides a model for language as sense machine. 
Sense should not be confused with meaning: if meaning is the arrival of the signifier at the 
signified (a red octagonal sign at a street corner signifies “stop”), sense is the conduit or 
trajectory followed by a message, or its capacity to generate a range of associations. In the 
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example just given sense might include ideas such as “ticket,” “accident,” “law,” “motion,” 
“traffic,” “safety,” but also “graffiti.” How does serialization work in literature? In Poe’s 
renowned detective story, “The Purloined Letter,” one series is constituted by the Queen who 
conceals a letter from her secret lover, the King who doesn’t see the letter and remains 
oblivious to its implications, and the Minister who does see the letter as well as the potential it 
bears. A second series is formed by the Minister who steals the letter and hides it in his 
apartment, the inept police who search the apartment but are unable to locate the letter, and 
the detective who is able to retrieve it because his search is guided not by common sense but 
by his identification with criminal intelligence. Deleuze highlights both the correspondences and 
displacements between series; in one series the Minister pulls a fast one on the Queen while in 
the other series he dupes the police but is bested by Dupin. The logic of serialization resembles 
a sliding tile puzzle: the differential relations within and between series are motivated by the 
uncanny presence of something that has no proper place in one series while in the other series 
it establishes an empty place that cannot be filled. In Poe’s story this uncanny object is of 
course the letter that is purloined and circulates from one party to another in the first series 
and which, in the second series, is never to be found where it is supposed to be.  
 The advantage of Deleuze’s account of serialization is that it helps us to focus on 
something in literature that remains irreducible to the economy of meaning-production and the 
claim to epistemological privilege. Whereas in the Rulfo example alluded to in the introduction 
we saw how literature might be equated with sublimation as the filling in of absence, in 
Deleuze’s analysis literature generates a gap and an excess where they did not previously exist. 
One could also read certain works associated with literary autonomy in this way, Pedro Páramo 
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included, since the fantasms and murmurs of Comala call attention to a concern with exclusion, 
excess, and the limits of phenomenality, all of which are foreclosed from the dominant cultural 
and political discourse of post-revolutionary Mexico. 
 In this light I want to propose that serialization provides both an important step back 
from and a much-needed compliment to the theory of post-autonomía. First, it enacts a step 
back from what can now be seen as an overly-hasty equation of modern literature with 
tropological language and signification; serialization helps us to see how literature also engages 
with a kind of relationality that is irreducible to the conversion of signifiers into meaning. 
Second, it could possibly add a useful supplement to Ludmer’s efforts to think about how 
today’s global capitalist system presents a real conundrum for the critical tradition. Post-
autonomy names a time in which both social organization and critical sensibilities are being 
reshaped by the hegemony of the market, premised on the tendential elimination of exclusion 
from our political and cultural vocabularies. There is room for anything and everything in the 
market so long as it presents itself as one brand among many; the market excludes nothing 
except perhaps exclusion itself.55 It may be that there can be no such thing as epistemological 
privilege under such conditions: if the tools that were once proper to critical thought have now 
become part and parcel of the system against which this thought aims its critiques, then the 
more devastating the critique the more it serves to strengthen the system at which it takes aim. 
In that case there would no longer be a critical role for literary or artistic sublimation today. 
Perhaps, following the path indicated by Deleuze, literature’s urgent task today would be not to 
fill in gaps but to make them appear as such. In order to show what serialization might look like 
in Aira’s text let me first say something about emplotment and context.  
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 Like many of his novels, La villa is set in Flores, Aira’s own neighborhood in Buenos 
Aires. Stylistically speaking the work displays elements of melodrama, the thriller and the hard-
boiled detective novel. The episodic structure of the plot is driven by a series of unexpected 
developments that tend toward the absurd. In the novel the Flores neighborhood borders on a 
fictive villa miseria or shantytown, and it is in and around this metonymy of “barbarism” that 
much of the action in the novel takes place.56 The uncanny presence of the villa in the heart of a 
metropolis that has always considered itself “the Paris of the South” is complemented by the 
shadowy existence of those who remain unaccounted for in the prevailing calculus of the social 
in post-dictatorship Argentina. The inhabitants of urban and suburban villas have historically 
included impoverished migrants from the country’s interior as well as illegal immigrants from 
Andean countries. In recent decades the villas have also come to be associated with a 
transnational drug trade that has flourished in Argentina alongside the systematic dismantling 
of old social structures. Moreover the villas have long posed a problem for the Argentine state 
and for the ruling ideology (liberal, populist or authoritarian). Under the populist regime of Juan 
Perón (1946-55) the existence of the villas was officially denied while at the same time images 
of state interventions to improve life of villa residents were used to highlight Peronism’s 
dedication to incorporating the working poor into modern society. Since the 1990s, meanwhile, 
the number of villas in and around Buenos Aires has grown dramatically in conjunction with 
increasing disparities between rich and poor. In the wake of Menem’s privatization reforms and 
the subsequent economic crisis of 2001 villa inhabitants have been obliged to pursue informal 
strategies for survival. Aira’s novel employs two of the most recognizable and powerful images 
of crisis and informality in Argentina: the common practice of constructing illegal networks of 
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cables to draw electricity from the local power grid, and the emergence of trash-picking as a 
semi-permanent vocation for a large number of Argentines. The term used to describe these 
practitioners is cartoneros.   
 It would not be difficult to surmise that the location of the villa in the heart of the 
metropolis generates a literary image of the failure of transition in Argentina during the 1980s 
and 90s, a transition from one political form to another (dictatorship to democracy) and from 
one principle of social organization to another (state to market). Similarly, the spectral sight of 
the cartoneros emerging from the villa to make their nocturnal rounds attests to the violence 
that accompanies and sustains a new phase of accumulation in Latin America today. The 
cartoneros would bear witness to the ongoing nature of what Marx calls “primitive 
accumulation.” The story of primitive accumulation names both an end and a new beginning in 
Marx’s analysis, as the destruction of old social forms and practices clears the way for the 
emergence of capitalist social relations characterized by the separation of capital and labor. 
Whereas Adam Smith attributes the separation of capital and labor to a moral discrepancy 
between virtue (embodied in those who know how to save) and vice (those who spend all they 
have and more) Marx reminds us that the accumulation required for capitalist production had 
material origins: in colonialist expropriation, legalized land-grabs, and criminalization of social 
practices deemed incompatible with the generation of surplus labor populations. Such 
processes generated a new class of people who, in Marx’s words, have “nothing to sell but their 
own skins” (Marx 1977, 873).  
 Aira’s novel appears to propose that we are now approaching the extreme limit of the 
history traced by Marx. On one hand the growth of cartonero populations should be 
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understood in the context of new forms of accumulation (flexible production, financial 
speculation) that first took root under the military dictatorships of the 1970s. The cartoneros 
populations would therefore attest to a new forms of accumulation in which the expropriation 
and reinscription of the common (e.g., public space, social justice, and the regulatory or welfare 
state model) generates the space and resources needed for the emergence of new forms of 
capitalism (post-Fordism and financial speculation). On the other hand the analogy with 
“primitive accumulation” understood as the origin of capitalism also has its limits, because the 
figure of the cartonero presents an inversion of the fable use by political economy to rationalize 
the origins of capitalism. The cartoneros embody a new social phenomenon for which even the 
unfreedom of labor market comes close to being out of reach. For this population the only 
access to even marginal and temporary employment lies in whatever residual value can be 
found in the refuse produced by the system—assuming they can get there before the city 
sanitation workers. If survival for the cartoneros depends on their ability to recover whatever 
the system generates as garbage, is this not because they themselves, qua social form, embody 
a kind of detritus of the system? 
 While a reading of the villa as allegory of the violent birth pangs of neoliberal transition 
seems irrefutable it also has a potentially fatal weakness: its inability to account for the fact 
that Aira is clearly interested in the villa not as a site for critique but as a literary topos. 
Moreover his unapologetic attempts to discover the literary in a site commonly associated with 
crime and suffering flies in the face of a social realist tradition that, from Bernardo Verbitsky on, 
sought to highlight both the social reality and the dignity of the villa inhabitants—and which has 
more or less overtly rejected what it considers to be the “literary” treatments of poverty found 
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in classical Argentine literature from Echeverría to Borges.  
 A few words about the plot of La villa will help give a sense of how the novel positions 
itself in relation to contemporary social, cultural and political debates in Argentina. In the first 
part of the novel we have the story of Maxi, a young body-builder who comes from a middle 
class family. Maxi is remarkable both for his physique and because, for whatever reason, he 
simply does not think; he embodies the pure spontaneity and selflessness of non-reflexive, 
uncalculating life. When he is not working out he devotes his time to assisting the cartoneros as 
they make their nocturnal rounds, competing with the sanitation services for anything that 
could conceivably be sold, eaten or repurposed. Whereas his self-absorbed teenage sister and 
their upper middle-class neighbors have adopted the habit of looking past the cartoneros as if 
they did not exist, Maxi joins these spectral residents as they traverse the city, helping to push 
their overloaded carts and hoist the more unwieldy items. Maxi is the ethical subject of the 
novel, performing his role as protector of the vulnerable and powerless with no concern 
whatsoever for what he himself might stand to benefit. Perhaps most noteworthy about 
Maxi—and as his name itself suggests—is the maxim that governs his actions. In aiding the 
cartoneros he responds to a law that has been evacuated of all particular content, all self-
interest and calculation. The true motivation that prompts Maxi to join the cartoneros every 
night remains mysterious. It is not just that his rationale is never revealed to the reader; Maxi 
himself never stops to reflect on his reasons for helping them, or perhaps he is incapable of 
such ethical reflection. His actions respond to a call whose origins remain beyond interrogation. 
In this respect he is like the rose in Angelus Silesius’s famous poem: he does not ask himself 
why he does what he does, he simply does it. Within the world of Aira’s novel it may be 
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precisely because he does not ask questions that Maxi finds himself on the side of the good; 
those who do think, by contrast, inevitably end up interpreting their situations badly, often with 
dismal consequences for themselves or others. The promise Maxi appears to embody, that the 
good could be brought into the world if we would only renounce the calculating and speculative 
deliberations that are proper to thinking, is one of the most seductive and also one of the more 
troubling aspects of Aira’s novel.57  
 The second part of the novel presents a parallel intrigue of drug trade, murder, and 
police surveillance. The cast of characters includes the Inspector Cabezas (a hard-boiled 
detective who, in contrast to Maxi and in homage to Poe and Borges, could be described as a 
puro razonador), a judge, an evangelical minister (who turns out to be the judge’s son working 
as a police informant), and another Cabezas, unrelated to the inspector, who seeks to bring his 
slain daughter’s killers to justice. The novel’s melodramatic culmination occurs when these two 
threads finally run together, as Maxi’s sister and her friend venture to the villa to make a drug 
buy and unwittingly lead the police to the place where the traffickers have hidden their stash. 
In a series of misrecognitions the Inspector Cabezas shoots the evangelist/informer after 
mistaking him for a member of the cartel, and then is in turn mistakenly pegged by the police as 
a rogue cop working for the cartel as a hitman. The ensuing police manhunt, which comprises 
the final episodes of the novel, is followed closely by news helicopters; the televised coverage 
of the events—seen from the perspective of the Inspector as he sits holed up in a pizzeria—
provides a live feed of the search for the assassin interspersed with frequent updates on the 
cast of characters in this real-life drama. The novel’s concluding episode offers a parody of 
mediatic coverage of violent crime, replete with claims to “full coverage” and “breaking news” 
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and plagued by ironic misinterpretations and distortions of the storyline. As a literary citation of 
mass media the conclusion illuminates at least two important ideas. The first concerns the 
question of form and repetition: Aira’s novel shows that the discourse it mimics is itself already 
a repetition of literary drama, including tragedy, comedy and melodrama. Second, the parody 
not only exposes the internal inconsistencies and absurdities of the discourse it repeats; in this 
case it also sheds light on how mass media and its ideologemes shape the way we perceive, 
think and imagine our world today.   
 Serialization in La villa would work as follows. In the first series we have a set of 
characters related to one another by way of their respective relations or non-relations to those 
quasi-invisible but increasingly ubiquitous urban dwellers, the cartoneros: Maxi, his family, and 
their friends and upper middle-class neighbors. The cartoneros both symbolically and quite 
literally have no place—no home to speak of and no social subjectivity. Not entirely unlike the 
garbage in which they seek the means to sustain themselves, they are the detritus of neoliberal 
privatization and of a post-Fordist mode of accumulation based on speculation and cultural 
commodity production. A second series is formed, meanwhile, when a certain subset of those 
characters are drawn into relation with other characters (the judge, the two Cabezas, and the 
minister) by an element that does not appear in the series itself: the lure of the mythical drug 
proxidina, whose renowned effect is “to bring everything closer” [acercarlo todo], but which is 
never there where it ought to be, never in its place. Proxidina is the analogue of detritus: the 
drug as lack or empty place of consumption in juxtaposition to trash as excess of consumption 
and cartoneros as the non-consumer, the occupant without a place in the market.  
True to his name, Cabezas is the embodiment of reason. Akin to the protagonist of Poe’s 
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detective stories—to say nothing of Aira himself and his literary procedimiento—Cabezas 
employs a foolproof, infinitely repeatable rational method for solving mysteries. Toward the 
end of the novel, and after catching a glimpse of the villa in its entirety while watching the 
aerial footage provided by a news helicopter, he manages to crack the code through which the 
cartel had communicated with its clientele while avoiding police surveillance. But in following 
through on this discovery Cabezas will find himself caught up in a fatally ironic denouement 
that recalls Borges’s rewriting of Poe in “La muerte y la brújula.” Cabezas’s downfall nicely 
illustrates how textual play with notions of place and displacement in La villa coincides with the 
novel’s reflections on mediatization as a technological mechanism for globalization, i.e., for the 
unification of the globe under a mediatic order that operates in real time and is governed, as 
we have already seen, by the logical economy of commodity demand, production and 
consumption. After deciphering the cartel’s code and intuiting where the cartel has its stash 
hidden the Inspector Cabezas makes his way to the secret location only to discover that he has 
been had. The spatial configuration of the villa is a vast circle of randomly-arranged, tightly-
packed shacks, with meandering passages leading from various points on the circumference in 
toward the center. The only way for outsiders to distinguish one entry point from another and 
thereby navigate the labyrinthine structure of informal construction is by consulting a 
configuration of light bulbs that has been arranged in unique fashion at each of the entry 
points. Every entry bears its own distinctive image; the path the Inspector is seeking is 
distinguished by a configuration arranged to resemble a duck. The unity of place in the villa can 
be altered, however, when the narcos—who have been tipped off to the imminent arrival of 
the Inspector—rotate the electrical image of the duck to another point on the circumference, 
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thereby leading Cabezas down the wrong path. Retrospectively we see that Cabezas’s downfall 
resides in his unshakeable belief in unity: in the unity of the sign or of place. The novel’s comic 
denouement is consistent with the critical belief that mass media technics undermines 
traditional values and concepts. 
 La villa looks at the ascendance of mass media in Argentina as the emergence of a new 
regime of truth. Aira’s literary treatment of the role of new media, especially television, in 
shaping public perception shares important insights with Martin Heidegger’s account of 
modern technological evolution. Particularly relevant is Heidegger’s association of modern 
technics with Gestell, a term that could be translated as “framing,” “installation” or 
“emplacement.” In an approach that resonates with the chapters’ epigraph, La villa portrays 
the mediatic regime as giving shape to a technologically produced world in which elements that 
once functioned as indices of transcendence have been subsumed into the here and now. We 
encounter a motif for this thought of total subsumption within the present in a literary 
description of the judge with whom the Inspector is competing to see who can be the first to 
crack the drug ring:  
In one of the judge’s most famous and misunderstood pronouncements, she 
once declared that her only wish was that, when her brief time on earth had 
come to an end, she would have left it a better place than she had found it. This 
may have struck some as a mere expediency, but things were in fact more 
complicated. For one, introducing something new into the world is no easy 
matter: it would have been like bringing back a rock from the moon, except that 
given the way things are today the moon is now in the world. She did not have in 
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mind creating a new combination of elements using things already at hand, nor 
did she intend to change the place occupied by something in the world. She 
meant adding something truly new, a new element with which—if one wanted 
to—one could combine old elements. At the same time, coming from a 
magistrate this was a strange desire indeed. Justice operates according to a zero 
sum logic. One could say that justice must leave a given situation with exactly 
the same number of elements previously encountered in it. Such is the essence 
of its task. As for adding something new, that task belongs to art. (Aira 2001, 
136-37; all translations of Aira are my own)58 
 I want first to pick up on the literary disqualification of this hypothetical moon rock on 
earth as a non-event. In a time dominated by techno-scientific and techno-military rationales 
and their calculative appropriations of (outer) space, the ontological status of the moon is 
transformed from a celestial signifier of the beyond (an immutable series of concentric spheres 
for Aristotle, for example) to one point among many in a cosmological system that has been 
fully mapped. The event of the first lunar landing announced the imminent technological 
domination of a sphere that had for millennia metonymically designated the unreachable 
and/or the unchangeable. In Aira’s novel the allusion to that event and its ripple effects 
provides an image for a technologically-driven world-historical transformation, which collapses 
the cosmological distance that was once the horizon for thinking and acting in the world. At the 
same time, the subsumption of the beyond into the here and now calls into question the 
Platonic understanding of truth as residing beyond the world of appearances. The ontological 
tremors unleashed by the phrase “the moon is now in the world” are consistent with the view 
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that the era of media differentiation necessitates a rethinking of the hermeneutic tradition that 
arose in the context of print-dominated societies. This literary image of subsumption would 
seem to be consistent with the Jamesonian account of postmodernity as the flattening out of 
old surface/depth dichotomies. Aira’s novel develops these motifs through a reflection on mass 
media and its role in reshaping our experience of the world, portraying a world that has been 
entirely transformed into a picture or an image. I borrow this phrase from Martin Heidegger’s 
1938 essay “Die Zeit des Weltbildes,” whose title has been translated into English as “The Age 
of the World Picture” (The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays).59  
 For Heidegger the modern philosophical tradition that begins with Descartes is 
grounded in an understanding of being as totality of objects capable of being represented or of 
appearing before a subject. Beings can only appear qua beings—and not nothing—insofar as 
they allow themselves to be objectified and measured according to the logical criteria of 
philosophy. The subject, meanwhile, is understood as the ground or origin that gathers 
appearances back into itself, thereby securing a proper place for everything that is. This 
subject-driven ordering process generates a world that comes into focus as a picture [Bild], 
which is to say as the totality of objects that lend themselves to being represented and ordered 
by a subject. Heidegger’s view of modernity as governed by calculative reason is equally 
applicable to modern methods of portraying the past (historiography) as to techno-scientific 
representations of present and future. The calculative ordering of the world aims to secure a 
place for the subject, who enters into the picture—or establishes its sovereignty—as the one 
who has anticipated the world as totality.60 
 Heidegger also suggests that this subject-centered project of domination can potentially 
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become a victim of its own success. Under the influence of modern techno-scientific thinking it 
is increasingly the system itself—in lieu of the representing human agent—that initiates and 
administers the ongoing ordering of the real. In Heidegger’s words, “where the world becomes 
picture, the system, and not only in thinking, comes to dominance” (Heidegger 1977, 141). In 
contrast to other modes of revealing and ordering the world, technics as enframing (Gestell) 
determines the essence or being of what is as “standing reserve” or as a totality of resources 
available to be counted, stockpiled and consumed. Whereas traditional forms of technology left 
room for a reciprocal relation with nature—the mill let itself be driven by the whims of the river 
current in Heidegger’s prosaic example—modern technology tends to assert itself over against 
nature; the power plant, to continue the analogy, demands the extraction of coal from the 
earth or imposes itself by damming up the river. Although modern technological systems clearly 
take root in a metaphysical view of the world based on subject-object relations, the 
evolutionary drive of modern technology threatens to override the old aim of securing a ground 
for the representing subject. Thus the historical irony identified by Heidegger: in a world now 
tendentially dominated by Gestell what awaits us is not the complete domination of nature by 
the human, but instead the demise of the old dream of the subject as master of its world. This 
displacement of the subject is no longer a mere hypothetical possibility; it becomes increasingly 
conceivable as technological evolution outstrips traditional conceits about technology as a 
means to an end and as a tool employed by a human agent. Amidst the relentless drive of 
Gestell there would seem to be nothing that could prevent the human itself from sliding fully 
into the picture, or into the stockpile of “standing reserve.” Indeed, one could say that such an 
event has already been announced, either because all time has now been incorporated into a 
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calculative, administrative rationale that self-evidently equates the human with “human 
resources,” or because the deployment of sovereignty today enforces a systematic reduction of 
the human to that figure of disposability that Agamben calls “bare life.” 
 Let us return to the novel’s assertion that “the moon is now in the world” and juxtapose 
this figure with Heidegger’s discussion of the world become picture. With that phrase Aira is 
doing something more than just commenting on the impact of the historical event of the lunar 
landing. That event is recalled as a proleptic announcement of a new situation that in Argentina 
only obtains at the end of the millennium. The distinction between the celestial and sublunary 
worlds will have been suspended in a time when both inner life and social practices have been 
subjugated by the demands of technological manipulation, programming and calculation. One 
could certainly read this tropological inclusion of the “outside” within the “inside” as indicating 
that the human has, in Maurice Blanchot’s words, “become astral” (Blanchot 1993, 396), or that 
humans can now accomplish what was formerly the proper domain of the stars. Aira suggests, 
however, that the collapsing of the celestial into the terrestrial world does not inaugurate a 
new immanent order of things in which the world now administers itself as a stable, self-
contained totality, i.e., with humanity fully in control of an always expanding and accelerating 
technological prowess. On the contrary, this tropological subsumption attests to the feeling 
that, with the collapse of the old horizon that separated the here-and-now from the beyond, 
our time suffers from a loss of sense. In Aira’s words, when “nobody sees the whole, especially 
because in reality there is no whole” (Aira 2001, 55) then “nothing makes sense, even within 
sense” (63).61 The inclusion of the beyond in the here and now is experienced as the loss of the 
world’s constitutive outside. That the moon is now part of the world means that the inside or 
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the sublunary, which has always received its bearings and its meaning from its relation to a 
certain beyond, can no longer sustain itself as a unified, coherent totality.  
 “Nothing makes sense, even within sense”: While I am taking this paradoxical phrase as 
a shorthand way that Aira’s novel has for illustrating the profoundly unsettling effects of 
technological (tele-technic and technocratic) globalization together with incapacity of our 
modern conceptual vocabularies to make sense of this new situation, we saw in the previous 
discussion of artistic innovation that this could also provide one possible formulation of the 
real, which is by definition refractory to thought. This sentence names in enigmatic fashion the 
unthought in contemporary thought. In the context of innovation and the avant garde, it is both 
from and toward this (non)place that all writing takes form. In this light we can begin to 
visualize an important difference between Sarlo, who believes that we can still think and write 
our way out of our current conundrum through a return to aesthetic values, and Aira, who is 
not in search of an exit from contemporary nihilism but rather a site from which a thinking 
confrontation with the present and its unthought might be possible.  
 La villa illustrates a powerful imaginary that coincides with the ascent of mass media 
technics while posing a significant challenge to modern epistemology. I will call this the fantasy 
of total inclusion and full coverage, allowing these terms to resonate with a variety of cultural, 
technological, epistemological and political contexts in the time of neoliberal globalization. The 
term “total inclusion” corresponds with the technological administering of free choice and 
unlimited economic opportunity in the market, the logic of which becomes hegemonic for all 
social spheres in post-dictatorship Southern Cone. “Full coverage,” meanwhile, names the self-
presentation of mass media as technologically equipped to provide direct, instantaneous and 
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universal access to the totality of the social, in real time and with no omissions or modifications, 
so that the viewer can freely choose what conclusions to draw from the data.62 Full coverage 
appeals to the identification of mass media with contemporaneity and unfettered access to the 
real. Full coverage and total inclusion are thus ideological signifiers that serve to dissimulate the 
forms of violence, the exclusions and the gaps that accompany the economically-driven 
reorganization of post-dictatorship Southern Cone societies. La villa explores the effects of this 
sweeping reconfiguration of the social by playing with the mediatic notion of full coverage, 
even to the point of mimicking its idiom, while also suggesting that the notion of total visibility 
includes its own peculiar kind of exclusion (more on that shortly). However, Aira’s literary 
reflection on technics and mass media is not a critique in the same vein as Sarlo’s essay. What 
La villa has to say does not presuppose or seek to imagine an alternative terrain outside the 
situation on which it reflects; nor does it rely, as Sarlo does, on a presumably clear and stable 
distinction between domains (e.g., art that fosters critical awareness as opposed to mass 
culture that anaesthetizes critical thinking). Not only does Aira’s novel thematize the absence of 
any site untainted by technological mediation and image commodification, it also self-
consciously highlights the presence of these tendencies in its own literary language.  
 In the introduction to Reading Matters, a critical anthology of essays on literature and 
mass media, Joseph Tabbi and Michael Wutz describe how writers such as Thomas Pynchon 
envision the technological development of new media leading up to a global system of 
knowledge and control that, for better or for worse, could alleviate the need for human 
oversight and decision-making. According to Tabbi and Wutz, this “endlessly looping, total 
knowledge” is precisely what Pynchon and other writers resist or attempt to transform by 
131 
 
imagining other, more affirmative uses for technology (Tabbi and Wutz 1997, 21). At the same 
time, the anthology editors also suggest that a total system of knowledge is logistically 
impossible, since its development would require “more time—more machine time and 
memory—more paper, more and cheaper human labor, more everything than the universe 
provides” (21).  
 In my reading La villa likewise raises doubts about the possibility of total knowledge or 
“complete coverage,” albeit with an important distinction. For Tabbi and Wutz the infinite must 
be considered a logistical impossibility based on the assumption that we live in a finite universe. 
Their understanding of total knowledge is thus what Hegel would call a bad infinity, or an 
infinity that consists of nothing more than endless accumulation of particularities. For Aira, 
meanwhile, the impossibility of complete coverage is logical in nature. As we will see, it is 
determined by the fact that the mediatic system generates excesses it cannot account for and 
control. It is there that the question of literature and mass media inserts itself in an important 
way. We have already seen how critics have documented Aira’s tendency to incorporate 
thematic and stylistic elements of television and other new media as a form of neo-avant garde 
rejuvenation of literary history today. Now, in light of this consideration of mass media as truth 
regime and of the possible limits of the ideology of full coverage and total exposure, I want to 
advance the following hypothesis: in Aira’s novel the literary incorporation of mass media—its 
sensibilities, its rhythms, its rhetoric, and its self-presentation—also generates a certain 
distortion or warping effect, which in turn exposes a limit for the self-presentation of mass 
media technics. This limit should not be conflated with the idea of an outside; it designates an 
excess that is produced through technical framing, reproduction and transmission but which 
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does not therefore remain within the sway of technological reason. This excess or limit is thus 
profoundly literary, even when it does not stem from literary texts, because it mimics the sense 
in which literature is itself constituted through an excess of words. I call this limit 
“overexposure” as the other side of full exposure.63 
 Rather than rely on supposedly stable distinctions between televisual media and mass 
culture on the one hand, and prior modes of technics and cultural production on the other, 
Aira’s text invites us to consider how mass media technics reproduces certain features found in 
traditional technological forms and understandings while intensifying contradictions inherent to 
human interaction with technics. This double movement of repetition and intensification can be 
elaborated by way of important points made by Samuel Weber in his discussion of television as 
a privileged sphere for thinking about mass media and technics (Weber 1996, 108-28). As the 
word “television” suggests [tele-: from afar] one of the powerful presuppositions driving the 
expansion of mass media in the world today is the notion that televisual technology extends 
visibility across distance. Since a body can only be present in one place at a time, distance not 
only constitutes a limit for the body, it marks the body as a limit. Tele-vision embodies the 
promise of overcoming those corporeal limits by making what can be seen in one place visible 
in another place. What gets transmitted in a television signal is thus never just a specific stream 
of images but also the power of vision and presentation themselves. Like all technological 
apparatuses, television functions as a prosthesis supplementing a limit that we tend to perceive 
as a deficiency of being. It should thus be clear that televisual technology is itself a form of 
globalization insofar as it promises a profound reduction or elimination of distance.  
  We saw previously that Sarlo locates the specificity of mass media technics in the 
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production and circulation of the electronic image, whose essence she understands as 
simulacrum. The problem posed by the simulacrum is that it effaces what the Western tradition 
has always held to be a necessary distinction between original and copy, or mere appearance 
and truth. A simulacrum is neither copy nor original but an orphaned copy that cannot be 
traced back to any origin that would be free from repetition, reproduction and artifice. 
However, the seemingly self-evident identification of mass media technics with image and 
simulacrum risks overlooking a crucial dimension of televisual technics. As McLuhan argued, the 
specificity of television requires us to address not only the image content but also, and even 
more fundamentally, the medium itself. Among its many and considerable merits, Weber’s 
essay emphasizes the way in which televisual medium produces ideological effects that in turn 
mediate the way in which we perceive technics, the world and ourselves in it. Televisual 
technics reproduces in the here and now an act of perception originating in another place. It is 
not just the image, then, but the power to perceive and (re)produce images that is at stake 
here. The images that appear on the TV screen are like impressions derived from another’s 
perception (that of the person holding the camera, for instance); and yet televisual 
transmission “sees” in a way that nobody ever could: by being capable of becoming present in 
more than one place at a time. Whereas we think of our subjective perceptions as situated and 
thus intransferrable, the technical process of image capture in television technology 
presupposes the possibility of duplication and transmission. This is not to say that the 
situatedness of perception is absent from television, but rather that the boundary between the 
singularity of place (situatedness of perspective) and the generality of what can be transmitted 
and made visible anywhere in real time (the electronic image) becomes unstable. Here we can 
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see a connection with Heidegger’s meditation on Gestell: televisual technics brings the act of 
perception into view as the power to frame and place something before our eyes. 
The television screen is the site of…an uncanny confusion and confounding. In 
the uncanniness of such confusion, what Derrida has called the irreducible 
“iterability” of the mark—that repeatability that both allows a trait to constitute 
its identity while splitting it at the same time—manifests itself in the only way 
open to it (since it is not of the order of manifestation), namely, as the 
undecidable being of the televised images we see. (Weber 1996, 121) 
 In Weber’s view, televisual technics calls into question—but stops short of 
overthrowing—some of modern philosophy’s foundational assumptions, including notions of 
body, subject, place and event. Mass media technics causes these philosophemes to become 
unstable because it intensifies the paradoxes and uncertainties that have always resided in 
them. For example, while television technology appears to transcend the limits that define our 
embodied scopic relation to the world around us, it also reintroduces separation in the very 
presentation of perception. Limits do not simply dissolve into the televisual ether but instead 
return—uncannily, as we shall soon see—as internal to the televisual process itself. What we 
see when we watch TV is not something taking place here in front of us alone. What is “on” 
here corresponds with an act of perception going on in some other place, something that is also 
being transmitted to an untold number of other locations at the same time. But if television 
presents the “same” images and the “same” power of perception in multiple places, then what 
is “here” televisually speaking can never be fully present, since that would exclude being 
present anywhere else. When it comes to television, the very reference to “the same” 
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underscores the fact that presentation can no longer be the same as itself—assuming it ever 
was. Tele-visual presentation turns out to be governed a ghostly logic: its transmissions are 
neither fully present nor simply absent. The technics of transmission and reception both 
extends and divides the identity of the perceiving-presenting subject (who ought to be only in 
one place at a time) as well as the unity of place (since here by definition cannot also be there). 
By the same token, the temporality of televisual transmission also disturbs the unity of what we 
call an event. If nothing in televisual transmission allows us to determine definitively whether 
we are viewing a live broadcast or a recording, and if what is “on” here is always going on 
someplace else, then the ontological status of the event understood as origin and first time has 
been placed in question—even before we begin to consider the problem of the so-called 
“media event.”  
 In contrast to what was said earlier in discussing Sarlo’s position on mass media, Weber 
indicates that television cannot prevent the constitutive reproducibility of the image (its 
iterability) from flashing before our eyes. If the systematizing drive of modern technics frames 
being as the totality of objects that can be dominated technologically and made available for 
consumption or instrumentalization, the setting-in-place of the televisual image would seem to 
disclose a limit internal to this calculative project: iterability both grants the image its power to 
appear while signaling the impossibility of determining a first time or ever becoming fully 
present. The appearing of the image thus coincides with the impossibility of establishing its 
ontological status (presence or representation?). The televisual image is a ghost that hovers in 
an ontologically undefinable zone between eidos and copy, appearance and epiphenomenon, 
presence and absence. The law of iterability unsettles the picture at the same time that it 
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enables the picture to constitute itself. Televisual presentation thus belongs to the logic of the 
event—because something happens, because there is presentation—but it cannot be made 
fully consistent with the logic by which events are customarily understood, since any such 
appearance, no matter how original, has already been inscribed within the secondary time of 
repetition. The tele-visual overcoming of distance thus cannot avoid reintroducing distance and 
separation. However, its flickering light does indeed seem to be more adept than other forms of 
technology at softening the ambiguities and paradoxes that accompany these limits. 
 One of the most fascinating instances of Aira’s literary reflection on mass media occurs 
toward the end of the novel, which as mentioned earlier culminates in a manhunt after a police 
informant is gunned down in a tragic misunderstanding on the periphery of the villa. The 
fugitive suspect of the manhunt, again, is none other than the unfortunate Inspector Cabezas, 
who shot the informant after mistaking him for a member of the drug cartel. The police, 
unaware of this fatal misunderstanding, believe the Inspector to be a rogue cop working for the 
cartel. As the forces of law and order close in on the villa, news helicopters circle overhead 
providing live coverage of the operation. The Inspector, meanwhile, has fled and sits holed up 
in a nearby pizzeria watching the events—how else?—as they unfold on TV. Media coverage of 
the “breaking news” assumes center stage in this literary drama, alternating between live 
footage of the manhunt and investigative reports delving into the sordid and tragic histories of 
victim and suspect. Aira’s literary treatment of the media event is driven by a series of 
misrecognitions and thereby provides an example of what Contreras calls desfasaje. In addition 
to the aforementioned misunderstandings surrounding the death of the informant, the media 
conflates the Inspector with another Ignacio Cabezas, a civilian whose daughter was the 
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accidental victim of an earlier shooting in the villa and who has been mounting a grassroots 
campaign to bring her unknown killers to justice. On the basis of these conflations, the real-
time coverage of the events unfolds as a fable about a grief-stricken father who has confused 
justice with revenge.  
 In a scene that illustrates another sense of desfasaje, meanwhile, we find a description 
of media coverage as it inadvertently—but also symptomatically—focuses on itself. The 
manhunt is conducted in the midst of a violent storm with high winds that cause the news 
helicopters to be tossed back and forth in midair. The live feed coming from the helicopters 
attests in real time to this turbulence, with images of the manhunt around the villa interspersed 
with occasional errant footage of other news helicopters with their TV cameras. What began as 
an uncanny scene in which the Inspector Cabezas sees himself in distorted form on TV, his face 
and history contorted almost beyond recognition by confusion and mistaken identities, morphs 
into a dizzying scenario in which television coverage of the event is interspersed with televisual 
coverage of itself covering the event. The inadvertent and spasmodic rhythm of mediatic self-
coverage would seem to be a parodic literalization of Sarlo’s claim: there is no event before the 
camera shows up, and thus the camera becomes indistinguishable from the event itself.  
I propose that we call this a scene of overexposure, exploiting both the photo-technical 
sense of the term (exposure of a negative as step in the reproduction process) as well as its 
epistemological sense (exposure or revelation of a concealed truth). The term clearly resonates 
with mass media culture and its specific form of technical reproduction: full coverage, in real 
time and from all conceivable angles, as synonymous with truth. The specific appeal in the idea 
of full coverage brings to mind two distinct sources. The first is a technological fetish rooted in 
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the belief that technological evolution brings us closer and closer to an immediate relation to 
the real. The other is a connection between “full coverage” and the association of the market 
with the end of exclusion: just as the market always benefits from the inclusion of new options, 
the transition from state to market opens up space for everyone to participate in the rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship. Full coverage and full inclusion are two variations on the theme 
of representation.  
Overexposure illustrates a way in which Aira’s text can be said to read itself: as 
extending insights generated at a given point in the novel onto prior moments in the narrative. 
The earlier moments are thereby “overexposed” to a second-order reading that superimposes 
itself over earlier possible readings. The linear chronology of narrative development would thus 
be overwritten by a second, non-linear movement of doubling back in which narrative folds 
back on its earlier presentations in order to highlight new interpretive possibilities made 
possible by subsequent developments. Textual meaning in Aira would thus be subject to 
transformation a posteriori. I will offer an example of what this might look like momentarily.  
The scene I have been discussing supports two readings that are not easily made 
compatible with one another. The first reading, whose skeletal framework has just been 
presented, would take as its point of departure Sarlo’s claim that mass media presides over the 
displacement of the sign by the simulacrum. With the strategic rearrangement of lights on the 
periphery of the villa we saw how Aira’s novel thematizes a destabilization of the unity of the 
sign. Now, with the sporadic appearance of other cameras in the media feed, the text presents 
us with an image in which the ordinary understanding of mass media, as dedicated to the 
exposure of truth and dissemination of information that exists apart from the media apparatus, 
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is subverted. If television promises to place another act of perception before us, the accidental 
appearance of another camera on the screen constitutes a symptomatic excess, or what Lacan 
would call a stain. A stain is what happens when the conditions of possibility for representation, 
which cannot logically appear within the field of visibility to which they give rise, uncannily and 
in distorted fashion intrude into the picture. Like the death’s head in Holbein’s painting The 
Ambassadors, it is the incursion of the frame on what it frames, or the showing through of the 
foreclosure that made the picture possible in the first place. One can go back in search of 
similar “excesses,” such as the presence of the villa miseria and the cartoneros in the heart of 
Buenos Aires. Literary treatments of mediatic coverage and social crisis reflect a number of 
formal similarities: in both cases, part of the hegemonic order (mass media and its claim to 
provide complete coverage of the social; neoliberalism and its claim to institute a more natural 
organization of the social) can be seen, by virtue of what mediatic and literary optics make 
visible, to have constituted itself through an exclusion or foreclosure, which is subsequently 
rendered invisible by the prevailing rationale of the system.  
The second reading superimposes itself on the first reading, not unlike the overexposure 
of a photographic negative. While it does not refute the first reading, the second reading 
suggests that the first must be situated historically, and that it has force only so long as we 
continue to believe that we can still distinguish the technological form of mediatic presentation 
and mediation from its social content. It could be that what in another era might have struck 
the reader’s eye as a symptomatic excess or stain today no longer constitutes a stain at all. For 
traditional understandings of the media and its social role, the accidental appearance of the TV 
camera within a televised feed would indeed have constituted an unwanted—and therefore 
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potentially illuminating—surprise. The presence of a camera “looking back” at us as we follow 
the unfolding of some real-life drama on TV would invite us to confront the invisible framing 
mechanisms that make televisual presentation possible, and whose non-appearance is a 
requirement for television to produce its reality effect. If the concept of media event has 
become commonplace today, however, then the accidental appearance of a camera on the 
screen would be no longer constitute the same kind of uncanny excess or stain. The camera is 
by now, as Heidegger would say, fully in the picture. It is now well known that mediatic 
presentations are shaped by bias, and the notion of objective, disinterested reporting has by 
now been put to rest. If the event and its mediatic presentation are no longer rigorously 
distinguishable and if everyone knows this to be the case, then the unintended appearance of a 
camera can no longer metonymically embody the unthought and unspoken truth of the news 
production and distribution process.  
What then could Aira’s novel still have to say to us, beyond the banality of repeating 
what is already well known? Perhaps we would do well to recall the Hegelian adage that what is 
familiar and well known is not really cognized at all (Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface, §31). Do 
the axiomatic truths of media bias and commodification themselves preside over a certain kind 
of exclusion? One possible response would be that what is excluded from the time of the media 
event is the very possibility of talking about truth, and that we should be asking what interests 
are served in relativistic eliminations of that possibility.  
In light of this second reading, let us return once more to the question of transposing 
the insights gleaned from the novel’s concluding scene onto earlier moments. Could the 
alternative reading of the mediatic stain I have been hinting at—the camera’s intrusion into the 
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screen as non-event, or as mark of overexposure that signals the exhaustion of that old 
equation of mediatic representation with exposure or revelation—be carried over to the socio-
economic problems thematized by Aira’s novel? Could it be that the visible presence of the 
cartoneros in the capital no longer constitutes a cognitive excess within the social topography 
of post-dictatorship Argentina? Have we reached a point where the cartoneros, in distinction 
from prior manifestations of the subaltern, can no longer be said to embody the obscene, 
unacknowledged exception to the developmentalist thinking that has dominated both the Left’s 
and the Right’s views of history in Latin America since the early 19th century? Consider Maxi’s 
upper-middle class neighbors and sister, whose social interactions and positions are predicated 
on their having rendered invisible the villa and its social conditions. Does this “invisibility” have 
the structure of a classical ideological misrecognition, in which the neighbors remain blind to 
the truth of their own situation? Are they simply unwilling to confront the fact that neoliberal 
accumulation produces the kind of extreme poverty and social marginalization that is made 
concrete by the villa and the practices of its inhabitants? Or does this invisibility on the contrary 
come closer to what Peter Sloterdijk calls cynical reason, which—in distinction from classical 
ideology—does not presuppose a separation between consciousness and truth? With cynical 
reason one knows perfectly well what is going on and yet one goes on living one’s life as if it 
had no connection with the social conditions of others.  
If La villa can be said to read itself as I am proposing it does, the results are certainly 
ambiguous. Self-reading discloses a rift between one historical temporality in which there is a 
stain, and another in which “full coverage” and “complete inclusion” name—while 
simultaneously covering over—the collapse of the old distinctions between truth and mere 
142 
 
appearance. What constitutes a stain in the first reading does not necessarily do so in the 
second. What space, if any, is left for imagining an event that would disrupt or transform the 
coordinates of this latter regime?  
Before I address this question, the notion of overexposure can be further developed in 
relation to Jean-Luc Nancy’s claim that, with globalization, we can see—perhaps for the first 
time—that the world and its history have no predetermined sense: no ultimate goal and no 
overarching direction, design, destiny, or meaning. Nor, for that matter, does the world allow 
itself to be conceived as a fully constituted space of immanence, as the apotheoses of free-
market capitalism would have it. As Nancy puts it, “what makes up ‘world’ and ‘sense’ can no 
longer be determined as a given, accomplished, ‘finished’ presence but is intermingled with the 
coming, the in-finity of a coming into presence, or of an e-venire” (Nancy 1997, 126). In 
proposing a thought of being as event [evenire] and arriving [venire], Nancy is not just stating 
that something is still taking place today, that our present moment has not yet been fully 
subsumed within the eternal present of neoliberal Consensus. The neologisms e-venire and in-
finity (or infinite finitude) are Nancy’s names for the incommensurability of any place, time or 
event with itself. These terms work against the reduction of sense to a predicate (the meaning 
of being, of history or of the world) and offer instead a thought of sense as presentation, or as a 
becoming that no system, picture or subject could ever fully grasp or complete. The sense of 
the world is not the meaning that we attribute to the world; it is the way in which a world 
unfolds for us today. If history is no longer understood as possessing a single sense (understood 
as telos or meaning) because it can no longer be theorized from some transcendent viewpoint 
(God, Reason, Progress, Spirit, Man, Revolution), then history now demands to be thought as 
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sense, as an arriving that is always already differing from itself. In the temporality of 
presentation (historical or mediatic) there is always something that remains irreducible to 
presence, something that is not a thing but which also cannot be described adequately as 
transcendence or otherworldly. I am describing a differential thought of sense that is opposed 
to the metaphysical tradition, which has always thought the world on the basis of some 
transcendent beyond and which always thought history as a process defined a priori by a 
determinate idea or goal. Sense understood as the difference of presentation with repsect to 
itself is of course incompatible with claims that we have now arrived at the “end of history,” 
and that globalization is synonymous with the immanence of a world that has become fully 
present to itself.   
 To assert with Sarlo that the world today suffers from a loss of sense qua meaning or 
direction is to remain caught in an unexamined ambiguity: there can be no sense before the 
mark of loss and without the exposure of meaning to repeatability, which is to say the risk of 
separation, alteration, misunderstanding, deferral, and so on. To speak of the loss of sense as if 
there could be sense before loss only serves to fictionalize sense as what it could never be: 
originary presence or fullness. It is to forget that finitude and errancy are constitutive of sense 
in its emergence, and that the law of iterability does not deprive sense of anything it might 
once have possessed. Like all technological terms, iterability names a state of originary 
“default” in which the human is obliged to resort to the supplementary domain of technology in 
order to become what it is.64 
In alluding to the presumed rupture brought about by the ascendancy of mass media, 
Aira’s text also destabilizes the distinction between the time of mass media and its others, 
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exposing what the distinction is obliged to repress and forget: the fact that all language is 
technological in nature (because it is structured by the law of repeatability), or the fact that 
technics supplements everything we consider human—all labor and creative activity, social 
relations, memory and history. If the instrumentalization of language and the commodification 
of the image have become defining features of the age of mass media, those outcomes could 
only have happened because technics was inherent to language in the first place. To 
acknowledge this point need not be synonymous with resigning oneself to the worst 
consequences of neoliberal globalization as if it were an inevitable, self-driven process, but it 
does require that any criticism of neoliberalism and globalization consider carefully the 
(political, moral and epistemological) ground on which it stands.  
 Let us return now to the question posed earlier: What remains for literature in a time 
whose defining experience seems to be a general and prevalent loss of sense, when the old 
distinctions between celestial and sublunary, outside and inside, are no longer able to provide a 
solid basis for thinking, writing and political practice? One possibility to be drawn from Aira’s 
novel is that what remains to be narrated is the story of overexposure or the sense of the loss 
of sense. What remains to be related is a new experience of history. Whereas modern thought 
has tended to view history as structured by an originary goal or as tending toward a logical 
endpoint, the exhaustion of all existing alternatives to free-market capitalism together with the 
increasingly clear fact that the market does not provide the solution for all social problems, 
leaves us facing a history that now manifestly has no telos but which, nonetheless, continues 
opening onto what it is not or what it is not yet. In order to see what this experience of history 
might look like in literature, let us turn once again to the narrative voice of La villa as it offers a 
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poetic assessment of the mediatic image in one of the novel’s concluding scenes. This passage 
offers a quasi-oneiric rendering of the cycle of images that accompany the news reporting on 
the hunt for the presumed assassin. Perhaps the most salient image is a shot of the Inspector’s 
face that has been distorted almost beyond recognition during the electronic reproduction and 
televisual transmission processes. This steam of images that comprise a mediatic account of the 
tragedy tells multiple stories, foremost among which is the age-old parable about the brevity of 
life itself:  
Things were getting frantic on the cable channels. They had found photos of 
Cabezas in their digitalized archives and were interspersing them with images 
from the live feed. This was a face that had been subjected to horrible electronic 
distortion, a face without rhyme or reason. For the duration of its presence on 
the screen the face became more and more distorted by the second. (…) Once 
again it was the theme of the fleetingness of life in the world of images. The 
fantasy that hovered over the television viewers at that moment was an 
exacerbated version of the theme of life’s fleetingness. It was as if an 
intergalactic traveler had landed on a strange planet, without any protection 
(what protection could there be?), and the environmental conditions in that 
world turned out to be unsuitable for sustaining life. Clearly the traveler was 
doomed and would die within a matter of nanoseconds. One could say he was 
already dead….But in the meantime he was still alive; he was landing in the 
world, arriving in the horrendous reality of the world. And this “in the 
meantime” was everything. (Aira 2001, 143)65 
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 This passage offers several possibilities for reading that are not easily reconciled with 
one another. The interpretive excess here is significant for our understanding of the novel and 
of Aira’s work in general. By one reading the horrendous fate of the space traveler points to a 
link between calculation and its spectral others: overexposure and the sense of the loss of 
sense. The connection flashes in the phrase “in the meantime” [mientras tanto], which in the 
context of the doomed astronaut amounts to a leftover or in-between time, the time of 
radiological overexposure in an environment inimical to life. This in-between or residual time 
has been evacuated of the familiar markers that situate time in the metaphysical tradition: as  a 
sequence of autonomous “Nows” linked together by an overarching logic of progress, self-
realization or development toward some predetermined end. In this time beyond 
(metaphysical) time, this time defined by the abandonment of all transcendence, all that 
remains is the sheer facticity of existence. We have already come across the motif of mass 
media technics presiding over the collapse of old distinctions between the terrestrial and the 
celestial. Coming in the wake of that earlier announcement the literary presentation of this 
unworldly traveler hovers in between the domains of fantasy and the real. It alludes to the 
possibility of a beyond that has not yet been subsumed within mediatization while at the same 
time evacuating that uncharted domain of any salvational promise.  
 I have been arguing all along that Aira’s novel takes up certain images from 
contemporary life that are fraught with instability or that call attention to ways in which 
economic and technological globalization destabilize the conceptual categories of modernity: 
the villa, the cartoneros, and the collapse of the heavens into the here-and-now. Aira’s novel, I 
have noted, does not deploy these images as part of a social critique so much as it plumbs their 
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depths in order to explore their literary potential. What then is the literary import of this figure 
of the abandoned, overexposed space traveler? If we take seriously the earlier claim that the 
celestial has been subsumed into the sublunary we can no longer invest literature with the 
hope of giving shape to another world, or of bearing witness to a true world beyond the world 
of mere appearances. This is one of the implications of overexposure: what literature has to say 
to us can no longer be conceived in terms of a clear distinction between the here-and-now and 
the beyond, between surface and depth, between mere appearance and reality. If appearance 
can be said to hide anything it is the fact that there is nothing to hide. Bearing witness to the 
overexposure of truth (or truth as overexposure) offers one example of what the writing of the 
sense of the loss of sense would look like. 
 The importance of this passage is to bring forth a fantasmatic echo of something that 
had supposedly already been eliminated by neoliberal hegemony: a thought of the future as 
radically other; a thought of the future as a new, unexplored world. The fact that its conditions 
prove hostile to life is only a sign of its radical otherness. But the dismal nature of the situation 
in which this fantasized encounter takes place also points to a profound questioning of the 
teleological trajectory of modern historical time. Walter Benjamin calls this “empty, 
homogeneous time,” alluding to the teleological and unidirectional trajectory of liberal 
concepts of progress and development based on a projected adequation to European 
modernity, in which what transpires in the periphery is only, as Hegel put it, “an echo” of Old 
Europe. The tiny, almost insignificant phrase mientras tanto performs the exhaustion of this 
teleological narrative—whose ideology is captured nowhere better than in the 20th century 
space race—and it simultaneously introduces the thought of an in-between times, a thought of 
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temporal heterogeneity or interregnum that is irreconcilable with any understanding of history 
as a single, unidirectional historical timeline. The concept of development is itself an obstacle to 
thinking history as interregnum or to thinking history as comprised of disjunctive but 
simultaneous forces and drives. Amidst the ruins of developmentalism it may well be that this 
tiny phrase—mientras tanto—is all there is.   
If announcing the exhaustion of our modern conceptual vocabulary were all that were 
left for literature, the notions of overexposure and the sense of the loss of sense would remain 
decidedly within the metaphysical tradition. But the phrase “mientras tanto” points to 
something that lies beyond redemption and memorialization, and which is not reducible to the 
dialectical motifs of contradiction, negation and reconciliation. It indicates a point where the 
dialectic begins to stutter, and attempts to name a facticity that negation is unable to negate. 
With this phrase Aira’s text affirms the existence of an in-between time that has yet to be 
accounted for by the calculative drives of modern techno-science and neoliberalism, and which 
similarly does not belong to the metaphysical understanding of time as a sequence of self-
contained Nows or presents. This time of overexposure is the zero-degree of relation; it is an 
opening to the other, to what is still strange in the familiar or still estranged within the present. 
It is thus also an opening to the future, which as futurity marks every present as different from 
itself. In the passage cited above a horrific death has been foretold as if it had already 
happened, a death by asphyxiation or irradiation, suffered in utter solitude and absolute 
oblivion. This imminent death bears the marks of repetition (it is a foregone conclusion, 
announced as if it had already happened) and absolute singularity (the experience is almost 
unimaginable; its story will never be told). Facticity here is all there is. Does this mean that the 
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non-negatable remainder of calculation is in fact the secret truth of every determination of 
being, that mientras tanto—the fatal leftover or in-between time that remains when all hope 
for progress, development, or even just the survival of the selfsame have been stripped away—
is another name for ser? 
The phrase “mientras tanto” provides a cognate in Aira’s novel for the existential time of 
being-toward-death in which Dasein is marked from the outset by a singular, mortal destiny 
that it can neither master, share or avoid. Mientras tanto names a second-order time beyond 
any hope of salvation from or redemption of finitude. Being-toward-death, however, also 
names a time of calculation through which Dasein seeks to anticipate and account for its 
horizonal finitude. In this latter sense “mientras tanto,” the time we are given according to our 
constitutive mortality, would also be the time of technics: of mass media and other modern 
tele-technologies but also of writing, literature, and the law of iterability that is inscribed in all 
languages. If this between-time of technics and repeatability appears last, after everything has 
been stripped away, shipwrecked and abandoned, this is because it comes first: it is that archaic 
time in which the human is born, albeit always “prematurely”—born into a need to turn outside 
itself toward the domain of prostheses and toward others. If the human has no essence or 
being to speak of before the turn to technics then in mientras tanto we can hear the murmur of 
a time that will have been forgotten in every account of technology as the instrument of a 
subject or as means to a non-technical end. 
 The phrase mientras tanto underscores a subtle but crucial distinction between Aira’s 
text and Sarlo’s critique of mass media technics. One can certainly identify moments in the 
novel that appear to share or at least mimic Sarlo’s critical views of the complicity between 
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mass media and neoliberal politics, which together threaten to deafen our ears to the voice of 
history. La villa can no doubt be read as a denunciation of the technical reconfiguration of post-
dictatorship Argentina. But for Aira’s novel technics is neither the problem nor the solution. As 
prosthesis, supplement, and even language, it is that which is both closest and most strange. In 
short, it is that to which we must open ourselves in order to think, act in the world, and relate 
to one another. By the same token if we take this Aira passage seriously then Ludmer’s account 
of post-autonomous literature would be nothing more than a performative contradiction, 
assuming we understand the term chronologically as what comes after the historical time of 
aesthetic autonomy. If it is to attain any kind of conceptual clarity post-autonomía must be 
thought as the other side of autonomía. 
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The Dis-jointures of History: Market, Virtuoso Labor, and Natural History in Post-dictatorship 
Chile 
  
Me pregunto: cuál será la manera posible de referirse a la historia política chilena 
cuando esa historia es a la vez personal [y] corporal, sin caer en el absorto vértigo 
testimonial o en el previsible ejercicio de construir una mirada “inteligente” o distante 
sobre acontecimientos que radican caóticamente—sin principio ni fin—en la memoria y 
cuyas huellas perviven en una atemporalidad transversal que, a menudo, asalta 
perceptiblemente en el presente.  
   —Diamela Eltit, “Las dos caras de la moneda” 
 
 History begins where memory ends. It begins where representation ends. 
     —Jean-Luc Nancy, “Finite History” 
 
It is…event-ness that one must think, but that best resists what is called the concept, if 
not thinking. And it will not be thought as long as one relies on the simple (ideal, 
mechanical, or dialectical) opposition of the real presence of the real present or the 
living present to its ghostly simulacrum, the opposition of the effective or actual 
(wirklich) to the non-effective, inactual, which is also to say, as long as one relies on a 
general temporality or an historical temporality made up of the successive linking of 
presents identical to themselves and contemporary with themselves  
    —Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx  
  
The word wounds and pierces me, opening a breech in my kidney.   
    —Diamela Eltit, Mano de obra 
 
The cut made by the signifying chain is the only cut that verifies the structure of the 
subject as a discontinuity in the real. If linguistics enables us to see the signifier as the 
determinant of the signified, analysis reveals the truth of this relationship by making 
holes in meaning the determinants in discourse. 
—Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire” 
 
 In the first of the five epigraphs to this chapter, a passage taken from a 1997 essay 
entitled “Las dos caras de la moneda” (Eltit 2000), Diamela Eltit poses a fundamental question 
for post-dictatorship cultural production: how to narrate unpleasant or disruptive experiences 
from the recent past, experiences associated with loss, destruction and defeat, in a way that 
would allow these experiences to be understood in their social-historical context but without 
thereby losing sight of how history itself marks us on a personal and corporeal level? Narrative 
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is governed by an episodic time of causes and effects that privileges the final denouement as if 
there were an overarching logic governing the flow of everything that happens, culminating 
inevitably in the historical present. How then, Eltit asks, can the logical time of narrative 
capture or do justice to the transversal and contingent character of experiences that cut across 
regions ordinarily considered to be separate and distinct, such as the public and the personal, 
or the intangible realms of cognition and understanding versus the material register of the 
body? Post-dictatorship writing faces the challenge of avoiding what Eltit understands to be 
two dead ends: the self-absorbed mirror of testimonial narrative with its focus on the subject, 
and the false objectivity of historiography which seeks to recover an ideal past in which events 
were in full possession of their own meaning. She then proceeds to add an additional layer of 
complexity to the problem. On one hand the memory traces she has in mind—she hasn’t yet 
told us anything about what these experiences might have entailed—have, akin to the structure 
of perception and cognition described by Freud, been inscribed on psychic and/or corporeal 
surfaces in such a way that they exist outside of time (“sin principio ni fin”).66 On the other 
hand these same memory traces have a way of crossing over into the temporal register of the 
present (“una atemporalidad transversal”) where they are experienced as so many “assaults” 
on the here and now. The “eternal” or atemporal nature of these inscriptions thereby gives rise 
to a secondary and untimely—but nonetheless temporal—experience of return. 
While biographical criticism would no doubt conclude that Eltit is alluding here to a very 
specific historical context, the fundamental problem thematized here—of narration and 
experience, history and memory, event and repetition—is not unique to the Chilean experience 
of dictatorship in the 1970s and 80s. As Freud proposed in comparing the process whereby 
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sensory data is registered in the psychic apparatus to a so-called “mystic writing pad,” even the 
experiences of everyday life entail mediation and inscription in a register other than that of 
consciousness. The supposedly “immediate” nature of lived experience is therefore already 
characterized by several forms of mediation: inscription, deferral, and repetition (Freud 1961, 
230-31). The mystic writing pad, as Freud explains, was an early 20th century commercial 
writing device consisting of a wax or resin tablet covered by a pair of semi-transparent sheets 
that were glued together at both ends; the sheets were fixed permanently to the top of the 
tablet while the lower edges rested loosely on the wax tablet. The bottom of the two 
translucent sheets was made of waxed paper and the top sheet was durable celluloid. To use 
the mystic writing pad, one would press with a stylus on the transparent sheets; the pressure of 
the stylus point would cause the bottom of the two translucent sheets to adhere to the 
underlying wax or resin wherever the stylus may have passed, leaving visibly darkened outlines 
in its wake. The written text can then be erased simply by lifting the adjoined sheets away from 
the wax base; when the sheets return to their original position the contact with the wax has 
been broken. The tablet itself, however, continues to bear the traces of prior inscriptions that 
are no longer visible on the transparent surface.   
For Freud this technological mechanism offers an analogy for how the mechanics of 
perception draw on conscious and unconscious processes. Like the celluloid sheet, the psychic 
register that first receives external stimuli—Freud calls this register the “perceptual-conscious 
system”—retains no permanent record of those occurrences, while the material medium in 
which these sensory traces are inscribed and stored belongs to another system that adjoins the 
conscious processes. As Jacques Derrida notes in his commentary on Freud’s essay (Derrida 
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1978), the Freudian analogy reminds us that all experience, no matter how “immediate,” is 
always already marked by mediation and deferral; there is no such thing as a direct or first-
hand experience insofar as all experience is mediated by way of this transversal movement of 
inscription and transferal between recording and transmitting systems. When we experience 
something for the first time we are already experiencing it “after the fact” as it were: through 
the traces of prior experiences and through the signifiers produced by the unconscious as the 
supplementary condition of possibility for any experience of presence. As Derrida puts it in 
“Freud and the Scene of Writing,” “writing supplements perception before perception even 
appears to itself” (Derrida 1978, 224).  
In the “Dos caras de la moneda” essay Eltit is somewhat provocatively using the 
historical trauma of September 1973 and its aftermath to highlight a general set of questions 
and problems having to do with perception and experience, cognition and materiality, memory 
and narration. It is fitting that this somewhat surprising formal juxtaposition between the 
singularity of September 1973 and the generality of “experience as such” should be duplicated 
at the level of what the essay appears to be telling us: that all experience, understood as 
singular encounter or contact with the real, turns out to be mediated by structures of 
repetition.  
One of the key terms in Eltit’s essay is golpe, which mobilizes an array of associations 
having to do with contact between bodies together with the effects of that contact. A list of 
ideas and meanings associated with golpe would include: blow, scar, bruise, fracture, 
mutilation, interruption, surprise, shock, accident, assault, pain, aggressive play, and symptom. 
Each of these possible connotations refers back to a scenario in which one body or corporeal 
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surface comes into contact with another, initiating a transfer of forces and stimuli that in turn 
crosses over from outside to inside, from soma to psyche—and then back again. We are 
prompted to envision a scenario in which some form of ideality—recognition, cognition, 
understanding, judgment—overwrites and codifies the material register in which bodies reside, 
move, and interact. One of the primary concerns in Eltit’s essay has to do with the temporality 
of experience and memory insofar as their end result (consciousness, self-consciousness, etc.) 
tends to project itself as the origin or justification of the process; what gets forgotten, 
meanwhile, is the necessary role played by materiality for spiritual life.  
El golpe, territorio privilegiado y repetido de la infancia, cuya frecuencia ocurre 
bajo la forma de la caída o del ataque, es quizás la primera memoria, la primera 
práctica en la que se internaliza de manera carnal esa palabra cuando el cuerpo 
estalla materialmente como cuerpo o aparece en su diferencia con lo otro—el 
otro—ese precoz contrincante que se diagrama como cuerpo enemigo desde el 
golpe mismo. (Eltit 2000, 17-18) 
As sign par excellence of infantile experience golpe holds the place of a mythical first 
memory. Repeated endlessly, as with a toddler losing balance and falling or suddenly seizing a 
companion’s toy, it is the golpe or the series of golpes that first delineates a distinction 
between inside and outside, psyche and soma, self and other, proper and improper. Here we 
have a complement to the Lacanian scene of the “mirror stage” in which misrecognition 
inaugurates the life of the autonomous Ego or subject; for Eltit it is the materiality of bodily 
contact that first gives shape to the self in distinction from the other. Golpe names an instance 
of contact that gives rise to corporeal sensations, which will in turn help to delineate a sense of 
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self, a that happened to me. As Freud puts it in The Ego and the Id, the Ego and its structure first 
derive from bodily sensations; the self that experiences things as happening to it, and which 
sees itself as the “depth” that resides beneath skin and flesh, is in fact a “projection” produced 
by the bodily surface in its interactions with the world: “The ego is first and foremost a bodily 
ego: it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface” (Freud 1923, 215-
16). Golpe names a material occurrence—a collision, a puncturing, a blow—that first delineates 
what will become a series of self-evident differences: between one body and another, and 
between corporeal and spiritual realms (soul, self, consciousness). Golpe thus designates a 
materiality prior to matter, prior to distinctions between matter and form, the sensible and the 
intelligible, and so on. Golpe is the name for an event whose occurrence will have given rise to 
an entire system of perception and intelligibility, but which for necessary reasons is not itself 
registered within that system. The origin of perception and consciousness, and of the self and 
its relation to others, cannot be subsumed within the distinctions to which it gives shape.   
Somewhat paradoxically, alongside this meditation on the absent material origin of self-
consciousness we find in Eltit’s essay a thought of event as repetition. Among its many possible 
meanings golpe names the symptom whose return “assaults” us in the here and now. We 
should keep in mind that the term alludes, on one hand, to the historical events of September 
1973 in which the Chilean “experiment with socialism” through democratic means was 
interrupted, and replaced within the course of a few years by the world’s first experiment with 
neoliberalism. On the other hand, her use of the term also points to a thought of history as 
event, as an occurrence that shapes perception and memory while resisting cognitive capture. 
Golpe as material (i.e., non-idealizable) event traces a horizon of intelligibility within which the 
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here and now can understand itself, but it does not itself appear within this horizonal frame as 
one entity or moment among others.  
 In recent years a sometimes-heated debate has arisen in Chilean critical circles 
concerning how artistic production under dictatorship should be understood in its relation to 
history—social and political history as much as art history. The debate has to do with competing 
critical assessments of a neo-avant garde movement whose productivity peaked in the late 
1970s and 1980s.67 This movement, which Nelly Richard famously dubbed “la escena de 
Avanzada,” draws on visual and performance art as well as poetry and narrative. Its participants 
share at least two primary concerns: denouncing violent repression under military dictatorship 
on the one hand, and calling attention to the severe impact of neoliberal monetarist policies on 
the most impoverished and vulnerable sectors of Chilean society on the other. The highlighting 
of how neoliberal reforms in Chile led to increased inequality and suffering is of course 
intended to refute the self-congratulatory discourse of neoliberal economists, as exemplified by 
Milton Friedman’s 1982 proclamation that a pair of “miracles” had occurred in Chile: first, the 
(arguable) return to relative economic stability following the hyperinflation of the early 1970s; 
and second, the fact that a free-market economy had been introduced by a military 
government with a centralized, authoritarian state apparatus (Friedman 1982, 59).68 At the 
heart of the more recent critical debate, which picks up steam in the first decade of the new 
millennium, is the question of what sort of meaning the critical concept of the avant garde 
retains in the wake of September 1973. I will say more about what is at stake in this question in 
a moment. Although Eltit’s Mano de obra was published long after the historical conjuncture in 
which the Avanzada emerged, the critical debate about the Chilean neo-avant garde has 
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something important to say about how we read Eltit’s post-dictatorship writing. Her 2002 novel 
shares fundamental concerns with the Avanzada scene having to do with the social impact of 
neoliberalism and what can be expected of art and literature in the time of neoliberal-
administered globalization. Factors that distinguish Mano de obra from the Avanzada, 
meanwhile, include the obvious difference between two political regimes (representative 
democracy and dictatorship) together with the various ways—some of them more obvious than 
others—in which globalization has become increasingly entrenched (and arguably also 
increasingly violent) over the course of the two decades that separate the publication of Mano 
de obra from the Avanzada scene.   
 In her groundbreaking 1986 book Margins and Institutions: Art in Chile Since 1973, Nelly 
Richard frames the aesthetic and political aims of this neo-avant garde movement in the 
following manner. On one hand, the Avanzada deploys its creative forces in order to interfere 
with the languages of administrative authority and power deployed by the military junta and its 
allied institutions.69 As “disruptive force” artistic form can no longer be understood simply as a 
vessel or mirror whose primary purpose would be to convey or represent a meaning or 
message whose origin lies elsewhere, outside of the creative realm of art. Literary and artistic 
composition become politically charged spaces or procedures not because they transmit 
information or judgments about the external world (though this can of course happen) but 
because, in the context of the Pinochetista restructuring of Chilean society, these artistic fields 
constitute sites where the very determination of truth—of what counts as meaningful speech 
versus what is to be discounted as mere babble or outdated jargon—is at stake. The avant 
garde’s historical association with critique of prevailing social forms and logics thus reemerges 
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as contestation of the authoritarian neoliberal common sense that prevails in Chile in the wake 
of September 1973. 
 In at least two different respects the artistic deployment of language, image, and 
symbolic production as fields of contestation helps explain why the works of the Chilean neo-
avant garde are notoriously resistant to interpretation, favoring ambiguity, circumlocution, and 
linguistic play over transparency and immediacy. For one, says Richard, the conditions for 
artistic production in the late 1970s and early 80s are constrained by the practical matters of 
political repression, censorship, and fear or self-censorship. While the use of metaphor and 
ellipsis serves to dissimulate political content that might run afoul of state censors, such 
rhetorical devices also stage a confrontation with the instrumental logic of business culture and 
its demand for efficacy and transparency in communication. While the Avanzada conceives of 
itself as a disruptive agent vis-à-vis the forces of reinscription that are in the process of 
transforming the social and symbolic order of post-1973 Chile this contestatory movement also 
breaks with old assumptions about the representational nature of art, assumptions that are 
prevalent in both traditionalist-conservative and radical artistic traditions. The Avanzada 
constitutes a critique of the post-Kantian ideal of aesthetic autonomy as well as a departure 
from earlier radical traditions, in which art was frequently instrumentalized in the service of 
one or another ideological program. 
 Richard also locates in Avanzada artistic production a solution to the paralysis and self-
censorship that afflicted much of the Chilean Left in the aftermath of September 1973. As 
artistic and critical practice the Avanzada endeavors to invent a new symbolic fabric and to 
initiate a new network of libidinal investments that could replace the old political imaginary 
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that was shattered in September 1973. In so doing it also seeks to steer clear of the ideological 
polarization that plagued Chilean politics in the early 1970s. 
[La escena de Avanzada] emerge en plena zona de catástrofe cuando ha 
naufragado el sentido, debido no sólo al fracaso de un proyecto histórico, sino al 
quiebre de todo el sistema de referencias sociales y culturales que, hasta 1973, 
articulaba—para el sujeto chileno—el manejo de sus claves de realidad y 
pensamiento. Desarticulado ese sistema y la organicidad social de su sujeto, es el 
lenguaje mismo y su textura intercomunicativa lo que deberá ser reinventado. 
(Richard 1986, 2) 
 To assess the catastrophic effects of September 11, 1973 and its aftermath, Richard 
asserts, we need to look beyond the immediate circumstances in which the Chilean military 
deposed a popularly-elected President and thereby brought to an abrupt and violent conclusion 
the possibility of achieving socialism through a democratic process. What was destroyed during 
and after September 1973, she asserts, was not only the generational project of the Chilean 
Left of the late 1960s and early 70s, but an entire social and cultural referential system that had 
served for the better part of the 20th century to orient perception, thought, speech and action 
in the public sphere in Chile. Above and beyond what it might have meant for the Chilean Left, 
9/11/73 names the destruction of the res publica together with its conceptual and pragmatic 
vocabularies, its parameters for understanding and acting.70 
 In contrast to the deployment of aesthetic experience as a way of interrupting 
authoritarian neoliberalism’s prevailing common sense, the Avanzada also seeks to create a 
new shared referential framework and collective idiom that has freed itself from the constraints 
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and coerciveness of authoritarian order as well as from the culture of fear that dominated 
much of Chilean society during the mid to late 1970s. The aim is not only to establish less 
coercive and more democratic parameters for social coexistence; it is to inaugurate a new 
symbolic order that could help to revitalize personal and collective desire following the 
collective shock of September 1973. For the Avanzada the solution to the task of world-creation 
is found in the figure of the fragment, which serves both as a memory of what was destroyed in 
September 1973 and as the index of a new beginning, a new way of being in common that 
would renounce the absolutist claims found in both the Latin American Left of the 1960s and 
the authoritarian traditionalist responses of the Right. The aesthetic of the fragment as 
conceived by the Avanzada carries out two artistic operations at the same time: on one hand it 
constitutes a form of historical memory that attests to the secret connection between progress 
and destruction, while on the other it proposes that we consider dislocation and the 
impossibility of wholeness—the impossibility of a social totality that would have freed itself 
finally from all forms of strife, conflict and difference—as the factical conditions in which any 
world first becomes possible. Fragmentation performs double duty in Richard’s account, 
indicating both the actual conditions for which art offers a critical response and an originary 
condition of finitude that constitutes both the limit and the only hope for a democratic project 
in the 1980s.71 The Avanzada is thus a reflection on the idea that what we call world takes root 
in a void or a gap. In emphasizing the creative potential of the fragment, Richard takes pains to 
distinguish Chilean neo-avant garde production of the 1970s from the utopian tendencies that 
defined militant experience in Latin America during previous decades. The Avanzada rejects the 
utopian determination of historical time that is programmed in advance by the idea of a 
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unified, homogeneous and conflict-free social totality, e.g., the plenitude and harmony that 
would obtain with the end of separation and alienated labor, or the natural efficacy and 
productivity of the market.  
Las figuras que construye esta escena son más propiamente atópicas que 
utópicas: más que la superación de la realidad en la idealidad de un más allá 
(ficticio o imaginario) que evada las limitantes de un aquí y ahora declarado 
inhabitable, las obras postulan—desde el arte—el no lugar de la distancia que 
separa lo real de su(s) otro(s) deseados; la exploración de esa distancia nómada 
como desarreglo calculado de las sistematicidades vigentes, como infracción a la 
normalidad pauteada por las técnicas disciplinarias de adiestramiento del 
sentido, como práctica de la disensión. (5) 
 Whereas the vanguard traditions of the early 20th century often dedicated themselves 
to the figuration of imagined realities that had yet to see the light of day, as an atopic praxis the 
Avanzada attends not to ideality per se but rather to the ideal insofar as its semblance helps to 
illuminate a gap between the actual and the possible. Its aesthetic object, in other words, is not 
a utopian future but rather the structuring void at the heart of authoritarian neoliberal social 
order. The Avanzada, as Richard understands it, is a radically anti-representational project. It 
will be important to bear this point in mind when it comes to exploring some of the most 
forceful and compelling critiques of Richard’s account of the Avanzada.   
Critical emphasis on the negative (the void, the gap) in the work of the Avanzada is 
echoed in Richard’s analysis by what she calls “a practice of the interstice” (11). Aesthetic 
thematization of intermediacy pushes back against the totalization of sense at work in such 
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disparate projects as sovereign dictatorship, neoliberal Consensus, and the political militancy 
that characterized much of the 1960s Latin American Left. The interstice forms an internal limit 
for any and all ordering and accounting procedures. There can be no count of the whole—of 
bodies, social categories, roles, words, and so on—that does not rely on interstitial spaces, 
which is to say the gaps and the contiguity between constituted, recognizable spaces: between 
male and female, bourgeois and proletariat, intellectual and worker, and so on. And yet the 
interstice itself cannot be counted or ordered; the sexual difference that allows for the 
distinction between “masculine” and “feminine,” for example, cannot itself be assigned a sex or 
a gender. The interstice therefore introduces a limit for the calculative logic that governs 
politics (the friend/enemy distinction) and the mediatic regime of globalization (complete 
coverage, full exposure). Its prominence in neo-avant garde art brings to light those points or 
moments where the logic of the prevailing order is made to tremble.  
For Richard it is the Avanzada’s focus on the body in its materiality that best illustrates 
both the new challenges faced by Chilean contestatory movements in the aftermath of 
September 1973 well as the strategies developed by the Avanzada for intervening in the new 
conjuncture that is authoritarian neoliberalism. Neo-avant garde attention to the body should 
be understood in part as a response to what was happening to the concept of the public in 
Chile in the aftermath of the 1973 golpe de estado, when established public spaces and 
institutions—including labor movements, political parties, free elections, the free press, and so 
on—were severely curtailed or suspended. In a context where public space as such has been 
subjugated to the state of exception, the private sphere—and especially the body—offer new 
sites for struggle between power and the resistance that is proper to life. The body is not just 
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one site among many; as a primary site for interrogating confrontations between power and 
resistance, the body calls attention to a tectonic shift whereby the old delineations between 
public and political on the one hand, and private and personal on the other, have become 
unstable. As interstitial surface the body makes evident a shift in contemporary configurations 
of power, in which the spectacular displays of September 1973 give way to more subtle, routine 
and unremarkable forms of subjugation.  
La elección de la corporalidad como material de trabajo en el arte…habla de 
reasignarle valores de procesamiento crítico a todas las zonas de experiencia 
conformadoras de una cotidianeidad social: de producir interferencias críticas en 
esas zonas que abarcan el cuerpo y el paisaje como escenarios de autocensura o 
de microrepresión.” (Richard 1986, 5)  
In focusing artistic attention on corporeal surfaces—through “body art” in particular—
the Avanzada bears witness to the emergence of new forms of power that closely align with 
Deleuze’s notion of control as opposed to the modern disciplinary power theorized by Foucault 
(Deleuze 1992). A similar dynamic can be observed in the generalization of corporate 
supervisory power in Mano de obra, to which I will turn next. The reorientation of artistic and 
literary focus toward the body, seen as an interstitial contact surface where the 
personal/private and the mechanisms of power interact, sets the tone for the Avanzada’s 
artistic practice of “critical interference”: the task of art, as this movement understands it, is to 
explore and make visible how the body in its materiality constitutes a site of struggle between 
new forms of power and resistance for these apparatuses of capture, control and subjugation. 
A passage from Deleuze’s essay on societies of control could provide the epigraph for the 
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Avanzda: “there is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons” (Deleuze 1992, 
4).   
 What Richard and others refer to as el Golpe tends, as we will now see, to function as a 
metonymical reference that holds the place of a series of historical occurrences that began in 
late 1960s. The term holds the place for a chain of effects that is not governed by any 
discernible necessity—no predetermining goal or rationale—and whose meaning is subject to 
retroactive transformations in the context of subsequent historical developments. This 
metonymic chain is not a sequence in the traditional, linear sense of the term; its figure attests 
to a strange multidirectional temporality in which any particular occurrence may be at one and 
the same time: an effect that is made possible by the occurrences that precede it; a deviation 
that departs from the political intentions that engendered it; and a cause that retroactively 
confers new meaning onto the past. Golpe in this context designates as a discrete event 
something that in fact also demands to be understood as repetition or as part of a circuit 
defined by retroaction. What follows is a condensed account of how these conceptual 
categories—event, repetition and reinscription—interact with one another in the Chilean 
context.  
 As Javier Martínez and Alvaro Díaz argue in their 1996 book Chile: The Great 
Transformation, economic restructuring in Chile following the 1973 golpe was facilitated—in a 
great irony of history—by several waves of reformism that were initiated in the late 1960s. 
These reforms involved nationalization of latifundios and copper mines that had long been in 
the hands of the Chilean oligarchy. The expropriation strategy was initiated by the moderate 
Christian Democratic regime of Eduardo Frei (1964-70) and later extended and radicalized 
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under Salvador Allende’s socialist Popular Unity government (1970-73). Nationalization broke 
the traditional power monopoly of Chile’s landed oligarchy and deposited considerable 
resources in the hands of the state.72 In the aftermath of September 1973 much of the 
expropriated land and capital was transferred back into the private sector—not to the landed 
oligarchy from whence they came, however, but to a newly emergent group of entrepreneurs 
and investors who were in a position to purchase land and capital at greatly reduced prices. The 
golpe is thus only poorly understood as a power play in a long-standing conflict between the 
landed elite and the working class. The turbulent transformative process that runs from the late 
1960s through the mid-1970s in Chile more closely resembles what Marx described as “so-
called primitive accumulation,” in which the violence of destruction and expropriation gives rise 
to a new dominant social class and to a new logic for organizing social relations, time, legal 
codes, and so on. The imposition of neoliberal economic reform and monetary policy in Chile 
after the 1973 golpe has as its primary goal the dismantling of the modern state form and its 
role as mediator between global capital and the local (Martínez and Díaz 1996, 88-89).  
 In his fascinating monograph on the political thought of Jaime Guzmán, an economic 
advisor to Pinochet as well as one of his leading ideologues, Renato Cristi documents how 
Pinochet’s regime continued to redefine the meaning of the golpe during the mid-1970s and in 
accordance with the emergence of new economic and juridical goals (Cristi 2000). In the weeks 
and months leading up to the September 1973 golpe de estado the anti-Allende opposition in 
Chile had been calling for military intervention on the premise that Allende’s political 
maneuvers were in violation of the rule of law established in Chile’s 1925 Constitution. These 
allegations prompted the call to protect constitutional rule of law, and thereby provided the 
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major pretext under which the military overthrew Allende and established a ruling junta in his 
place. In its inaugural moment the junta was seen publicly—and, just as importantly, apparently 
understood itself—as a commissarial dictatorship charged with protecting constitutional rule of 
law against the twin threats of disorder and Marxist dictatorship.73 However, in the days 
following the September 11th golpe and in response to internal conversations between the 
military command and its legal and economic advisors, the regime’s self-understanding soon 
evolved into something more closely resembling what Schmitt would call sovereign 
dictatorship. The first clear indication of this metamorphosis in the meaning of the golpe and 
dictatorship came in the days following the coup when the junta announced the creation of a 
new Commission charged with producing the first draft of what was to be a new Constitution, 
which would become known as the Constitution of 1980.74 Jaime Guzmán, then a 27-year old 
Constitutional law professor at the Catholic University of Chile, was selected by the junta to 
head the Comisión Ortúzar. Although Guzmán had asserted publicly in his mid-September 
university lectures that the military command believed it was acting in defense of the existing 
Constitution, according to Cristi he was at the same time working to convince the junta that the 
1925 Constitution was in fact already dead—it had been killed by Allende with his subversion of 
the rule of law—and that a new constitution was therefore not only desirable but necessary. 
One of the most significant differences between the 1925 and 1980 Constitutions involves a 
discrepancy in how political sovereignty is determined. Whereas the 1925 Constitution 
acknowledged the Chilean people as constituent power, the new constitution arrogated this 
sovereign power to the junta itself. It was not until 1975, however, that the junta finally 
announced publicly—again, through Jaime Guzmán in a communique published in the Santiago 
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daily El Mercurio—that the 1925 Constitution was no longer in effect (Cristi 2000, 33-36).  
 Over the course of the first decade of dictatorship Guzmán’s thought reveals its own 
transformations. These changes are consistent with the ongoing process of reinscription that I 
am suggesting is at work in public perception and discourse about el Golpe and the meaning of 
September 11. Guzmán came from a deeply conservative Catholic background. As a student 
and a junior faculty member he advocated a traditional form of national corporatism, which 
he—like many Latin American intellectuals of the late 19th and 20th century—viewed as 
providing a moral buttress against the destructive forces of modernization and the amoral 
tendencies of consumerism. After assuming his new role as leading juridical theorist for the 
junta, however, Guzmán began to see Milton Friedman’s account of the moral foundations of 
liberalism in new light. As Cristi tells it, Guzmán’s reservations about capitalism appear to 
subside in the mid-1970s, and by 1980 he had become a staunch supporter of Friedrich Hayek’s 
brand of neoliberalism, which advocated doing away with the Welfare State and returning to 
the “Lochner Era” of unregulated liberty of contract as the only effective solution to the moral 
and economic crises of modernity (Cristi 2000, 192-97).  
 A turn to Willy Thayer’s 2003 response to Richard’s theorization of the Avanzada can 
help shed further light on how this ongoing process of reinscription informs our understanding 
of both the Golpe and artistic responses to it. Thayer’s critical assessment of the Chilean neo-
avant garde furthermore establishes parameters for exploring what kind of relation Eltit’s Mano 
de obra maintains with the avant garde. Like Richard, Thayer understands the vanguard 
tradition as grounded in two fundamental aims. The first tendency is what he calls the critique 
of representation, which itself entails two related registers: first, a critique of the account of the 
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essence of art as mimetic representation, which determination runs from Plato through the 
realist tradition and its post-19th century legacy (the regional novel, la novela social, testimonio, 
etc.); second, a critique of the liberal reduction of politics to representative structures and 
institutions, which goes hand in hand with the suppression of radical forms of political action 
and politicization. Alongside this double critical impulse Thayer also understands the avant 
garde tradition as striving to bring about a rupture within prevailing social organizational logic. 
Paraphrasing Nietzsche, he terms this rupturalist impulse a “voluntad de acontecimiento” 
[literally, “will to event”] (Thayer 2006, 16).  
 This association of the avant garde with a rupturalist intention differs little, if at all, from 
Richard’s influential account of the Avanzada. The real disagreement arises because, according 
to Thayer, Richard takes for granted the possibility of generating a ruptural event in a context 
where representation may no longer have a primary role to play in organizing social relations 
and justifying power relations. In that case, Thayer suggests, it would no longer be clear 
whether critique and rupture can still be expected to provide the impulse for social 
transformation. From a post-millennial perspective, Thayer argues, the Avanzada shows itself 
to have been a belated attempt to recover an aesthetic and political modernity that had already 
been eclipsed through the total integration of Latin American localities into the global capitalist 
system, along with the concurrent privatization of all public spheres and subordination of 
politics to the market as first principle of the social. The attribution of a ruptural potential to 
artistic innovation in Chile today stems from a critical forgetting or refusal of the fact that the 
real rupture, according to Thayer, has already taken place with the Golpe. In retrospect el Golpe 
can be seen to have beaten the Avanzada to the punch and already carried out its vanguard 
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“will to event.”  
 The provocative assertion that the Golpe constitutes the real event of recent Chilean 
history responds—albeit without naming it as such—to Federico Galende’s assertion that the 
Unidad Popular was “el verdadero acontecimiento de Chile” (Galende 2005, 62). As Thayer sees 
it there is an unexamined formal symmetry between the avant garde tradition—as exemplified 
by either the Unidad Popular or the Avanzada—and its attempt to bring about what Walter 
Benjamin called the “true state of exception” on the one hand, and the Golpe understood in 
Benjaminian terms as routinization of the state of exception on the other hand. Where 
Benjamin posits a distinction between “routinized” and “true” states of exception, Thayer 
proposes that the one (routinized state of exception) has annulled the possibility of the other. 
By the same token its institutionalization exposes the hidden truth of the constituted order, in 
which the consensus and legitimacy presupposed by the social pact have always served to 
occlude or naturalize an underlying violence. As Sergio Villalobos-Ruminott puts it, “through its 
so-called state of exception dictatorship ends up confirming the exceptionalist foundation of 
Chilean history in its more than two hundred years of political violence, “Republicanism” and 
“rule of law” notwithstanding” (Villalobos-Ruminott 2013, 134). Thayer would therefore also 
reject the relevance of the Schmittian distinction between “commissarial dictatorship” and 
“sovereign dictatorship” today. That distinction has been relegated to secondary status due to 
the fact that what the Golpe exposes in Thayer’s view is a secret link between the ruptural 
promise of the vanguard tradition and the absolutization of the state and its representational 
apparatuses.  
 Although the tenor of this specific debate does not always allow for such subtleties, we 
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should not conclude too hastily that Thayer is simply dismissing Richard’s account as mere 
ideology of the Avanzada. His contribution to our understanding of this scene is to call 
attention to a peculiar temporal structure of critical insight and knowledge when it comes to 
history. His response to Richard seeks to bring forth something that could not have been 
apparent to Richard in the mid-1980s, something that only becomes legible today, twenty or 
more years after Margins and Institutions and when the form of life it sought to theorize has 
grown old. 
 Thayer’s assertion that the Golpe already accomplished the purported aim of the neo-
avant garde requires some explanation. It is not difficult to see how the Golpe initiates a break 
with the past insofar as the military junta first suspends a Constitution that had oriented almost 
half a century of democratization and development in Chile, and then later declares that 
Constitution dead. But the previously-mentioned redefinition of political sovereignty and 
Constituent power (as belonging to the junta rather than the People) cannot alone bear the 
explanatory weight of Thayer’s argument. After all, one could certainly envision a scenario 
where critical interventions in the post-Golpe years play a role in swaying popular opinion 
against dictatorship and thereby hasten its demise, leading either to restoration of the old 
democratic tradition or the institution of an alternative to the sovereign dictatorship of 1973-
89. Thayer’s critique, however, asserts that the old association between critique of 
representation and rupture has become inoperative today, because what the Golpe ushers in is 
a new order in which the old political logic, grounded in the principles of representation and 
sovereignty, is now subordinated to a new logic predicated on the full integration of the 
national within the global capitalist system.  
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 The new order inaugurated by the Golpe is one that Thayer terms “post-sovereignty,” 
and which I in turn am calling interregnum. Interregnum as I use the term here is no longer 
synonymous with a time in between sovereign orders, nor does it name the disappearance of 
sovereignty tout court. Interregnum is the time of political sovereignty’s subordination to the 
requirements and dictates of global capital and, at the local/national level, the administrative 
rationale of neoliberalism. Indeed, what could be more compelling evidence of this 
subordination of political sovereignty to the economic than the observation that the economic 
principles of liberalism function equally well under democracy, dictatorship, or anything else in 
between (Thayer 2006, 84)? Jaime Guzmán was also well aware of the indifference of 
neoliberal order to democratic or non-democratic political forms; he asserted that if and when 
democracy is conceived in Republican terms (as freedom from domination) rather than 
according to liberal criteria (as freedom from interference) then democracy in fact becomes a 
detriment to the liberal conception of freedom, progress and security:  
Democracy is a form of government, and as such it is only a means—and it is by 
no means the only one or the best in all circumstances—for assisting liberty, 
which in turn is the form of life toward which all political systems should take as 
their end or goal. This form of life encompasses security as well as spiritual and 
material progress in the social and economic realms. (Guzman 1979, 18; as 
quoted in Cristi 2000, 11; my translation). 
 The organization of social relations (time, labor, bodies, etc.) is grounded in the logic of 
entrepreneurialism and investment, whose truths comprise the common preunderstanding that 
goes without saying and determines what counts as intelligible, reasonable, practicable, and so 
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on. Within this new post-sovereign order, neo-avant garde movements may well be capable of 
producing their critiques and their breaks; and they may even be very good critiques and very 
interesting breaks. What has changed, however, is that we can no longer expect of critique that 
it provide the spark for a ruptural event, because in the prevailing order the targets of 
critique—representation and ideology—have now been relegated to subservient positions 
(Thayer 2006, 16). The inevitable conclusion to which Thayer’s essay points (without actually 
saying as much) is that we must look elsewhere to find the real target of this movement’s 
artistic innovations and interventions, or else we must look precisely to the absence of any 
stable distinction between appearances and truth, surface and depth, narrative and reality in 
order to understand what the Avanzada might have been responding to—albeit without 
necessarily being fully aware of it at the time. It is precisely in view of the void that appears 
with interregnum, a void left by the retreat and exhaustion of old models of determining who 
and what counts (as the rightful place of members of the community, as reasonable speech 
rather than babble, and so on), that the artists and writers of the Avanzada seek to envision and 
invent new forms of being with others.  
 We now come to the heart of Thayer’s response to Richard:  
El Golpe globalizador, treinta años después, opera póstumamente la deflación de 
la voluntad vanguardista de presencia (deflación de la presentación de lo 
impresentable) al transparentar lo impresentable, la presencia, como maqueta. 
La globalización no es otra cosa que la nihilización póstuma de la voluntad 
acontecimiento que activó a la vanguardia. La verdad del Golpe la 
experimentamos más ahora, en el intercambio globalizado, en que no hay 
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tiempo prometido en el tiempo intercambiado. Lo que póstumamente se revela 
con el Golpe—y esto sería lo siniestro que se ha presentado—no es la irrupción 
de una presencia que devasta toda forma trascendiendo la inmanencia 
representacional del sujeto histórico. Lo que con el Golpe se ha presentado—y 
esto es lo que sabemos ahora, en el momento postdictatorial—es que la 
presencia prometida no era más que una forma progresista en la teleología 
estatal de la representación: era un recurso más de capital. (31-32) 
 That the old structures against which critique aimed to bring about a ruptural event 
have now been dismantled or displaced was not readily apparent to the Avanzada in its 
moment. It only becomes fully evident after the fact: after the military intervention of 
September 1973 that interrupted Chile’s democratic experiment with socialism, after the 
transfer of Constituent power from the People to military junta, and after the neo-avant garde 
response that culminates in the publication of Margins and Institutions in the mid-1980s. Akin 
to Freud’s understanding of the structure of trauma as Nachträglichkeit, the term Golpe names 
a series of transformations through which the past is subjected to ongoing resignification. What 
is more, in Thayer’s view this deferred disclosure reveals in uncanny fashion (lo siniestro) the 
secret, long-forgotten identity between avant garde rupturalism and the representational 
domain to which it always understood itself as opposed. The avant garde would therefore find 
its ultimate truth in the modern configuration of the state as mediating and disseminating 
agent for capital, both of which are defined by a nihilistic postulation of the will as origin of all 
truth in the world.  
 As Thayer describes it the exhaustion of the avant garde and its rupturalist potential 
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only becomes fully clear in the aftermath of that other 9/11: the terrorist attacks on New York 
and Washington of September 2001. The latter 9/11 telegraphically designates the 
inauguration of a new time of global war in which the forces of capitalist globalization are 
engaged in endless conflict with violent fundamentalisms that are themselves the offshoot of 
capitalist globalization. However, this date also stands in metonymically for mediatization, or 
the mediatic integration of the planet through real-time telecommunicational technologies that 
serve to unify our world today within a single time (“real time”) and under the regime of the 
image in its im-mediacy.  
La fotografía con que el número especial de El Mercurio del 11 de septiembre 
del 2001 hizo circular, una vez más, la imagen teledigital del cielo de Nueva York 
quemando las pantallas y las portadas del planeta, imagen que durante todo ese 
año no dejábamos de ver una y otra vez en la TV del escaparate o del 
restaurante, o en el sofá de la casa, o en la imaginación; tal fotografía no cita 
tanto el estallido de las torres, sino el evento de su mediación, el 
acontecimiento: la clausura del suceder en la mediación, y a la vez, el despliegue 
de la mediación como suceder. Esto equivale a decir que el velocidad de la 
mediación es más veloz que la velocidad del suceso o, como dice Virilio, “que los 
sucesos se virtualizan al momento mismo de suceder,” que el suceso es 
alcanzado en su velocidad por la velocidad de la mediación. (34)  
 Globalization exposes a turn and a hiatus within the time of modernity and its 
representational logic. “La clausura del suceder en la mediación”: what the ceaselessly-
proliferating televisual images of the attacks on the Twin Towers remind us is that no event can 
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hope to arrive, to appear on the horizon of our world and be recognized as something that has 
taken place, except insofar as it aligns itself with prevailing forms of visibility and intelligibility, 
namely mediatic representation and the calculative rationale of the market. In other words, 
within the horizonal time of neoliberal globalization and mediatization there can be no event 
that is not mediatable. Thus globalization is itself the event, the Golpe that conditions what is 
perceivable and comprehensible in our world. Mediatization as one of the names for 
globalization does not itself arrive or happen so much as it is the condition of possibility for 
anything to take place today. 
A partir del Golpe ya no actuamos-comprendemos desde la lengua estatal, el 
principio de la autonomía de los campos. El Golpe de Estado rompe con la 
ruptura (epokhe) que produjo la autonomía inaugurando, más que la neo-
heteronomía, la invaginación entre empresa, transnacional, educación, 
pragmáticas gubernamentales, cotidianeidad, massmediación, extensas 
superficies labores nihilizada, monopolio de la decisión, etc. (73) 
While the term “Golpe” clearly alludes to Chilean social and political history the 
capitalization of the term in Thayer’s text serves to stake out a space in between empiricism 
and historicism on the one hand, and transcendence and idealist philosophy on the other. It 
designates an event that is irreducible to phenomenalization or transcendence. Heidegger’s 
distinction between Offenbarung, or the event of revelation, and Offenbarkeit, or the 
conditions of revealability, here proves inadequate.75 Whereas Heidegger asserts that an event 
can only be perceived—and hence be recognized as having taken place—under certain 
conditions that are separate from the event in question (for instance, to register that a 
177 
 
“miracle” has taken place presupposes the existence of a certain religious faith and familiarity 
with a certain theological narrative structure), Thayer is attempting to think the event as 
transformation of the conditions under which we can perceive and recognize. The Heideggerian 
privileging of Offenbarkeit (revealability) over Offenbarung (the revealed) is thus set on its side 
and destabilized: Offenbarung or event of revelation is nothing other than a puncturing of 
Offenbarkeit or conditions of possibility for revelation. If the tectonic effects of the Golpe had 
already become discernable in the late 1970s, as Thayer asserts, it was nonetheless not possible 
to discern fully what is at stake in this global transformation until the repetition of 9/11.  
If a second 9/11 must take place before the Owl of Minerva can spread its wings and fly, 
then is not what Thayer refers to as the event or the Golpe in fact another name for thinking 
the event as repetition? The Golpe, in distinction from all phenomenal golpes, gives a name to 
the epochal forces that are reshaping not only the social pact but also the ways in which we 
perceive, think and understand ourselves in relation to the world—and therefore also, 
inevitably, the ways in which we act or do not act. This is why the Golpe cannot be 
phenomenalized: because it is the blow that catches us by surprise, arresting and 
(re)conditioning all perception and all understanding. We cannot think or perceive the Golpe as 
such because it is precisely from something like a Golpe that perception and thought proceed in 
the first place. 
I now turn to Diamela Eltit’s Mano de obra [The Workforce] (2002), an important literary 
reflection on the history of the present in postdictatorship Chile. Eltit’s novel juxtaposes a 
portrait of working conditions in neoliberal Chile over against allusions to the reinscriptions, 
erasures, disappearances and forgetting through which a space was cleared for neoliberal 
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hegemony in Chile beginning in the 1970s. A few words about the organization of the novel will 
help to put that juxtaposition in perspective. Mano de obra is divided into two parts, each of 
which is organized into chapters. The first part is set in a mega-supermarket, the “súper,” in 
which the narrator is employed under precarious and highly exploitative conditions. Each 
chapter from the first part bears a title whose meaning is never explained but which turn out to 
have been taken from the archives of early 20th century Chilean working class culture; each title 
is accompanied by a place name and a date (I will return to the matter of these chapter 
headings later). By contrast, narrative discourse in the first part focuses on the social and 
psychological dynamics in the contemporary supermarket, through the highly idiosyncratic first-
person account of an entry-level employee who alternates between seeing himself as an 
extension of corporate power and a victim of its technologies of control. Devoid of any 
substantial plot, it relates the narrator’s interactions with demanding clientele and sinister 
supervisors during a holiday shopping frenzy. These dealings are woven into a meticulously-
detailed account of his daily routine: stocking, arranging and maintaining produce displays; and 
responding to customer queries and requests. Narrative discourse deploys what Dianna 
Niebylski terms an “aesthetics of scarcity” [estética de carencia]: a minimalist plot mediated by 
a pseudo-realist attention to the minutiae of the narrator’s surroundings in lieu of the symbolic 
language of metaphor. While the privileging of referentiality over the ideality of signifying 
relations might be understood as promising enhanced access to the real, what the reader finds 
here is not a literary presentation of the real but a density and opacity in which both mediation 
and immediacy encounter their limit (Niebylski 2005, 497-98). This “impoverishment” or 
hollowing out of literary language can be understood as a transcoding of social reality into 
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literary form. In Niebylski’s view it also constitutes a form of possible resistance to neoliberal 
ideology, a fly in the ointment that exposes what Consensus prefers to keep out of view: the 
link between neoliberal reform and deepening of inequality; privatization as instrument for a 
massive redistribution of wealth and resources to the rich; and the pervasive marginalization 
and moral denigration of the working poor. 
The novel’s second half, entitled “Puro Chile, 1973,” is an account of the narrator’s 
domestic life in an apartment shared with a group of fellow employees. It narrates—primarily in 
a sober, third-person voice—the collective’s desire for the national popular in the time of post-
dictatorship. At the same time, the personal relations between housemates display a broad 
spectrum of attitudes ranging from solidarity among the exploited to the petty jealousies and 
rivalries that are the symptoms of dislocatedness and precarity. As Franco and Niebylski both 
point out, the second part of the novel deploys the colloquial use of profanity and other 
“improper” forms of discourse in order to highlight the breakdown of modern forms of 
collective existence—not just civility and other bourgeois codes but the very notions of the 
public and the common (Franco 2007; Niebylski 2014). In the concluding chapters an 
overarching theme emerges: the group’s previously-unspoken search for a charismatic leader 
who could deliver them from their dislocated situation and resolve their new inability to 
symbolize exploitation in a way that would make it recognizable as a wrong or, similarly, to 
effect any significant disruption within the temporality of neoliberal consensus. The saga ends 
on a somewhat ambiguous note, as it becomes clear that this group continues to be guided by 
the same racist, sexist and ontotheological imaginary that has dominated Latin American 
cultural politics in the region for the past two centuries. The unifying figure these housemates 
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seek turns out to be nothing more than a confirmation of the same dominant signifiers—
masculinity, whiteness, and heterosexual virility—that have sustained the criollista fiction of 
national identity in Latin America since colonial times. The concluding lines of the second part—
“Caminamos. Demos vuelta la página”—allow for two ways of reading: as holding open the 
hope of a new path that would puncture a hole in neoliberal consensus, or—more likely—as 
announcing the full reinscription of this shared yearning for the popular into the logic of the 
market. 
A handful of tropological figures from the novel’s first part serve to establish a 
referential frame for reading the novel as reflection on social transformation in Chile. In order 
to work through what is going on in the space of the súper we must first ask what this topos has 
displaced. The novel can be read as allegory of post-Fordism in which the factory has been 
supplanted by the supermarket as new paradigm for commodity production and as new site for 
reproduction of capitalist relations of production. As industrial manufacture gives way to 
flexible accumulation and service economy, the old emphasis on specialized labor is replaced by 
a new focus on diversification and continuous reskilling.76 With the privatization of the 
regulatory state together with the depoliticization of the relation between capital and labor 
providing the backdrop for this story, Mano de obra registers how precariousness emerges as a 
defining element for social relations in the time of postdictatorship. Employment is now devoid 
of contractual guarantees and defined by the withdrawal or privatization of social programs, 
the deregulation of labor markets and working conditions, and the dissolution of shared 
assumptions about what constitutes a livable wage and decent working conditions. In the time 
of industrial capitalism the factory was a site of potential conflict between capital and labor; 
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capital would often seek to defuse antagonism by providing workers with tangible measures of 
security, livability and dignity—as exemplified when Henry Ford promoted the idea that the 
worker should be able to purchase the product she or he makes. With the withering of the 
labor movement and the exhaustion of old vocabularies for symbolizing antagonism, 
meanwhile, post-industrial capital no longer finds itself obliged to seek compromises with labor 
so as to neutralize the radicalizing force of conflict. Workers are now well aware that everyone 
is equally dispensable in the time of diversification and reskilling, and that any suspected 
agitators will be dismissed and replaced from a readily-available stock of surplus labor. Under 
such circumstances one is now content to be able to say that one is exploited, because the 
mark of separation distinguishes one from the even worse fate of having no job at all. 
“The customers…meet in the supermarket only in order to talk” (Eltit 2002, 14). “The 
customers take over the supermarket as a venue [sede] (a mere infrastructure) for their 
meetings” (15). These two passages announce tropologically the subsumption of the modern 
concept of public space within the (super)market. Together they figure what Thayer terms the 
invagination of the political by extrapolitical (technological and economic) factors. The modern 
division between spheres begins to break down when the market emerges as first principle of 
all collective decision-making. The first of these two passages prepares the way for the 
narrator’s classification of customers on the basis of their purchasing power: the high-volume 
“buenos clientes”; the slow-moving, miserly “viejos del súper” who clog the aisles and impede 
the smooth flow of traffic while beleaguering others with their inane questions and petty 
requests. The worst of the worst, according to the narrator, are the clientele who come only to 
look, fraternize, and complain rather than to purchase, and whose persistent lingering impedes 
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the circulation of consumers and merchandise. To use a linguistic analogy, they are akin to a 
heavy accent, a stutter, or slip of the tongue, all well-known phenomena in Eltit’s writing: 
excesses of speech, devoid of any meaningful content, confusing the exchange of information 
and preventing language itself from silently retreating from the scene and returning to its place. 
 The second line, in which “sede” substitutes for “súper,” repeats the process of societal 
transformation at the level of the signifier. In this context the Spanish “sede” would be 
translated as “the venue for an event.” But in other contexts sede also allows for meanings such 
as “the headquarters of an organization” and “the seat of a government.” This condensation of 
possible meanings provides a tropological figure for privatization: all of these meanings, 
together with the institutional spaces and mandates they designate, have now been 
incorporated within the fold of the (super)market. The old division between civil society (“the 
headquarters of an organization”) and state (“the seat of a government”) has been collapsed 
into the commercial space of the súper, which now stands as a synecdoche of the new social 
totality. The súper would seem to have established itself as the only site where anything can 
happen today. Recall that the prefix super- refers to what lies over, above or beyond everything 
else; in the same way the space of the súper illuminates a new temporal horizon within which 
nothing can appear that has not already been attuned to the administrative rationale of the 
neoliberal marketplace. The setting of Mano de obra in the súper allegorizes the historical 
triumph of free-market capitalism over all adversaries; in its defeat of all ideological 
alternatives the market is understood, in the words of Francis Fukuyama, as the “coherent and 
directional [historical force] that will eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal 
democracy” (Fukuyama 1992, xii).  
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 In Mano de obra the rise of neoliberal Consensus is associated with an epochal shift 
from sovereignty to post-sovereignty or interregnum. Such a transformationt is registered in 
the narrator’s reflections on how the organization of time is reconfigured in the era of post-
Fordism: “Las horas son un peso (muerto) en mi muñeca y no me importa confesar que el 
tiempo juega de manera perversa conmigo porque no termina de inscribirse en ninguna parte 
de mi ser. Sólo está depositado en el súper, ocurre en el súper” (31). These somewhat 
enigmatic musings about time should not be understood too hastily as referring to phenomenal 
or experiential time. What does it mean to say that time “only occurs” in the supermarket, and 
moreover that it is “only deposited” in this venue? By my reading this passage refers to the way 
in which time as such is determined today; it is concerned with how temporalization is 
transformed in the service economy, or how post-Fordism can be understood as a total 
appropriation and management of time.  
 In Capital Marx famously demonstrates how industrial capitalism shapes the modern 
experience of time in a variety of ways. For one, capitalist production invents its own ways of 
dividing time: work time vs. leisure time; the introduction and regulation of break time; the 
administration of living labor through the careful measurement of how long takes the average 
worker to complete a given task; and, moreover, the determination of exchange value in 
accordance with an abstract, technologically-mediated “socially-necessary time” required to 
produce a given commodity. At the same time, time also becomes a primary site of struggle 
between capital and labor: the length of the workday, as well as related issues such as 
increased compensation for overtime (Marx 1977, 340-416).  
184 
 
 Temporalization in the supermarket is both like and unlike the factory. The súper, as 
synecdoche for the service economy and flexible accumulation, is formally similar to the factory 
because it gives rise to its own ways of organizing time such as the elimination of overtime 
wages, which the workforce appears to accept without so much as batting an eye. It is unlike 
the factory, meanwhile, in that it is conceived in seemingly contradictory fashion as both a 
depository of time and as the only place in which time can take place. While the latter idea 
would seem to support an allegorical reading of the novel in which the súper is the spatialized 
instantiation of an event that cannot be perceived as such, the depository motif is a bit more 
ambiguous. Is this a reference to post-Fordism and its specific temporality as giving rise to a 
new form of accumulation (“depositing”)? Or are we meant to hear this phrase as indicating an 
unsuspected resemblance between the supermarket and more readily identifiable depositories 
such as a bank?  
As suggested earlier, the first half of Mano de obra illustrates a situation resembling 
Deleuze’s “society of control.” Foucault’s well-known conceptualization of disciplinary society 
was of a striated space with divisions between spheres and institutions, each of which 
possesses its own distinctive way of codifying behaviors and integrating subject-formation with 
power. By contrast, control society describes a smooth space in which the boundaries 
separating institutions and spheres have become porous. In that context the codes and logic 
that were once specific to a given institution can be transferred and diffused throughout the 
social. One example of the movement from discipline to control society can be found in the 
dispersion of the economic logic of marketing into realms that used to conceive of themselves 
as autonomous from commercial forces, such as education, health care and politics. It is a sign 
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that we have entered control society when we have all become familiar with the administrative 
axiom that students or patients are to be treated as customers, while politicians seek to bolster 
their popular appeal by declaring in down-to-earth fashion that government’s task is to get out 
of the way of business or that the nation’s affairs should be conducted like a business.  
The súper presents a stark contrast with the many recognizable scenes of ideological 
conflict, repression and violence through which a space was cleared for neoliberal Consensus in 
Chile during the mid-1970s. To grasp this contrast it is enough to recall the “Las dos caras de la 
moneda” essay where Eltit reflects on how the golpe carried out its interruption of the national 
popular project through a calculated deployment of a bellicose theatrics: of soldiers walking the 
streets armed to the teeth, breaking down doors in search of a furtive enemy, detaining 
civilians at gunpoint and herding them into detention centers; of tanks and warplanes 
bombarding the Presidential Palace; and so on (Eltit 2000, 18-19). Eltit qualifies these images of 
war staged in the streets of Santiago and elsewhere and circulated throughout the country by 
the media, as “Hollywoodesque” (18). Their repeated dissemination in September 1973 
effectively transformed the country—not into a battlefield but into a giant movie theater. The 
primary target in the mediatic reproduction and circulation of these images is the Chilean 
public, which is presented with the sudden and spectacular recasting of politics as war. What 
does this transformation mean, and what effects does it put in motion? The aesthetic of war 
initiates a recoding in which what Carl Schmitt would term the real enemy—the political 
adversary with whom one shares common ground and thus also the possibility of recognition 
and negotiation—is symbolically transformed into an absolute enemy. The absolute enemy is 
one who refuses to play by the rules of the nomic game, and with whom reconciliation is 
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therefore impossible.77 Whereas inside the real enemy there is always a potential friend waiting 
to emerge, the naming of the absolute enemy raises the specter of a monstrous, inhuman other 
whose destruction has been legitimated in advance (Schmitt 2004, 64-68). The “war” of which 
Eltit speaks in “Las dos caras de la moneda” is not a typical war as conceived by traditional 
conceptual categories; it is staged as a battle between uniformed soldiers of the state and a 
furtive, irregular force who, in disassociating themselves from the rules of the game (they wear 
no uniforms and they do not show themselves in public), have renounced the rights of 
protection under which both uniformed combatants and citizens have historically been 
protected. The cinematic effects described by Eltit engender the image of a furtive enemy who 
is neither a soldier nor a common criminal, and who espouses ideas that are not authentically 
Chilean but which cannot be properly assigned to any foreign nationality either (not Russian, 
not Cuban, etc.). The furtive enemy falls outside of the law but not therefore outside of 
sovereignty tout court; it falls precisely within the space of the sovereign ban, and can thus be 
killed with impunity. 
In contrast to the cinematography of war that Eltit associates with the 1973 golpe de 
estado, the contemporary súper deploys softer but not necessarily less insidious forms of 
sovereign control that go hand in hand with precarious employment and technologies of full 
exposure: the omniscient video cameras that track the employee’s every move; and a corporate 
culture in which employees are regarded as potential thieves or, stripped of their historical 
rights as workers, become easy targets for abusive clientele.78 The bellicose imagery and 
metaphorics have not dissipated entirely from the contemporary scene, but the specific form of 
violence they once invoked has now been recodified as a diffuse mixture of psychological and 
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social tendencies that could be associated with the weakening of the social pact: anomie, 
aggressivity, unregulated corporate power, and generalized insecurity and privatization of risk. 
The narrator-employee and the store’s clientele now regard one another through the lens of 
hatred and enmity (27); the employee’s job is likened to combat waged against an enemy caste 
(26); compulsory extension of the workday without increased pay is translated as a declared 
“turno de emergencia” (69); and the tanks that once assaulted La Moneda have been replaced 
by armored vehicles whose comings and goings appear under the metaphor of “un bello 
operativo bélico” (76). But is it just a metaphor? Or does the insecurity that obtains with 
flexible accumulation, precariousness, and privatization give rise to a different kind of “war” 
that accompanies the breakdown of modern political forms and restraining structures? The 
past continues to haunt the present neoliberal consensus, no doubt at least in part because of 
what had to happen in order for a space to be opened for neoliberal accumulation. By the same 
token, these bellic figures metaphorize both the subreption of sovereign power by the military 
state in the 1980 Constitution and the invagination of political sovereignty by global and 
corporate capital. 
Under this new configuration of space, bodies, time and power it is no longer just the 
worker’s body and time that are surrendered to capital. The elements of inner life—moods, 
emotions, states of mind—are also attuned to and absorbed by a production process that has 
become increasingly reliant on the commodification of “service”: affect, care, and the ability to 
create and manipulate symbolic meanings. The scene of the súper illustrates a growing 
indistinction between what belongs objectively to the production process and what is 
extraneous—or used to be extraneous—to production. One of the consequences of this 
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porosity is that capital’s sway now infiltrates every pore and moment of the worker’s existence.  
In A Grammar of the Multitude (Virno 2004) Paolo Virno introduces a notion of 
“virtuosity” to shed light on how the interaction between capitalist production and life acquires 
new features and dimensions in the time of post-Fordism and the service economy. Virtuoso 
labor illustrates how elements that formerly had no role in the workplace have not only been 
integrated into the production process but now come to occupy front and center in the scene 
of commodity production and the extraction of value. Virtuoso labor emerges as paradigmatic 
in the context of post-Fordism, in which manufacture has become largely automated while 
“living labor” is increasingly dedicated to immaterial production, either as a supplement in the 
production of durable commodities or as part of the service economy. Virtuosity exemplifies 
how capitalism today incorporates psychic and somatic processes that were previously 
considered external to the production process; it thereby notifies us of the need to reexamine 
old boundaries that ostensibly separated “living labor”—or the quantum of time and energy 
that the worker devotes to production—from the rest of life. In that light, the concept should 
be understood as dialoguing with other attempts to theorize post-Fordist working conditions, 
including Jameson’s discussion of the cultural logic of late capitalism, and Hardt and Negri’s 
consideration of affective labor. 
 Virtuosity also necessitates a revised understanding of how the production process 
relates to its end or goal.  In the factory the distinction between process and end is not 
complicated: the work of assembling a car is nothing like the final product, the car itself; and as 
long as the car is functional the buyer cares little about how it was actually produced. By 
contrast, virtuoso labor describes a scene in which the product that consumers pay for is 
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inseparable from the process of making it. The end is immanent to the time of production, 
which is in every case a kind of performance. To recall the distinction made by Aristotle in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, virtuosity is the praxis of a poiēsis or making; the end is contained in the 
praxis itself. While the term “virtuoso” implies exceptionality, the excellence that is reserved for 
those who possess a unique talent and/or expertise, Virno’s claim is that the formal immanence 
exemplified in virtuoso performance has become paradigmatic for contemporary capitalist 
production in general. In a manner of speaking we are all virtuosos now, no matter how 
inexperienced or inept we may be at what we do, because what we produce as the workforce 
of immaterial labor is inseparable from the act of producing it. The working conditions in which 
we find ourselves today require us to approach our work as if it were a performance. As 
teachers, administrators, doctors, editors, therapists, baristas, hotel maids, or produce 
stockers, the services we provide are for the most part inseparable from the manner in which 
they are carried out and presented. It is performance that generates the interest that finally 
convinces employers to hire us and clients to purchase the services we provide. By the same 
token, because virtuosity encompasses and calls upon the entirety of our being and not just our 
hands, eyes or minds, its ascent to paradigmatic form means that it is no longer clear where to 
draw the line between the time of production and non-productive time. We are always at work, 
even when we are at home, working out, or out for lunch. 
 The universalization of virtuosity in today’s capitalist system is made possible, according 
to Virno, by the fact that virtuosity is inherent to language itself, or at least to spoken language. 
The speech act is essentially virtuosic. Indeed, speech turns out to be even more virtuosic than 
whatever we envision as the exemplar of virtuoso performativity: a Glenn Gould piano recital, 
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to use Virno’s example. Speech is the prototype of prototypical virtuoso performativity. Why 
so? In distinction from communicative modes whose purpose is to convey information, the 
speech act is characterized by an immanence found only in activities that constitute an end in 
themselves. Unlike other forms of discourse, unscripted speech imitates nothing; or at least it 
cannot be reduced to an imitative intention. Speech, moreover, has no shelf life beyond the 
time of its delivery, and it need not produce any durable effects in the listener in order to 
qualify as a virtuoso performance. Unlike the concert pianist, who performs a set piece that has 
been memorized or read and can therefore be repeated endlessly, a speaker is—sometimes to 
his or her misfortune!—under no requirement to follow a script. Indeed, the speech genre 
includes an implied proscription of repetition: the experience of listening to a speech is 
informed by the unstated expectation that what one is hearing rises to the level of an event, 
something that is about to be heard for the first—and possibly last—time. 
 There would appear to be sound basis for concluding that Virno’s conception of virtuoso 
performance adheres more or less uncritically to the Platonic association of speech with the 
self-presence of the logos and writing with mediation and separation of the logos from itself.79 
Nonetheless, there is also an important distinction to be made between Virno’s conception of 
the virtuoso act and Platonic thought: whereas Plato understands speech as guaranteeing a 
more or less immediate relation to the logos understood as pre- or non-discursive origin of 
speech—like a good father, the Platonic speaker always remains present to account for the 
“offspring” or logoi he produces—for Virno the speech act does not reflect or represent 
anything other than itself. There is no question of speech offering increased fidelity to some 
original intention or enhanced security against the risk of errancy and misinterpretation. There 
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is no separating form and content in Virno’s conception of the speech act, and hence no 
possibility of content becoming available immediately—unless it is as form understood as end 
in itself. What Virno is interested in is the immanence of the act. What a speech performs is the 
sheer immanence of language, which in turn provides the model for the immanence of politics 
and post-Fordist commodity production. We can surmise that Virno accepts the Platonic 
distinction between speech and writing (i.e., that speech is more immediate and writing more 
fraught by mediation) despite all of the problems associated with that position, while at the 
same time moving away from the Platonic project of saving transcendence from the perils of 
mediation and finitude.  
 The paradigmatic status of speech turns out to be what virtuoso performance shares 
with politics. Neither the virtuoso act nor politics is conceivable apart from a thought of 
language. Both spheres must therefore be understood as containing their own end: they are 
praxes of a poiesis. On this point Virno’s thought owes a debt to Hannah Arendt and her 
observation that virtuoso performance presupposes not just a performer but also an audience 
and an organized space or place in which the performance is delivered. Arendt detects a 
“strong affinity” between virtuosity and politics (Arendt 1968, 153) because virtuoso 
performance presupposes a public that does not exist prior to the act; the public of virtuoso 
performance is constituted in the act itself, i.e., through a performance in which the public first 
comes to see itself as such—as the privileged witnesses of a unique or exceptional 
occurrence—and through which it is moved, individually and collectively. Virtuoso performance 
and public presuppose one another: there can be no act that does not take place for an 
audience in a performance space, while the audience and the space of performance in turn are 
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constituted in their specificity—as different from, say, the audience in a movie theater—by the 
awareness of witnessing a singular performance. Arendt’s point is not just the obvious one that 
there can be no performance without observers. Unlike activities that can be repeated with no 
or little appreciable difference, such as going to see a movie or even (arguably) attending a 
piano recital, gathering for a virtuoso performance is itself a way of constituting a specific 
public that understands itself as such: as partaking in what will have been an unrepeatable 
event. Virtuosity highlights both the enhanced capacity of contemporary capitalism to 
incorporate all moments and aspects of our lives into commodity production as well as the 
emergence of new possibilities for contestatory politics that are opened through the creation of 
shared social spaces and activities that constitute ends in themselves.  
 Where does this leave us in our reading of Eltit’s Mano de obra? The concept of 
virtuosity sheds explanatory light on the scene of the súper and thus, by extension, on Eltit’s 
conception of how social relations have been reshaped in post-dictatorship Chile. It is much less 
clear whether or not the thought of virtuosity opens up any new spaces for contestatory 
practices in Eltit’s work. In the first half of the novel, we find disclosed the identity of narrative 
discourse with narrated content; in the second half, by contrast, narrative form and content 
merge asymptotically as the unfulfilled desire for a charismatic leader. In the first part, form 
and content become the same though the narrator’s endeavor to render an account that would 
bestow order on his myriad of menial tasks, all of which fall under one overarching 
responsibility: establishing and maintaining aesthetic order in the market. The identity of 
narrative form (subsumption of this myriad of tasks and tribulations within a single coherent 
story) with narrated content (e.g., maintaining the produce section of the supermarket as a 
193 
 
unified assortment of commodities) finds at least two corollaries within the storyline. The first 
occurs with the narrator’s tendency to perceive the workplace as an extension of his body. The 
second parallel emerges through our awareness of the supermarket as a space in which body 
and psycho-somatic processes are infiltrated by corporate reason and power. This infiltration is 
evidenced in various ways: in the narrator’s simmering resentment against customers whose 
traversal of the produce section threatens the delicate ordering of time and space; in the 
disclosure of a work ethos that amounts to an orthopedic determination and enforcement of 
proper posture in the face of adversity; and in the shadowy and sinister presence of supervisors 
whom the narrator suspects of seeking pretexts for his dismissal.  
Tocan los productos igual que si rozaran a Dios. Los acarician con una devoción 
fanática (y religiosamente precipitada) mientras se ufanan ante el presagio de un 
resentimiento sagrado, urgente y trágico. Es verídico. Estoy en condiciones de 
asegurar que detrás de estas actitudes se esconde la molécula de una mística 
contaminada. (15)  
 The narrator’s portrait of the supermarket unveils an aesthetic space in which the 
arrangement of commodities appears to constitute an end in itself. The virtuoso character of 
immaterial labor helps to explain the narrator’s obsessive fastidiousness in attending to the 
orderliness of the displays as well as his seething resentment toward a clientele which, in 
making its way through the produce section, invariably disturbs the careful arrangements of 
items or impedes the free circulation of shoppers and goods. Not only is the object of his labor 
inseparable from the vigilance with which he attends to the displays, the order of commodities 
over which he presides is also the field in which subjectivity is constituted and confirmed. 
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 While the aestheticization of work in Mano de obra thematizes a societal 
transformation through which material production is replaced by virtuoso labor, the literary 
portrait of consumption as secularized theology in the passage reproduced above alludes to the 
Marxian analysis of commodity fetishism.80 The consumerist attribution of a “spiritual” force to 
the commodity bears witness to a forgetting of the role that social relations—and, in particular, 
the extraction of the surplus value—play in the determination of an object’s value. But is this 
passage simply a literary citation of Marx’s critique of valuation, perhaps in the interest of 
advancing an artistic condemnation of consumerism in post-dictatorship Chile? How we answer 
this question depends on how we read the novel: if we approach this scene as an isolated 
episode in possession of its own meaning then it would seem that the “citation” only makes 
sense as a derogatory portrait of consumer society; and, in light of the novel’s historical 
allusiveness, it no doubt also reminds us of what had to be crushed and dismantled in order or 
this “spiritualization” of the commodity to take place.  
 But what if this particular episode in the novel were not in full possession of its own 
meaning? What if its meaning has to be sought elsewhere? What if its meaning were to be 
found in between one episode and others that are either adjacent to it or which, located at a 
distance, still produce echoes of its thematics? The “tocan los productos como si rozaran a 
Dios” passage prefigures a later scene (chapter seven, “El Obrero Gráfico,” 61-68) in which the 
theme of commodity fetishism appears again, albeit in a very different light. There we find the 
narrator immersed in delirious or drunken musings about a small Christ figurine, a “plastic 
Jesus” of sorts which the narrator, in holding it up to the light, imagines to be God poised on his 
hand. 
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Estoy poseído por un Dios que me invade con un brillo que me ubica en la mira 
ávida de todos los presentes. Dios me posee constantemente como si yo fuera su 
ramera. Se me sienta (ya lo dije) encima de la palma de la mano o trepa, a duras 
penas, por mi espalda o se cuelga de una de mis piernas o se introduce de lleno 
en mi interior hasta oprimir los conductos de mi agobiado corazón. Dios está en 
todas partes. A lo largo y a lo ancho de mi cuerpo. Y se radica con una intensidad 
(que ni te digo) en mis órganos para que retumben en su honor. Quiere 
constatar hasta qué grado su morada se establece en mis retumbos. Ay de mí. 
No me queda más remedio que ala bar el in menso, incomparable honor que 
Dios me ha dado. (62-63) 
 What was earlier presented as a secularized theological narrative now appears as the 
parody of a mystical narrative that renders obscure the way in which the laborer becomes a 
mere appendage to the scene of commodity production. This inversion unmistakably evokes 
Freud’s famous commentary on the memoires of President Schreber, albeit perhaps channeled 
via Deleuze and Guattari and their critique of what they perceive as psychoanalytic 
reinforcement of Victorian heteronormativity. The literary allusion to psychosis in this later 
episode from Chapter 7 highlights a distinction between postdictatorship and earlier 
organizations of social order, using the Schreberian figure of schizophrenia in order to comment 
on a distinction between forms of social totalitization. The market inaugurates a new totality of 
sense comprised of individual signs (goods, brands) that have been deprived of any unifying 
meaning; in Lacanian terms, it is a totality in which no master signifier is to be found, no Other 
and no Law to bestow order and confer meaning on things in the world. In this post-sovereign 
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realm, signs now inhabit the narrator’s world in a devastatingly literal manner. It is as if they 
were things and not coded references to something else. The reinscription of sovereignty (from 
the national popular to sovereign dictatorship), which makes room for the invagination of the 
political space of collective decision-making by economic and technological forces, raises the 
specter of a catastrophic loss of sense, or what Lacan terms the foreclosure of the paternal 
signifier, which leads to a collapse of the distinction between symbolic and real. The new order 
that is post-dictatorship, in which the market now constitutes the horizonal condition of 
possibility for the emergence of the new, is experienced here as the absence of that signifier 
that enables all other potential signifiers to act as signifiers. The scene of commodity fetishism 
in the supermarket thus inaugurates an allegory of the social impact of neoliberal globalization, 
where the totalizing function of political sovereignty has been suspended or invaginated by 
economic and technological spheres, and the possibilities for conceptualizing the social as 
totality have been reduced to one: the fragmentary logic of equivalency and infinite 
accumulation of particularities that is the market. By the same token, what I am describing as 
the commodity fetishism episode also initiates an illustration of why ideology critique (e.g., 
demystifying the commodity by showing how value is in fact the product of social relations 
defined by separation and exploitation) alone may not be enough.   
 This is also the point where the narrator begins to describe himself as feminized in 
relation to the phallic potency of God or of capital. This repositioning can be read as yet 
another literary citation; it alludes not only to the Schreber case and Freud’s use of it to 
develop his own understanding of psychosis, but also to Scheber’s significance for Deleuze and 
Guattari’s critique of Freudian psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). Why 
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precisely this case and why the emphasis of this particular aspect of the case, i.e., the self-
feminization experienced by Schreber in relation to the phallic potency of God? I have already 
proposed the possibility of an allegorical connection between psychosis and the neoliberal 
social pact. Through the turn to Deleuze and Guatarri, meanwhile, we find a critique of Freud’s 
supposed privileging of traditional gender roles, such as the unquestioning postulation of the 
Oedipal (heterosexual and monogamous, nuclear familial) structure of subjectivity. By the same 
token, Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence on the insufficiently-explored social and economic 
components of psychoanalytic categories may be consistent with the critical outlook of Eltit’s 
novel, in which psychic and affective phenomena offer themselves to be interpreted as 
symptoms of social realities that have yet to receive sufficient critical illumination—often 
because in the time of postdictatorship there is no vocabulary or symbolic archive for making 
antagonism visible. Literary allusions to psychoanalytic conceptual categories—desire, 
narcissism, aggressivity, perversion, neurosis, paranoia, and psychosis—in Eltit’s novel are open 
to being read as symptoms of the tectonic shift to neoliberal post-sovereignty. Whereas gender 
traditionally designates the social codification of biological and anatomical differences—or, in 
Lacan’s reading of the Schreber memoire, signals the impossibility of constituting a 
symbolically-differentiated field from out of the oppositional and complementary images of the 
imaginary register (Lacan 1993, 73-101)—in the discourse of the narrator of Mano de obra the 
rhetoric of feminization points to a gendered coding of the social relations of production. 
Gender becomes a mark of the new forms assumed by separation today; it is a metaphor for 
the production of precariousness (i.e., the dismantling of the labor movement, the privatization 
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of the Welfare state and the creation of a large army of surplus labor) as a fundamental 
condition for neoliberal accumulation. As Donna Haraway puts it her “Cyborg Manifesto”: 
Work is being redefined as both literally female and feminized, whether 
performed by men or women. To be feminized means to be made extremely 
vulnerable; able to be disassembled, reassembled, exploited as a reserve labor 
force; seen less as workers than as servers; subjected to time arrangements on 
and off the paid job that make a mockery of a limited work day; leading an 
existence that always borders on being obscene, out of place, and reducible to 
sex. Deskilling is an old strategy newly applicable to formerly privileged workers. 
(Haraway 1991, 26) 
 Earlier, in the context of looking at how the term “golpe” functions in the “Las dos caras 
de la moneda” essay, I discussed a correlation between the body in its materiality and the ideal 
register of the self as understood by Freudian psychoanalysis. In Mano de obra a similar 
interaction takes shape in the context of new ways of configuring social relations and new ways 
of expropriating time and surplus value in the post-Fordist economy. Here speech displays a 
peculiar cutting and penetrating power that recalls how the old metaphorics of war is 
redeployed in the current context of precarity and insecurity. In the first part of Mano de obra 
the narrator literalizes a cutting remark uttered by one customer as affecting him at an organic 
level: “Me hiere y me perfora la palabra abriendo un boquete en mi riñón” (23). This poetic 
phrase finds resonance elsewhere in the first part through images of perforation and 
penetration: “Yo me estremezco ante la amenaza de unas pausas sin asunto o me atormento 
por los ruidos insípidos y, sumergido de lleno en la violencia, me convierto en un panal 
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agujerado por el terror” (13); and “Soy víctima de un mal que, si bien no es estrictamente 
orgánico, compromete a cada uno de mis órganos” (48). In these scenes the body becomes 
visible in a way that destabilizes traditional distinctions between inside and outside, materiality 
and ideality, soma and psyche. The body here is a surface inscribed and circumscribed by 
interactions between power and the resistance proper to life. This corporeal surface or 
boundary does not serve to fix and stabilize the distinction between inside and outside (e.g., 
public vs. private, outer world vs. inner life) as it is traditionally understood to do; instead it 
offers a permeable site open to the possibility of contamination—from the outside 
(penetration, internalization) or the inside (discharge of bodily fluids, the expression of 
symptoms). The first of these three images (23) could well serve as an epigraph for the novel as 
a whole. This literary image of an organ that has been “perforated” in the course of a passing 
exchange of words between customer and employee succinctly illustrates the way in which 
previously stable boundaries separating one sphere from another (e.g., the concrete realm of 
social relations of production versus states of mind; speech and body; material and somatic 
processes versus psychic processes and moods; etc.) have now become porous. At the same 
timme this image makes palpable the violence of reinscription through which the traces of 
earlier histories are effaced from the landscape of postdictatorship Chile.  
 “Me hiere y me perfora la palabra abriendo un boquete en mi riñón.” One might 
wonder whether the relation between power, inscription, and body is not more complex than 
what syntax and grammar are able to convey here. The sentence refers us to a somatic register 
that finds itself subjugated under a new logic of sense and a new way of organizing social 
relations. The verbal exchange between clientele and employee plays out as a kind of theater in 
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which one party is able to display itself as possessing the capacity to reduce the other to almost 
nothing or, more exactly, to reduce the other to a state of passivity in which the other is able to 
understand and follow orders (or denigrating remarks) but is no longer in a position to produce 
anything comparable in return. Here we see at work two different but complementary ways of 
relating to the logos: there are the masters of the logos who are capable of giving orders, and 
there are the slaves of the logos whose capabilities are exhausted in follow orders. These ways 
of relating to or having logos are not the properties of subjects but are generated by the scene 
itself.  
 In this scene, which we could imagine reproducing itself ad infinitum in the daily routine 
of the narrator, we find an image of the specific form that alienation takes in post-Fordist 
society: bodies reduced to a standing reserve of serviceable parts; working conditions that 
mandate the subordination of all dignity to the subservience of “service with a smile”; and body 
and subjectivity marked and penetrated by forms of sovereign power for which there is no 
longer any corresponding contestatory vocabulary. The body as seen in this context is not a 
natural (biological or physiological) entity that only subsequently gets pulled into the symbolic 
fray of culture. As Judith Butler and Charles Shepherdson have shown in different ways, what 
we call the body is a field that has always already been marked by symbolic processes of 
appropriation and signification.81 While body designates a materiality irreducible to the realm 
of meaning and identity, as an entity that is always already socialized its surfaces and 
physiological processes are not equitable with a biological or natural state of existence; they 
have been inscribed by the same social forces and logics that produce the subject. The point is 
significant because it helps to shed light on a complexity inherent to the attempt to think 
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materiality and power in distinction from ideality in Mano de obra. Eltit’s novel uncovers a kind 
of materiality precisely where one would expect to find ideality: in language and in the symbolic 
archives of the Chilean labor movement. It is thus a materiality that must be thought prior to 
the distinction between matter and idea, the sensible and the intelligible.  
 Not unlike a Benjaminian ruin, the body in Mano de obra constitutes an in-between site 
that does not belong fully to nature or to culture. An analogy can be found in the 
psychoanalytic theory of the drives as described by Shepherdson: the body constitutes a field of 
symbolic inscription and interpellation as well as a site of resistance to symbolic codification; 
physiological processes bear witness both to the symbolic coding of differences and to the 
inability of the signifier fully to suture the subjective field. It is on the body and in its processes 
that what Lacan refers to as the holes in meaning or the discontinuity in the real are registered 
or manifested. In the passage cited above this limit is announced with the term boquete: a hole 
or tear in the fabric of the organic body left by the signifier—in this case, a wounding remark 
made in passing. The etymology of the term points us to the intermediary zone that is the 
mouth (boquete: from boca). This peculiar wound would also seem to be an orifice that can act 
as a site for ingestion and speech. 
 I now turn once again to question of the novel’s formal organization, and specifically the 
chapter headings which call attention to a certain break or discontinuity in history. My reading 
will, by way of conclusion, make its way back to the place where this chapter began: the recent 
critical debate about history and the neo-avant garde in Chile. For Eltit’s novel the socio-
political landscape of post-dictatorship Chile is defined by a rift which both links it to the past in 
a certain way (the present defined by neoliberal ideology as culmination and overcoming of a 
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long history of ideological conflict) while also marking off certain archives as illegible or 
inaccessible (as we will see in a moment). There are various ways of understanding what I am 
calling a rift, and thus it is not entirely clear that it would in fact be a rift rather than multiple 
fault lines running alongside one another. For one, we find—most notably in the second part—
a literary reflection on the disappearance of “class” in contemporary social awareness and 
discourse, which retreat goes hand in hand with the neoliberal determination of Consensus 
(and the attendant retreat of all ideological conflict) as telos of history. Second, and relatedly, in 
the disjunctive relation between chapter headings and chapter content we find traces of the 
destruction of the labor movement during the 1970s and subsequently—as inaugural act of the 
democratically-elected Concertación alliance—the foreclosure of any possibility of politicizing 
the relation between capital and labor. Let us designate these first two rifts under the heading 
of the withering of antagonism. Then there is also the matter of a “deafness” to history which, 
while by no means unique to Chile, unquestionably acquires a distinctive character in the 
context of Chile’s recent past. For Chilean cultural critique it is the so-called transition to 
democracy that constitutes the present through a collective “forgetting” or eclipse of 
historicity; the past becomes illegible to the present insofar as the past was defined by 
antagonisms and ideological conflicts whose very form has become inconceivable or been 
recoded as antithetical with neoliberal reason. Any new occasions for reflection and debate 
about the past that might have opened in the wake of dictatorship are quickly tamped down 
and closed off through the combined forces of self-censorship and public stigmatization of 
contestatory politics; the neoliberal economic model imposed under military rule during the 
mid-1970s, meanwhile receives retroactive legitimation under the sign of democracy and is 
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recoded as the only conceivable alternative to fratricidal political violence.82 
 The way of life of one class, in becoming synonymous with the prevailing logic of the 
social, threatens the existence of other sectors: this is the fundamental conflict that can give 
rise to the articulation of antagonism. Yet, in the time of post-dictatorship, there are few or no 
tools available for symbolizing such an existential threat. Post-dictatorship is an order founded 
on dislocation, which is to say the impossibility of making antagonism visible.83 Separation and 
exploitation still obtain, at times in even more entrenched and intense forms than before, yet 
there would seem to be no poetics capable of bringing these conditions into view as a wrong 
that is suffered collectively, a wrong that affects the count of the whole. The impossibility of 
discursively bringing antagonism into view as such today is translated, in Eltit’s novel, as the 
formal composition of the novel itself. The chapter headings are taken from the titles of 
working class political and cultural journals from the early 20th century, and allude back to key 
sites of conflict between labor and capital (e.g., Iquique). By contrast the contemporary 
supermarket constitutes a new totality devoid of any recognizable signs of history, in which any 
attempt to politicize the relation between labor and capital will immediately be expelled—not 
necessarily by police and military repression, but through dismissal and replacement from a 
standing reserve of surplus laborers. 
The chapter titles of the first part, rather than performing the instrumental and 
contextualizing function that is conventionally expected of them, present instead a  stark 
contrast juxtaposing the seamless façade of Consensus against the material ruins of an earlier 
history of political radicalism. These orphaned headings cast a faint light on the history of the 
present as an order whose prevailing common sense—or the determination of what goes 
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without saying—has been founded on erasure, destruction, terror, disappearance, and 
reinscription. Although the novel provides no hints about where these mysterious proper 
names might come from, readers familiar with Chilean social history will have little difficulty in 
discerning that the titles in the first half of the novel were taken from working class journals 
and pamphlets dating from the early 20th century, most of which were associated with 
radicalized workers in the mining industry. The title of the second half, “Puro Chile,” is taken 
from a leftist alternative daily published in Santiago during the time of Allende’s Unidad Popular 
government. The first part as a whole, meanwhile, is entitled “El despertar de los trabajadores 
(Iquique, 1911).” As Susana Draper reminds us Iquique was the epicenter of the Chilean mining 
labor movement during the early 20th century following a brutal 1907 army massacre of striking 
miners (Draper 2012, 99-124). El despertar de los trabajadores, meanwhile, was the title of a 
socialist journal founded by Luis Recabarren, one of the most dynamic voices in early 20th 
century Latin American labor politics. The first half of the novel is thus framed by a series of 
citations through which the novel evokes an older history of struggle against exploitation and 
repression—and which, for the neoliberal present, turns out to be a lost history that might as 
well belong to another world. These citations have been torn from their original context and 
inserted into a new context in which there is no longer any place for the illumination of 
antagonism that once resonated in them. As Jean Franco puts it, the headings are  
fantasmatic indices of the distance that separates the neoliberal present, in which all 
that is solid melts into air, and a past in which those who worked had the power to 
negotiate using the threat of strike, in which labor unions had political force, and in 
which the working class could dream of inheriting the world” (Franco  2007, 145).   
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 In her own very insightful reading of Eltit’s novel, Susana Draper proposes that the 
chapter titles illuminate—in the Benjaminian sense of the term—a space or modality in 
between the empirical domain of actually occurring events (what Hegel terms the rerum 
gestarum of history) and the narrativization of these events within an overarching or 
transcendent poetic logic (the res gestae), an emplotment that serves to organize events in 
terms of causes and effects, and thereby inscribes them with meaning (tragedy or farse?). 
Draper associates this in-between dimension with Benjamin’s understanding of how current 
political struggles can be animated through recollection of past struggles, as well as with 
Derrida’s thinking about the structure of repetition—what he calls “iterability,” or the 
possibility of being repeated—as the condition of possibility for any novelty or event. Draper 
thereby develops a reading of the poetics of naming in Mano de obra, proposing that the 
recycling of these names taken from a bygone history of emancipatory struggles might help to 
catalyze a new “awakening” [despertar] in a quite different context: that of neoliberal 
privatization of the regulatory state, in which the politics of dissensus has been thoroughly 
stigmatized through association with the “demons” of the past.84 This new awakening would 
rely on what Draper describes as a “double play between the possibility of remembering...[a] 
truncated past as that which never was in an actual state...and…a process of learning to 
remember what is closest to us in a more physical, material way” (Draper 2010, 108). In other 
words, awakening would involve two different modalities of “remembering.” On one hand 
remembrance draws on images from the past in order to actualize something latent in the prior 
context that could in turn serve as a catalyst for the present. It would not be a matter of 
reviving some political meaning or subjectivity that had fallen dormant so much as a kind of 
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aesthetico-political formalism in which old images and signifiers of struggle are taken from the 
past and redeployed in the here and now in order to open up a space in which new 
antagonisms could be made visible today. On the other hand, remembrance is also about 
coming to see the familiar arrangements of the present in a different light. In the Arcades 
Project Benjamin discusses such a potential for turning the familiar into something strange 
through the examples of domestic space and furniture (Proust), but one might also think of his 
interest in Brecht’s concept of theatrical gesture as a way of bringing to light the social 
implications of seeming neutral accounts and positionings of bodies.  
What Proust intends with the experimental rearrangement of furniture in 
matinal half-slumber, what Bloch recognizes as the darkness of the lived 
moment, is nothing other than what here is to be secured on the level of the 
historical, and collectively. There is a not-yet-conscious knowledge of what has 
been: its advancement has the structure of awakening. (Benjamin 1999, 389) 
In agreement with Draper I propose that we look at the chapter titles of the first part as 
a field of symbolic ruins. They are akin to citations that have been torn from their original 
contexts. Or, like archaeological glyphs, they attest mutely to the existence of past cultural 
practices whose symbolic world is no longer accessible to us. By the obscure light of these 
enigmatic names, the novel’s plot content is revealed as belonging to a social order that has 
been founded on destruction, expropriation, and the foreclosure of history—not just of a 
specific past but of historicity as such. Not only have the struggles and conflicts alluded to in the 
chapter headings been relegated to oblivion, this disappearance has itself been rendered mute 
and nearly invisible in the context of a historical present that understands itself as the 
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inevitable culmination of all historical processes. These somewhat obscure citations play a role 
that is analogous to what Walter Benjamin, in his study of German Trauerspiel (Benjamin 1977), 
calls “natural history.” In Eltit’s novel precariousness and dislocation generate an experience 
similar to the one that Benjamin calls “natural history.”  
Natural history refers not to the history of nature but to the material persistence of 
cultural artifacts after the dissipation of their symbolic milieu. Like a ruin, these signifiers may 
well find themselves in the process of being “reclaimed” by nature, and yet something that is 
not reducible to nature—and which may also be irreducible to the human—haunts such sites. 
Natural history designates the “afterlife” of culture, a time of material remainders that cannot 
be categorized as either culture or nature. By the same token, natural history can also name 
what becomes of life itself when it is torn from the lived context in which it emerged. One 
might think, for example, of what becomes of the tragic hero Oedipus once he has been obliged 
to abandon his familiar symbolic place and his customary trappings of power: the Oedipus of 
Colonus, that is. As Eric Santner puts it in On Creaturely Life:  
Natural history is born out of the dual possibilities that life can persist beyond 
the death of the symbolic forms that gave it meaning and that symbolic forms 
can persist beyond the death of the form of life that gave them human vitality. 
Natural history transpires against the background of this space between real and 
symbolic death, this space of the “undead.” (Santner 2006, 17) 
The epistemological and political import of natural history for Benjamin’s discussion of 
allegory resides with its bearing on our ability to experience history otherwise than its liberal 
conceptualization—i.e., as something other than a unidirectional, progressively-structured 
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sequence of occurrences in which “progress” serves to rationalize destruction and justify the 
infliction of suffering on others while also ensuring that any alternative to the liberal order can 
only appear as regression to a barbaric past from which we have thankfully moved beyond. 
Natural history understood as material “afterlife” constitutes an archive with the potential to 
animate alternatives to the liberal philosophy of history. As Santer emphasizes it is violence 
that gives shape in Benjamin’s thought to what I am calling historicity (17). The linking of history 
to contingency and violence (destruction, domination, reinscription, massacre, torture, etc.) 
similarly provides an interpretive key for Mano de obra, whose titles attest to the existence of 
another history. The chapter headings bear mute witness to the destructive violence and 
oblivion that have always accompanied what is called “progress” in Chile and Latin America. In 
this way Mano de obra takes shape as a neo-avant garde work in which social critique emerges 
as dissonance between form and content. The disjuncture between form and content highlights 
what Nelly Richard calls the “insubordination of signs” (Richard 1994), exposing as unstable 
those reference points that ostensibly serve to secure the appearance of inevitability for 
neoliberal consensus as the only game in town.  
 At the same time, and not in an unrelated way, we could say that the chapter headings 
exemplify a fundamental link between literature and the secret in its opacity, and that they 
thereby affirm a limit for any understanding of literature as revelation of inconvenient truths. 
The chapter headings point to what has been lost and destroyed, and they thereby cannot help 
but mark a limit for what we can hope to read and decipher. If these proper names and dates 
attest to an experience of history as irreversibility of destruction, they thereby also introduce 
within the novel an irreducible exteriority whose alterity cannot be neutralized through 
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interpretation, identification or any other form of communion with the past. But this is not all. 
It seems to me that these names that have been torn from their rootedness in a certain past 
also point mutely, beyond whatever specific historical contexts they may once have been 
associated with, to an essential void at the heart of the signifier. These orphaned names attest 
to what Platonism knows all too well and cannot abide: the capacity of any signifier to stray 
outside the city walls, beyond its pre-authorized domain of circulation, or to persist in its 
material existence after its original signifying intention has exhausted itself. As Derrida has 
shown, when it comes to the logos, “original intention” can never be truly and purely original 
(Derrida 1978, 63-171). The event qua opening or first time is always already contaminated by 
the law of repeatability as a condition of its appearing at all. These orphaned names thus do 
double duty in Mano de obra, both calling attention to destruction in the history of the present, 
and pointing to a split within the signifier itself, or the signifier as split. 
In contrast to her previous work, at first glance Eltit’s Mano de obra appears to have 
little in common with the avant garde. It displays none of the overt experimentation with 
literary form and genre found in her previous works, and it is largely devoid of the linguistic play 
for which her writing became renowned during the 1980s and 90s. If there is an avant garde 
component to Mano de obra it is to be found in its literary exploration of the double register of 
the proper name and the signifier, an exploration that engages with forms of materiality that 
are irreducible to representation: incompatible with a Consensus that presents itself as the 
rational culmination of history, and irreducible to an idealist conceptualization of the sign as 
expression or representation of an original meaning. If neoliberal Consensus understands itself 
as the end of antagonism and exclusion—a time in which there is a place for everyone, a 
210 
 
market in which any and all are welcome to compete—Mano de obra takes up the task of 
bringing the void itself into view.  
 In his critique of Nelly Richard’s account of the Chilean Avanzada, Willy Thayer raises 
important points about the importance of historicizing literary critical concepts while warning 
us against presuming too hastily that the conceptual categories of literary modernity can be 
applied unproblematically today. However, perhaps the critical points raised by Thayer would 
apply to more than just the avant garde and its contemporary reiterations. Indeed, Eltit’s novel 
itself serves as a reminder that the conceptualization of the avant garde is in fact coterminous 
with what we call literature itself. If we have reached a point where the avant garde and its 
critical or ruptural impulse is no longer available to us, then literature as such may have 
suffered a similar fate. Literature, at least as it has been understood since the Romantics, is 
inconceivable without the accompanying thought of a narrative or poetic process that takes a 
critical distance toward representational understandings of language. What we call literature is 
born with the self-reflexive discovery that its classificatory categories are inherently unstable. 
Literature is its own critique. Since the Romantics literature has always manifested a tension or 
conflict between “avant garde” tendencies on the one hand, which are driven to explore the 
points where representation and signification stumble, and conservative, “retro-guard” 
tendencies on the other hand, which serve to reinforce representational uses of language. 
There can be no literature apart from this self-confrontation and this redoubling. A text that did 
not in some way raise unsettling questions about representation and truth would amount to 
nothing more than a transparent linguistic act that requires no interpretation whatsoever—
simply put, there would be nothing literary about it. A text that abandoned representation 
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altogether, by contrast, would be nothing other than illegible—again, nothing literary. Mano de 
obra deploys this double register of the literary as its own critique in order to bring to light the 
limits of Consensus. What remains unclear is whether or not such a gesture can hope to 
produce anything like a rupture or awakening today.   
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Literary Contretemps: Histories of Love, Labor, and Abandonment 
 
Toda escritura es una puesta en práctica del distanciamiento: cuando uno escribe, el 
distanciamiento con la realidad se hace tangible, porque de lo contrario no podría crearse esa 
mediación, que es la escritura. 
   —Sergio Chejfec, “Escribo para olvidar lo que escribí antes” 
 
La idea de realidad ha ingresado en [la literatura] bajo la forma de una advertencia crítica. En la 
medida en que esas inclusiones se conciben como pertenecientes a un orden mediana o 
completamente ajeno a la escritura, producen un efecto desestabilizador, a su modo son 
anticipaciones críticas, aparatos levantados para resistir clasificaciones inmediatas y a la vez 
para disponer indirectamente su propia crónica, dibujando sus límites. 
   —Chejfec, “Breves opiniones sobre relatos con imágenes” 
 
We do not know it, we cannot really know it, but abandoned being has already begun to 
constitute an inevitable condition for our thought, perhaps its only condition. From now on, the 
ontology that summons us will be an ontology in which abandonment remains the sole 
predicament of being, in which it even remains—in the scholastic sense of the word—the 
transcendental. If being has not ceased to speak itself in multiple ways—pollakōs legetai—
abandonment adds nothing to the proliferation of this pollakōs. It sums up the proliferation, 
assembles it, but by exhausting it, carrying it to the extreme poverty of abandonment. Being 
speaks itself as abandonment by all categories, all transcendentals. 
   —Jean-Luc Nancy, “Abandoned Being” 
 
  Sergio Chejfec’s millennial novel Boca de lobo (2000) tells the story of a romance 
involving an unnamed writer and a young factory worker named Delia. It is narrated by the 
writer some years later as he sits in his well-lit studio at night, recollecting everything from their 
first encounter to their habitual nighttime meanderings through Delia’s neighborhood to the 
abrupt end of the relationship, all the while interjecting his idiosyncratic interpretations of the 
practices and outlooks found in Delia’s working-class community. The reader is surprised to 
learn, midway through the narrator’s recounting of this romantic tale, of its violent end: one 
night, while out on their customary evening walk, the seemingly mild-mannered narrator 
throws Delia to the ground, rapes her and then abandons her. He recalls having been informed 
by a mutual acquaintance sometime later of her pregnancy, presumably conceived the night of 
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the attack; the violation and betrayal is thereby suddenly redoubled in the abandonment of a 
progeny that he will never meet. His recounting of this saga leaves little room for moralizing; to 
be sure we can condemn the narrator as abusive and exploitative, but with Chejfec’s novel we 
also get the strong sense that such moral judgments can only miss the point. On a formal level 
their relationship sets the stage for a series of reflections on capitalism, history and destruction, 
interpellation and abandonment, and potentiality and actuality among other themes.  
 While the storyline of Boca de lobo unmistakably gestures to the realist tradition and 
the novela social, at the level of poetics the novel distances itself from the referential ground of 
the realist novel. It treats what Barthes calls the “referential illusion”—or the narration of social 
reality through the minutiae of socially-situated objects, bodies and gestures—as an occasion 
for posing questions about literature itself. Through a highly self-aware deployment of aesthetic 
distance and mediation Chejfec’s literary practice recasts social history as literary form.85 The 
literary gesture of juxtaposing lettered and working-poor cultures, and of situating pockets of 
rural or proletariat culture within the urban, middle-class space of Buenos Aires, can be traced 
back to Esteban Echeverría’s “El matadero” (written in approximately 1838, but not published 
posthumously until 1871). For Echeverría the matedero or slaughterhouse is a metonymy of 
“barbarism,” a legacy of subjugation to a colonial order defined by authoritarian traditionalism 
and its disdain for the social codes of modern cosmopolitan life. By locating it in the heart of the 
city Echeverría created a poetic image of post-independence Argentina’s inability to integrate 
itself fully into the temporality of modernity. As Sarmiento would put it, the slaughterhouse 
within the city is akin to a residue of the 12th century existing side-by-side with the 19th 
century.86 When it comes to the novela social tradition, meanwhile, the poetic juxtaposition of 
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the villa miseria within urban space performs a near-complete inversion of Echeverría’s 
critique, asserting the innate dignity of the working poor against liberalism’s tendency to 
disparage these groups as something less than human. Chejfec’s novel, meanwhile, should be 
read as a citation of both of traditions and their tropologies, which exposes an element of the 
original contexts that was not previously apparent. In that light, I will propose that Boca de lobo 
brings forth the traces of the literary from within the factory. But in doing so it also performs a 
profound displacement within the concept of literature.   
 Alongside its unavoidable engagement with the social realist tradition one of the most 
striking aspects of Boca de lobo is the complete absence of recognizable signposts that would 
help to situate the romance and/or the scene of its recollection in a specific historical context. 
One might reasonably assume that then and now take place on either side of the Menem era of 
neoliberal privatization. However, there is no indication of how the before time fits into what 
we know about 20th century Argentine history; there is no way of situating it in relation to 
Peronism, post-1955 authoritarianism, or the guerrillas, political violence and military 
dictatorship of the 1970s. The elimination of all familiar markers of historical time generates a 
disorienting, dream-like effect. It thereby replicates on purely a formal level a situation in which 
the capacity to experience history has been thrown in doubt. This is one example of what I 
meant when I suggested that Chejfec’s novel transposes social history into literary form.  
 The difference between the time of romance and the time of recollection and narration 
is emplotted through contrasting ways of inhabiting space and relating with others. Events from 
the past characteristically take place outdoors or in highly socialized contexts (a visit to Delia’s 
friend from whom she borrows clothing, a scene from inside the factory that Delia related to 
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her lover, etc.). The couple’s time together is framed by their habitual and aimless nocturnal 
wanderings through her neighborhood, the recollection of which prompt many of his 
speculations concerning the zone’s topography, its architecture and its working-class 
inhabitants. The narrative present is also situated at night time, but in contrast to the 
recollected scenes the narrator reposes in the solitude of his studio. His recollections and 
speculations are mediated poetically by the stark discrepancy between interior lighting and 
external darkness, by virtue of which the window over his desk functions more like a mirror 
than a frame that would allow the eye access to what lies beyond the writer’s own domain. The 
brief descriptions of this scene of nocturnal writing suggest that Boca de lobo is a novel about 
the imagination as much as it is about social history.  
 Narration in Chejfec’s novel sustains a strange relation to time. On one hand narrative 
unavoidably temporalizes. The narrator recounts the story he tells us by assigning it a 
beginning, a middle, and an end, connected logically through attributions of causes and effects. 
The sequencing of events acquires additional significance with the tragic reversal—the rape 
scene—together with an accompanying symbolization of an act that at first glance defies 
understanding.87 On the other hand the novel displays a tendency to return repeatedly to 
certain key scenes. In conjunction with the absence of referential signposts repetition has the 
effect of disrupting the experience of temporal sequentiality and consistency. Boca de lobo is a 
novel about time in which narrative temporalization revolves around an atemporal void. The 
structure of the novel encourages an allegorical reading in which “then” and “now” correspond 
with different periods in national history: the time of the national-popular, import-substitution 
industrialization and class conflict for one; and a new time in which the old social referents and 
216 
 
principles have faded from view and in which there is far less certainty about what might have 
replaced them. The reader only catches brief and oblique glimpses of the narrative present, a 
time and place that is marked by the retreat and crisis of modern figures of sovereignty. The 
work of memory and writing do not bring into view a concrete past in its social specificity so 
much as they generate a sense of incompatibility between times or worlds: between a time 
that experiences itself historically, whose inhabitants see their lives as shaped by the 
technological and social forces of history, and a world in which historical processes are no 
longer evident and in which the future can only be conceived as a continuation of the present.  
While the allegorical reading is unavoidable there is at least one important element in 
the novel that allegorical reference cannot account for: the excess or the lack of measure at the 
heart of this literary temporalization of love, betrayal and abandonment. In Chejfec’s  extended 
citation of the novela social what has been subtracted is a reference point that would afford 
some kind of perspective on the history of the present. We have no insight into what became of 
Delia and their child; and while we intuit that a long time must have passed since the breakup, 
we learn nothing of how the narrator has lived his life since that moment or of what has 
become of the factory and Delia’s working class community. These questions, which are quite 
simply never posed, point to an ontological void within the text, a real boca de lobo that is 
without measure but that nonetheless gives form to the strange, tenuous relation between 
“then” and “now.” 
In the limitations of a book chapter I cannot hope to do justice to all aspects of what is 
unquestionably a very rich and complex novel, nor do I have the space in which to discuss what 
might be the place of Boca de lobo in Chejfec’s oeuvre. My goal here is the more modest one of 
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exploring how memory, as illustrated by the narrator’s recollections of Delia and her working 
class social environment, establishes a dialogue between literary self-reflection on the one 
hand and considerations of history, indeterminacy, potentiality, facticity and the crisis of 
sovereignty on the other.  
 In a collection of essays entitled Potentialities (Agamben 1999)88 Giorgio Agamben 
develops a connection between language and philosophical consideration of potentiality and 
actuality that can help to shed light on the link between literary concerns and social history in 
Chejfec’s novel. One of Agamben’s aims in that collection is to call into question the way in 
which, since Aristotle, the philosophical tradition has tended to derive its understanding of the 
possible from the presence of the actual, so that possibility is only ever construed as a 
derivative of presence: as lacking actuality or as a future actuality awaiting realization. This 
questioning has clear significance when it comes to the question of modernity and its historical 
self-understanding. Agamben departs from this metaphysics of presence by proposing that we 
think the difference between actuality and potentiality as a distinction between language 
conceived in instrumental terms (as communicative, expressive, pragmatic, etc.) in contrast to 
language understood as referring to itself—or language as event, as in the fact that there is 
language. This “event” is at once the most obscure and the most quotidian of all facts. It is 
silently presupposed in every speech act and every written text, and yet as condition of 
possibility for communication, expression, or articulation this “fact” cannot become the object 
of representation or perception. It cannot be represented because, in the very act of referring 
to “the fact that there is language,” we have already produced another occurrence whose 
facticity must in turn be recognized. That there is language can never itself become apparent 
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but can only be glimpsed or intuited in specific linguistic acts. For instance, deictic language 
introduces simultaneously an appeal to referential immediacy (“here,” “now”) and the 
possibility of being repeated (received and reinterpreted) in a different context (e.g., the “now” 
that I designate as I write this is other than any of the “now’s” in which it might be read). The 
structure of deixis is what enables reference to take place at all (“this cat here”), but its 
indexical function exposes any actual utterance or inscription to the law of repeatability, which 
ruins in advance any hope of ensuring referential immediacy and immunizing a specific 
linguistic act or event against the risks associated with mediation and repetition 
(misunderstanding, alteration, being taken out of context, etc.). If the event of language cannot 
be submitted to representation this is not because it is “beyond” language in the manner of the 
Kantian sublime. It is because as event it is not One but divided, occurring in the difference and 
deferral of every linguistic act from itself.  
 In analogous fashion Agamben proposes a thought of potentiality as something other 
than a possible actuality. Potentiality would name a non-phenomenalizable register that cannot 
be reduced to presence: potentiality as a capacity not to be. I understand this “capacity not to 
be” as analogous to Heidegger’s thematization of the ontological difference. Potentiality for 
Agamben refers to something akin to the retreat of being amidst the presentation of beings, 
where being names the event of presencing or the movement of disclosure in distinction from 
the phenomenality of what is presented or disclosed as a being. If potentiality names a capacity 
not to be amidst the flow of becoming, then actuality in turn would mean the cancelation or 
suspension of that potentiality—if not also its forgetting. Potentiality is the condition of 
possibility for anything actual, but it is also what will have been subtracted from every actual 
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and thus it cannot be situated on either side of the actual/potential dichotomy that has 
presided over the philosophical understanding of time since Aristotle. Potentiality, as we will 
see with Chejfec, names the difference of all actuality (real or potential) from itself. 
 In the same collection of essays Agamben turns to Walter Benjamin’s writings on 
historical remembrance [Eingedenken] to explore how it is that the question of potentiality 
opens up new ways of thinking about history and historical time. The rethinking of potentiality 
against the grain of metaphysical interpretation holds the key, says Agamben, for breaking 
away from the modern determination of historical time as progressive, sequential, and 
teleologically-guided continuity—or what Benjamin termed the “empty, homogeneous” time of 
historicism. In response to a letter from Horkheimer that is reproduced in the Arcades Project 
Benjamin poses an enigmatic account of historical remembrance that serves as impetus for this 
break with liberal and philosophical idealist accounts of history. The exchange between 
Benjamin and Horkeimer goes as follows. According to Horkheimer the contrast between the 
temporal nature of beings and projects on the one hand and the absolute finality of injustice on 
the other, legislates against any secularized expectation of justice within the lived time of 
human history. Regardless of how one chooses to define justice it unavoidably brings theology 
into the picture. The late Benjamin’s idiosyncratic blend of Marxian historical materialism and 
Jewish messianism would not be immune to this critique. The implication of these cautionary 
words from Horkheimer is that Benjamin’s understanding of memory and history remains 
dependent on an unexamined eschatology of the Last Judgment and Resurrection. The concept 
of justice necessarily presupposes a thought of completion, of an end to time or of a time 
beyond historical time when all debts would finally be liquidated and just shares meted out. But 
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the inclusion of a thought of completion within a non-teleological conception of history would 
seem to entail a contradiction, because the rejection of teleological solutions to the 
contingency of history involves a refusal of the idea that history has a goal or finality. 
Horkheimer’s critique of the concept of justice is based on the principle that only what is 
negative in this world (suffering, iniquity, death) can be said to have permanence; anything that 
has philosophically positive content (works, projects, dreams, joy) has no staying power. What 
is positive is always already differing from itself—because it is temporal and fleeting, and 
because history is the history of destruction—whereas the negative contains its own unity. 
Once an act of iniquity is realized it can never be undone: the dead cannot be brought back to 
life, and the stain of suffering cannot be wiped clean through progress and forgetting.89 
 Benjamin’s somewhat surprising response to Horkheimer’s critique is that, given the 
transient nature of everything positive in history, the work of remembrance [Eingedenken] does 
indeed offer a possibility for thinking justice from a non-transcendent standpoint.90 Without 
recourse to theology, it is remembrance that can make “the incomplete (happiness) into 
something complete, and the complete (suffering) into something incomplete” (Arcades 
Project, N 8, 1; Benjamin 1999, 471).91 Historical remembrance in its intensive form provides 
Benjamin with a response to Horkheimer’s warning that a non-teleological understanding of 
history must either make room for an idea of completion or find itself condemned to idealism. 
Memory as Eingedenken does not claim to recover what actually happened on a given occasion, 
but instead searches for, discovers, and activates differences that have been inscribed within a 
given past. The “now” of remembrance exposes what was only latent or possible in the “then.” 
If a non-teleological understanding of history would envision a process that cannot be 
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completed because it has no predetermined goal, remembrance in turn provides an antidote to 
the risk of idealism to which Horkheimer refers. Remembrance alone can account for the need 
for finality within history while at the same time illustrating what is at stake in the idea of 
incompleteness: not just that history has no predetermined goal or finish line but that memory 
is not synonymous with historicism’s tendency to reduce time to the presumed self-identity of 
the actual, which in turn is the basis upon which historicism conceives of remembering or 
historicizing as recovery what actually happened. Remembrance is a form of gnosis that 
recovers the past—a specific past, or a fragment of the past—in order to animate something 
that was “in it more than it.” 
 Remembrance as Benjamin understands it is imbued with a capacity to displace us from 
our accustomed adherence to the idea of historical time as linear, teleologically-driven process. 
“Remembrance is neither what happened nor what did not happen,” adds Agamben, “but, 
rather, their potentialization, their becoming possible once again” (Agamben 1999, 267). 
Remembrance aims at potentiality in the past, and it thereby also highlights a split within the 
thought of potentiality, a difference between what could be actualized (but hasn’t yet seen the 
light of day) and what falls out of all presentation of the actual. It focuses its light on a fissure 
that haunts time, a difference between the actuality of the “Now” and a potential not to be that 
must already have been suspended and forgotten in order for the actual to become what it is. If 
every “Now” is marked by an alterity that cannot see the light of day, the paradoxical task of 
remembrance is to bring into view the traces of this originary retreat from presentation.  
 We can use Benjamin’s account of remembrance to shed light on the peculiar turns 
taken by narrative discourse on memory in Boca de lobo. We must keep in mind, however, that 
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this alternative thinking of the possible—as withdrawal from presentation or actualization—
cannot itself become the object of representation, except at the cost of becoming what it is 
not. This is another example I meant when I stated earlier that Chejfec’s novel enacts a turn 
away from the representational and referential ground of the realist tradition. Akin to 
Benjamin’s thinking about remembrance, Chejfec’s novel is interested in recovering fragments 
from the past—images, bits and pieces of conversations, thoughts—not in order to provide the 
reader with more complete knowledge of what transpired between the narrator and Delia but 
insofar as these fragments can speak to the present about what is out of joint in the here and 
now. Literary image in Chejfec introduces a gap or a stammering into narrative time, which in 
turn shows itself to be out of step with the progressive temporality of modernity that Peter 
Osborne describes as “permanent transition” (Osborne 1995, 14). 
 Having established a possible connection between literary memory and a thought of 
heterogeneity that is incompatible with modernity’s dominant modalities of temporalization 
(namely: time as “empty, homogeneous” sequence of moments; or time as teleological 
progression directed by a predetermined goal), I now turn to narrator’s recollections of what 
might be termed the primal scene of his romance with Delia. His recounting of their fateful first 
encounter is pieced together through a series of reflections spanning the first hundred or so 
pages of the novel. The periodic return to this scene of origin illustrates a tendency in Chejfec’s 
prose to inhabit certain images and mine them for additional insights. In looking at these 
scattered reflections I will pay close critical attention to narrative focus on Delia’s gait, which 
emerges as a key topos for thinking about potentiality and difference in time.   
“Todo comenzó en la esquina de los Huérfanos, donde la veía bajar del colectivo. Delia 
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llegaba cuando caía la tarde, ponía un pie sobre el pavimento y sin distraerse tomaba el camino 
de su casa. Más adelante hablaré de la forma como apoyaba ese pie” (Chejfec 2000, 12). This 
narrative postulation of origin—the birth of love and, by extension, of the need to tell the 
story—occurs four pages into the novel. This sketch assigns the history of love a unique place 
and time: a street named Los Huérfanos [Orphans]—not an insignificant name—at twilight, a 
transitional point when day gives way to night and the visible distinctions between individual 
beings fade into the poetry of grey. It is only fitting that Delia’s appearance coincide with this 
moment in between times, because for the narrator her very being will be associated with an 
experience of the threshold and of temporal flux. The name los Huérfanos will acquire 
importance as signifier in view of the conspicuous absence of Delia’s father. We learn nothing 
of him or his status from the narrator except by virtue of his omission from story, and by the 
fact that Delia has been obliged to take a job in order to support her family. “Orphanhood” 
could be construed as a signifier of the narrator’s somewhat paternalistic attitude toward Delia 
and the working class in general, of his tendency to see her as abandoned and as in need of a 
compensatory stabilizing presence.92 The narrator will return more than once to this originary 
scene to consider, from one angle or another, the image or gesture that prompted him to fall 
for Delia. Reading these different iterations of return with and against one another, we can see 
how literary repetition in Chejfec illuminates new features that were not apparent in the initial 
reading of the scene. This is one example of how recollection activates potentiality in a 
mnemonic image taken from the past.  
Second iteration: several pages later the narrator returns to this scene in order to add a 
puzzling clarification about the birth of his attraction to Delia. “Descubrir que era obrera, 
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aunque me sorprendiera, fue decisivo para enamorarme de ella. Sin exagerar, era la marca que 
la distinguía del resto del género humano, y la condición que la señalaba entre todas mujeres” 
(15). It is Delia’s status as female worker [obrera] that sets her apart. Desire here is mediated 
not by sexual difference alone but by a bifurcation of social difference into forms of belonging 
that cannot easily be reconciled with one another. Just as her status as woman mediates her 
identity as a worker in the narrator’s eyes, her role as worker mediates her being as a woman, 
transforming her into something of an exception within the realm of the feminine. It may be 
precisely this overdetermination of (seemingly) disjunctive social codifications that accounts for 
the origin of love in the narrative. 
Third iteration:  
Antes mencioné su manera de pisar, la forma como apoyaba el pie sobre el 
pavimento al bajar del colectivo. Ahora voy a decir cómo era esa forma: era la de 
quien vive atravesando umbrales. Estribos de colectivos, portones de fábricas, 
lajas de jardines, cercas de terrenos, umbrales de casas, bordes de caminos. Con 
su levedad, Delia nunca parecía recuperar del todo una memoria trabajosamente 
acumulada; estaba aquí, por ejemplo, pero daba la impresión de demorarse 
mucho antes de terminar de llegar. (21)  
 In this passage, some half a dozen pages later, the narrator returns for a second time to 
the scene of origin. In her radiant appearance Delia plays the role of a Muse, an incarnation of 
beauty and artistic inspiration. This description is not unlike that of Beatriz Viterbo in Borges’s 
“El Aleph.”93 Similarly it could be read as an allusion to the surrealist fascination with the figure 
of Gradiva (“she who walks”).94 The point to be emphasized here is that the figure of Delia is 
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overdetermined by several thematic threads: artistic creation, the unconscious understood as 
limit for representation, and a structure of literary citation that encompasses Jensen, Freud, the 
Surrealists and Borges.  
 Although during his time with Delia it was typically the narrator who ventured across 
the social boundary known as “Calle Pedrera” into the foreign territory of Delia’s working class 
community, in retrospect he remembers Delia as the one who traverses social, geographical 
and temporal thresholds: factory/residential, working class/middle class, work/free time, etc. 
Her singular gait illuminates the threshold as such: an in-between site, the traversal of which 
symbolically constitutes the proper and property of a space or place (e.g., carrying the bride 
over the threshold as symbolic constitution of matrimony), yet which itself is neither inside nor 
outside, neither proper nor improper. Her stride, moreover, traces a potentially conflictive 
juxtaposition of vectors: appearing and retreating, stepping forth and stepping back. In the 
phrase “trabajosamente acumulada” we hear an echo of the sphere that Delia has left behind 
when she steps off the bus: the scene of capitalist production and accumulation in the factory. 
Whereas Delia’s appearance as she steps down from the bus was first associated with a 
transitional time of day this later return the scene focuses on a delay or gap within time. In her 
way of walking Delia seems to hold back part of herself, suggesting to the narrator a thought of 
withdrawal in what is otherwise a scene of radiant appearance. It is the “lightness” of her step 
that best conveys this lag time, as if every step forward were accompanied by a retreat by some 
other portion of her being. Her appearance in the street conveys the sense that the here and 
now is not fully in step with itself.  
 Fourth iteration:  
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Delia era una persona que iba hacia atrás. Para ella el tiempo no avanzaba; y si 
evidentemente tampoco retrocedía era claro que ocupaba dimensiones 
contiguas, donde la progresión o el retroceso, incluso la lentitud o la aceleración, 
estaban abolidas como posibilidades prácticas. Ese “ir hacia atrás” significaba 
que siempre ocupaba el momento previo, muy raramente el actual. No era 
posible el alcance ni la diferencia. Un don que le permitía no estar, como ya 
describí varias veces, sin irse de todo. Pero claro, ese minuto “previo” era 
engañoso, porque como ocurre con todo el mundo estaba obligada a participar 
del mismo tiempo que los demás. Entonces, para que ocurriera esto y lo inverso, 
Delia ponía en ejecución una impresionante cantidad de recursos involuntarios, 
que siempre por una u otra vía acababan dando esa idea de ausencia y 
regresión. (92)   
 Near the midpoint in the novel the narrator returns again to the association of Delia and 
her footsteps with delay [demorarse]. The rhetoric of memory shifts once again, moving from 
spatial divisions (umbrales) back to a movement in or against time. Unlike in the first scene, 
however, her gait now cuts a paradoxical figure—ir hacia atrás—that is not easily reconciled 
with the familiar conceptualization of time as linear, sequential progression. This ir hacia atrás, 
a counter-movement that suspends the earlier allusion to transition from one time to another 
(cuando caía la tarde), initiates a literary confrontation with the chronological ordering 
principles that frame modern understandings of history and historical time. Conceptual 
vocabulary for thinking movement and temporality—if it is not avanzar then it must be 
retroceder—proves insufficient here. The sequential ordering of movement into a chronology of 
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moments is deceptive (“ese minunto ‘previo’ era engañoso”) and incapable of accounting for 
what actually happens. In fact it is grammar and syntax themselves that turn out to be 
inadequate here insofar as they impose a single, homogeneous temporality on experience and 
history (“el mismo tiempo que los demás”). Narrativization subjugates what does not belong 
fully to the One (heterogeneity, potentiality) within a sequential time in which every moment 
or word is obliged to occupy its own place [previo: from pre- and via, or that which lies 
immediately prior along the same road]. Within such a sequential order there can be no 
thought of difference that does not reconfirm the silent, underlying principle of unidirectional, 
linear progress. The articulation of difference within a chronological chain of equivalency thus 
spells the annihilation of heterogeneity as such. But if submitting the strange, singular glance 
(“ese minuto ‘previo’”) that is the source of love to the strictures of grammar and rhetoric 
means betraying its singularity, would the alternative be any better? To remain silent, to refuse 
to speak or write of this “difference,” would not solve the problem either, because any such 
refusal—for example, to refer to alterity as “the unnamable”—can just as easily begin to act as 
a name in its own right. 
 The difficulty encountered here is a literary problem brought about, as Paul de Man 
frequently reminds us, by the conflation of grammar and/or rhetoric with reference. It is a 
problem to which literature itself calls attention, as can be seen as soon as we come to the 
realization that this passage amounts to another veiled citation of Borges, of the “Borges” who 
narrates the tale of “El Aleph”: “Lo que vieron mis ojos fue simultáneo: lo que transcribiré 
sucesivo, porque el lenguaje lo es” (Borges 1989, 1068).95 We might surmise that this 
inadequacy is itself a sign that we have to do with an event: something which in taking place 
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also punctures our preunderstanding of the world and of being.  
 Many of the quintessentially literary moments in Chejfec’s novel occur when the text 
calls attention to the failure or slippage of its own language, its inability to put its finger on 
difference as singularity without transforming it and converting it into something else: 
something familiar, equivalent and calculable. We have just seen one instance of what this 
looks like: the self-correcting account of Delia’s gait as out of step with the present. At the very 
moment the narrator’s discourse seeks to grasp the singularity of love, it discovers that it can 
only reinscribe this alterity back into a dialectical structure of capture from which nothing 
escapes. 
 We encounter another case in the fifth and final return to this scene of origin: 
Esa forma sutil de ocupar un leve después, para decirlo de alguna manera, o un 
leve antes, una especie de “apenas” cronológico. [Delia] hablaba desde esa 
demora, quizá por eso su voz sonaba débil; y lo que decía se refería a algo que 
estaba a punto de ser superado, nunca transcurriendo en ese mismo momento. 
Así se desplazaba ella, por carriles diferentes. Estaba por ejemplo conmigo, toda 
su conciencia podía estar segura de acompañarme, y sin embargo había una 
parte que no estaba. Y cuando digo una parte quiero decir tiempo, no lugar. 
Esto, por supuesto, sería difícil tomarlo en su sentido literal, pero no puede 
expresarse sino a través de esta forma. (99-100)  
 Here temporality emerges as the dominant preoccupation in these returns to the scene 
of love at first sight. The “‘apenas’ cronológico” reference serves as a reminder of the 
limitations of the rhetoric of temporality when it comes to describing what actually happens, or 
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the event in its irreducibility to the idealities of causality and signification, or to rhetoric, syntax 
and grammar.96 This is also the first time we hear Delia referred to as a speaking subject, and it 
is from withdrawal—rather than from a conscious, self-present subject—that her voice is said 
to issue. The elaboration of this point, in the phrase “se refería a algo que estaba a punto de ser 
superado,” provides another citational echo of the Borgesian account of aesthetic activity as “la 
inminencia de una revelación que no se produce.” Similar to what we saw in the first chapter 
with Lino’s consideration of stumbling while walking as a metaphor for interruption or the step 
back as the condition of possibility for thinking in El oído absoluto, with Delia the paso (a step, 
pace, passage, or crossing) traces a way in which cognition and understanding become 
uncertain, or where the dialectic stumbles.  
As Edgardo Berg has pointed out this pattern of returning over and over again to a 
seemingly quotidian gesture or scene is a recognizable trait of Chejfec’s writing, one that Berg 
understands as reflecting the influence of César Aira (Berg 2007, np). The narrator’s frequent 
returns to certain key motifs—the gait, the threshold, and temporal heterogeneity among 
others—open up a diffuse narrative space in which far-reaching considerations of time and 
history, potentiality and actuality can unfold. Consistent with what we have been seeing with 
the narrator’s efforts to describe what it is about Delia’s gait that first caught his attention, 
narrative repetition destabilizes the clear distinction between before and after or first time and 
iteration. The insights that become available over the course of these returns to a “primal 
scene” are generated through shifts affecting how an image, scene or gesture gives itself to be 
read. But we should not conclude too hastily that Delia’s gait harbors some secret meaning 
waiting to be deciphered. Form, figure, and gesture are nothing more than generators of 
230 
 
interpretive possibilities that emerge from the narrative process itself, from the contiguous 
arrangement of episodes (e.g., from whatever it is that separates the first iterations on pp. 12, 
15 and 21 from the later iterations on pp.92 and 99). The new insights that are gleaned in the 
each iteration are not contained in latent fashion in the original scene as such; these 
interpretive discoveries are a function of the incalculable juxtapositions of the “original” scene 
with what transpires “later” in the narrative, such as something the narrator might have been 
ruminating over just prior to a given recollection of the “first” scene. 
 Figurative association of Delia with the liminal space of the threshold illustrates how 
social content provides a point of departure for reflecting on literature itself. As the “Toda 
escritura” epigraph suggests, correlation between the literary and its others—the social history 
of capitalism, love and betrayal, ethical considerations of self and alterity—takes shape in Boca 
de lobo through an aesthetic of distancing and contortion rather than through reference or 
metaphorics. The narrator’s recollections of Delia and her social circumstances frequently 
initiate veiled meditations on literary form, and by the same token it is often precisely when the 
question of literary form asserts itself that the text insinuates that it might also be saying 
something about the world beyond it. The representational basis of literary realism is 
supplanted in Chejfec by an analogical relation between forms: between literary form on the 
one hand, and ontological, epistemological, and political questions about potentiality and 
actuality on the other. The movement between social context and literary self-reflection in 
Boca de lobo finds a recognizable reference point in the various allusions to Borges’s 
formulation of the aesthetic act in “La muralla y los libros” as “la inminencia de una revelación 
que no se produce.” The threshold and the formulations of temporal heterogeneity translate 
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Borges’s association of the aesthetic with liminality and with competing movements: disclosure 
and deferral or withdrawal.  
 Leo Bersani’s discussion of aesthetics, form and ontology can serve to illustrate how this 
mirroring of literary reflection back to itself in Boca de lobo helps to open up new ways of 
thinking about non-literary questions concerning our relation to the world. In an essay entitled 
“Sociality and Sexuality” Bersani proposes an understanding of art and literature as spheres 
defined by a fundamental tension between figuration or creation of form on the one hand, and 
dissolution or unraveling of form on the other. Art, according to Bersani, is concerned first and 
foremost with the matter of being understood not as substance or essence but relation: with 
the coming-into-being of relationality or with relationality as the fundamental condition for 
what is. But since relationality is also the condition of possibility for all representation, 
relationality “as such” cannot be represented in any direct manner. Thus aesthetic figuration of 
being as event, or of coming-into-being as relation, requires that art first create a figure of non-
relationality in order for relationality as such to become perceptible. To become perceptible 
means: to provide a glimpse of itself, to shine through. All art and literature must therefore 
submit its own formal structure, its figuring of form as relationality, to the risk of dissolution or 
unravelling. Interestingly, then, art does not begin from nothing (non-relationality) in order to 
arrive at something (relationality) but rather the reverse—or almost the reverse. I say almost 
because what Bersani describes as the unraveling of form, or in-formity, is not simply the 
antithesis or negation of being; it turns out to be the very site of its taking place:  
If art is the principal site/sight (both place and view) of being as emergence into 
connectedness, then the metaphysical dimension of the aesthetic—which may 
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also be its aesthetically distinguishing dimension—is an erosion of aesthetic 
form. Origination is designated by figures of its perhaps not taking place; the 
coming-to-be of relationality, which is our birth into being, can only be 
retroactively enacted, and it is enacted largely as a rubbing out of formal 
relations. Perhaps traditional associations of art with form-giving or form-
revealing activities are at least partly a denial of such formal disappearance in 
art. If art celebrates an originating extensibility of all objects and creatures into 
space—and therefore our connectedness to the universe—it does so by also 
inscribing within connectedness the possibility of its not happening. Relationality 
is itself related to its own absence. (Bersani 2000, 643)  
 Cognition can only grasp the event of origination retroactively and on the basis of what 
the event gives rise to. The origin only comes into view as an effect of its effects, which is 
perhaps another way of saying that the event only becomes visible as the outline of its retreat, 
not unlike the profile of Delia as she steps forward and down from the bus. For art to give 
shape to the event of presentation it must, like Delia’s gait, begin by working “backwards,” i.e., 
by systematically erasing formal relations in order to arrive back at their beginning. This is not 
merely a reverse chronological procedure of deducing causes through the elimination of their 
effects. If all figuration of being begins with the undoing of form, then critical 
conceptualizations of art and literature as figuration or creation of form—that is to say, of art 
understood as activation of the Kantian imagination, whose purpose is to bestow unity of form 
on the chaotic manifold of the sensible—must be supplemented by a thought of art’s secret 
alliance with the other side of being: the nothing. Bersani is not opposing the idea of the 
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dissolution of form to Kant; the nothing is not the opposite of being, its absence or its negation. 
It “is” the movement of form’s unraveling or dispersion, the nothing-ing of nothing, an undoing 
of form that is at the same time already a relating-to that happens prior to the consolidation of 
ipseity. Aesthetic experience as Bersani thinks it initiates an engagement with potentiality as 
retreat, as the capacity not to be; it proceeds by negating the actual, the presence of which has 
been predicated on the negation or suspension of potentiality as such.  
Continuing this critical exploration of the themes of indeterminacy and potentiality in 
Chejfec’s novel, let us now turn to look briefly at the title, Boca de lobo. Its significance is 
indicated in the following passage taken from one of the narrator’s recollections of his 
nocturnal meanderings with Delia: 
La oscuridad, una incitación que prometía lo salvaje, la intimidad. A veces un 
foco vacilante aparecía en alguna dirección lejana: la linterna de alguien. Otras 
veces una lámpara solitaria alumbraba el aire inmóvil, con la excepción de los 
insectos o los pájaros que atravesaban el cono de luz. Una frase común puede 
dar la idea de aquellos pozos de oscuridad: boca de lobo. Había muchas bocas de 
lobo; o más bien el conjunto de la tierra era una bien grande e insaciable. Allí, en 
el reino de lo velado, todo parecía perdido y sin nombre. He leído muchas 
novelas donde la oscuridad es el reflejo invertido de lo claro; éste no era el caso. 
Si hay una belleza en el mundo, pensábamos con Delia, si algo golpea la emoción 
hasta dejarnos sin aliento, si algo confunde los recuerdos hasta el límite de su 
propia memoria impidiéndoles volver a ser tal como eran, ese algo vive en lo 
oscuro y muy de cuando en cuando se manifiesta. (59-60) 
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Darkness introduces the trope of veiling through which the narrative speaks of literature itself. 
The literary importance of the title is hinted at in the allusion to its proliferation (“había muchos 
bocas de lobo”), an assertion that will find confirmation elsewhere when the narrator 
associates the topos with a variety of sites of production or creation, including Delia’s womb, 
the factory in which she works, vestiges of nature in the city, and time itself. Obscurity, we are 
told here, is not the dialectical other (“reflejo invertido”) of light and visibility. The reign of the 
veiled and of darkness harbors what is most rare in the world: beauty, whose appearance takes 
us by surprise and has the potential to transform the present by exposing the obverse side of 
the memory image. If veiling is not the antithesis of the visible or of revelation, and if what is 
veiled cannot be brought to light, is this not because the veil is itself constitutive of visibility? El 
reino de lo velado configures a movement of withdrawal or secreting that is co-originary with 
the constitution of the field of the visible.  
 This proliferation of bocas de lobo performs a figuration of indeterminacy as one of the 
novel’s primary concerns: the indeterminacy of what remains formless in or alongside the 
presentation of what is. The phrase boca de lobo names a void that haunts the present and the 
sensible as its internal limit, a point that renders unstable the distinction between inside and 
outside, proper and improper. This figure also holds the place of a process of historical 
reinscription in which older social forms (industrial capitalism, class conflict) are replaced by 
new forms (service economy, Consensus). As a figure of obscurity it corresponds with the way 
in which reinscription processes tend to efface their own traces, making the present appear 
under the light of necessity, as if things couldn’t be otherwise. Pitch darkness, the narrator tells 
us, is not opposed to illumination and clarity as “not A” is to “A.” The darkness topos indexes a 
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thought of obscurity that proves refractory for modern modes of temporalizing history—e.g., in 
terms of production and development. It names a thought of negativity prior to dialectics. It is 
from within the enigma of this absolute darkness, unmediated by any economy of negation and 
recuperation, that beauty in its singular radiance emerges. As poetry has been reminding us 
since it began to speak of Orpheus, it is darkness and not the bright light of day that constitutes 
the proper domain of the beautiful and the strange power it holds over us. Like literature, pitch 
darkness moves us in potentially contradictory directions: fear and foreboding, intrigue and 
intimacy, not to mention the savagery of the lion’s den.  
 Literally a wolf’s mouth, the colloquial phrase boca de lobo can mean one of two things 
depending on context. “Meterse en la boca de lobo” is to place oneself in a dangerous 
situation, equivalent to the English phrase “to enter into the lion’s den.” “Oscuro como la boca 
de lobo”—clearly the implied meaning in this passage—translates as “pitch darkness.” While 
translating the novel’s title as Pitch Darkness might seem uncontroversial it comes with the 
price of losing the enigmatic link in the Spanish-language title between darkness and a certain 
animality, an animality that brings with it an association with danger and perhaps also with a 
site at the extreme limit of the law.  
 As Agamben notes in Homo Sacer, for pre- and early modern Germanic, Scandinavian 
and Anglo traditions, the wolf and the werewolf are associated with banditry and expulsion 
from the social pact (Agamben 1998, 104-12). Like a wolf, the outlaw is considered Friedlos 
[without peace], and it is on the basis of that determination—of an animal-like disregard for the 
law, a disdain that is refractory to reason and education—that it is considered permissible to kill 
the wolf or the werewolf without consequence. This figure represents an extreme limit for the 
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formalizing procedures of the law, occupying an indeterminate non-place in between the 
human and the non-human animal. But it is not just a figure of indeterminacy that resists the 
form-giving drives of biology and social institutions; as embodiment of indeterminacy it also 
provides a pretext for the deployment of power. The werewolf signals, in Agamben’s words, “a 
threshold of indistinction and of passage between animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion 
and inclusion” (Agamben 1998, 105). This figure is where the Aristotelian politicizing distinction 
between more voice [phone] and speech [logos] come together and fly off in their separate 
directions, and it is thus also a figure of the sovereign ban: the exception that constitutes the 
rule of law, the outside that is in the inside. 
 One detects a link between these different interpretive possibilities associated with the 
titular figure of the wolf’s mouth (darkness, danger, criminality and sovereign ban) in the 
narrator’s subsequent attempt to explain the unexpected and seemingly senseless attack on his 
lover. As he recalls, in that moment love was suddenly transformed into war; the lovers now 
appear in his mind’s eye as mutually hostile forces bent on annihilation of one another in the 
name of self-preservation. It is not that enmity replaces love so much as that, at that moment, 
these opposing forces revealed themselves to be two sides of the same coin. Idealization and 
annihilation, adoration and destruction, are suddenly seen to be the same: not identical but of 
the same cloth. It is not a desire for possession that motivates the attack, then, but a 
compulsion to fulfill what the narrator views as a hidden connection between love and war. The 
passage is worth citing extensively; it also gives a sense of the narrator’s circumlocutory style, 
which is wont to become acutely aware of its own rhetorical structures.   
Y junto a Delia pensé, mientras caminábamos en silencio respirando ese aire 
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cansado del verano, una mezcla de olores húmedos y bruma plástica, pensé algo 
así como “La niña que es Delia me puede dar un niño.” Fue una reflexión 
instantánea, como si algo se desbaratara sin aviso. No era un deseo de posesión, 
sino más que eso: una urgencia por alcanzar la conquista arrollando, 
destruyendo, aniquilando. Sentí que Delia tenía algo que ya me pertenecía, y que 
si no se lo arrancaba a como diera lugar nunca lo habría de obtener. Esto era 
algo completamente distinto del deseo, por supuesto también diferente de la 
pasión, aunque debería reconocer que en alguna medida la contenía. Era sentir a 
Delia como mi enemiga, de quien sólo destruyéndola y adorándola podía 
obtener aquello que precisaba, un sacrificio. Esa boca de lobo que era el 
conjunto de los campos cuando bajaba el sol…se duplicaba y continuaba por un 
lado con su recorrido natural…en el interior de Delia. No me refiero a un interior 
figurado; digo “dentro” de Delia: literalmente en sus partes internas, entrañas, 
como se las llama. La noche inmensa, que devora el tiempo y la luz a una 
velocidad incesante, y el vientre de Delia, que esperaba alimentarse de mi fuerza 
para despojarme de lo que todavía no existe. (117-18) 
 Here we see the “boca de lobo” topos associated with potentiality in human 
reproduction, with the still unrealized possibility that Delia could “give him a child.” In the 
narrator’s recollections this thought of potentiality, located somewhat uncertainly within the 
female body, is quickly recoded as a struggle between rival programs of conquest, 
expropriation and possession. Up until this point the narrator had linked the boca de lobo topos 
with geographical places such as the factory and the undeveloped area in Delia’s neighborhood 
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known as los Cardos. The shift from economic production and development to the human body 
and its biological reproductive mechanisms does not become fully stable, however, due to the 
narrator’s hesitations about the exact location of this biological boca de lobo. The first 
reference to “el interior de Delia” remains vague, and the efforts to provide more clarity are not 
necessarily any more decisive: “sus partes internas, entrañas, como se las llama” points 
hesitantly to the viscera, after which the reference to “el vientre” shifts the focus once again 
from digestion to reproduction. By his account rape constitutes an effort to safeguard or 
reclaim what will have been his, something that Delia was conspiring to take from him even 
before it became actual: his vitality? potency? paternal-filial relation? The one thing that is clear 
in this meandering attempt at explanation and rationalization is that a peculiar logic has 
announced itself: he takes from her by penetrating and inseminating on his own violent terms 
and then abandoning. In the process he both contributes to engendering a life and relinquishes 
any claim he might have had to participate in that life’s future. He violates and betrays so as to 
forestall an imminent theft, the theft of something virtual but nonetheless vital; and then he 
takes flight from what his violent act will have helped to engender. In all of this the narrator 
acts out a fantasy grounded in Platonic and Hegelian accounts of sexual difference and truth, 
according to which paternity, logos and Spirit are the same.97 
 Later on there will be occasion to discuss the novel’s thematization of abandonment and 
a corresponding thought of remitting or giving oneself over to the other, in the context of a co-
worker of Delia’s who is dismissed from his position in the factory and compelled to undergo an 
informal “deskilling” process. Under the thematic light of abandonment as the factical condition 
of love—and indeed, of existence in general—we could hypothesize that the rape of Delia 
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amounts to a refusal on the part of the narrator of this unconditional demand that is 
synonymous with love: the demand that one expose oneself and give oneself prior to any 
calculation of what one stands to gain in return. What I am proposing to call abandonment 
implies a demand for remittance prior to any recognition or any other form of specular return. 
If rape constitutes a refusal of the fundamental selflessness of love it does according to a 
certain logic. First there is the projection of an imaginary relation that would justify the refusal. 
Delia is conceived as an enemy plotting to deprive him of what is rightfully his; and it is thus the 
proper is determined: as what can be (as in, is in danger of being) expropriated by the other. In 
a second logical step the violence of rape is recoded as a just defense of the proper. Or it could 
be that the rape carries out a war against indeterminacy as such, against potentiality seen as a 
condition that places in danger or destabilizes the determination of the proper.   
 Keeping in mind these questions about indeterminacy and potentiality, I now turn to 
literary treatment of history and time in Boca de lobo. I begin with a brief exploration of how 
Chejfec’s novel both gestures toward and turns away from the representational poetics that 
forms the foundation of the social-realist tradition. While its subject matter is clearly familiar to 
the novela social and related genres, Boca de lobo announces no less clearly its distance from 
the aesthetic program of presenting the working class as typical or of giving voice to the 
subaltern:  
El silencio del obrero, lo sé por Delia, es estático; al contrario del silencio rural, 
no transmite nada, a lo sumo poco, y cuando lo hace, por su misma complejidad 
no es otra cosa que una forma de comunicación contradictoria. Esta ausencia de 
expresión se convierte en contratiempo y nos desorienta, son múltiples 
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mensajes a la vez, disímiles pero solidarios; no es posible entenderlos como 
conjunto y no existen de manera individual. (98-99)  
The peculiar silence that the narrator associates with the working class does not constitute a 
site for possible recuperation or restitution; it is not a sign of exclusion or expropriation, at least 
not of some positive, determinate content. This silence transmits nothing, or very little. Nothing 
or very little? Silence here does indeed announce a literary construction of social difference, 
but one that remains irreducible to any positive content. Perhaps this strange silence that 
transmits (almost) nothing serves notice that social differentiation is at work prior to any 
determination of the essence or identity of particular groups or classes. The description of this 
almost empty silence acquires additional complexity when it metamorphoses into an account of 
silence as contratiempo [contretemps]. In music theory contratiempo denotes syncopation, in 
which an established musical rhythm is unsettled through the introduction of unexpected, off-
beat stresses and accents that deviate from the regular spacing of strong and weak beats. 
Contratiempo begins with an arrival that could not have been expected, a beat that arrives out 
of time and whose occurrence could not have been anticipated by the prevailing rhythm. The 
disruptive effects generated by this off beat open up new possibilities for rhythmic variation. In 
this passage, contratiempo offers an aesthetic metaphor for social heterogeneity experienced 
as disruption of the prevailing social logic, and as a form of visibility that resembles what 
Jacques Derrida calls the promise of a democracy to come (Derrida 1997). This content-less 
silence circumscribes a field whose determination or suturing is only ever tendentially secured, 
and which therefore remains perpetually open to the arrival or emergence of new forms and 
new voices. The semantic shift from a purely aural and static register (silencio) to a dynamic 
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term that combines sound with rhythmic repetition and alteration (contratiempo) suggests, 
moreover, that disruption occurs in or as an experience of temporalization, or the organization 
and disorganization of time. The smooth functioning of modernity is disrupted by the 
appearance of a heterogeneity that does not subordinate itself to dialectical unification of 
differences in time.  
 The contratiempo motif also turns back to literature itself, inviting us to consider literary 
language as something other than a mere conduit for meaning or purveyor of beauty, harmony 
and reconciliation. It names, for instance, an interruption of the rhythmic regularities that 
inform how we think and act in certain spaces and spheres of activity—e.g., the rhythm of 
production in the factory, the rhythm of our daily lives as citizens and consumers, and so on. 
The silence associated with the working class is, paradoxically, both (almost) empty and 
polyphonic. In this poetic account of social heterogeneity, silence is always already differing 
from itself; it is infinitely more and less than One, whence its potential to disorient us or 
awaken us from the prevailing logic of social organization. The intermingling of social and 
literary-artistic motifs in this passage displays a tendency that is becoming familiar in this 
exploration of Boca de lobo: what begins as a consideration of social difference and the limits of 
hegemony proves also to be a mode of literary self-reflection.  
 We have seen how the contratiempo motif lends itself to two distinct but interrelated 
lines of thinking in Boca de lobo. One thread is literary and has to do with the novel’s 
engagement with a social content that has traditionally been the domain of the realist tradition 
and the novela social.  Similar to what we saw earlier in the reflections on Delia and her gait, 
the contratiempo motif establishes a double register in which literary reflection on social 
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content turns out to be offering a way of thinking about literature itself: as heterogeneous 
totality irreducible to any representational program (e.g., the realist novel as presenting the 
social totality as tapestry awaiting interpretation; testimonio as giving voice to the subaltern, 
etc.). The intertwining of thematic threads; the myriad of messages that do not come together 
to form a unified totality, yet which cannot be neatly disentangled and isolated as a plurality of 
pure, self-contained meanings: these are nothing if not self-impressions of Chejfec’s novel 
itself. The redoubling of interpretative possibilities for “silencio” and “contratiempo”—toward 
the social and the historical on the one hand, and back onto the literary on the other—precisely 
illustrates how literary contretemps works. Citing and distancing itself from the novela social in 
the same gesture, contratiempo literario remains skeptical of any claim of harmony or 
consensus, contratiempo introduces a thought of heterogeneity at the heart of totality.  
 The other tread entails an attempt to think historical time otherwise than its hegemonic 
liberal interpretation, according to which time is understood as a linear sequence of moments 
or stages organized by an overarching idea of progress, and whose end coincides with the 
liberal social pact. Contratiempo, which derives its creative force from interruptive and 
arrhythmic features, moves against what Walter Benjamin famously termed the “homogeneous 
empty time” of liberal modernity and historicism. Several scenes in the novel help to illustrate 
what a literary rethinking of historical time as arrhythmic creativity might look like. The motif 
plays out in a slightly different thematic register in each case. Such contextual variation has an 
undeniable impact on how we understand the thematization of contratiempo; it is not simply 
one self-identical theme appearing over and over again under different guises. The novel’s 
consideration of the contratiempo topos is itself informed by a contratemporal law of 
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interruption, mutation and new beginning.  
 The first scene I want to look at occurs near the end of the novel as the narrator recalls 
having observed with Delia a group of children (“los hijos de F”) playing near a dump. This scene 
is accorded a power of framing the novel in its entirety, as the children’s innocent curiosity in 
contemplation of the garbage heap provides a metaphor that defines both the mnemonic 
process that drives narrative production and the experience of reading. This mirroring of 
reflective acts—play, speculation, writing and reading—destabilizes any preconceptions that 
the narrator might hold about the working class as embodying a drastically different outlook on 
the world in comparison with other classes. What we find here is a group of children whose 
desires and contemplative actions turn out to be indistinguishable, on a formal level, from the 
process of writing and the experience of reading.  
Delia me dijo que en muchos casos mirar la basura era poner en práctica la 
imaginación, “Lo que no se tiene,” acotó…Toda mi vida había visto la ceremonia, 
ahora comprendía que quizá también yo la había practicado, pero por un 
extraño mecanismo de la memoria, o de la conciencia, recién entonces, 
observando los hijos de F en actividad…El pasatiempo consistía en desentrañar el 
pasado: el origen de la basura…y las cosas que se habían hecho con ella antes de 
que se convirtiera en desperdicio. Efectuada día tras día, era una tarea 
indeterminada que sólo los hijos de F, esa mañana, pudieron destacar para mí. 
Algunos pensaban que la basura hablaba, que mostraba una verdad oculta 
mediante mensajes organizados así, como basura, cuyo único destino consistía 
en ser descifrados. Y en este “destino único” estaba incluido el lenguaje 
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específico, necesario para leer y observar, que se activaba al ejecutar el análisis. 
(143-44) 
 “Lo que no se tiene”: Delia’s interpretation is codified twice over, once in terms of 
desire and absence, and again in terms of expropriation in which the trash heap presents the 
culmination of a long process of labor, expropriation, production and consumption. Later in this 
same passage the scene is described—now presumably the words are no longer Delia’s but the 
narrator’s own—as the children engaging in a “pastime.” This latter term catachrestically 
equates the activity of a group of working class children with a concept (leisure time) that is the 
distinguishing invention of the bourgeoisie. Whereas the narrator’s choice of words glosses 
over social differentiation, Delia’s description emphasizes exploitation and exclusion from a 
form of activity—consumption—that is virtually synonymous with social belonging or 
citizenship. 
 Epistemologically speaking, the mound of worn-out objects is akin to a puzzle, and the 
children scrutinizing it are like critics charged with deciphering a secret [desentrañar: to solve a 
mystery, to get to the bottom of things]. Their task is to decode the history and former purpose 
of objects that have effectively fallen out of historical time. The resonances with the vanguard 
tradition—Duchamp’s readymade, the interest in “found objects” in Picasso and Dada, Breton’s 
objet trouvé, for example—are unmistakable. A cyclical pattern emerges from this scene. First 
the children are seen as initiating a retrospective and speculative assessment of the contents of 
the garbage heap, decoding or imagining a prior history of use through which the objects have 
been used up. These children are the eyes and minds that will reconstruct the social trajectory 
of objects that have been reduced to a mute, disordered collection of inert matter. This 
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archaeological operation, if completed, would take the curious observers back to a time of 
instrumental use; inert mater would be elevated once again to the ideal level of meaning 
through the children’s playful work of interpretation. The structure of this interpretive labor is 
rigorously dialectical: first it presupposes production and the creation of value through labor; 
then comes the depreciation of value through consumption; and finally there is the negation of 
negation (the restoration of meaning through the work of interpretation), culminating in the 
Aufhebung [negation or elevation] of the negative in the retrospective deciphering of history.98 
The fact that Delia employs the indefinite grammatical subject (“lo que no se tiene”) instead of 
a determinate one (“lo que [ellos] no tienen”) instills a broader social relevance in her 
commentary. This impersonal grammar also allows for a metaphorical transfer from trash to 
memory, as if memory too were a kind of “trash heap of the past” in which what is no longer 
present could be brought forth and show itself in a new light.  
 These two mirroring scenes—the children at the garbage heap; the writer sitting before 
the mirror-like window or the blank page—together initiate a thinking of historical time as 
something other than a sequence of presents strung together or a teleologically-governed 
process. The impulses that give rise to memory in this novel have little to do with the aim of 
recuperating what actually happened in the past. Thus the fact that the narrator’s recollections 
are mediated by the perspective of a particular social class is, in the end, beside the point. What 
is at stake in remembrance, let us recall, has to do with illuminating elements of past 
experience that could not have seen the light of day in their own time. Once again, by the same 
token, we see in the garbage heap scene a tendency in narrative discourse to turn back to 
literature; the anecdote taken from the lives of the narrator and Delia turns out to be telling us 
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something about the genesis of the text itself. Similar to what we saw in the discussion of 
contratiempo, the trash-heap scene juxtaposes a meditation on social relations with questions 
about literature and memory. Akin to the silence of the working class and the refuse in the 
garbage heap, literature would seem here to be a medium devoid of content (extra-literary 
meanings, purposes) and, at the same time, capable of illuminating the more obscure regions of 
our social and historical existence.  
 In the last part of the passage, beginning with the sentence “Algunos pensaban que la 
basura hablaba…,” we encounter the notion that the refuse heap might be harboring a 
concealed meaning that awaits discovery and interpretation. This mound of used-up objects 
would be akin to a giant tapestry awaiting decipherment at the hands of this group of miniature 
archaeologists or critics. As Jacques Rancière has pointed out in numerous places, the image of 
the tapestry, whose deciphering would unlock the truth of the social, turns out to be an 
invention of the realist tradition; it is literature that first introduces the association of a social 
totality, defined by the anonymous equality of its parts, with a woven textile whose hidden 
truths can be unlocked through interpretation. But narrative voice in Chejfec’s novel also 
destabilizes this modern conceit about the trash heap as an image that harbors hidden social 
meaning. At the very least it dispels the idea that interpretation could ever resolve the enigma 
of the social and the political—its dissensual composition—and arrive at true count of its parts: 
“Siempre hubo algo que descrifrar, un mensaje a la espera de ser descifrado” (145). It is the fact 
that the social has no ground to call its own, no arkhē or first principle, which makes 
interpretation both necessary and impossible.  
Posiblemente esta tarea colectiva prolongaba esa arcaica labor del mundo que 
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consistía en adivinar el futuro desde un sistema de señales; pero en algún 
momento se había producido la inversión, y desde entonces era una labor 
dirigida a desentrañar el pasado. ¿Era otra prueba de que el futuro había dejado 
de importar? Los pobladores quizá se revelaban contra el tiempo lineal, 
“histórico,” que tanto los castigaba, optando por las alternativas que tuvieran 
más a la mano. Así, los desperdicios, para muchos un tipo de materia terminada 
que ha llegado al final de su ciclo de utilidad, tomaban un poco más de aliento: 
no importaba el futuro o el pasado, mejor o peor; importaba que fuera distinto. 
(144) 
 This passage, which follows the preceding portrait by less than a full page, introduces 
several important interpretive shifts. We are now asked to see the scene we were just looking 
at a moment ago as the continuation by way of inversion of an older tradition of seeking in 
nature the signs through which the future can be foretold. The decline of prophetic practices 
coincides with the rationalization of the world, which in turn renders the future in its alterity 
inconceivable. Within a rationalized world the only future that can be envisioned is a 
continuation of the present or its trajectory, which is to say that from within modernity we 
perceive the totality of our present—i.e., the modern state, the social relations of capitalism, 
etc.—as objectively necessary outcomes of history. The turn to the past on the part of those 
who do not yet have a full share in this modernity may constitute an attempt to revitalize 
attunement to contingency and thereby reactivate alternative historical temporalities.  
 Once again we are reminded here that mnemonic practice has little to do with the 
historicist project recuperating the meaning once held by used-up objects. Such a hermeneutic 
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practice of recuperation would have difficulty breaking free of the linear model of historical 
time that constitutes one of the repressive elements deployed against the working class. 
Against the liberal, enlightened determination of history as progress through rationalization, 
Chejfec’s novel highlights the material leftover of commodity production as bearing traces of 
alternative, non-linear experiences of historical time. The afterlife of the commodity in its used-
up condition illuminates a form of materiality that resists the dialectical organization of 
historical time—i.e., the division of history into progressive stages, each of which surpasses or 
negates its predecessor, and which will in turn be surpassed by the next stage to come, while 
the violence of surpassing is recoded as progress. In the trash heap we find an accumulation of 
objects that have fallen out of the economy of production, circulation and consumption; these 
remains have become separated from what was once their rationalizing purpose, while their 
residual existence attests to a materiality that negation cannot be done with.  
 But the trace-like structure of this residue of commodity production and utility also 
constitutes a site for potential reanimation of historical time at a deeper level. This structure 
promotes a thinking of time as differing from itself in a way that cannot be recuperated and 
subsumed under a broader unity. The mound of residue marks the difference of presence—of 
any given present—from itself. In order to see what this self-differentiating role of the 
remainder looks like let us return to the narrator’s earlier observations, made in passing as he 
recalled the typical appearance of housing in Delia’s neighborhood, about the connection 
between development and ruins: “Todo lo que se edifica es una promesa de ruina, lo que se 
acaba de levantar también. Uno vive rodeado de escombros; habitar casas significa ocupar 
ruinas” (27). Architectural ruins are not just the eventual fate that awaits the structures we 
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inhabit and whose solidity and permanence we ordinarily take for granted. The challenge issued 
by Chejfec’s novel involves thinking ruins—architectural ruins or used-up objects—as form. Or, 
more precisely, the novel invites us to think the unraveling of architectural and instrumental 
form that is the ruin or the used-up object as the other side of the significant relations that 
make up our world. The ruin is there from the beginning, not as goal or end but as return of the 
indeterminacy that lurks within all determination. In the next section I will look more closely at 
indeterminacy in terms of what Aristotle calls sterēsis, or potentiality as a register that is 
irreducible to the distinction between the actual and the possible.   
 Similar to what we saw with the chapter headings in Eltit’s Mano de obra, literary 
reflections on the trash heap and ruins in Boca de lobo share a connection with what Benjamin 
tries to think under the heading of natural history: a zone that straddles the culture/nature 
division, a liminal space where objects once produced by human hands (or machines) and 
assigned functional meanings within a certain social configuration, subsequently fall out of 
those significant contexts. For Boca de lobo the possibility of a post-symbolic or natural history 
seems to be imprinted within cultural artifacts at the moment of their production; like a specter 
the ruin has already inscribed itself in the blueprint through invisible ink. Let us note an 
important logical turn in this formulation of the “promise of ruin” that haunts all production 
and edification, the rhetoric of which forces a differentiation of time from itself: the post-
symbolic afterlife is both the material complement to ideal processes of cultural signification 
and it is a ghostly shadow cast upon the production of material culture. In the final section of 
this chapter I take this connection between ruins and architecture in a slightly different 
direction by exploring how similar figures—the ruin and also the trace—show up in the novel’s 
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consideration of industrial production and capitalist social relations.  
 In Specters of Marx Jacques Derrida proposes that the thought of event is incompatible 
with what Heidegger refers to as the vulgar conceptualization of time, i.e., time thought on the 
basis of presentism, as a series of autonomous, self-contained Nows:  
It is…event-ness that one must think, but that best resists what is called the 
concept, if not thinking. And it will not be thought as long as one relies on the 
simple (ideal, mechanical, or dialectical) opposition of the real presence of the 
real present or the living present to its ghostly simulacrum, the opposition of the 
effective or the actual (wirklich) to the non-effective, inactual, which is also to 
say, as long as one relies on a general temporality or an historical temporality 
made up of the successive linking of presents identical to themselves and 
contemporary with themselves. (Derrida 1994, 70) 
 Thought cannot even begin to approach what is at stake in an event until it abandons 
the metaphysical determination of time that has prevailed since at least Aristotle. There can be 
no thought of the event without a concurrent thinking of the present as contaminated or 
haunted by its others: past and future, to be sure, but also other modalities of non-presence 
(withdrawal, ir hacia atrás). The event, if it is thinkable, requires an overturning of the 
traditional determination of the non-actual as derivative of the present. But what would that 
overturning look like, and what kind of thought would it give rise to? Could there be a non- or 
post-metaphysical conceptualization of time? Without claiming to resolve this question once 
and for all, let us recall Derrida’s assertion in “Ousia and Grammē”—in response to Heidegger’s 
attempts to distinguish between “authentic” (non-metaphysical) and “inauthentic” 
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(metaphysical) experiences of time, that time as such is suppressed as soon as one begins to ask 
about its meaning—that is, its whatness, its essence, ti esti (what is it?) (Derrida 1982, 53, n.32). 
In that case it may be that there is no “vulgar” concept of time—because all conceptualizations 
of time belong by definition to the history of metaphysics, including (if not especially) those 
that oppose themselves to that history. 
 
NATURE AND (IN)DETERMINATION: POIESIS AND TEKHNE IN THE TIME OF MECHANICAL PRODUCTION   
      Verum esse ipsum factum. 
       —Giambattista Vico, The New Science 
 
The movements in Chejfec’s novel between history and literature, and nature and 
culture, come to a head in the narrator’s reflections on labor and industrial capitalism. These 
realms comprise distinct modes of poiēsis (making or production), which Aristotle defines as 
the imposition of form on materia prima. As Heidegger points out the Aristotelian 
understanding of production as form-giving presupposes a state of matter that could receive 
form (just as a piece of wax receives a stamp), a state from which matter would then emerge as 
fully formed, and to which it could presumably revert if and when it sheds its form (Heidegger 
1976). Aristotle’s term for this hypothetical state of matter prior to form is sterēsis [ὑστέρησις: 
deficiency or lagging behind]. Sterēsis, often translated as “lack” or “privation,” names a 
withdrawal that opposes or complements the poiēsis through which determinate form is 
imposed on matter. Sterēsis, in Heidegger’s reading, is therefore the Aristotelian axis for 
thinking the ontological difference. It names a difference and a deferral of actuality that 
conditions every manifestation of being, but which also falls into oblivion as soon as thought 
focuses on the totality of beings in their actuality. Giorgio Agamben, meanwhile, associates 
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sterēsis with potentiality, which translates simultaneously a receptivity to form and, as we saw 
earlier, a capacity not to be that remains irreducible to presentation. As capacity not to be, 
sterēsis can never become present or manifest as such. I will take up the question of sterēsis in 
more detail shortly.  
For the reader of Chejfec’s novel these philosophical discussions initiate a dialogue that 
includes thematic concerns (social relations and technologies of capitalist production; class 
conflict and its disappearance in the time of post-dictatorship) and metaliterary concerns about 
aesthetic experience, representation and difference.   
Ese edificio antiguo y en ruinas...irradiaba una de las pocas formas de la verdad, 
o sea, [era] el sitio donde se produce la transformación de las cosas, la 
combinación de trabajo humano y materia dócil que da como producto final la 
mercancía, los objetos que cada uno después compra, si puede. (100)  
This portrait of the factory where Delia is employed contributes in at least two ways to 
the unfolding of the literary, philosophical and social-historical concerns I have been discussing. 
For one, it provides one of the few visible signposts in the novel of shifting historical 
temporalities. It is a metonymy of the “Import Substitution Industrialization” policies that 
dominated in Latin America from the 1930s through the 1960s and 70s. The other implication, 
which I will discuss in more detail shortly, involves the factory space as metonym of capitalist 
imperium, of a regime of sense that produces and imposes its own specific form of truth and 
intelligibility. In recounting Delia’s experience of social organization in the historical time of 
industrial capitalism, narrative discourse in Boca de lobo illustrates the way in which capitalism 
generates a powerful account of subjectivity and freedom which simultaneously activates a 
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form of subjugation. At the same time this portrait of the factory anticipates a different kind of 
subjugation that might be presumed to define the time of recollection and writing: the 
subjugation of all social spheres, including the political logic of sovereignty, to the workings of 
the market.  
It is helpful here to recall Fredric Jameson’s assessment of the historicizing potential of 
the realist novel as exemplified by Balzac, whose literary production spanned the transitional 
period immediately prior to the Second Republic in France. “In Balzac,” Jameson writes, 
“factories do not yet exist as such: we watch not the end products but the efforts of the great 
capitalists and inventors to construct them” (Jameson 1974, 203-04). If the Balzackian novel 
bore witness to the birth pangs of industrial capitalism in France prior to and during the Second 
Republic, in Chejfec’s millennial novel the factory now appears in a ghostly light. Industrial 
capitalism is now in the process of being supplanted by other forms of production and 
accumulation, but these new modes are not accompanied by an iconographic image or 
topography that would be analogous to the factory as metonym of industrial production. Not 
unlike the pile of used-up objects discussed in the previous section and the ruins that haunt all 
architectural construction, the factory in Chejfec’s novel serves as mute witnesses to the 
effacements and reinscriptions that have given shape to the history of the present in post-
dictatorship, neoliberal Argentina. It appears under the phantasmagoric light of anachronism; in 
recalling the old order of industrial capitalism, its shadow also reminds us of the violent 
transformations experienced in Argentina during the last decades of the 20th century.  
Once again we find in Chejfec’s novel a building in ruins that is in the process of settling 
into the post-symbolic realm of natural history. How, in that light, should the statement that 
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the factory “radiates one of the few forms of truth” be understood? In what way can the 
factory be said to constitute a source of truth in the world? As Marx shows in the first volume 
of Capital the industrial workplace, organized to meet the needs of capitalist production of 
increasingly large scale, becomes the powerful generator of a new social logic: new ways of 
expropriating, dividing and allocating time; new ways of configuring motion and activity; and 
technological evolution driven by conflict between capital and labor. At the time of the 
industrial revolution the factory emerges as paradigmatic form of production, reshaping the 
way in which all forms of labor are conceived and organized. Although the majority of 
Englishmen in the 19th century may not have been employed in industrial workplaces, workers 
of all vocations were nonetheless compelled to see their work as mechanical and themselves as 
machines.99 
 It may be, as the epigraph taken from Vico’s New Science suggests, that the thought of 
industrial production as truth regime only comprises a new chapter in a much longer history of 
thinking about truth. Verum esse ipsum factum: Vico’s statement can be translated as either 
“truth itself is fact” or “truth itself is made” [factum derives from facere or “to make”]. I want to 
focus on the second possibility here. If truth is understood as something to be made rather 
than found or unveiled it cannot correspond to an already existing property or essence; it must 
be produced through language and action. Vico’s statement goes against the Platonic account 
of truth as eternal Form, and comes close to the Kantian “Copernican revolution” according to 
which the subjective schema of perception and understanding (i.e., time, space and causality) 
must be rigorously distinguished from things and beings themselves. Truth, which determines 
what counts as intelligible or sensible experience, must be made because it is itself 
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fundamentally a form of making; truth qua intelligibility and sensibility is itself fashioned and 
deployed by the (Kantian) imagination and the understanding. Truth for Vico and Kant is thus a 
fictioning—not a distortion but a doing—that clears the way for cognition in time and space, 
and according to the rational law of causes and effects. As Reiner Schürmann demonstrates the 
understanding of truth as making is entirely consistent with the Kantian critical tradition, for 
which, in Schürmann’s words, “in every experience, it is we who constitute the true—verum 
factum, that which we make is true. The true and the fabricated are convertible” (Schürmann 
2003, 453).  
 For Boca de lobo, in which the factory [fábrica] constitutes the site of making [fabricar] 
par excellence, the correlation between truth and poiēsis assumes a new historical dimension 
that is not yet fully accounted for by the Kantian critical tradition. Truth for Kant refers to the 
way in which reason freely assigns itself the laws according to which the sensory can be 
perceived and the intelligible grasped. In Chejfec’s novel, meanwhile, we encounter a literary 
reflection on how the historical evolution of capitalism, from industrial to post-industrial 
production, impacts social organization while also shaping the practices and sensibilities that 
accompany these forms of organization. Thus the equation of the factory with imperium 
proposes a historicizing operation that is absent from Kantian critique; if as Marx showed the 
factory invents its own specific ways of organizing time, bodies and motion, what then becomes 
of that industrial imperium in the time of post-Fordist capitalism? This is one of the central 
allegorical questions posed by the novel, which does not attempt to provide an answer (unless 
it is to be found simply in the retreat of the narrator to the private confines of his studio) so 
much as it presents the question itself as a point of departure for literary meditation on history 
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as destruction or finitude. 
 The interaction between “material docil” and “trabajo humano” in the passage cited 
above recalls Aristotle’s distinction between physis and tekhnē, or nature and technology 
(including arts and crafts). Aristotle defines this as the difference between those things that 
have within themselves their own source of growth (e.g., a tree has a self-regulating growth 
cycle that begins with the germination of a seed) and things that are brought about by external 
agents (e.g., unlike the tree, a wooden bed must be envisioned and crafted by a furniture 
maker). The distinction between endogenous and exogenous causality relates closely to 
Aristotle’s conceptualization of sterēsis as “privation” or “falling away” in contrast to ousia as 
“presencing.” Sterēsis, as indicated earlier, names a constitutive subtraction from all forms of 
poiēsis, of determination and production.  
 In Aristotle’s thought sterēsis provides a solution to an apparent contradiction at the 
heart of the Greek conception of being as ousia. The contradiction goes as follows: whatever is 
(e.g., a bed or a tree) must have derived from something that was there beforehand or, 
alternatively, it must have come from nothing. Both alternatives are fraught with problems, 
however. It is impossible to conceive of something coming from nothing, since in that case 
nothing would already be something—otherwise how to explain the fact that this particular 
nothing here and now engendered something substantial? By the same token, it is logically 
inconceivable that something could come into being from something else, since that something 
else can only be what it is and where it is; only one thing can occupy a given place at a given 
time, and the situated being of the thing does not have room for the additional presence of 
some other being.100  
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 The Parmenidean problem turns out to be a mere pseudo-problem, as Aristotle shows, 
because it accepts too easily the reduction of ousia to an either/or alternative—either being or 
nothing—while neglecting the possibility that existence and non-existence might each possess 
multiple modalities. Aristotle identifies two such modes which he calls “absolute” and 
“incidental” non-existence (sterēsis); it is the conflation of these two modes that leads 
Parmenides to confusion. While Parmenides is the implicit target of this move in Aristotle’s 
thought, the conflation of the absolute and the incidental or contingent is not the fault of a 
particular thinker but is endemic to Greek language (and, by extension, to our modern 
languages). When we say—to use Aristotle’s example—that a physician does something other 
than the practice of medicine (“the physician builds a house,” for instance) or becomes 
something other than a physician (“the physician becomes a mother”), we unwittingly assert 
that it is as a physician that she or he acts in such a way or becomes this or that. In fact the 
opposite is the case: the physician does nothing other than what a physician already does 
(attend to the sick), while alongside this physician-ness something or someone else emerges (a 
house-builder, a parent). And where does this something else come from? It comes from 
incidental non-existence or potentiality. Our language with its substantive, subject-oriented 
grammar can only obfuscate key distinctions between actuality [entelechia, energeia] and 
potentiality [dunamis], between form [morphé], coming into existence [ousia] and falling out of 
actuality [sterēsis], and between different modes of non-existence (absolute versus contingent). 
While it is indeed unthinkable that something come from nothing, all coming-into-being owes a 
debt to what Aristotle terms sterēsis, which is not nothing and could be translated as 
potentiality or as constitutive withdrawal. 
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 Aristotle’s discussion of matter and form remains clouded by an ambiguity that I want to 
highlight for the purposes of reading Chejfec’s novel. Sterēsis, once again, names a privation of 
form or a falling out of existence that is contingent in nature and which must itself be shed in 
order for something to come into being. Moreover it can be understood as either “perishable” 
or “imperishable.” Contingent or perishable sterēsis includes all of the accidents that befall 
things at certain moments in their history: the physician has a baby, for example, prior to which 
her maternal potentiality was contingently in privation. Imperishable sterēsis meanwhile, 
names an atemporal register that is presupposed by presentation or coming into being, but 
which is itself irreducible to presentation as such. Whatever the physician does, has done, and 
may do or become in the future, there will always be the potential for something more, and it is 
this potential for—in distinction from all future determinate somethings—that is irreducible to 
presence, either actual or potential. An atemporal deprivation or potentiality-to-be cannot 
dissolve once this or that possibility is actualized, since what dissolves is by definition already 
within time. Imperishable sterēsis designates the difference of all presentation or coming-into-
being from itself. 
 While it would be easy to conceive of sterēsis and ousia as opposites, in a 1939 essay on 
Aristotle’s Physics Heidegger adds a clarification that warns us away from such a hasty 
reduction. Sterēsis as potentiality for form or existence, or as capacity not to be, cannot be 
equated with absence understood simply as deprivation or negation of presence. Potentiality 
introduces a conceptual fold in which absence and presence, existence and non-existence 
touch on one another prior to their logical separation as antitheses. Sterēsis, as condition of 
possibility for any appearance or presentation, is not absence per se but rather the presence of 
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absence, the insistence of the limits of presentation within the order of the present and the 
visible. How does this insistence work or make itself known? Heidegger offers the analogy of an 
everyday object—a bicycle—that goes missing and whose absence itself becomes a source of 
preoccupation for us. The point of this illustration is not the distinction between the bike when 
it was present and the bike now that it is absent; it is the way in which absence “itself” becomes 
a cause for concern, as if absence as such were a thing that could be experienced in its own 
right. Sterēsis, in this philosophical anecdote, is the materialization or thingliness of withdrawal 
or privation:  
When we say today, for example, “My bicycle is gone!” we do not mean that it is 
somewhere else; we mean that it is missing. When something is missing, the 
missing thing is gone, to be sure, but the goneness itself, the lack itself, is what 
irritates and upsets us, and the “lack” can do this only if the lack itself is “there,” 
i.e., constitutes a mode of being. Sterēsis as becoming-absent is not simply 
absentness, but rather is a kind of becoming-present, in which the becoming-
absent (but not the absent thing) becomes present. (Heidegger 1976, 266)  
 In Heidegger’s account sterēsis makes itself known through affect and in response to our 
awareness that some key element has removed itself from an accustomed network of practical 
relations in our lives. The phenomenal fact that the bicycle has gone missing throws a monkey 
wrench into our organization of time, movement, activities and responsibilities. Its absence 
announces an interruption of the economy of everyday life with its appointed tasks, obligations 
and circuits; suddenly we find ourselves unable to make it to an appointment, get to work, go 
to the grocery store, and so on. This anecdote helps us to understand sterēsis as exposing a 
260 
 
void at the heart of the dialectic of presence and absence, and of coming-into-being as the 
negation of non-being or absence. 
 As experience of absence as such, sterēsis casts its uncanny shadow over the totality of 
our world. It is a non-place in which appearing and withdrawal, presence and absence fold into 
one another without becoming identical. Heidegger’s use of the missing bicycle to illustrate 
what sterēsis looks like—and feels like—brings to mind his discussion of “world” in Division 
One, Chapter 3, §16 of Being and Time (1927), in which Heidegger equates world with a 
familiarized structure of practical reference [Verweisung]. We only become aware of 
worldliness [Weltilchkeit] or the totality of such referential structures when one of the 
referential relations is interrupted—for instance, when the carpenter’s hammer breaks he 
becomes aware of the totality of referential assignations that makes up the “world” of his 
workshop and his practice. I will have more to say that connection in the next chapter. 
 Let us now return to factory in Boca de lobo so as to take a closer look at how literary 
reflections on technologically-driven organization of time and space under industrial capitalism 
cross paths with concerns about literary language. One memorable scene from the factory 
involves a coworker of Delia’s, “G,” whose highly specialized skills are rendered obsolete and 
whose subsequent trajectory illustrates a form of abandonment that can be associated either 
with the existential condition that Heidegger terms facticity (more on that shortly) or with the 
historical situation of post-sovereignty. The tragic fate of “G” is a consequence of what Marx 
terms the real subsumption of labor under capital, a secondary process whereby capitalism 
generates its own forms of social organization, specialization and productivity, as opposed to 
the formal subsumption of labor in which capital appropriates preexisting productive forms for 
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its own purposes. This scene serves as a reminder of how technological evolution is intricately 
bound up with the social history of capital and its conflicts with labor. 
 Before turning to a closer examination of this episode in the novel, a brief look at the 
interaction between technology and human labor in capitalist production will help focus the 
discussion. The concepts of specialization and deskilling are of particular interest here. Classical 
political economy envisions capitalism as conferring on the worker the freedom to do whatever 
he or she pleases with technical skill and labor. In equating of the labor market with freedom, 
however, political economy is unable to account for how specialization in the capitalist 
workplace shapes and limits what the worker is able to do with skill and knowledge. The market 
encourages workers to develop expertise in a certain area—those who do not are consigned to 
the most menial of all jobs—but then a worker with specialized training is no longer capable of 
producing commodities; she or he can only contribute one or another part in a larger 
production process. In that light specialization, as a passport into the labor market, in fact 
makes the worker more dependent than ever on capital. The inevitable result of specialization, 
as Marx puts it, is that the laborer becomes a mere appendage of the production process:  
If, in the first place, the worker sold his labor-power to capital because he lacked 
the material means of producing a commodity, now his own individual labor-
power withholds its services unless it has been sold to capital. It will continue to 
function only in an environment which first comes into existence after [labor’s] 
sale, namely the capitalist’s workshop. Unfitted by nature to make anything 
independently, the manufacturing worker develops his productive activity only 
as an appendage of that workshop. As the chosen people bore in their features 
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the sign that they were the property of Jehovah, so the division of labor brands 
the manufacturing worker as the property of capital. (Marx 1977, 482)  
The “freedom” of the labor market masks an originary unfreedom that coincides with the 
conjunction of real subsumption, i.e., specialization and deskilling. What political economy calls 
freedom presupposes a prior cut, a “circumcision” that marks all living labor as belonging a 
priori to what Chejfec’s novel calls the imperium of capital. The event that Marx calls primitive 
accumulation is thereby consolidated and repeated, within the historical temporality of 
capitalism, by a cut that will from here on function as the sign of an originary and unsurpassable 
debt. Any attempt to theorize how the productive potential of labor can be translated into anti-
capitalist political subjectivization of the working class must take this originary condition into 
account.101 As long as separation between labor and capital prevails, freedom will always 
already bear this inscription of belonging. 
 In the context of Fordist and post-Fordist production, specialization becomes difficult to 
distinguish from what would seem to be its conceptual antithesis, deskilling. Forms of deskilling 
can be found in automatization of the production process, diversification (in which workers 
trained in one industry must acquire news skills), deprofessionalization (redefining doctors as 
health care providers, etc.), and so on. Deskilling is also synonymous with hyper-specialization, 
which draws new limitations on the number of tasks assigned to any given worker. In the 
industrial workplace deskilling typically took the form of breaking up and compartmentalizing 
the production process into component actions (adding a headlight to a car, screwing a lid on a 
jar), as well as organizing discrete tasks in an effort to minimize wasted movements and 
unnecessary down time (Harvey 1989, 125). In the post-Fordist world, meanwhile, deskilling no 
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longer simply delimits the number and variety of tasks a worker is asked to perform; it now 
redefines in more radical fashion the expected “shelf life” of skills, expertise and even job 
security. Deskilling comes into play, for example, with corporate decisions to downsize, 
automate, relocate, and diversify. It thus goes hand in hand with the condition of precarity. 
Under the paradigm of flexible accumulation it is no longer sufficient that workers learn to do 
one task well. Workers must now also learn to adapt to unpredictability, which often means 
being ready to forget what they know and acquire new skills following an acquisition or when 
they find themselves out of work (Harvey 1989, esp. chapter 17). If in the time of industrial 
capitalism specialization was the circumcisional mark of belonging inscribed in the body of 
labor, in the time of post-Fordism specialization is now only advantageous to the degree that it 
can be shed like an old skin. In this latter context, the reflection on abandonment in Boca de 
lobo supplements what Marx was attempting to think with the circumcision metaphor; if this 
scene anticipates the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism, it also illustrates how abandonment is 
already present as possibility within the time of industrial capitalism.  
  Let us now turn to the episode in question, as the narrator recalls having heard it from 
Delia. “G” has worked in the factory for as long as he can remember. One day he shows up at 
his customary place only to discover that the machine he is trained to operate, and for which 
only he possesses the requisite specialist knowledge, has been replaced by a newer apparatus 
whose mechanics are entirely unfamiliar to him—in fact it is a pair of apparatuses that have 
replaced the singular machine that “G” was uniquely qualified to operate. In this scene technics 
turns its stinger against the human in its presumptive uniqueness as author of its own fate and 
history. The prosthetic know-how that gave G a proper place in the factory as imperium of truth 
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has silently transformed itself into an impediment for which there is no place. 
G no estaba en condiciones de recordar su primer día de trabajo en la fábrica, 
pero intuía que hasta ese momento la vida no había sido real; la recordaba como 
un tiempo de espera, una antesala. La vida antes de la fábrica era una ficción, 
pero no tanto por haberlo sido realmente sino por la forma como la recordaba. Y 
al contrario, ahora pertenecía al imperio de la verdad. Como se ve, G no 
esperaba que esto terminara: las ficciones concluyen, la realidad no. Sin 
embargo los títulos estaban a punto de invertirse y sólo restaba que el drama se 
desencadenara de improviso. Ocurrió cierto día, cuando llegó al taller y se 
encontró con dos máquinas; no una sola, la habitual, sino otras dos. En el suelo 
se dibujaban las marcas de la anterior, huellas profundas, imborrables, que 
señalaban el paso del tiempo y el antiguo peso. En un primer momento creyó 
que las nuevas máquinas tendrían las mismas funciones que la otra, y que 
entonces se trabajaría con ellas de manera similar. Pero cuando advirtió que no 
era así, sino al revés, que no habría podido pensarse en nada más alejado de su 
viejo artefacto, se negó a trabajar. . . . No hace falta decir que lo despidieron de 
la manera menos contemplativa; según la fábrica, se necesitaba una respuesta 
“ejemplar” ante el resto de los operarios. Una máquina fuera de circulación 
dejaba una rémora: un obrero en desuso, en este caso G, desde varios puntos de 
vista el mejor de la fábrica, joven, sano y disciplinado. (162-63)  
 We first encounter “G” as exemplary subject of the disciplinary order of industrial 
capitalism. The circumcisional logic I have been discussing marks him to the core of his being; 
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for him the artificially organized time and space of industrial production possess more reality 
than does life outside the factory walls. Fully incorporated into the truth regime that is the 
factory, whatever lies outside its walls and prior to its temporalizing divisions can only appear 
to “G” as a “waiting room” [antesala], a staging ground whose meaning is determined 
teleologically by what follows. The antesala evinces something similar to what Borges calls the 
logic of the precursor: the outside world, like the past (the precursor), is understood on the 
basis of the inside or the present (Kafka); the outside or the past is defined retroactively as 
having made way for the present. The present (the factory, Kafka) thereby ceases to be seen as 
one particular moment among many and comes to represent the privileged point through 
which the meaning of all history becomes intelligible.  
 Nothing, however, could have prepared “G” for the stunning developments that await 
him on that fateful morning. Upon arriving at work he discovers that the place previously 
reserved for him no longer exists and that his specialized knowledge and skills have been 
rendered obsolete. The factory is an imperium that admits no rivals, which is what makes 
unthinkable the sudden and uncanny appearance of the double, the pair of machines in the 
place formerly occupied by a single, self-sufficient machine. “G” has been transformed 
overnight from a model worker into an obstacle to progress [una rémora], a non-part whose 
obstructiveness must be dealt with in notable fashion. The tragic irony in his downfall is that 
this sudden reversal, which takes him from exemplary subject of imperium to impediment and 
outcast, stems precisely from his having been too good a subject, from having internalized all 
too well the originary mark of belonging inscribed on his body. 
 The tragic story of “G” contributes a supplementary economic dimension to Bernard 
266 
 
Stiegler’s philosophico-anthropological account of the relation between technics and the 
human. Stiegler’s account of technics and the human offers a critical response to the humanist 
predilection for viewing technology as an instrument developed by and for the human. For 
Stiegler the human is defined by a congenital insufficiency vis-à-vis the facticity of existence (an 
insufficiently mythologized as the “fault of Empedocles”), while technics in turn plays the role 
of supplement or prosthetic. Whereas a traditional prosthesis replaces a natural appendage 
that has been lost or damaged, technics as prosthesis replaces nothing. Technics marks the 
human difference: not to say the sovereign difference postulated by humanism but an uncanny 
difference which, from the moment of birth to the instant of death, divides the human from 
itself and prevents it from becoming One (“whole” or identical to itself). The human can only 
realize its potential for being by turning outside of itself to technics: to language, instrumental 
reason, tools, etc. Its being is defined by a state of arrears, of being-behind, for which technics 
serves as an originary supplement.  
 Not unlike Stiegler’s re-reading of the Prometheus and Empedocles myth, the story of 
“G” inverts the humanist narrative of mastery—both of technics itself and of nature through 
technics. Here technology is the interface that enables living labor to be organized in a 
productive manner and the surplus value extracted. The experience of obsolescence and 
abandonment marks the precise moment at which it becomes clear that this exemplary subject 
of technics and capital was in fact never anything more than a mere appendage of the machine, 
a supplement of the supplement. As David Harvey reminds us, technological innovation and 
evolution are both a logical consequence of capitalist competition and an instrument of 
discipline that assists the capitalist in circumventing market disadvantages (e.g., labor scarcity 
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that would drive wages up) and in combating and neutralizing organized resistance. The 
trajectory of technological evolution within the workplace serves as a reminder to workers that 
their replacement may well be just around the corner—if not another worker then in the form 
of a machine. The mythologization of the entrepreneur is thus but a modern version of Adam 
Smith’s secular theologization of the origins of capitalism: a fable that serves to mask the 
coercive and exploitative forces at work in the social history of modernity.102  
 As we might have predicted the “G” anecdote also illuminates a formal connection 
between the scene of industrial production and literature. We first glimpse such a link when the 
narrator, who is recalling a story once told to him by Delia, pauses to reflect on her description 
of the marks that have been left by the obsolete machine on the factory floor. These 
“profound,” “indelible” traces attest, as Marx and Engels put it in the “Communist Manifesto,” 
to the former solidity of what has since vanished into thin air (Marx and Engels 1978, 476). By 
implication these depressions in the factory floor also prophesize the precarity that lurks within 
those structures that we today tend to regard as permanent and necessary. The marks call 
attention to the imperceptible process whereby the contingent nature of the present order 
comes to be perceived as necessity by those who inhabit its domain. They are not only the signs 
of a deferred or absent meaning or subject, but they also attest silently to what no subject 
could ever experience in its simultaneity: history as destruction and annihilation, reinscription 
and recodification.  
Si quiere ser obrera, la persona sabe que debe olvidar buena parte de sus 
destrezas y adquirir otras, circunscriptas a un radio limitado y relacionadas con 
una serie de tareas repetidas y relativamente sencillas. Y debo decir que ese 
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olvido de sí, el “abandono,” era otro elemento que convertía a los obreros, a mi 
modo de ver, en sostenedores del mundo. (174)  
 This episode thematizes abandonment as the other side of Marx’s metaphorization of 
circumcision discussed earlier. In the passage reproduced here abandonment indicates 
something more than just a synonym for deskilling. The forgetting that is a prelude to reskilling 
is no doubt a facet of what the narrator here calls abandonment, but abandonment as such 
appears to name something like the fundamental condition in which both destreza and olvido 
operate.  
In an essay entitled “Abandoned Being” Jean-Luc Nancy proposes the term 
“abandonment” as a re-elaboration of Heidegger’s thinking of facticity or “thrownness” as point 
of departure for his engagement with the metaphysical tradition. Abandonment is what 
prevails following the exhaustion of the ontotheological history of determining the truth of 
being as self-presence or transcendence in any of its various manifestations: God, Man, Reason, 
Progress, etc.103 Against the presentism that governs thought in the Western tradition from 
Plato through Hegel, abandonment attempts to thematize a thinking and experience of being 
that would start from—rather than simply turning away from—the destitution of all ground. 
That being is abandoned means that being relies on nothing, no arkhē or first principle; by the 
same token it also says that there is nothing to which being can return: no transcendent origin 
or first principle. Abandoned being is in a permanent state of being-thrown or being-born.  
 “We do not know it, we cannot really know it, but abandoned being has already begun 
to constitute an inevitable condition for our thought, perhaps its only condition” (Nancy 1993, 
36). One of the crucial questions opened up in Nancy’s essay concerns the historicity of 
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abandonment. On one hand, abandonment is not something that happens to being or to the 
world at some point in history (e.g., after the “death of God”). There can be no history of 
abandonment; rather, abandonment is the unthought of all history. Whatever comes into being 
enters by necessity into abandonment as its fundamental condition, it (non)ground. Being is not 
abandoned so much as it itself is this abandonment. If we do not know it, as Nancy says, this is 
because abandonment cannot be grasped as a concept. It cannot be known as such not only 
because it does not respond to the ontological question “What is it?” but also because it “is” 
the unthought condition of possibility of knowing. Abandonment cannot be represented, or it 
can only be figured catachrestically—as, for instance, in the phrase “boca de lobo.” By the same 
token, and paraphrasing Heidegger, abandonment is also what calls to (and calls for) thinking 
today. On the other hand, if abandoned being has “already begun to constitute an inevitable 
condition for our thought” this would seem to imply that abandonment is becoming perceptible 
or thinkable today in a way that was not the case before—and that the experience of 
abandonment has something fundamental to do with time. The reality of abandonment 
becomes unavoidable with the retreat of transcendence in its various forms (God, Man, 
Progress, etc.) and with the decline of principial thought announced by the crises of sovereignty 
and of Hegel-inspired philosophies of history (of the Right and the Left). Abandonment as 
existential-ontological condition may be nothing new, then, but as a matter for experience and 
thought it makes itself known today in unprecedented ways and degrees of intensity.  
 While there is much more in Nancy’s essay that is deserving of close attention I will limit 
myself here to commenting on what he has to say about the relation between abandonment 
and the law insofar as it has something to say to the experience of reading Boca de lobo.   
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The origin of “abandonment” is a putting at bandon. Bandon (bandum, band, bannen) is 
an order, a prescription, a decree, a permission, and the power that holds these freely 
at its disposal. To abandon is to remit, entrust, or turn over to such a sovereign power, 
and to remit, entrust, or turn over to its ban, that is, to its proclaiming, to its convening, 
and to its sentencing. (Nancy 1993, 44) 
Abandonment derives from bandum or the sovereign proclamation. This proclamation has no 
content other than itself; it forbids and requires nothing except for abandonment. Nancy’s 
account of the sovereign ban needs to be distinguished from several perspectives with which it 
has elements in common, such as Schmittian decisionism and Agamben’s messianic 
proclamations about politics freeing itself from the sovereign ban (Agamben 1998, 59). What 
Nancy describes as remitting or giving over to sovereign power in its abandonment is not a 
decision that one could undertake or refuse. Abandonment as condition precedes the self-
conscious, willful subject in the same way that the name precedes and creates a place for the 
speaking subject. One does not choose or opt out of abandonment. Insofar as we decide 
anything at all we do so from the condition of abandonment itself. By the same token there can 
be no freeing of politics from what Nancy tries to think as the sovereign ban, as Agamben 
imagines it, because there is no being beyond abandonment, no being except being-in-
abandonment. 
One always abandons to a law. The destitution of abandoned being is measured 
by the limitless severity of the law to which it finds itself exposed. Abandonment 
does not constitute a subpoena to present oneself before this or that court of 
law. It is a compulsion to appear absolutely under the law, under the law as such 
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and in its totality. In the same way…to be banished does not amount to coming 
under a provision of the law, but rather to coming under the entirety of the law. 
Turned over to the absolute of the law, the banished one is thereby abandoned 
completely outside its jurisdiction. The law of abandonment requires that the 
law be applied through its withdrawal. The law of abandonment is the other of 
the law, which constitutes the law. (44)  
The law of which Nancy speaks here is not the codified, phenomenal order that Schmitt 
has in mind with his account of sovereignty as exceptional decision that either suspends or 
guarantees a given legal order. The law of abandonment is the other of the phenomenal order, 
an other which both constitutes the law in its phenomenality and escapes its purview. As 
Benjamin Pryor notes, there is an important ethico-political position inherent in Nancy’s 
insistence on the irreducibility of the sovereign ban to any phenomenal order of legality. The 
distinction interrupts or marks a limit for the law’s self-presentation through which it equates 
itself with the exhaustive fulfillment of the meaning of justice (Pryor 2004, 265). The sovereign 
ban introduces a remainder, which the law can neither account for nor expel and have done 
with. Abandonment, as Nancy thinks it, is at once the situation in which we find ourselves 
always already and the unthought of our situation, what still remains and calls for thinking in 
the time of postmodernity as post-history. It thus constitutes what Heidegger would call a 
destiny. For Nancy it is only in and through thinking abandonment as such—as something other 
than a merely negative condition: deprivation, lack, alienation—that we can hope to initiate 
something new, something that could oppose the sovereign violence inflicted by capitalism and 
the state and thereby disclose the possibility of a world. 
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By way of conclusion let us return now to the thematization of abandonment in the 
story of “G.” If specialization or destreza signifies belonging to the imperium of capital, G’s fate 
illustrates how, in the blink of an eye, the sign of belonging can transform itself into a mark that 
consigns its bearer to irrelevance and disappearance. In fact it has never been anything but 
that—as David Harvey puts it, “the only thing secure about modernity is insecurity” (Harvey 
107)—though it may be only now that this lesson begins to impart itself to us. The self-
forgetting that is put on display in the exceptional case of “G” is an extreme version of a general 
condition that holds for all capitalist production. The violence of primitive accumulation did not 
cease when there was no longer any colonial expropriation or uprooting of peasants, gauchos 
and indios from the land, followed by their forced conversion into wage laborers or 
extermination through military expeditions. That archaic violence is repeated in the time of 
capitalist production, only now it operates in more or less subterranean ways, for example 
through the double disciplinary demand for learning and forgetting, specialization and 
deskilling. The degree zero of supplementation and inscription into capital, la falta de destreza 
original, constitutes a defense against the even more profound abandonment whose depths 
are touched by “G” in the moment of confronting his unexpected dislocation. The narrator calls 
this originary state “indetermination” (175).  
 Specialization remits the worker to the facticity of abandonment, which in the case of 
“G” reveals itself as the hidden, sinister other of circumcised inscription. The juxtaposition of 
specialization and belonging with deskilling and abandonment acquires added weight through 
the narrator’s recollections of “G’s” peripatetic trajectory in the weeks following his sudden 
expulsion from the imperium. In his exodus “G” could be seen wandering through the 
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neighborhood without apparent purpose or destination. The narrator surmises that what drove 
him into his new vagabond-like trajectory was a desire to rid himself of his prior mark of 
inscription—the knowledge, experience and sensibility cultivated through specialization—so as 
to recover what the narrator calls la falta de destreza original [original lack of skill]: an 
imaginary state prior to supplementation that would lay bare the radical nudity or what Stiegler 
calls the “(de)fault” [falta] of the human (1998). This falta de destreza may represent for “G” a 
blank slate that could pave the way for a new beginning, but as his exodus demonstrates it is 
also indistinguishable from the post-symbolic natural history into which Oedipus enters 
following his tragic downfall. 
 In the narrator’s discourse la falta de destreza almost certainly coincides with what he 
refers to elsewhere, in the context of his reflections on the working class, as humanity’s 
“infinite debt” (43). According to the narrator’s idiosyncratic reckoning, the working class is 
subject to a double expropriation. The first expropriation occurs with the extraction of the 
surplus value; the second happens because the working class inherits what he enigmatically 
calls humanity’s infinite accumulation of debt: “pagan con su trabajo en primer lugar lo literal, o 
sea lo que reciben como salario—por otra parte una cantidad que jamás se iguala con el valor 
verdadero de su esfuerzo—, y que también pagan todo aquello que no tiene precio, es decir, la 
deuda infinita acumulada por la humanidad” (43). Infinite debt corresponds with what has no 
price (“aquello que no tiene precio”) and thus cannot be calculated let alone liquidated. It is 
perhaps analogous to what Heidegger calls facticity and Nancy terms abandonment. If this debt 
is infinite it is because it constitutes the condition for all thought today.  
 Perhaps we are now in a position better to understand the narrator’s attribution of how 
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he fell in love with Delia to the fact of her being a female worker—“Descubrir que era obrera, 
aunque me sorprendiera, fue decisivo para enamorarme de ella”—as well as his assertion that 
industrial workers are the backbone of the world [los sostenedores del mundo]. Both 
statements postulate a deep correspondence between the conditions of capitalist social 
organization on the one hand and the existential-ontological conditioning of thought and action 
by finitude on the other. As the obscure other side of belonging, as its boca de lobo, 
abandonment is not just what happens to those whose usefulness to capitalist imperium has 
been used up or rendered obsolete. As bandum or proclamation, abandonment names a zone 
of capture in which sovereign power grabs us and subjugates us to its mandate while also 
maintaining us at a distance. If for “G” the experience of abandono harbors the dream of 
returning to a mythical pre-technical “state of nature” from which his reintegration into 
capitalist productivity could then be facilitated, his exile from the workplace is already an 
encounter with the finitude of abandonment: exile from the imperium of the factory, to be 
sure, but also abandonment under the law of capitalism. These regional forms of abandonment 
in turn presuppose a more general sense of abandonment that would coincide with what 
reveals itself in our time as the an-archic (groundless, a-principial) condition for all thought and 
action.   
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Repetition or Interruption? The Fates of Literary Modernity and World in the Time of 
Globalization and Global War 
 
In a 2003 interview conducted shortly before his death Roberto Bolaño describes Ciudad 
Juárez—a city he would never see firsthand—as a cont275emporary and terrestrial hell, calling 
it “nuestra maldición y nuestro espejo, el espejo desasosegado de nuestras frustraciones y de 
nuestra infame interpretación de la libertad y de los deseos” (Maristain 2010, 29-30). The 
distant echoes of Plato’s account of mimesis as a mirror held up to the world (Republic, Book II) 
are unmistakable here. For Bolaño’s posthumous novel 2666 (2004; English translation 2008), 
meanwhile, the interweaving of reflections on violent turmoil in the Free Trade Zone along the 
Mexican-US border with age-old questions about art and representation stages complementary 
considerations of what may be the limits of political and aesthetic modernity in the time of 
globalization. If it is art that brings truth into view for classical understandings of mimesis, for 
Bolaño it is a place on the geopolitical map that first exposes the unsettling truth of neoliberal 
Consensus. 2666 would thus constitute a second-order mirror, a mimesis of mimesis, framing 
an ill-formed and infirm reality whose disproportions and morbid symptoms seem to defy 
comprehension in any single, unifying image. Or perhaps this novel should instead be 
understood as working the limits of mimesis. This does not happen in the manner of certain 
novels associated with the “Boom” and the Latin American neobaroque, in which the “free play 
of the signifier” subverts familiar forms of literary reference. In 2666 we encounter not the 
apotheosis of linguistic play but instead a familiar and fully legible referential structure for 
which the referent has withdrawn. Reference is not subverted in favor of self-reference; it 
remains intact, albeit as a suspended relation, a relating-to whose substantial object has gone 
missing. It would be reductive to claim that 2666 is a novel about Ciudad Juárez and 
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globalization. It is that, among other things, but it is also a novel about literature: about writing, 
reading, criticism, and literary institutionality. It is a novel about narration and the 
unnarratable, about temporalization and temporal heterogeneity, about citation and 
innovation. Moreover, when we pursue this or that thematic thread far enough in 2666, we 
invariably find ourselves back where we began: facing questions about literature. This is not to 
say that Bolaño reduces everything that we call real to literature. This labyrinthian hermeneutic 
structure contributes to destabilizing our understanding of literature and its “essence,” and 
therefore, by extension, of the distinction between the fictive and the real, literature and the 
world. Put another way, 2666 bears witness to historical processes that are reshaping social 
spaces and relations while redefining the way in which art and literature have been conceived 
in modernity. And it does so by telling a story in which aesthetic form and aesthetic procedures 
assert themselves as problems.  
As a friend says to the narrator in Borges’s “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” mirrors and 
paternity are abominable because they reproduce and disseminate the visible universe [porque 
lo multiplican y lo divulgan]. Not unlike the technique of writing, the mirror introduces a 
thought of duplication and with it the unavoidable risk that the copy (son, image, grapheme) 
will stray from the security of its origin and become separated from the authority (father, eidos, 
idea) whose task it is to track and account for the offspring’s words and deeds. But where 
exactly does the anxious component (desasosiego) reside in the mimetic relation between 
Ciudad Juárez and the world? And if the appearance of Juárez itself is unsettling, what then of 
its presumed duplication in the novel? Does literary representation provide a way of dressing 
the real in a familiarizing, comforting veil? Or does this literary portrait of Juárez instead disrupt 
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aesthetic harmonization and thereby—perhaps—prepare us to awaken from our post-historical 
slumber?  
Without pretending to offer a definitive answer to these questions, I propose that 
Bolaño’s posthumous novel deploys a poetics that is analogous to Freud’s conceptualization of 
the uncanny, understood as disclosure of what was once familiar—on a personal or collective 
register—but has long been forgotten (Freud 1955, 247-48). The novel presents an appearance 
whose uncertain status—underdeveloped aberration or truth of globalization?—disrupts the 
integral logic of the autonomous subject of liberalism. Repression or forgetting do not 
presuppose any positive content; the uncanny is not a literary formula for referring to the 
female victims of Ciudad Juárez. At a more originary level it provides a way of indicating how 
the subject of psychoanalysis depends on the forgetting of a negation or expulsion, which must 
in turn have been coterminous with the constitution of the self in its delineation from a certain 
outside. The subject, in other words, is constituted through the expulsion of what is neither 
proper nor improper; and it is the return of this undecibablity, this other side of the self, that 
ushers in the uncanny as experience of the return of the subject’s own originary division. The 
psychoanalytic relation between the uncanny and the subject provides a metaphor for thinking 
about the history of the present and about how the historical present is similarly constituted 
through negation and forgetting of negation.  
Although the Santa Teresa of 2666 is located in the state of Sonora and not Chihuahua, 
it displays many if not all of what have become the most recognizable traits of Juárez: a 
sprawling border town with a thriving transnational máquila industry together with abundant 
sex and entertainment industries; a major destination for migrants seeking employment as well 
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as a nexus for illegal international trafficking of people and narcotics; and, of course, the 
unresolved serial killing of women, many of whom have been employed in the máquila or sex 
industries. For the time being I am going to pass over the distinction between Santa Teresa and 
Ciudad Juárez, treating them as if they were two names for the same thing. Later on there will 
be occasion to look more closely at what is at stake in the composition of Santa Teresa as 
literary space.  
I want to pose a preliminary query concerning the “we” in Bolaño’s assessment of 
Ciudad Juárez as a site that produces consternation for us today (nuestra maldición y nuestro 
espejo). Does this collective grammatical subject appeal to an idea of Latin America as a region 
defined by shared interests and a shared history, or does the “we” designate a geographically 
indeterminate collectivity, as in the West or even a global community that could be expected to 
feel responsibility in view of the alarming disparities that arise along the border? The real 
question, however, is not one of semantic clarification—who is this “we”?—but about how the 
reality of Juárez might oblige us to reconsider our accustomed belief in the self-reflexive totality 
that we call “world.” It has to do with how what calls out to us in the name Ciudad Juárez also 
inevitably affects how we think about our world. The two are absolutely inseparable: we cannot 
talk about the world today or even make reference to “our world” without also bringing up the 
various malignancies that are named metonymically by Ciudad Juárez, i.e., the precarity 
produced by neoliberal globalization, the naked savagery of narcocapitalism, and so on. To the 
extent that “we” to perceive the reality of Juárez as “unimaginable” and “unlivable,” does the 
existence of Juárez and the social phenomena it names metonymically still allow us to speak of 
anything like a world understood as global community? What sort of community would this be, 
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if one of its parts can only be perceived by the other parts as infernal order of the damned? Or 
does the unsettling, uncanny appearance of Juárez announce the disruption of the sort of 
being-in-common on which any reference to a world is predicated? 
 The question I am raising here requires further clarification concerning what we 
understand by “world.” A world is not just a sum total of countable entities but, first and 
foremost, a structuring of sense, reference and relations of co-belonging that makes it possible 
to think or experience totality and commonality. The question I want to explore here, then, has 
to do with the way in which the economic and technological unifying effects of contemporary 
globalization act to disarticulate older ontological-existential structures of relationality, and 
whether or not the dissociative logic of global capital leaves any room for the emergence of 
new forms of relationality. Neoliberal globalization presides over the dismantling of an old 
referential framework in which the national state served as mediator between the global and 
the local. It coincides with technological evolutions that have resulted in both the automation 
of tasks formerly performed by manual labor together with the real-time integration of 
production and demand on a planetary scale. Moreover, as Naomi Klein has argued with her 
notion of “disaster capitalism,” financial capital appears to have become increasingly adept at 
finding in natural disasters and man-made destruction new opportunities for accumulation and 
development (Klein 2007). But does this new configuration of accumulation, circulation, 
distribution and production on a global scale still constitute a world in the strong, Heideggerian 
sense of the term? Or does it instead produce what Jean-Luc Nancy calls an “enclosure in the 
undifferentiated sphere of a unitotality” (Nancy 2007, 28), that is to say, a totality in which both 
difference and infinity are violently subsumed under a global logic of equivalence?  
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 Nancy’s unitotality is analogous to what Hegel calls a “bad infinity.” A bad infinity can 
never constitute a true totality because it is incapable in principle of closing itself off and thus it 
is unable to relate to itself as totality. Hegel illustrates the distinction between a “bad” or 
“spurious” infinity and a “true” infinity as the difference between a straight line and a circle.104 
The logic of the market fits the Hegelian definition of a bad infinity because its organizing 
principle is the negation and sublimation of difference under the logic of equivalency. As a kind 
of totality the market is nothing more than a potentially endless accumulation of differences in 
which one particular (a consumer or brand X) establishes its being over against another 
particular (another consumer or brand Y), while that other particular in turn establishes itself as 
“something” over against some other particular, and so on ad infinitum.105 The problem with 
this form of infinity is that it has no necessary limit. Like the straight line in Hegel’s example, the 
whole is nothing more than an endless amassing of particulars, akin to brands on the 
supermarket shelves. As totality it cannot comprise a system, since it cannot in principle be 
completed; one can always add more brands, more consumers. And yet it also remains 
incapable of fulfilling the definition of incompleteness as something that ought to be able to 
complete itself. By contrast, a true infinity can be illustrated by the figure of a circle, which 
displays characteristics of both the infinite and the finite at the same time. With a circle the 
finite (the particular points on the circumference) has been absorbed by the infinite (the 
circumference, which has no beginning or end), which is in turn mediated by finitude (the 
enclosed nature of the geometrical form). The points of a circle are no longer just 
particularities; they have also begun to act as parts of a whole. Modern configurations of 
sovereignty, such as the nation, are analogous to a circle; the nation’s members lead the lives of 
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individuals while at the same time functioning as constituent parts of a larger entity. Society 
understood as a group of consumers, meanwhile, would be analogous to an infinitely 
extendable line.  
 In Narrative and Time Paul Ricoeur demonstrates how narrative processes have the 
potential to enact a form of Hegelian totalization through the symbolic work of poetics. Poetic 
temporalization works by transforming a chaotic or arbitrary sequence of occurrences into an 
ordered whole that has a beginning and an end; the discrete, episodic parts are related to one 
another via an overarching causal logic that is disclosed, over the course of narrative time, 
through aesthetic devices such as peripeteia (reversal) and anagnorisis (recognition) (Ricoeur 
1984, 31-51). With and against Ricoeur’s account, and largely in agreement with readings by 
Brett Levinson (2009) and Gareth Williams (2014), I propose that 2666 places in question the 
possibility of totalization today. If Ciudad Juárez brings into view the dissociative effects of 
global capital in the absence of the mediating structure formerly provided by the national state, 
Bolaño’s novel reproduces the possibility of the impossibility of totalization at the level of 
literary form. Levinson’s analysis of the episodic structure of 2666 is apropos here: the 
structuring of episodes is neither random nor is it governed by an identifiable theme, paradigm 
or logic. If violence or atrocity is the thread that links different Parts and episodes (the racist 
assault against the Pakistani cab driver in the first Part; the knockout punch in Fate’s Part; the 
serial killing of women; WWII and the Nazi genocide; and so on), there is no single instance that 
exemplifies or grounds what the sequence is about (Levinson 2009, 182).  
 If the world worlds, as Heidegger puts it in “The Origin of the Work of Art” (Heidegger 
1971, 44), does Ciudad Juárez as symptom of globalization attest to the unworlding of the 
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world in a time when all openings for creation or the new are just as rapidly subsumed within 
global capital’s calculative logic of equivalency? This may be one way of defining the major 
concern that haunts 2666, the real “gran tiburón negro” (Bolaño 2005, 25) that lurks beneath 
the thematic surface of Bolaño’s novel and for which the critics’ pursuit of Archimboldi—an 
obvious allusion to Ahab’s pursuit of Moby Dick—plays the role of stand-in.106 2666, then, could 
be read as a literary meditation on the possibility that neoliberal globalization generates a new 
form of enclosure within which infinity, alterity, and heterogeneity are all too easily captured: a 
world that has been entirely produced and whose horizon has been subsumed within a 
calculative logic that forecloses any possibility of the event. If the “secret of the world” lies 
concealed in the crimes of Santa Teresa, as one of Bolaño’s characters asserts, this may be 
because those crimes illustrate a mortal danger that accompanies globalization: that the 
unification of the globe does not yield “One World” but instead unleashes an unworlding of the 
sovereign ban, through which life is increasingly reduced to the status of detritus and 
disposability.  
 A brief discussion of Heidegger’s philosophical treatment of world may help to make this 
point clearer, and it may also serve to illustrate why the questions about Juárez and the world 
do not meet with any definitive answer in Bolaño’s novel. World, as Heidegger clarifies in 
Chapter 3, §16 of Being and Time, is “not an innerworldly being, and yet it determines 
innerworldly beings to such an extent that they can only be encountered and discovered and 
show themselves in their being, insofar as ‘there is’ [es gibt] world” (Heidegger 2010, 72). 
Neither transcendent (extraworldly) nor immanent (innerworldly), world names the horizonal 
condition of possibility for thinking, perceiving and encountering beings. World refers not to a 
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sum total of objects and beings but to a historically specific structure of interrelatedness that 
precedes the determinate identities and purposes associated with the beings that populate a 
world. World names a pre-ontological structuring through which beings disclose themselves to 
one another. Heidegger’s formulation, es gibt world, literally says “it gives world” rather than 
“there is a world.” It thereby positions the question of world prior to ontology and its 
interrogation of essences. World precedes and conditions any determination of what is to be 
understood under the heading of being, as it is only from within a given world that ontology can 
begin to inquire into the being of beings. 
Heidegger uses the term reference [Verweisung] to describe the interrelatedness of 
beings and things. Reference refers not to language in the restrictive sense but to the practical 
assignations and correlations through which entities take on specific values, purposes and 
meanings while being brought together as the interrelated parts of a totality of use values. 
Things and beings in the world are interrelated insofar as they are referred or remitted to an 
overarching structure of meaning and utility. The world we inhabit first manifests itself to us, 
Heidegger says, not as objects in general [res] but as that specific class of object known as tools 
[pragmata]. Our experience and understanding of our world is first and foremost practical and 
equipmental in nature.107 In our daily lives we move about in equipmentally-attuned spaces in 
which things disclose themselves to us as tools that are ready to hand. Heidegger’s assertion 
that the relationality that comprises our world is equipmental in nature is illustrated by the 
linguistic fact that we never speak of “an equipment”; we speak of equipment only ever in the 
plural, i.e. as part of a pre-given totality. 
The ontological-existential structuring of totality, or the worldliness of the world, 
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remains an elusive secret both to everyday consciousness and to the inquiries put forth by the 
metaphysical tradition. For practical reason, the question of the totality within which it finds 
itself is overshadowed by pragmatic concerns and demands. After all, it would be a poor 
craftsperson that lets him or herself get distracted from the tasks at hand by the fundamental 
questions of philosophy. By the same token, when ontology asks about the world it is trained to 
inquire about the nature or essence of its object. But in formulating its inquiries in this way 
ontology necessarily overlooks the fact that to ask questions in the way it does, questions that 
probe into what hidden “nature” or “essence” lies behind appearances, is already to be 
situated within a particular, constituted frame of reference: the ti esti of metaphysics, the 
“what is it?” concerning a given being or the question about essentia or essence. When it 
comes to thinking the worldliness of the world, Heidegger asserts, traditional ontology “is at a 
dead end—if it sees the problem at all” (Heidegger 2010, 65). Ontology’s inquiries are founded 
on an originary forgetting or foreclosure of the fact that thought always finds itself already 
within a referentially structured world, and that its representations and questions about 
entities, things and their essence have already been framed by a structuring of sensibility, 
meaning and belonging-together that delimits in one way or another the horizon for thinking. 
The worldliness of the world thus comprises a secret register that remains inaccessible 
both to ordinary experience and to ontology in its traditional configurations. Where we do have 
a chance of experiencing the secret of the world or its worldiness, Heidegger tells us, are in 
those rare moments when referential networks are interrupted or suffer breakdowns. In a 
carpenter’s workshop, to take just one example, it is immediately obvious how everything 
discloses itself first and foremost as a tool that has its proper place and its designated function; 
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it is so obvious, in fact, that we rarely give it a moment’s thought. Each tool is defined a priori 
by its relation to other tools: the hammer in relation to nails, the saw in relation to the lathe, 
and so on. Moreover, all such tools are situated in relation to an overarching production 
process within which everything takes on purpose. It is within the space of the workshop, then, 
that the hammer first appears as a hammer. All of this goes without saying, and this 
obviousness makes the carpenter’s practice akin to a second nature. In this example it is a 
carpenter’s shop but one could also speak of the referential structuring of a city, a nation, of a 
community of nations or even of the planet. It is when something happens to disrupt the 
smooth functioning of referential order, meanwhile, that we are suddenly in a position to 
experience “world” as such. For instance, the hammer unexpectedly breaks, and it is then, 
alongside our rising irritation in the face of what does not work, that we first become aware of 
worldliness as such.108  
Bolaño’s literary treatment of Ciudad Juárez illuminates a similar thought of interruption 
or breakdown with respect to the ordering rationale of aesthetic and political modernity. 
Specifically, 2666 registers how two of the foundational discourses of modernity—the academic 
and literary institutional determination of literature, and the political logic of sovereignty—have 
fallen into crisis today. By the same token, the novel initiates a figuration of evil through which 
Santa Teresa emerges as the visible form that accompanies the lifting of the katechonic 
restraining structures imposed by modernity in order to regulate the antagonisms generated by 
capitalism.109 One of the novel’s most significant contributions to Latin Americanist debates 
about literature and critical thought is to have placed in question the adequacy of traditional 
epistemological tools for understanding what is happening in our world today. As one of the 
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cops in “The Crimes” puts it, “Siempre hay que hacer preguntas, y siempre hay que preguntarse 
el porqué de nuestras propias preguntas. ¿Y sabes por qué? Porque nuestras preguntas, al 
primer descuido, nos dirigen hacia lugares adonde no queremos ir. . . . Nuestras preguntas son, 
por definición, sospechosas.”110  
For Heidegger there could be no clearer formulation of the way in which the conceptual 
vocabulary of political modernity has difficulty accounting for what is going on in—and going 
terribly wrong with—our world today. This statement, uttered by a speaker whose moral 
legitimacy to represent the law is inherently suspect, has the power of suggesting that an 
unsurpassable gap may in fact separate what is transpiring in the world today on the one hand, 
and the critical vocabulary and modes of inquiry that we have at our disposal for understanding 
it on the other hand. What Bolaño’s fictional rendition of the Mexican-US border offers us is not 
a rehashing of the old national-allegorical literary frame but instead a literary reflection on the 
possibility that our conceptual toolbox may turn out to be harboring some broken hammers. 
The appearance of Santa Teresa both withholds and discloses our world to us. What I have 
elsewhere called the secret of literature—a fold where form and content, reference and self-
reference, presentation and withdrawal become undecidable—here proves to be formally 
indistinguishable from the secret of the world, or the site of a breakdown in the global circuitry 
that at once calls attention to the fact that there is [es gibt] a world while simultaneously 
illuminating the terrible specter of the end of the world (as we know it).111 
Juárez is a symptom of the violent contradictions that accompany globalization, putting 
on display the inability of modernization to resolve the social problems associated with a long 
history of inequality in Latin America. What is more, Juárez illustrates how destruction, 
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dissociation and precarity, more than just unintended and temporary side-effects of 
modernization, have in fact become integral elements in the restructuring and accumulation 
that mark the shift from Fordism and national capitalism to post-Fordism and globalization.112 
While capitalism has always relied on the dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, 
destruction and development, neoliberal globalization inaugurates new forms of accumulation 
that thrive on more drastic, far-reaching forms of destruction. Globalization produces 
enormous concentrations of wealth alongside massive impoverishment, intensified insecurity 
and precariousness. Its ebbs and flows are not easily regulated by the modern partitioning of 
the globe into sovereign national states. But globalization should not be confused with 
homogenization. While benefitting from the lifting of old restraining structures, global capital 
also produces its own forms of delineation between what Etienne Balibar calls “life zones” and 
“death zones,” which at times coincide with national borders and regional boundaries (“North” 
vs. “South”) while at other times arising within one and the same nation or city (Balibar 2003, 
126). These new divisions form what Balibar calls “superborders,” which give rise to the specter 
of new forms of enmity and conflict: not between a clearly delineated “us” and a “them” as was 
the case for modernity, but between a fully constituted humanity on the one hand and a 
remainder classified as something less than human on the other hand. The non-belonging of 
this “non-human” excess is evidenced by its refusal or inability to play by the common rules, 
and serves to legitimate its potential annihilation. 
Juárez names a location that can be mapped within the modern geopolitical boundaries 
of Mexico, but the geographic specificity it appears to name turns out to be destabilized by the 
concurrence of rapid economic growth with the privatization of the state and the crisis of 
288 
 
national sovereignty. The historical processes embodied by Ciudad Juárez today could thus be 
said to pose the question of its impossibility qua discrete and unified place in the cartographic 
system of modernity. This particular place name stands in for a conjuncture of historical forces 
that can no longer be administered and controlled by the geometry of modernity and its 
corresponding institutions. Juárez is synonymous with, among other things, new forms of global 
capitalist production that are less tied than ever to a specific place or political space, and new, 
globally integrated modes of production, distribution and consumption that are not easily 
regulated by national states. The rapid expansion of the máquila industry in the wake of NAFTA 
has transformed the social and demographic landscape of northern Mexico, disarticulating 
traditional forms of collectivity while attracting new waves of migrant populations from 
elsewhere in Mexico and Central America in search of readily available jobs. In the case of 
Juárez, moreover, neoliberal globalization coincides with the proliferation of narco-capitalism, 
whose violence not only poses a threat to the modern state form with its monopoly on 
legitimate forms of coercion, but also announces the decoupling of capitalist accumulation 
from the ideological narrativization processes of modernity (labor and accumulation in the 
name of virtue, progress, civilization, and so on). As Bolaño frequently reminds us, neoliberal 
economic growth in northern Mexico leads not to social stability but to new forms of 
vulnerability—especially among working-poor women—and an intensification of anomie and 
various forms of precariousness (social anonymity, transience, temporary employment, as well 
as the emergence of new labor patterns at odds with traditional mores and ideologies). 
In what follows I pursue a reading of 2666 in terms Carlo Galli’s distinction between 
political modernity on the one hand and globalization and global war on the other.113 Galli 
289 
 
proposes that recent transformations in the technological, economic and political structuring of 
the planet—in the wake of privatization and the dismantling of the Welfare State, together with 
the emergence of the war on terror as a conflict that transcends the modern logic of 
sovereignty—constitute a new conjuncture for which the conceptual vocabulary of modernity is 
unable to account. As far as this conceptual vocabulary goes, Galli focuses on what he calls the 
political geometry of modernity. My reading of Bolaño is an inquiry into what happens when we 
extend Galli’s argument to include what might be called the aesthetic vocabulary of modernity, 
a vocabulary that extends from Romanticism to the neo-avant garde movements of the 1960s 
and 70s.   
For Galli the dominant concepts and structures of the modern era—from the Hobbesian 
theorization of sovereignty through the invention of the Welfare State in response to the crises 
of global capital in the first part of the 20th century—are the products of a “political geometry” 
whose function is to produce and organize space. The modern nation and the Jus publicum 
europaeum are two classic examples of how political geometry delineates and generates 
smooth, homogeneous social spaces that can be mapped in a variety of ways and according to 
various political rationales. In Galli’s view almost all of the important categories of modern 
political thought—sovereignty, freedom, friendship, enmity, empire, state, nation, hegemony—
are spatial concepts that presuppose the self-production of the world as spatial totality.114 
 Take for example Hobbes’s Leviathan, which first gives shape to the modern concept of 
sovereignty. It is only when all Englishmen agree to relinquish their own unconstrained freedom 
and recognize the authority of the sovereign over the affairs of all that a stable common space 
can be secured against the fatal passions and insecurities that threaten everyone—the 
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strongest as much as the weakest—in the state of nature. In contrast to traditional figures of 
sovereignty that find their support in transcendent references—Being as One, the Platonic 
Forms, Nature, God—Hobbesian sovereignty is immanent to the order to which it gives rise, 
albeit without becoming subject to the order’s norms. Its formal logic is that of quasi-
immanence. The Leviathan draws a border that delineates an inside, whose space is unified and 
homogeneous, over against an outside that is conceived as chaotic and threatening. The 
specters of disorder and bloodshed raised by the 16th and 17th century European religious civil 
wars are thereby expelled from the inside, and banished to the outside where they are 
reincorporated in the figure of the enemy or, even more frightful, the non-European barbarian 
whose existence is not governed by any sovereign pact whatsoever. 
 Political modernity discovers in geometry—the study of the relative shape, size and 
position of figures in space—a conceptual vocabulary and a set of procedures with which to 
develop its own authoritative social organization and decision-making. Geometry’s criteria 
provide politics with a schematic archive for theorizing, as Galli puts it, “collaboration and 
conflict, order and disorder, hierarchy and equality, inclusion and exclusion, borders and 
freedom, sedentariness and nomadism, marginality and centrality” (Galli 2010, 4). An analogy 
with Kantian critical philosophy helps to illustrate what geometry has to offer to modernity. For 
Kant, concepts need to find support in a sensory impression such as an example (if the concepts 
are empirical) or a schema (if they are non-empirical), in order to confirm that their 
abstractions indeed possess reality.115 In that light, the turn to geometry constitutes both the 
strength and an internal limit for modern political thought. The reliance on geometry provides 
evidence that modern thought is unable to address the political immediately and as such; it 
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must rely on the spatial figures and diagrams of geometry to provide recognizable figures and 
formal arrangements for thinking about the political portioning of bodies, roles and goods. But 
in borrowing from geometry, political thought must also make a “cut”—it must select or create 
a specific figure or diagram—which cannot be justified by reason, precisely because the act of 
cutting grounds political reason itself. Modern political thought thus depends on figurations 
whose origins and legitimacy cannot be guaranteed or accounted for by political reason. 
Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction is a classic illustration of this aporia, and it points out the 
irreducible instability of all modern political concepts. 
 There is also an ideological component to the connection between modern politics and 
geometry that is worth commenting on briefly. Modern political thought is confronted with the 
dilemma of how to generate consent for figurations that it must make without having recourse 
to traditional references to transcendence. Once one accepts that geometrically-mapped 
spaces are not equivalent to the real, lived space in the world around us, the language and 
methods of geometry can then readily be accepted as exemplifying the modern principles of 
self-making and autonomy. As Paul de Man has shown in “Pascal’s Allegory of Persuasion” (de 
Man 1996), geometry provides an exemplary language for the modern subject because its 
methodology is determined by what Pascal calls nominal definitions in distinction from real 
definitions. Nominal definitions are conventional; unlike real definitions, they have no bearing 
on the nature of the things they designate. For instance, mathematics defines all numbers that 
are divisible by two without remainder as even numbers; it thereby unambiguously designates 
real objects (numbers) while refraining from attributing any external meaning to them (the fact 
of being “even” has no bearing on the relative value or position of the numbers “two” and 
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“four”). As a purely auto-referential language, geometry divests itself of any referential 
involvement in phenomenal matters. Freed in this way from any suspicion of harboring 
undeclared interests, geometry exemplifies a self-founding discourse of truth that is accessible 
to all and infinitely open to rational scrutiny. Hobbes, meanwhile, describes the virtues of 
geometrical language sardonically as a system whose rational authority is admitted only 
because it steers clear of individual interest:  
For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man’s right or 
dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a 
square, that the doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of 
all books of geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able. 
(Hobbes 1972, 166)  
 What Galli calls global war names, by contrast, a new time in which the restraining 
forces and institutions invented by modernity are no longer able to perform their appointed 
historical tasks of containing or expelling the contradictions and antagonisms that accompany 
the production, mapping, and administration of social space. In producing social and 
geopolitical space, the political geometry of modernity also generated conflicts and 
antagonism, which it then had to regulate or banish. Globalization and global war by contrast 
are characterized by a more or less uncontained irruption of conflict. Borders are no longer able 
to secure stable, enforceable distinctions between inside and outside; frontiers have become 
sites of indistinction, contamination and infection where the logic of sovereignty is no longer 
capable of administering and policing the flows of capital investments, technology, contraband, 
populations, diseases, and so on. Whereas modernity was shaped by the dialectic of 
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systematization and contradiction, enclosure and freedom, the time of globalization and global 
war bears witness to what Galli calls a “contradiction without system” (Galli 2010, 110), or an 
explosion of drives and antagonisms that were previously suppressed, expelled or put to work. 
A contradiction without system is a conflict that cannot absorbed dialectically within a larger 
totality, and which therefore cannot be converted into part of the system’s mechanics. A 
contradiction without system is another name for what I am calling interregnum.   
  The shift from modernity to global war occurs, roughly speaking, in two phases. The 
first stage corresponds with the wave of economic globalization and privatization initiated in 
the 1980s and 90s under the banner of neoliberal Consensus; it also coincides with new 
technological, administrative, and political trends: (1) industrial capitalism is supplanted by 
automation and the service economy, and the factory is replaced as paradigmatic form of 
production by a new configuration of affective and intellectual labor; (2) the rise of flexible 
accumulation and development of new technologies allowing for enhanced, real-time 
coordination between supply and demand throughout the world; and (3) the privatization and 
dismantling of the Welfare state, which until the 1970s stood as the last form of political 
mediation between the local/national and global capital.  
 The second phase corresponds with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New 
York and Washington DC, and the subsequent response by the US and its allies. The events of 
9/11 inaugurate a new global situation for which the modern distinction between politics (the 
ordering and regulation of the inside) and war (crisis of order in which the continued existence 
of the political community is threatened, most often from outside) has become unsustainable. 
“Global war” describes a knot whose strands cannot be untied using the conceptual vocabulary 
294 
 
of political modernity. Its syntax enacts this impasse through its own internal contradiction. The 
modern concept of warfare refers to militarized conflict between sovereign territorial states 
employing uniformed armies; its usage can be expanded to include conflict between factions 
competing for control over the state (civil war) or between an invading uniformed army and an 
informal partisan or guerrilla force dedicated to the defense of a territorial homeland. In going 
global, meanwhile, war sheds its definitional rootedness in the defense or conquest of 
territorial space, and it thereby also separates itself from what used to be its legitimating 
foundation: the sovereign decision that draws the line between “us” and “them,” friend and 
foe, order and crisis. If, for modernity, war was a means of last resort undertaken by national 
states at exceptional times of crisis, global war names a process without sovereign and without 
telos whose violence and insecurity has become difficult to distinguish from the routine time of 
order. Global war names a time in which clear and stable distinctions between politics and its 
others—war for one, but also terrorism, criminality, and other specters of social disorder and 
insecurity driven by ostensibly non- or pre-political forms of violence—are becoming nebulous. 
The theaters of armed conflict in today’s world are no longer defined exclusively or even 
primarily by confrontations between sovereign actors over defined territories. By the same 
token, the distinction between times—the time of war and the time of peace—is no longer self-
evident. The threat and reality of war, terror and insecurity play prominent roles in shaping all 
aspects of the foreign and domestic policies of national states. Not only would war seem to 
have become part and parcel of the game of politics as usual, the US-led “War on Terror”—a 
doubling down on the confusion between categories—has served to legitimate a profound 
expansion of the biopolitical technologies of Western states into our daily lives. In the time of 
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global war the forms and figures invented by modern political geometry are no longer capable 
of explaining or administering over conflict as it flares up around the globe. 
In the time of global war, Galli says, “the external seems to have become internal and to 
have opened up a second front” (139). This trope accounts for a variety of phenomena that are 
arguably new to the time of globalization. As 9/11 taught us, the enemy is no longer 
reassuringly located on the other side of a border or an ocean, nor can the potential enemy 
easily be distinguished from the guest who would be a friend. That the external has become 
internal takes us back to the Leviathan in order to announce the undoing of the Hobbesian 
spatial pact, which was predicated on the expulsion of negativity from the inside or the proper. 
Global war is the uncanny other side of modernity, the violent return of the repressed of 
modern political geometry.  
The external has become internal: this should not be confused with a simple inversion of 
modern paradigms of spacing, which as inversion would still reconfirm the organizing integrity 
of the inside/outside distinction as such. The subreption of the inside/outside distinction 
constitutes a rupture for political modernity, because the outside was never a fully determinate 
space to begin with. With the outside’s uncanny presentation within the inside, political 
geometry is now unable to produce and regulate flows within and between spaces. The 
determination of political differences—friend or foe, fellow citizen or outsider—can no longer 
be secured through recourse to a stable boundary between inside and outside, proper and 
improper. Galli’s essay challenges us to extend our understanding of “war” to spheres and 
contexts that have no direct or necessary connection to military power structures and 
politically-governed decision-making processes. If the “Global War on Terrorism” is in fact 
296 
 
globalization by another name, it may be that globalization in all of its modalities unfolds as one 
or another kind of war, as insecurity and violent conflict with varying degrees of intensity, but in 
every instance without sovereign and without telos.  
 One might be tempted to object that Galli’s thesis on global war is guilty of an Anglo-
European bias, and that Latin America, which has for the most part avoided direct involvement 
in the US-led “War on Terror,” is not necessarily subject to this epochal distinction. “Global 
war” might therefore be somewhat less than truly global in its scope. The objection, while 
useful because it obliges us to clarify and expand what is understood by “war,” overlooks what 
seems to me a more productive reading of Galli’s thesis. Global war is not just a name for the 
extension of militarized conflict beyond the purview of sovereign nation states, nor is it simply 
the outcome of conflicts involving the US and its allies with “rogue” states and non-state 
terrorist organizations. Global war functions metonymically in naming a time in which the 
categories of modern political geometry—politics and war, order and crisis, inside and 
outside—are increasingly difficult to keep separate, and in which the regulatory mechanisms of 
modernity are no longer fully operative. To persist in thinking war as a matter of the sovereign 
decision and the military apparatuses of the state, or as entirely synonymous with a “War on 
Terror” that continues to understand itself as a defense and policing of the distinction between 
legitimate sovereign power and illegitimate power, is to avoid dealing with the unsettling 
emergence of new forms of violence, insecurity and destruction on the one hand, and the 
production, accumulation and reproduction of global capitalism on the other hand. And that is 
precisely the point: that global war is inseparable from economic globalization. Naomi Klein’s 
thesis on “disaster capitalism,” which tries to account for how both man-made disasters and 
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natural calamities have been seized by capital as new opportunities for accumulation and 
restructuring of social relations, is one example of how “global war” could be said to unfold in 
non-traditional forms and theaters. The flourishing of drug trade in the Free Trade Zone along 
the Mexican-US border as well as throughout Mexico and Central America is another such 
example.  
 While the rapid growth of the máquila industries in the Free Trade Zone during the 
1990s coincides with the retreat of the state’s historical role as mediator between the local and 
the capitalist world system, the more recent surge in narco violence provides clear evidence 
that the Mexican state is now unable to guarantee order and security through monopolization 
of the legitimate means of physical force.116 If NAFTA (1994) provided the most recognizable 
threshold in the region for the opening of national markets to global capital, the 2005 Security 
and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) sought to establish coordination between 
the security apparatuses of Canada, the United States and Mexico in what Thomas Shannon, 
then the US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs, described as the 
“armoring” of NAFTA.117 Although the SPP is of course the product of political decisions 
undertaken by sovereign states in concordance with national security mandates, its existence 
illustrates how state sovereignty increasingly struggles to confront the uncertainties associated 
with economic globalization, drug trafficking and the specter of terrorism. The SPP was 
discontinued in 2009, but other programs such as the Mérida Initiative (or “Plan México”) 
continue to operate and to generate controversy in light of apparent connections between 
private capital, the state and extrajudicial violence, as evidenced in a 2008 LA Times exposé of a 
video showing employees of a private US security firm instructing Mexican police officials on 
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the use of torture techniques for interrogation (Bonello 2008, np).   
With the alarming increase in narco-related violence in northern Mexico during the first 
decade of the 21st century, the distinction between law and illegality, order and insecurity, is 
becoming less clear and less stable. While the Mexican federal police and army are once again 
accused of employing the tactics of terror while committing widespread human rights abuses 
against known and alleged cartel members, one former cartel hitman recounts how the best 
and brightest of the Chihuahua police academies find employment not with local law 
enforcement but in the cartels they have been trained to combat. This same witness asserts 
that the spectacular proliferation of violence and fear in the narco wars in fact serves as a 
“smokescreen for the real business,” where profits are higher than ever (Bowden and Molloy 
2011, 26).  
Globalization and global war are unmistakably intertwined in the case of Mexico. The 
roots of the recent escalation of narco violence can be traced back to the presidential election 
of Vicente Fox in 2000, whose political triumph broke a seven-decade-long PRI hegemony and 
put an end to existing arrangements between the cartels and the PRI state. The cartels were 
thus obliged to seek out new arrangements with local politicians and law enforcement 
agencies, which in turn prompted a proliferation of corruption at local levels. At the same time, 
the PAN’s decision to end the state’s unwritten pacts with the cartels led to the dissolution of 
old territorial divisions and fostered increasingly violent encounters between rival cartels 
seeking to carve out new plazas or defend old ones. In 2006, Fox’s successor, Felipe Calderón, 
intensified the Mexican state’s crackdown on the cartels by deploying federal troops in 
Michoacán and other regions for the first time in the conflict. While militarization was enacted 
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in the name of overcoming the corruption and inefficiency that plagued local law enforcement 
and political institutions—in other words, it was done in the name of national-state 
sovereignty—it quickly escalated into an undeclared war between cartels and the Mexican 
state, which would in turn deepen suspicions about the Mexican state’s inability to administer 
affairs and mediate conflict within national territory (Bussey 2008).  
If Juárez is a mirror for us today, as Bolaño suggests, it is because it gives geopolitical 
form to a situation that exceeds the explanatory capacity and ordering authority of the political 
geometry of modernity. Grounded in the concepts of national and state sovereignty, the 
geometry of smooth spaces and stable inside/outside distinctions proves incapable of 
accounting for how the relation between capitalist accumulation, violence and insecurity is 
reshaping social conditions in Central and North America today. In this context Ciudad Juárez 
provides an uncanny image of what Galli’s assertion that “the external seems to have become 
internal” might look like. Juárez is a point on the map that calls attention to the fact that the 
map itself, and along with it the modern linking of epistemology and politics under the 
discourse of geometry, may have been rendered inoperative. As a nodal point for an array of 
new exchange circuits and trafficking flows, Juárez is the contorted, mutilated image that 
exposes the fractured, dissociated non-unity of what used to be the sovereign nation-state.  
In much of northern Mexico it would seem that everything is now out in the open and 
interconnected—and torn asunder—under the double rubric of globalization and global war: 
post-Fordist, transnational capital thriving in predatory fashion alongside the retreat of the 
regulatory state; an army that knows no restraints and whose tactics resemble those of a 
terrorist organization; and the cartels that act like mini-states, claiming territory in Mexico and 
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Central America using military-grade weaponry and recruiting soldiers—not through ideology 
but with the offer of paying jobs—from the growing ranks of unemployed and, increasingly, 
among disaffected young adolescents who have been abandoned by a collapsing educational 
system (González Rodríguez 2012; Beckhusen 2013). Even the state appears willing to embrace 
the thesis of global war, as suggested by a November 2012 petition issued by the President of 
Costa Rica on behalf of the Organization of American States requesting that the UN begin 
categorizing drug trafficking as a form of terrorism (Fendt 2012). If Oliver North and Iran-Contra 
exposed the secret connection between politics, counterinsurgency terror and the drug trade 
during the Reagan years, that Cold War secret is now out in the open for all to see in the time of 
global war. 
 Galli uses the term katechon to describe the restraining structures—such as the Welfare 
State—that were invented by political modernity to administer and mediate the conflicts that 
accompany the production of smooth but differentiatable social spaces. Originally a theological 
concept, katechon enters into the political vocabulary of modernity in Carl Schmitt’s The Nomos 
of the Earth (Schmitt 2006). In his Second Epistle, Paul counsels the Thessalonians not to act as 
if the Judgment Day were near, since for that to come about the Antichrist would first need to 
make an appearance. According to Paul something [τὸ κατέχον] or someone [ὁ κατέχων] must 
currently be preventing the arrival of the Antichrist, and it is this unnamed restraining force or 
structure that receives the name katechon [that which withholds]. For Schmitt the modern 
state form in its various guises plays an analogous role, from state sovereignty conceptualized 
by Hobbes as a barricade against the “war of all against all” to the regulatory and welfare state 
of the 20th century—arguably the last instance of the katechon—understood as a restraining 
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device against the dual threats of economic crisis and anti-capitalist movements that first 
emerged in the wake of global financial crisis in the 1930s. Globalization and global war, 
meanwhile, together announce the definitive dismantling of these modern restraining 
structures. The state has not disappeared today, of course; but its institutional, juridical and 
ideological presence no longer serves as the unquestioned first principle of all social 
organization, nor is it still capable of regulating the global ebbs and flows of capital, 
information, migrant populations, and contraband that traverse its borders. Global war 
suspends the old distinctions between war and peace, war and politics, while also helping to 
put an end to the principial status formerly held by state sovereignty.  
 Until now I have been treating Santa Teresa and Ciudad Juárez as if they were two 
names for the same thing. I now turn to take a closer look at the question of the literary in 
2666, focusing on how literary figuration and innovation emerge as concerns in the novel. Two 
narrative threads serve to orient this exploration. One is found in the novel’s reflection on 
spatiotemporal condensation and distortion in the time of globalization, which is first 
introduced through a literary portrait of the topography of Sonora, and then further developed 
through Amalfitano’s experiment with a certain geometry textbook. The other thread consists 
of the novel’s engagement with the avant garde tradition in a series of episodes that resonate 
with what Hal Foster calls the neo-avant garde (Foster 1996). Generally speaking these stagings 
of the avant garde involve marginal figures who are widely regarded as not being of sound 
mind, and whose activities recall or reenact early 20th century avant garde experiments. While 
each of these figures produces an aesthetic act that recalls the critical or ruptural force 
associated with the avant garde, these returns unavoidably add to and transform the 
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significance of what they repeat. When the two threads touch on one another, most notably in 
the last sections of the Part about the Critics and the Part about Amalfitano, we find ourselves 
confronted with the question of what possibilities remain open for literature in the time of 
globalization and global war, when it is no longer clear that the ruptural force associated with 
the avant garde would still be available, or that it could still be expected to possess 
transformative potential if it were to show itself.  
I begin this discussion by looking at a description of the state of Sonora as perceived by 
the critics upon their arrival in the Hermosillo airport following their flight from Mexico City, in 
the last section of Part One. In the second Part, meanwhile, new ways of looking at this literary 
landscape portrait will be opened up in the context of Amalfitano’s meditations on the 
distinction between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries—that is, between a geometry of 
flat, smooth spaces and a geometry of warped or curved space. Carlo Galli’s diagnosis of how 
the political vocabulary of modernity is unable to account for globalization and global war can 
help to bring these otherwise disparate literary reflections on geometry and geography into 
dialogue with Bolaño’s literary fascination with the crimes of Ciudad Juárez and their 
connection with globalization and the narco wars.  
A la mañana siguiente volaron a Hermosillo y desde el aeropuerto telefonearon 
al rector de la Universidad de Santa Teresa y después alquilaron un coche y 
partieron hacia la frontera. Al salir del aeropuerto los tres percibieron la 
luminosidad del estado de Sonora. Era como si la luz se sumergiera en el océano 
Pacífico produciendo una enorme curvatura en el espacio. Daba hambre 
desplazarse bajo aquella luz, aunque también, pensó Norton, y tal vez de forma 
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más perentoria, daba ganas de aguantar el hambre hasta el final. Entraron por el 
sur de Santa Teresa y la ciudad les pareció un enorme campamento de gitanos o 
de refugiados dispuestos a ponerse en marcha a la más mínima señal. (Bolaño 
2004, 148)  
This first impression of a strange luminescence and a “curved” atmospheric space 
suggest tropologically that the critics have left behind the familiar (“flat”) space of Europe and 
Mexico City, and that they have now entered a zone of differentiated space. It is difficult to 
know—for the reader at least—to what extent the codes and expectations borne by the critics 
in their passage from the capitals of Europe to the DF will still be relevant in Sonora. Similarly, it 
may be that this spatialization of difference allegorizes a temporal discrepancy that separates 
the peripheral zone of Northern Mexico from the metropolis, in the sense that Sonora, as 
stand-in for the periphery in general, finds itself “out of sync” with respect to the 
developmental historical trajectory of European and Latin American capitals. The allegorical 
reading I am proposing gains momentum when juxtaposed with the novel’s thematization of 
spatiotemporal compression in the time of globalization, first in the presence of transnational 
capital in the máquilas and similarly with the critics’ discovery, while talking with Amalfitano’s 
students, that their own translations of the German novelist Archimboldi have already reached 
the nether regions of the world thanks to the wonders of the Internet. It is not until we reach 
the second Part, however, that we can begin to unpack the implications of this strange literary 
portrait of the desert landscape of northern Mexico. For the time being the images of curved 
space and unexplained luminescence are quickly overshadowed by the encroachment of other 
narrative preoccupations: Liz Norton’s equally enigmatic speculations about a possible 
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correlation between the strange atmospheric lighting and her own hunger; and then the critics’ 
shared perception of Santa Teresa as a gigantic gypsy camp, which serves to introduce the 
precarious social atmosphere of this border city while also reminding us that the critics’ 
perceptions are mediated by their own provincial predisposition to see and evaluate everything 
as if they were still in Europe. 
In the second Part, which opens with a brief prosaic sketch of Amalfitano’s house, we 
are brought back to the geographical specificity of Sonora. Narrative discourse looks over 
Amalfitano’s humble abode in quasi-cinematic fashion, first comprehending the structure in its 
entirety and then zooming in on a seemingly insignificant appendage: a wooden bench that sits 
on his porch, its planks worn smooth by the winds that come at it from each and every 
direction.118 The bench is an inanimate double of Amalfitano himself, who has similarly 
weathered the winds of history and persevered—albeit in threadbare fashion—through a series 
of displacements that have propelled him from Chile to Buenos Aires to Barcelona to Sonora. 
This unremarkable domestic scene also provides the stage for a series of thematic encounters 
between culture and nature, and between the temporality of change (the forces of erosion) and 
the materiality of resistance.119 This little bench also sets the stage for what is to come; in 
hanging a geometry textbook on a clothesline in his back yard, Amalfitano will reenact one of 
the classic artistic experiments with the relation between ideality (the realm of mathematical 
concepts) and materiality (the pages of a book). 
The motive behind the experiment, as Amalfitano describes it to his daughter, is to 
determine whether a mathematics textbook is capable of absorbing the realities of life: “Se me 
ocurrió de repente, dijo Amalfitano, la idea es de Duchamp, dejar un libro de geometría colgado 
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a la intemperie para ver si aprende cuatro cosas de la vida real” (251). The English-language 
translation by Natasha Wimmer renders the crucial final portion of Amalfitano’s explanation as 
“to see if it learns something from real life” (Bolaño 2008, 195). A comparison between the 
Spanish and English idioms (aprender cuatro cosas; to learn something) provides a clue about 
what is at stake in this scene, which poses among other things a limit for translation. While the 
Spanish construction is idiomatic and somewhat unusual (a more common phrase would be “si 
aprende algo de la vida real”), Wimmer’s choice of “something” is self-explanatory and 
common. What perforce falls out in the English-language translation is the motif of calculation 
(cuatro cosas) in a context where what truly counts—a matter of learning—resides beyond all 
calculation. What could there be for this particular book to learn, if a book were capable of 
learning? Something, no doubt. But if one could predetermine exactly what or how much the 
book stood in deficit vis-à-vis life and the real, one would then find oneself back within the 
domain of calculative mastery; having already been calculated, this something would no longer 
impose itself with urgency, and as in need of being learned. The odd proposition about the 
book learning from real life must therefore by logical necessity be incompatible with any claim 
to have calculated the deficit. If the Spanish idiom calls attention to what is at stake here 
through irony—the naming of the direct object destabilizes the premise of the verb—the 
English translation has no room for this fold where narrative language turns back on itself. I say 
this not in order to find fault with Wimmer’s choice of words but simply to note the bind, which 
as we will soon see imposes itself on Spanish just as with English and any other language. One 
cannot say in English “to see if it learns four things from real life.” One could perhaps translate 
cuatro cosas as a few things, but that would probably sound somewhat clunky and, moreover, 
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it cannot retain what is at issue in the Spanish: the overly-precise enumeration of an epistemic 
deficit in a context where it is precisely the limits of calculation that are at stake.  
The experiment is of course a reenactment of Marcel Duchamp’s collaborative 
“Unhappy Readymade,” and it is fitting that the melancholic Amalfitano would choose that 
particular installation from among Duchamp’s large corpus of Readymades. In 1919, while living 
in Buenos Aires, Duchamp mailed an unusual wedding gift to his sister and brother-in-law in 
Paris: a set of instructions for stringing up a geometry book on the balcony outside their 
apartment so that the wind could, as Duchamp would later recount, “go through the book, 
choose its own problems, turn and tear out the pages” (Cabanne 1971, 61). The completed 
installation, which Duchamp also referred to as an “Assisted Readymade,” poses critical 
questions for aesthetic theory concerning some of its key concepts and ideologemes, including 
the notion of the work and its time and place, as well as the relation between creation and the 
intentional subject. When Duchamp’s new brother-in-law, the French painter Jean Crotti, hangs 
the geometry book on a clothesline outside the apartment, is he bringing a new artwork into 
existence or is he merely playing a curatorial role in carrying out orders for an idea conceived in 
a different time and place? Where and when does the work take place, and what roles do 
ideation, transmission, and manual labor play respectively in its taking place? The question 
becomes even more complex in light of the fact that the installation of the “Assisted 
Readymade” yields not a self-identical, unchanging work but a fluid scene destined to culminate 
in its own unravelling. To be sure, the only visual evidence that remains today of the “Unhappy 
Readymade” are a blurry black-and-white photograph and a painting of the clotheslined 
textbook done by Suzanne Duchamp. The question of when and where the work takes place is 
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thus simultaneously a question about when the work ceases to be a work, a question about its 
un-working or—once again, like Amalfitano?—becoming unhinged.  
Duchamp’s Unhappy Readymade stages an exposure of aesthetics and mathematics to a 
series of contradictions: between installation and decomposition; artistic conception and 
manual realization; and the logic of geometrical theory on the one hand and the materiality of 
its pages along with the unpredictable chance represented by the weather on the other. It 
stages a confrontation between the rational and the real that is made even more salient by the 
audible echoes, on both sides of the encounter, of a key signifier: the implied presence of 
Euclid’s Elements [Les Éléments in French], the foundational text of classical geometry, in 
juxtaposition with the transformative, corrosive force of atmospheric elements [les éléments]. 
We are back again at the question of translation and its limits, which shows here in the Spanish-
language original when Amalfitano refers to Duchamp’s work as his inspirational source. The 
implicit play on Euclid’s text (Los elementos) in relation to the unpredictable and corrosive 
forces of nature is absent from the Spanish version—in which no exact translation of the 
atmospheric “elements” exists; the closest approximation is la intemperie [the open; inclement 
weather]—but it surfaces again in Wimmer’s English translation, which would be the felicitous 
translation of a translation of a translation: “It occurred to me all of a sudden, said Amalfitano, 
it’s a Duchamp idea, leaving a geometry book hanging exposed to the elements to see if it 
learns something about real life” (Bolaño 2008, 195; my emphasis). 
Although Duchampian original and Amalfitanian repetition both participate in a Latin 
America-Europe circuit, the neo-avant garde reenactment does not simply reproduce verbatim 
the formal features of the avant garde aesthetic act. Amalfitano’s extraterritorial trajectory 
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presents the inverted image of Duchamp’s journey from Europe to Argentina and back again. By 
the same token, in Amalfitano’s reenactment there is no letter, no gift, and no others—unless 
we understand his trajectory as itself introducing considerations of transmission and reception, 
distance, and time—for example, through his oft-repeated ritual of packing and unpacking his 
library. But missive and gift are not simply absent in Amalfitano’s installation either. They are 
substituted, as he is unpacking his boxes in Santa Teresa, by the uncanny appearance of a 
strange geometry book, one which Amalfitano, wracking his book-addled and jet-lagged brain, 
cannot recall having acquired let alone packed before his departure from Barcelona: the 
Galician writer Rafael Dieste’s 1975 Testamento geométrico: Introducción a Euclides, 
Lobatchevski y Riemann: Los movimientos en geometría: Tres demostraciones del V postulado. 
Dieste was himself an exile; he spent almost two decades in Buenos Aires (1939-48, 1952-61) 
following the fall the Spanish Republic in 1939. His “testament” is peculiar for reasons that go 
beyond its unexplained presence in Amalfitano’s library (about which I will have more to say 
shortly). Not only does it purport to offer an introduction to both Euclidean and non-Euclidean 
geometries (those of the 19th century mathematicians Lobatchevsky and Riemann), it is written 
by a minor author known primarily as a poet, playwright and essayist rather than a professional 
mathematician. But then again, before the world saw any evidence of his artistic ability, 
Duchamp’s first academic recognition came in the form of several mathematics prizes awarded 
during his lycée years.  
The title of Dieste’s book provides an important indicator for thinking about neo-avant 
garde repetition and reenactment as transformation of a prior act or context. Euclid’s Fifth 
Postulate or Parallel Postulate, the primary focus of Dieste’s text, is precisely the differential 
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axis that distinguishes Euclidean geometry (a geometry of flat space for which the Fifth 
Postulate is axiomatically valid) and the non-Euclidean geometries associated with the names 
Lobatchevsky and Riemann (hyperbolic and elliptical geometries of curved spaces for which the 
Fifth Postulate is not axiomatically true).120 If Amalfitano’s reenactment of Duchamp shares or 
reproduces the avant garde sensibility associated with the original it is because, akin to the 
literary portrait of the skies over Sonora discussed earlier, it demarcates the thought of a 
spatiality that would be irreconcilable with the smooth spaces of Euclidean geometry and 
political modernity. It points to such a difference as becoming apparent in Sonora, inscribing 
this difference as a sign available to be read. In alluding to a distinction between how different 
geometries theorize parallelism and transversality, Amalfitano’s experiment also sets the scene 
for understanding Santa Teresa as a literary nexus traversed by a myriad of narrative threads 
and emplotted trajectories (the critics, Amalfitano and his daughter, Fate, Haas, and 
Archimboldi among others), as well as by various circuits of exchange, trafficking and 
accumulation. But do the various narrative threads of 2666 in fact meet in Santa Teresa or does 
their parallelism legislate against their eventual meeting, as it would in a smooth, Euclidean 
space? As we can see here, Amalfitano’s reenactment stages what Brett Levinson has described 
as an unresolved—and perhaps unresolvable—question about the interrelatedness between 
the novel’s various threads and parts (Levinson 2009).  
The presence of the Dieste text poses additional problems for what seems to be the 
obvious way in which Amalfitano’s reenactment wants to be read: as appropriation and 
revitalization of the disruptive potentiality of the avant garde. Let us see why. In his recollection 
of the instructions he sent to his sister and brother-in-law, Duchamp speaks only of geometry in 
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the singular. Although the instructions may or may not have stated what sort of geometry book 
was to be used, one might surmise that the ironic thought behind the “Unhappy Readymade” 
was to take a textbook on Euclidean geometry and, through exposure to the unpredictability of 
the elements, allow its pages to be transformed materially into a non-Euclidean order of 
uneven, rumpled space. Thus the ideational content of the book will manifestly have no answer 
for the real, for the unpredictability of the elements and, by extension, for the materiality of a 
book whose form is undergoing continual mutation. In Amalfitano’s reenactment, by contrast, 
something resembling the post-Euclidean destiny envisioned by Duchamp has already been 
accounted for in the book’s title and epistemological contents, and thus it becomes more 
difficult to claim that a ruptural or transformative force could emerge from Amalfitano’s 
repetition. The neo-avant garde gesture seems silently to acknowledge its own inability—which 
may well be the inability of contemporary art and literature—to generate an experience of 
incommensurability between form and content, between the rational and the real. It performs 
the impossibility of the avant garde understood as interruption or transformation. Is that 
because the real has now tendentially been fully rationalized under the equivalential logic of 
commodity exchange in the time of globalization? Or is it because both the spacing and the 
ruptural possibilities found in the geometries of modernity have been eclipsed by the situation 
that Galli calls global war, which manifests in Sonora in the form of narcocapitalism and 
narcowars?  
I now return to the matter of the unexpected appearance of the Dieste text amidst 
Amalfitano’s library. A close examination of this scene will lead us to other scenarios in 2666 in 
which the neo-avant garde figures prominently. The unexplained presence of this odd book is 
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structurally analogous to what Lacan, borrowing from Aristotle, calls tuché in contrast to 
automaton.121 For Lacan tuché names a chance encounter with the real that irrupts with 
traumatic, unassimilable force from within the order of automata, or the symbolic ordering of 
life according to the regulatory mechanisms of the pleasure principle (Lacan 1978, 53-64). 
Tuché designates an encounter with the real “in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is 
essentially the missed encounter” (Lacan 1978, 55). The automaton refers to the associative 
and contiguous chain of signifiers that mediate—in machine-like fashion—the subject’s relation 
to the real so that reality can be experienced in more or less predictable fashion and without 
disruption of the subject’s world. Tuché by contrast denotes what happens when our actions 
bear witness to a misfire in one of the circuits in the symbolic economy. The misfire is 
contingent but not for that reason simply arbitrary. It signals the return of the repressed: not of 
a determinate content (e.g., a prohibited desire) but of a primordial foreclosure that must be 
presumed to have accompanied the advent of signifier and the speaking subject’s entrance into 
language. It is in this sense that tuché is always experienced as a missed encounter: it 
announces the return of an “event” that never took place as such; it is the echo of a foreclosure 
that was constitutive of the subject. As Malcolm Bowie puts it: 
Lacan’s tuché is in one sense very simple: it is a tile falling on to the head of a 
passer-by, a person from Porlock bringing a creative trance prematurely to its 
end, or, to take one of Lacan’s own examples, a knock on the door that 
interrupts a dream.122 The network of signifiers in which we have our being is not 
all that there is, and the rest of what is may chance to break in upon us at any 
moment. (Bowie 1993, 103) 
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While Lacan discusses in detail the metaphorical significance of the knock on the door in 
the context of Freud’s account of the dream of the “burning child” in The Interpretation of 
Dreams (Lacan 1978, 57-60), Bowie’s added example of the ceiling tile falling on the head of a 
passer-by is useful because it metaphorizes both the sheer contingency of irruption (who walks 
around expecting a falling tile?) as well as its correlation with a breakdown in social and psychic 
ordering and regulatory structures. In this example what gets dislodged is nothing other than a 
piece from an architectural structure designed to protect us from the unpredictable nature of 
the elements. 
The presence of an uninvited guest of sorts amidst Amalfitano’s personal library can be 
illuminated by Lacan’s discussion of tuché because this book of no account—Dieste’s—precisely 
disrupts the fulfillment of a ritual that ought to symbolize the reestablishment of subjective 
homeostasis following an experience of displacement. If the weather-beaten porch bench is the 
material embodiment of Amalfitano’s travails, the unpacking of his personal library would in 
turn offer itself as an image of temporalization or temporal totalization. This ritualistic scene 
would symbolize the unification of past and present, contingency and necessity, displacement 
and home-making, destiny and freedom. Amalfitano appears to be saying something similar 
when he asserts, in a conversation with Norton and Pelletier near the end of the first Part, that 
exile constitutes the negation of destiny. 
El exilio debe de ser algo terrible–dijo Norton, comprensiva. 
–En realidad–dijo Amalfitano–ahora lo veo como un movimiento natural, algo 
que, a su manera, contribuye a abolir el destino o lo que comúnmente se 
considera el destino. 
313 
 
–Pero el exilio–dijo Pelletier–está lleno de inconvenientes, de saltos y rupturas 
que más o menos se repiten y que dificultan cualquier cosa importante que uno 
se proponga hacer. 
–Ahí precisamente radica–dijo Amalfitano–la abolición del destino. (Bolaño 
2004, 157) 
 In a reversal of Mallarmé’s assertion that a throw of the dice could never abolish 
chance, the contingencies of exile are said by Amalfitano to abolish destiny, or what is 
commonly understood as destiny. That understanding, if we take our cue from Pelletier, would 
entail “anything you try to do that’s important” (Bolaño 2008, 117); in other words, the 
associatively-linked chain of duties, obligations and appointments that we construct and 
assume in our personal and professional lives—or in Freud’s terms, anything and everything 
that relates to the pleasure principle. Exile, says Amalfitano in response to the overly-
sympathetic, romanticized images of abjection and trauma put forth by the critics, in fact has 
the fortuitous effect of disrupting the symbolic network into which we habitually integrate 
ourselves. In that respect it turns out to be formally analogous to the chance encounter or 
tuché in contrast to destiny understood as the circuitry of the automaton. By the same token, it 
also bears formal resemblance to the avant garde conceptualization of aesthetic act as 
interruption of the status quo. 
 Something, however, does not fully add up between these two scenes that speak of the 
same topic—exile and destiny, chance and homeostasis—without either arriving at a complete 
agreement or articulating a clear and distinct disagreement. In his exchange with the critics, 
Amalfitano is the one who sets the critics right by demystifying their idealized and patronizing 
314 
 
assumptions about Latin American exile. Exile is not the unimaginable, traumatic experience 
they imagine it to be; and he, by extension, is not the abject survivor they need him to be.123 If 
exile is, despite everything that has been said about it, a liberating experience that releases one 
from the routines and abstract temporality of capitalism (specialization, work time vs. leisure 
time, etc.) then destiny is implicitly juxtaposed to azar or tuché, a motif that appears 
throughout the novel and which is also signified indirectly in Amalfitano’s response here 
through allusion to Mallarmé’s poem “Un coup de des… jamais n’abolira le hazard.” In 
Amalfitano’s conversation with the critics it is the trajectory of exile with its unforeseeable and 
serendipitous occurrences that abolishes a certain idea of destiny, interrupting the symbolic 
circuitry of regulatory goals generated by the pleasure principle.  
In the subsequent episode we find Amalfitano unpacking his library. Here chance in its 
incalculable returns in the form of the Dieste text, whose presence among his books he cannot 
explain to himself. This book of no account embodies an excess that may be proper to exile, 
and it also disrupts Amalfitano’s own symbolic practice: his attempt to reorganize subjective life 
through the reinstallation of that familiar symbolic order that is his cherished, mentally 
catalogued collection of titles or signifiers. The uncanny presence of the Dieste text introduces 
one signifier too many, an excess that ruins the count.  
I suggested earlier that these meditations on destiny and chance find echoes in other 
sections of the novel. There are two episodes in particular that help to shed light on the 
question of avant garde poetics in 2666. The first is the Edwin Johns episode in the Part about 
the Critics. The Englishman Johns is a former painter whose artistic career culminated in a final 
self-portrait that he crowned with the gruesome gesture of cutting off his own hand and 
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attaching it to the canvas. Johns’s opus magnum is a literalization of reflection on the relation 
between art and body, self-representation and mutilation; it also recalls neo-avant garde 
experiments with body art and self-mutilation such as the Vienna actionists of the 1960s or the 
Chilean CADA movement (Raúl Zurita, Diamela Eltit and Carlos Leppe) of the 1970s and 80s. On 
Morini’s bidding the critics decide to pay Johns a visit in the Swiss asylum where he has been 
institutionalized. Their efforts to establish rapport with the enigmatic, reclusive artist appear to 
find a foothold when Morini observes that Johns possesses an anthology of German literature 
containing a story by Achimboldi. When Morini remarks happily on this coincidence (“es 
increible, qué casualidad”) Johns replies sardonically that the world itself is nothing but an 
infinite series of coincidences and that there is therefore no point in speaking of chance—which 
is, after all, just the other side of the coin that is destiny. Johns then launches into a monologue 
that can be drawn into productive relation with the discussions of chance and destiny:  
–La casualidad no es un lujo, es la otra cara del destino y también algo más–dijo 
Johns. 
–¿Qué más?–dijo Morini. 
–Algo que se le escapaba a mi amigo por una razón muy sencilla y comprensible. 
Mi amigo (tal vez sea una presunción de mi parte llamarlo aún así) creía en la 
humanidad, por lo tanto creía en el orden, en el orden de la pintura y en el orden 
de las palabras, que no con otra cosa se hace la pintura. Creía en la redención. En 
el fondo hasta es posible que creyera en el progreso. La casualidad, por el 
contrario, es la libertad total a la que estamos abocados por nuestra propia 
naturaleza. La casualidad no obedece leyes y si las obedece nosotros las 
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desconocemos. La casualidad, si me permite el símil, es como Dios que se 
manifiesta cada segundo en nuestro planeta. Un Dios incomprensible 
con gestos incomprensibles dirigidos a sus criaturas incomprensibles. En ese 
huracán, en esa implosión ósea, se realiza la comunión. La comunión de la 
casualidad con sus rastros y la comunión de sus rastros con nosotros. (Bolaño 
2004, 123) 
 Morini’s exclamation—“qué casualidad”—is not just a banality that one utters when one 
doesn’t know what to say. It advances a performative appeal to equality. The chance disclosure 
of a shared interest in Archimboldi, he proposes, is proof that the critics and Johns have 
something to say to one another and, moreover, it suggests that he should not hesitate to 
confide in them. What Morini means to say is that the presence of an Archimboldi text in this 
forsaken place is anything but a coincidence: it is a manifestation of the being-in-common that 
joins critics and artist. Johns replies to Morini’s initiative by noting that he does not read 
German (thus there is no common ground, at least not a ground based on a shared aesthetic 
appreciation) and then by appropriating and resituating Morini’s term, casualidad [coincidence, 
chance], first within a dialectic (chance, he reminds them, is just the other side of the coin that 
is destiny, and thus it is not the absolute that Morini makes it out to be) and then by asserting 
its irreducibility to dialectics (y también algo más). All of this transpires as if to show to Morini 
and his friends that they are at least two steps removed from knowing of what they speak.  
In a half-mad rhetorical tour de force, Johns then stages for the benefit of the critics a 
dialogue between two competing accounts of art: the viewpoint of a certain friend who 
associates art with redemption and progress, contrasted with what we take to be Johns’s own 
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position, which links art to the terrifying figure of the unknowable, beyond redemption and 
irreconcilable with the teleology of progress or with any thought of communion. It is fitting that 
Johns speak to the critics of an “incomprehensible God” who directs himself toward his 
“incomprehensible creatures,” since he himself—not unlike the mad poet sought out by 
Amalfitano’s wife Lola or the German immigrant Klaus Haas, who we meet at the end of the 
Part about Fate—embodies the contradiction of a minor, forgotten figure who, when finally 
seen in person, suddenly and terrifyingly looms larger than life. 
At face value Johns’s self-portrait is indistinguishable from a prototypical avant garde 
act: it combines shock value with a questioning of prevailing codifications of art, i.e., of what 
counts as artistic subject matter and media, and of the avoidance or denigration of material 
concerns in aesthetic theory, including perhaps the exploitation and marginalization of manual 
labor in the production of art.124 The self-portrait aligns itself with the avant garde tradition and 
its critical predilection for raising uncomfortable questions about the autonomy of art in 
capitalist society, and for exposing the hidden side of autonomy: culture and art as fetish. It 
exemplifies what Hal Foster (Foster 1996) terms the neo-avant garde, or mid- to late-20th 
century returns to the scenes and gestures of the historical garde that serve to recode the 
characteristic avant garde act in a new way and in light of the contemporary contexts. The 
historical distinction between the avant garde and the neo-avant garde seeks to account for 
how return or repetition can bring out unrealized meanings or possibilities in the first scene 
while at the same time constituting it as “origin” and “original.”  
In Johns’s case the meaning of neo-avant garde repetition is rendered somewhat 
uncertain, however, by the secretive nature of his whispered response to Morini’s question 
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about what prompted him to cut off his own hand. If Johns’s answer to Morini was—as Morini 
later tells Norton—that his self-mutilation was motivated by the prospect of financial gain, then 
the neo- would signify that the critical potential associated with avant garde radicalism has now 
been fully subsumed back into the logic of the status quo: equivalency and commodity 
production.125 While the irony of a repetition that cancels what it purports to repeat certainly 
illustrates one way of reading this episode, there may also be a residual ambiguity in Johns’s 
response, whose content is only relayed to us via Morini. We should not lose sight completely 
of the inherently violent nature of Morini’s question, which demands that art give accounts to a 
questioner who just happens to be a critic, and that it do so on the critic’s terms. If art must 
explain what it does by aligning itself with a principle of reason that belongs to criticism, then 
the avant garde in its historical mandate has already been rendered obsolete. So it is Morini’s 
question that first introduces the possibility of the impossibility of the avant garde. In that light, 
what if Johns, in letting on that this seemingly subversive work was in truth prompted by mere 
commercial motives, were simply returning to Morini his own message in inverted form? The 
market or the metaphysics of criticism: as far as art is concerned it makes little difference, 
because both represent exogenous truth regimes in which nothing can happen that will not 
quickly be reabsorbed within the logic of the regime.  
This residual uncertainty that haunts Morini’s account of Johns’s response to Morini’s 
question parallels an ambiguity concerning the possibilities remaining for literature today. In 
returning to avant garde scenes of interruption, Bolaño’s text raises the possibility that the 
avant garde and its aesthetic of interruption have run aground—not because it is no longer 
possible to produce works that move against the dominant logic of the capitalist order, but 
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because the cultural logic of late capitalism has dulled our capacity to be shocked and 
awakened, or because shock has become part and parcel of the logic of the market and thus 
has relinquished its disruptive power, or because—as we saw in Chapter 3—the aesthetics of 
interruption may be unable to touch the pre-political decision that has rendered politics 
subservient to the market. 
The hyperbolic image of an “incomprehensible God” gesturing to his uncomprehending 
and uncomprehended creatures is echoed in an episode from the novel’s second Part, when 
Amalfitano’s wife Lola visits another “mad” creator: a Spanish poet residing in a psychiatric 
hospital in Mondragón, Spain.126 The poet’s physician, who also happens to be his biographer—
no conflict of interest here!—describes his literary project in terms similar to those through 
which Johns confronts his friend’s reassuringly humanistic, enlightened view of art. As the 
doctor-biographer puts it, the poet’s work harbors and conceals a kind of disorder—of an 
ontological, not psychological, nature—that, if it were ever to see the light of day, would cause 
even the most fearless and composed among us to tremble:  
lo que él nos quiere mostrar, su aparente orden, un orden de carácter verbal que 
esconde, con una estrategia que creo comprender pero cuyo fin ignoro, un 
desorden verbal que si lo experimentáramos, aunque sólo fuera como 
espectadores de una puesta en escena teatral, nos haría estremecernos hasta un 
grado difícilmente soportable. (225) 
  Neo-avant garde poetry leaves no room for catharsis. The teeming fray lurking beneath 
the ordered flow of poetic discourse pertains to the (dis)order of the real, which is not to be 
confused with the unrepresentable. Recall Aristotle’s distinction in the Poetics between the 
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terrible and pitiable on the one hand and the merely monstrous on the other. Drama is at its 
best, Aristotle tells us, when violence is reported but not actually made visible on the stage; in 
that manner it is left up to imagination to find a specific form for violence. To put violence on 
the stage, meanwhile, is to risk letting it sink into mere spectacle. Thus the unrepresentable, 
which alone stands capable of evoking true terror and pity, is not at all incompatible with a 
certain theatrical dialectic of identification, empathy, and purgation of negative affect. The 
“verbal disorder” of which the poet’s doctor speaks, meanwhile, belongs to another register; it 
lies beyond the Aristotelian economy of identification and purgation, beyond the diagnostic and 
statistical calculations of the psychiatric profession—and perhaps beyond dialectics tout court. 
“Divine incomprehension” and “verbal disorder” in Bolaño’s narrative discourse may also be 
consistent with what the Spanish critic (also Bolaño’s friend and executor) Ignacio Echevarría, in 
his prologue to El secreto del mal (Bolaño 2013), terms a poetics of indetermination or 
uncertainty [indeterminación], a narrative tendency to veer away from its object and cut off as 
the moment of truth nears. Narrative discourse is suddenly and unexpectedly brought to a halt 
just as the reader is preparing to undergo an encounter with evil. While the short story genre 
provides an ideal framework for exploring the literary relation between presentation and 
interruption or revelation and withdrawal, the critical concept of indetermination can also help 
to shed light on the episodic structure of Bolaño’s novels in general and of 2666 in particular. It 
is precisely the loose, uncertain association between seemingly disparate episodes and Parts 
that allows for self-interruption of narrative discourse in 2666.  
 As the episode with the poet of Mondragón illustrates, evil in Bolaño’s writing is not 
what we often make it out to be: a phenomenon whose content is beyond representation, 
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“unimaginable” because too heinous or inhuman. As Alenka Zupancic points out, if evil names 
an irruption within the symbolic that departs from its codifications of what is possible, then evil 
is determined not by content but by the form of the phenomenon; or, more precisely, evil is the 
morphing of form into formlessness as seen from the perspective of the symbolic law (Zupancic 
2001, np). In many of Bolaño’s works, narrative form approximates the experience of 
incomprehension that must logically accompany the kind of irruption within the symbolic 
described by Zupancic. In distinction from the Kantian sublime, here reason does not discover 
in the incapacity of the aesthetic imagination to bestow form on the object the sign of its own 
triumphant ascent. 
 Of course Bolaño is not the first writer to have been taken in by the question of evil, 
which has similarly preoccupied and fascinated writers such as de Sade, Baudelaire, Melville, 
Céline, Sartre, Bataille and others. In fact the question of evil may be inherently linked to art 
and literature if, as Zupancic asserts, the nature of evil resides in a constitutive lack that 
structures all representation. It is in this specific sense that evil designates a limit for 
representation. Evil is not unrepresentable by virtue of a content whose malevolent intensity 
cannot be—or ought not be—fathomed by the imagination of mere mortals. Evil resides at the 
limit of representation because its appearance touches on the void that structures the 
imaginary and the symbolic registers. As Zupancic explains:  
[Evil] belongs to the Imaginary register although it is not an image, in the strict 
sense of the word; rather, it is that which makes a certain image “shine” and 
stand out. You could say that it is an effect of the Real on our imagination, the 
last veil or “screen” that separates us from the impossible Real” (Zupancic 2001, 
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np).  
What distinguishes evil from symbolically-legitimated modes of being and acting is a kind of 
flatness, a spreading-out of form that coincides with the fact that evil has no proper motive 
other than itself. Evil does as evil does, for the sheer enjoyment of it—or out of pure spite—and 
not because it harbors ulterior motives or hopes to gain something in return. In this sense, as 
Zupancic points out, it is formally indistinguishable from the Kantian definition of the moral law.  
 Much of the contemporary, psychoanalytically-informed interest in the question of evil 
allows itself to be historicized in terms of recent global trends, such as technological evolutions 
that have rendered unstable what used to be seen as natural and insurmountable limits for the 
human (e.g., cloning, advances in treating previously incurable diseases, etc.), as well as the 
emergence of free market capitalism as the sole legitimate or possible model for social 
organization. The technologically-administered unification of our world under capitalist 
production coincides with what we could call an evacuation of the form of the impossible. The 
foreclosure of the impossible occurs both in the ethical and the political spheres. It happens 
with the evolution of biotechnologies that destabilize old boundaries between nature and 
culture, or biology and technology; and it also happens with the relegation of all utopian 
imaginaries to the trashcan of history. To the extent that globalization cancels or subordinates 
the authority of traditional boundaries, it unleashes what Lacan in his seminar on anxiety calls a 
lack of lack (“lack happens to be lacking”: Lacan 2014, 42). This may explain why the 
manifestations of globalization seem to intensify our anxieties today instead of dissuading 
them. In this light, Bolaño’s literary interest in the matter of evil does not just translate some 
fascination with the morbid symptoms that obtain with the crisis of modern forms of 
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sovereignty. The turn to evil may be part of a literary attempt to reintroduce the possibility of 
the impossible, understood as structuring void of the imaginary and the symbolic, and in the 
absence of which desire turns out to be incapable of latching onto any object for more than just 
a fleeting moment.127   
Having established a tentative connection between Bolaño’s literary project and the 
possible consequences of globalization for ethical and political life, let us return now to 
Amalfitano and the question of the neo-avant garde. It seems clear that Amalfitano’s 
reenactment of Duchamp seeks to recover and redeploy the ruptural intentions at work in the 
historical avant garde. Or, if that motive cannot be attributed with certainty to Amalfitano (e.g., 
because he may simply be mad), at the very least it provides a possible measure for the 
significance of this episode within the novel as a whole. If Duchamp’s “Readymade” genre 
unleashed a critical force against the institutional structures (economic, cultural, academic, 
etc.) within which art finds itself enclosed in the time of modernity, Amalfitano’s reenactment 
might be seen to take aim at a different but similarly dominant set of institutional 
configurations in the time of globalization: the colonization of nature and imagination by the 
logic of commodity production, and the reduction of knowledge and symbolic practices to 
techno-scientific and capitalist forms of valuation. But, as we have begun to see, repetition also 
raises questions about the status of the example, and it thereby destabilizes this seemingly self-
evident analogy. For Duchamp art unquestionably occupies a key place within the dominant 
social logic; in a historical context where blood, lineage, and religion no longer serve to secure 
social authority, liberal bourgeois order is sustained in large part by a postulated link between 
aesthetic education, citizenship, and human freedom. Duchamp’s innovations acquire their 
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force because they take aim at one of the aesthetic and ethical principles of modernity: the 
autonomy of the modern subject as evidenced and perfected through aesthetic education. 
Today, however, that classical liberal education has been displaced from its central role in 
disseminating and legitimating social authority. So whereas Duchamp’s procedures turn one of 
liberalism’s key ideologemes against liberalism itself, Amalfitano finds himself in a world in 
which art has all but been stripped of its prestige and thus also of its critical potential; his 
reenactment cannot help but call attention to the historical distance that separates it from the 
original context. If the meaning of the original (“Duchamp”) is determined a posteriori and 
through repetition, the status of the repetition is in turn structured by a missed encounter that 
repetition can never hope to master. 
The concept of the avant garde postulates a faction or part that moves ahead of the 
whole; the avant garde is out in front, attuned to what has not yet dawned on the majority. But 
as Amalfitano’s reenactment reminds us, an event—say, the avant garde act or “Duchamp”—
can never amount to a self-contained, fully autonomous moment. The meaning of a given act or 
event only ever arrives after the fact; or more precisely, meaning is always in arrears, always 
still to come because open to the possibility of future reiterations and transformations. It is only 
retrospectively that the Duchampian “Readymade” is constituted as a genre exemplifying an 
avant garde sensibility with respect to modernity. Duchamp will not have been “Duchamp” 
until repeated. By the same token, Amalfitano’s reenactment of Duchamp sheds light on the 
way repetition alters the original that it claims to repeat; in reenacting the avant-garde 
Readymade, Amalfitano illustrates precisely what may be unreproducible in that earlier scene 
today. If the meaning of an event is only constituted a posteriori, then perhaps the avant garde, 
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in addition to giving conceptual and aesthetic form to rupture, revolution and new beginning, 
also illuminates a difference and a lag-time that divides any event from itself, a delay or 
splitting that is internal to the temporality of history. The thought of the event can never be 
made synonymous with the immediacy and autonomy of the moment or the subject; the 
structure of the event necessarily introduces temporal heterogeneity into history. The avant 
garde spirit, of invoking or announcing a new present that would break decisively with the past, 
gives rise in Amalfitano’s repetition to a different and yet not entirely unrelated possibility: a 
thought of the present as divided and differing from itself in relation to meaning that is always 
still to come. Against the apotheoses of neoliberalism as the end of ideological conflict and 
antagonism, Amalfitano’s anachronistic, unhinged gesture—which is seen by very few and 
apparently understood by no one—nonetheless affords a reminder (if there is anyone who 
knows how to read it) that the here-and-now remains different from itself, open to what is—
perhaps—still yet to come.  
Let me pose a possible resolution to the question of what is at stake in this literary 
interest in the avant and neo-avant garde in 2666. The myriad of allusions to and citations of 
the avant garde tradition and its characteristic gestures tend to work in an ironic manner, 
suggesting that the interruption or rupture that the avant garde sought to bring about is not 
available to be produced today. Neo-avant garde repetition in Bolaño is not a catalyst for 
rupture or interruption, but rather sheds light on the possibility that the aesthetic and political 
logic of modernity is no longer in force. That logic has been replaced by something else—but 
what? Is it simply the naked force of a savage capitalism that has been freed from all restraining 
devices? Or is there something else, a new governing logic, working alongside global capital?   
326 
 
In assessing the exhaustion or suspension of aesthetic and political modernity, Bolaño’s 
novel paradoxically confirms and denies its belonging to the tradition whose end it announces. 
In assesses the exhaustion of that tradition Bolaño’s text necessarily situates itself beyond it or 
outside modernity; otherwise the announcement would negate its own message. But in order 
to mark a limit for the modern, Bolaño’s work would have to cross that limit and survive it; and, 
as Hegel has taught us, a limit that can be crossed is no limit at all, and in crossing it one merely 
pushes it further out. The announcement or performance of the exhaustion of modernity in 
Bolaño cannot be reduced to either of the two mutually-incompatible interpretations: it is 
neither the end of the modern and the beginning of something else nor a simple continuation 
of the modern, albeit perhaps under a different name. One possible alternative to this 
conundrum is what I have been calling interregnum, or persisting within the ruins of the 
modern in a way that illuminates their ruination, albeit without being able to imagine or 
inaugurate a new order. Bolaño’s return to the aesthetics of interruption takes the odd form of 
a tradition that announces its own suspension: the interruption of interruption. Interruption is 
accompanied by an awareness that aesthetic experience and whatever critical insight it might 
be expected to foster can no longer claim to provide a reliable roadmap to good or desirable 
ethical and political ends, and that critical awareness of ideology does not provide a clear path 
to transforming the material practices of power in the world today. 
By way of conclusion I want to focus on how the literary thematization of repetition in 
2666 generates a thinking of time that could prove helpful for advancing this discussion of 
literary aesthetics and its relation to history today. As a reiteration of an exemplary moment 
from the vanguard tradition, Amalfitano’s reenactment attempts to register that something is 
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out of joint in our contemporary situation. The “conjuncture” that is neoliberal-administered 
globalization is in fact a disjuncture; Consensus is a denial of temporal heterogeneity. I have 
already discussed how, in Amalfitano’s reenactment, irony points up the inability to reproduce 
avant garde interruption today. But his repetition of Duchamp also illuminates a difference that 
marks the here and now, separating the present from itself. It points, without knowing to 
whom or to what, to something in the present that is neither here nor there, neither present 
nor absent. Let us call this something spectral, which continues to insist in dissenting fashion, 
within and against the neoliberal conjuncture. While we can no longer state with confidence 
that this spectral remainder embodies revolutionary or ruptural potential today, we cannot for 
that matter simply consign it to the logic of the market either.  
Perhaps the most recognizable thematization of temporal heterogeneity in Bolaño’s 
novel is to be found in Amalfitano’s idiosyncratic theory of jetlag, which I will not discuss 
here.128 But we should also consider Liz Norton’s struggle, shortly after arriving in Santa Teresa, 
to put her finger on a peculiar but insistent sense that something strange is going on in the 
world. Not only does she find herself unable to determine what it is that is going on and going 
wrong, she cannot even locate the intuited disorder within established geographical 
coordinates: “Norton…pensó que algo raro estaba pasando, en la avenida, en la terraza, en las 
habitaciones del hotel, incluso en el DF con esos taxistas y porteros irreales, o al menos sin un 
asidero lógico por dónde agarrarlos, e incluso algo raro, que escapaba a su comprensión, estaba 
pasando en Europa…” (Bolaño 2004, 151). Norton’s suspicions do not translate a presumed 
phenomenal difference proper to Santa Teresa, an essence that would distinguish this 
peripheral place from Europe or even from the metropolitan Mexico City. Heterogeneity is not 
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an essence or a property. On the contrary, Norton’s sense of foreboding is inseparable from a 
dawning realization that modernity’s cartographic and epistemological resources are unable to 
provide a reliable diagnosis for what is going on in—and going terribly wrong with—our world 
today. For Norton and her colleagues Santa Teresa is undoubtedly the locus where this general 
sense of the world’s disadjustment with respect to itself obtains. But disadjustment, we learn, is 
both everywhere in general and nowhere in particular. It names the fundamental experience of 
our world today.   
 What do Norton’s sense that something is out of joint in the world today, Amalfitano’s 
theory of jetlag, and neo-avant garde repetition have in common? They are all literary 
considerations of a thought of temporal heterogeneity that remains irreducible both to the 
metaphysical determination of time as a sequence of self-contained moments and to the 
modern determination of time as linear evolution governed by the overarching principle of 
progress. How should we understand these literary illuminations of the problem of time in the 
context of Bolaño’s engagement with geometry? Do these reflections on time intersect with 
reflections on space in 2666? Does the discrepancy between the spatial logic of modernity and 
global war discussed earlier find a corollary in our experience of time?  
 Carlo Galli understands space as product of a modern synthesis of epistemology with 
politics. The political geometry of modernity produces the very social space that it is charged 
with organizing, partitioning and regulating. By implication, there can be no pure 
phenomenology of space, no perception or intuition of “space as such” prior to the 
incorporation of geometrical figures and schema into political discourse. In his monumental 
Narrative and Time, Paul Ricoeur proposes a similar way of understanding time and modernity: 
329 
 
time, according to Ricoeur, becomes available to experience through narrative poetics and its 
temporalizing procedures. It is through narrative poetics that discrete occurrences can be 
articulated together as episodes linked by a common logic of cause and effect; and it is the 
poetic procedures of narrative that confer a tragic or comic sense on this or that sequence of 
events. For Ricoeur there is no pure phenomenology of time either (Ricoeur 1984, 6ff): our 
experience of time is always already supplemented by rhetorical figuration, through which 
relations of contiguity and succession are infused with meaning. As Peter Osborne has shown, 
meanwhile, European modernity unfolds as a particular modality of experiencing and projecting 
time (Osborne 1995, 1-29). There are of course many ways of conceiving time within 
modernity. The Enlightenment tradition, liberalism, and Marxism all give shape to their own 
distinct conceptualizations of how historical time is structured. What they have in common is 
that their understandings of time are all grounded in the postulated connection between the 
present and the new. It is the principle of newness—understood as progress, permanent 
transition, or revolution—that governs all modern conceptions of time.  
 But perhaps the understanding of time as determined product of narrative 
temporalization procedures is not the only way of thinking time. In contrast to Ricoeur’s 
account of narrative as resolution of the aporias of time, Jorge Luis Borges proposes in a 1979 
lecture that philosophical and literary reflections on time lead to the conclusion that the aporia 
of time is in fact unresolvable. Moreover, Borges proposes that history itself in fact depends on 
the non-resolution of the aporias of time. Time, as Borges puts it, is our problem: not because it 
is ours to possess and resolve but because it defines us. To resolve the aporias of time, then, 
would be to dissolve and dismiss for once and for all the question of being, and moreover it 
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would be to annihilate ourselves as sensible, thinking, and speaking beings.  
 Creo que Henri Bergson dijo que el tiempo era el problema capital de la 
metafísica. Si se hubiera resuelto ese problema, se habría resuelto todo. 
Felizmente, yo creo que no hay ningún peligro en que se resuelva; es decir, 
seguiremos siempre ansiosos. Siempre podremos decir, como San Agustín ¿Qué 
es el tiempo? Si no me lo preguntan, lo sé. Si me lo preguntan, lo ignoro.  
 No sé si al cabo de veinte o treinta siglos de meditación hemos avanzado 
mucho en el problema del tiempo. Yo diría que siempre sentimos esa antigua 
perplejidad, esa que sintió mortalmente Heráclito en aquel ejemplo al que 
vuelvo siempre: nadie baja dos veces al mismo río. ¿Por qué nadie baja dos veces 
al mismo río? En primer término, porque las aguas del río fluyen. En segundo 
término—esto es algo que ya nos toca metafísicamente, que nos da como un 
principio de horror sagrado—porque nosotros mismos somos también un río, 
nosotros también somos fluctuantes. El problema del tiempo es ése. Es el 
problema de lo fugitivo. (Borges 1979, pp?) 
Borges goes on to propose that what we call time is a donation of eternity in the double sense 
of the genitive. Time is imparted to us as possible experience by eternity understood as beyond 
time and as forever inaccessible to us as object of experience. An experience of eternity would 
be ruinous or fatal; like the God of the Old Testament, if being as such were to disclose itself to 
us, Borges says, we would be struck dead or be driven mad. Time, then, is the donation of the 
real as possible experience, a giving of the real by the real.   
 What if, when it comes to modernity, time were not simply the other side of the coin 
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vis-à-vis space? And what if Ricoeur’s account of poetic temporalization were only half the story 
when it comes to the modern experience of time? What if we were to think of time not only as 
a vehicle or instrument through which modernity asserts itself as historical project but also, 
following Borges, as the real of modernity: as a problem that modernity never ceases to grapple 
with, and which it remains incapable of resolving and banishing once and for all?  
 In 2666 Bolaño’s meditations on the violence and destabilizing effects of 
narcocapitalism and post-Fordism give shape to a thought of the historical present as 
disjuncture rather than conjuncture, or as a situation defined by temporal heterogeneity. 
Heterogeneity is a name for our historical conjuncture—a coalescence of forces that include 
global capital, its liberal proponents and its illiberal opponents, as well as the integration of the 
planet through informational and mediatic technics—but it is also a name for a difference or 
non-contemporaneity that inhabits history; heterogeneity, which can be illuminated through 
repetition, moves against the current of progress while also keeping open a sense of the future 
as incalculable, as openness to the possibility of being surprised by the event. Our conjuncture 
is thus defined at once by the uncertain experience of disadjustment—as illustrated in the cases 
of Norton and Amalfitano—and by concerted technological, political and military efforts to 
eliminate all disadjustment.  
 In Specters of Marx (Derrida 1994), Jacques Derrida proposes a thinking of time as 
informed by the logic of spectrality, in which the living present is secretly marked—and 
unhinged—by undead remnants of the past and apparitions of the future. The present, any 
given present, owes a debt to the past from which it inherits more than it can ever know. Yet to 
inherit something is also by definition to change it, and thus the incursion of debt also 
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invariably transforms our understanding of the prior moment from which we inherit. Time, as 
Borges puts it, is a constant state of flux; and we ourselves are also this flow, flight and self-
differentiation. If time is to be conceived as a sequence of Nows or presents, Amalfitano’s 
repetition of Duchamp in turn illustrates how every Now is already different from itself; the 
proper sense of any present is contaminated by what is not (yet), by what is no longer and by 
what is yet to come. 
 I have argued that Amalfitano performs the possibility of the impossibility of the avant 
garde qua interruption today. The manifest impossibility of interruption might lead us to the 
conclusion that it is no longer possible to experience or imagine an outside, an alternative to 
globalization and the hegemony of the market. However, if the avant garde was always 
paradigmatically modern in its sensibility—indeed, however much it strives to make a clean 
break with the modern, it could be said to embody the essence of modernity—then it may be 
that the interruption of interruption generates a second-order interruption, the ghost of 
interruption, which would be conjured through our recognition that art is no longer capable of 
providing a compensatory “outside” for modernity and its history of destruction. The 
interruption of interruption might therefore stand a chance of bringing the contradictions 
inherent in the global system to a head for us in a way that a classical avant garde gesture 
would be incapable of providing, i.e., because it was always possible to experience avant garde 
provocations and ruptures as belonging to redemptive aesthetic practice and experience. One 
of the most important insights offered by Bolaño’s literary project—at times despite himself 
and the never-ending construction of his literary persona and legacy—is that our world today 
leaves intact no hope for an aesthetic remedy to the suffering and destruction inflicted by 
333 
 
modernization and the disasters of the 20th and 21st centuries. What is more, the illumination 
today of the impossibility of a compensatory role for art—which is to say, the impossibility of 
what was once the great hope of aesthetic modernity—may well be the only thing that 
provides a glimmer of hope in our ever-darkening world. “El mundo está vivo,” he tells Mónica 
Maristain, “y nada vivo tiene remedio y ésa es nuestra suerte” (Bolaño 2006, 71). 
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1 Occasionalism refers to a logic that attributes phenomenal occurrences to a transcendent cause or first principle—
in this case, the sovereign decision that gives rise to and legitimates a given legal or political order albeit without 
becoming subject to the codes of that order.  
2 “Principial authority” refers to Reiner Schürmann’s discussion of the Aristotelean concept of principle (arkhé) as a 
term that serves as the axiomatic foundation of a given lexicon or logic (Schürmann 2003). Schürmann’s analysis of 
arkhé in the history of Western thought turns out to be formally quite similar to Schmitt’s account of sovereignty in 
the history of modern politics.    
3 On the status of this term (sous rature) see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976, 19-26, as well as Martin Heidegger, “On the Question of Being” (Pathmarks, trans. 
William McNeill, Cambridge University Press, 1998). Spivak’s introduction to Of Grammatology also contains a 
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highly useful clarification of the Derridean and Heideggerian deployments of this critique of ontology; see Of 
Grammatology, xvii-xx.  
4 Whereas some critics understand testimonio as initiating a radical break from Latin American literature and its 
aesthetic sensibility, I would argue that testimonio is a continuation of that literary history in a different key. The 
fact that its conventions and rhetorical gestures differ from those of the Boom or the regional novel does not in itself 
make the testimonial genre any less literary. On the contrary, it is the critical understanding of this genre as 
contributing to the production of a subject—no matter how alternative or revolutionary—that makes testimonio 
literary in the ideological sense of the term that I am trying to pin down here.  
5 On the globalization of capitalist production see Harvey 1990 and Jameson 1991. On the notion of paradigmatic 
forms of labor see “Postmodernization, or the Informatization of Production” (chapter 3.4) in Hardt and Negri 2000, 
280-303.  
6 See, among others, Jameson 1991 and Virno 2004. 
7 See my discussion of this scene in Dove 2004. 
8 See Sauri 2010, DiStefano 2013 and Hatfield 2014. While I largely agree with the objections that these three critics 
raise against the critical shift from interpretation and truth to affect—in particular I find myself in agreement with 
the idea that such a shift could provide emancipatory or even just desirable results today—I have reservations about 
what seem to me to their insufficiently critical reliance on conceptual distinctions such as form and content (Sauri) 
and authorial intention versus reader perception (DiStefano and Hatfield).  
9 See in particular “Kant’s Materialism” and “Kant in Schiller” in the posthumously published Aesthetic Ideology 
(de Man 1996). 
10 See in particular Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (1927) and the 1936-38 lectures published as Contributions to 
Philosophy (From Enowning).  
11 See the introduction to Jameson 1991.   
12 The tactical equivalence ignores the fact (as documented by Martin Edward Andersen in his Dossier Secreto: 
Argentina’s Desaparecidos and the Myth of the “Dirty War”) that the armed Left in Argentina had already been 
infilitrated and no longer posed a military threat when the March 1976 golpe de estado was implemented under the 
much-publicized pretext of saving the country from communism or disorder. The moral equivalency argument, 
meanwhile, discounts any meaningful distinction between civic violence on the one hand and extrajudicial 
repression by the state on the other. However misconstrued and fatally flawed the decisions that led many among the 
Argentine Left to adopt armed struggle as the solution to a political problem may have been, those decisions cannot 
be placed on the same moral plane as the decisions and procedures that led to the permanent suspension of 
constitutional rights and the systematic implementation of torture and other forms of terror in the name of “Western, 
Christian values.”  
13 Similar forms of rewriting can be found in the Chilean transitional process. See Levinson 2003.   
14 For an illustration of what such reflection could look like, see Thayer 2006. In response to the conceptualization 
of “transition” as return to or restoration of democratic tradition in Chile, Thayer proposes that the real transition is 
to be found in the epochal transformations initiated with the military golpes de estado, which not only interrupted 
the possibility of radical Left projects but also enacted their own, equally radical shift away from the state-centered 
national histories of the 19th and 20th centuries and into a new history governed by the retreat of the state in 
deference to the logic of the market. 
15 For a discussion of hegemony and universality see Ernesto Laclau 2005, and Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000. 
16 I am alluding to the so-called “Washington Consensus,” a term that was coined by the IMF’s John Williamson in 
1989 and soon became the code word for the particular brand of neoliberal reforms (in particular: deregulation of 
major national industries; privatization of public services; prioritization of fiscal discipline over public expenditure; 
elimination or reduction of entitlement programs deemed not to possess a high rate of economic return, such as 
welfare and social services; liberalization of trade and foreign investment policies and removal of protective tariffs; 
securing of private property rights against state appropriation and nationalization; and liberalization of interest rates) 
(Birdsall et al. 2010).  
17 In 1989 and 1990 Alfonsín’s successor, Carlos Menem, issued blanket pardons for convicted military criminals as 
well as for a number of actors who might conceivably have faced prosecution for crimes committed before, during 
or after dictatorship. The pardons covered crimes committed by guerrilla leaders, by the military during dictatorship 
as well as during post-dictatorship military uprisings.  
18 One of the best accounts of the turn from optimism to despair in post-dictatorship Argentina is Marguerite 
Feitlowitz’s Lexicon of Terror; see in particular the final two chapters (Feitlowitz 1998). 
19 While he was writing El oído absoluto Cohen was still residing in Barcelona. At the conclusion of the novel we 
find the dateline: “Lorelei, 1986-1989.”  
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20 My discussion of Stimmung and Bestimmung is informed by Michel Haar’s “Attunement and Thinking” (Haar 
1992) By the same token, I was influenced to begin thinking about “mood” as a philosophical and literary problem 
by Alberto Moreiras’s “The Order of Order” (Moreiras 1999).  
21 With the considered use of the future perfect here I am trying to describe a paradoxical temporality by which 
something (“being” or its determination by thought) shapes the way we look at the world while at the same time it 
can only be said to acquire consistency and efficacy through determinate acts (e.g., of praxis or thought). Let us give 
a concrete example: the underlying experience of being in Ancient Greece is nothing outside of the specific works of 
Greek culture (philosophy, tragedy, poetry, sculpture) and politics that reason presumes to be governed by an 
originary experience or essence, albeit only unconsciously. The preunderstanding of being thus functions in 
Heidegger’s argument like a speculative fiction: it is a necessary supposition for thinking but it cannot be discovered 
through interpretive work of any kind.  
22 Like Stimmung, Bestimmung bears a variety of related connotations, the most salient of which for this discussion 
are “determination,” “modification” and “destination.” 
23 In “Science and Reflection” Heidegger recalls that “the [Greek] verb theōrein grew out of the coalescing of two 
root words, thea and horaō. Thea (cf. theater) is the outward look, the aspect, in which something shows itself. Plato 
names this aspect in which what presences shows what it is, eidos. To have seen this aspect, eidenai, is to know 
[wissen]. The second root word in theōrein, horaō, means: to look at something attentively, to look it over, to view it 
closely. Thus it follows that theōrein is thean horan, to look attentively on the outward appearance wherein what 
presences becomes visible and, through such sight—seeing—to linger with it” (Heidegger 1977, 163). While 
Heidegger relentlessly emphasizes the connection linking the origins of the metaphysical tradition in the Platonic 
eidos to the modern specular project, such an analysis would be incomplete unless it also attends to the economic 
undertones present in Heidegger’s translation of horaō as “to look at something attentively, to look it over, to view it 
closely”—in other words, as appraisal grounded in a preunderstanding of value as exchange value.  
24 “The subject, if anything, is the thing that senses and thinks. Sensations and thoughts do not belong to the ‘world 
of energy’, they cannot produce any change in this world of energy as we know from Spinoza and Sir Charles 
Sherrington. All this was said from the point of view that we accept the time-hallowed discrimination between 
subject and object. Though we have to accept it in everyday life ‘for practical reference’, we ought, so I believe, to 
abandon it in philosophical thought. Its rigid logical consequence has been revealed by Kant: the sublime, but 
empty, idea of the ‘thing in itself’ about which we forever know nothing. It is the same elements that go to compose 
my mind and the world. This situation is the same for every mind and its world, in spite of the unfathomable 
abundance of ‘cross references’ between them. The world is given to me only once, not one existing and one 
perceived. Subject and object are only one. The barrier between them cannot be said to have broken down as a result 
of recent experience in the physical sciences, for this barrier does not exist” (126).  
25 As for narrative approaches that are incapable of navigating the complexities of globalization as violence, Cohen 
specifically mentions: “el relato confiado de las tensiones dramáticas que se resuelven” (which seems to refer not to 
a specific genre or subgenre but  to a classical understanding of aesthetic experience with the production and 
resolution of dramatic conflict, of which Aristotle is the principle example); “las estéticas exotistas y el cuento 
maravilloso” (which seem to refer to the proliferation of magical realism in the aftermath of the Boom novel); “el 
grotesco colorista” (the theater of the grostesque was popularized in Argentina and Uruguay by Italian immigrants 
during the first decades of the 20th century but was soon adopted by the hegemonic criollo culture and became an 
important vehicle for representing social conflict and class antagonism in the work of Armando Discépolo and 
others); “la comedia negra de costumbres” (the comedia was an early modern Spanish theatrical tradition; comedia 
de costumbres as a general term translates as “comedy of manners”); “las comprensibles poéticas de denuncia” 
(which could refer to any use of poetry or prose as a vehicle for denouncing injustices); and, finally, “la literatura 
prospectiva de nuestro siglo” (science fiction understood as attempt to predict the future).  
26 Sarlo is by no means the only one to offer such an assessment. As Gianpietro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz see 
it, “mediatized politics is politics that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass 
media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media” (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, 249-50).  
27 There is a non-fictive Lorelei to which Cohen’s Lorelei alludes: a large rock structure that towers over the Rhine 
River near St. Goarshausen, Germany, at the narrowest point in the river’s trajectory. Because the narrowing of the 
river combines with unusually strong currents, this point is one of the most hazardous for navigation along the entire 
river, as evidenced by its many shipwrecks. In 19th and 20th century literature (Brentano, Heine, Joyce and others) 
and music (Mendelssohn), Lorelei has been linked to legends of a mermaid or siren who lures unsuspecting sailors 
to their demise. The thematization of utopia and dystopia in El oído absoluto has a clear relation to the Lorelei 
legend: it is through neopopulist sentimentality or kitsch that Cohen’s Lorelei sells itself as a bastion of tranquility in 
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contrast to an outside world that is increasingly threatened by natural and man-made disasters.  
28 While the resonances between the events in Lorelei and post-dictatorship Argentina are too obvious to be ignored, 
my intention here is to illustrate why interpretive focus on this more or less direct connection would result in a very 
limited and impoverishing reading of the novel. At the same time, the link between utopian thought and 
developmentalism is further underscored in one of the self-promotional slogans projected above the city’s sky: 
“LORELEI ES TUYA. HA NACIDO PARA ALENTAR A QUIENES SE ESFUERZAN POR SUPERAR EL 
ATRASO” (20; all caps in original). What could better capture the ideology of neoliberalism described by Wendy 
Brown as staging an individualized, moralistic opposition to postmodern despair by taking charge of our own human 
capital through “proper choices and investing in proper things” (Brown 2010, np)?  
29 In Lotario’s cryptic formulation, “El aire hierve de vibraciones, pensamientos, deseos, mala leche, voluntad….El 
aire es una jungla de aspiradoras mentales. O surtidores. Y los únicos que lo saben son los paranoicos. Ellos saben 
que el aire está infestado” (Cohen 1989, 73). 
30 On the lexicon of terror see Feitlowitz 1998.  
31 This ghostly anecdote reflects Cohen’s interest in the dynamics of libidinal investment and love, especially in the 
context of distance and absence. Whereas the case of Eugenia’s sister presents a thought of love “before first sight” 
whose generative force is not immediacy but rather narrative, in his essay “Realmente fantástico” Cohen relates a 
story from the Taoist text Leizi about a man born in Yan and raised in Yu, who is deceived by travelling companions 
into believing that a third town, Jin, is his native Yan. The man reacts emotionally, touching the city’s walls, kissing 
the ground beneath him and bursting into tears. Later his follower travelers reveal the deception, but when the man 
finally arrives at the real Yan his reaction is devoid of all emotion. Cohen then proposes a number of possible 
interpretations of the Taoist fable (we are dominated by our fantasies; language and mental categories are 
constitutive of our reality) before moving into a reflection on how the relentless bombardment of “messages” in our 
contemporary mediatized world might alter or intensify the questions posed in the Taoist fable of the man from Yan.  
32 “…Yo no tenía pasado, no me acordaba nada. Mi historia era un montón de muertos” (Cohen 1989, 216); 
“Eugenia era mi almanaque, mis pertenencias y mi barco, mi libro de balances…el diario que algunos escriben para 
vigilar la memoria” (204). 
33 This phrase is a near-exact translation of a line from Emily Dickinson’s poem “Perception of an Object,” which is 
itself a commentary on memory and idealization.  
34 If one wishes one can still perfectly well read El oído absoluto as national allegory. In an all-too-literal key, the 
utopian façade of Lorelei would correspond with the first years of postdictatorship during which time radical 
contestatory politics was highly stigmatized (the teoría de los dos demonios) while democratic governments were 
periodically threatened by military uprisings led by far-right factions of the Argentine armed forces. By the same 
token, Campomanes embodies the increasing involvement of mass media in Argentine politics, a process which 
according to Luis Alberto Quevedo began with the innovative and intensive use of televisual advertising and 
marketing during the 1983 Presidential election (the first election following military dictatorship) and came to full 
fruition during Menem’s presidential election campaign in 1987—a year or so before the publication of Cohen’s 
novel (Reati 2006, 138). While the resonances between the events in Lorelei and post-dictatorship Argentina are too 
obvious to be ignored, my intention here is to illustrate why interpretive focus on this more or less direct connection 
would result in a very limited and impoverishing reading of the novel. 
35 See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Musica Ficta: Figures of Wagner (Lacoue-Labarthe 1994), esp. pp.26-31. For a 
fuller discussion of Cohen’s thinking about the so-called return to realism in contemporary Argentine narrative see 
the essay “¡Realmente fantástico!” in Cohen 2003. 
36 Elsewhere in the same essay Guevara refers to love as the originary impulse of Marxist praxis (love for one’s 
fellow human) and as the vital force and rhythm of labor in Cuba (the Cuban women and campesinos “cut the sugar 
cane with love”).  
37 These questions were prompted by chapter 4 of Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Inoperative Community, entitled 
“Shattered Love” (Nancy 1991).  
38 Earlier versions of this chapter have been presented in conferences (the 2006 Latin American Studies Association 
and American Comparative Literature Association Conferences), as a lecture at the University of Aberdeen (2006) 
and as an invited paper at the University of Illinois at Chicago (2011), and as an article published in the Revista de 
Estudios Hispánicos (Dove 2009). I am grateful to Kate Jenckes, Alberto Moreiras and Dianna Niebylski for those 
invitations, and to Carl Good for having prompted me to begin thinking about Aira.  
39 As Winfried Schulz puts it, “media technologies extend the natural limits [sic] of human communication 
capacities. Human communication is limited in terms of space, time and expressiveness; the media serve to bridge 
spatial and temporal distances. In addition, the media help to surmount limitations of encoding. Hence, the 
phylogeny of the media has to be understood as a continuous effort to extend these limits” (Schulz 2004, 88).  
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40 See p.65, footnote 28. 
41 The idea that televisual media introduces a new degree of self-reflexivity that is unparalleled in other media was 
first discussed, in the Argentine context, by Oscar Landi in Devórame otra vez: qué hizo la television con la gente, 
qué hace la gente con la television (Landi 1992).   
42 The origins of neoliberalism in the Southern Cone involve at least two forms of violence. One, to which Sarlo is 
alluding in this passage, entails the presentation of what was in fact a political decision (the determination of 
technocratic knowledge as the truth of the political, a decision that was consolidated under Menem) as if it were 
something other than a decision, i.e., the market as the only “natural” means of social organization. The other 
account of origin involves the fact that the groundwork for the transitions to market economy in Argentina, Chile 
and Uruguay were laid under military dictatorship in the 1970’s and 80’s, and that the imposition of market-driven 
reforms have frequently been accompanied by a rhetoric of fear: either embrace the road to modernization as defined 
by global capital or risk the return of the “demons” that terrorized the country in the past (revolutionary violence and 
state terrorism). If neoliberalism is only officially introduced to Argentina under Menem, the groundwork for its 
introduction was nonetheless created by the dictatorship’s Minister of Economy, José Martínez de Hoz.  
43 In Communication, Culture and Hegemony, Jesús Martín Barbero describes how radio and film “convey[ed] the 
challenge and the appeal of populism, which transformed the mass into the people and the people into the nation” 
(Barbero 164). In “The Cinematic State,” meanwhile, John Kraniauskas discusses how the use of cinematic 
techniques and affect (melodrama in particular) helped generate a “state effect” in which the image of Eva Perón 
acted as an ideological mediating force between Juan Perón and the masses of descamisados. A concrete example of 
this mediation can be seen in video recordings of the August 1951 Cabildo Abierto in which Eva Perón, at a moment 
when she was expected to accept the popular nomination for Vice Presidency, addresses the masses and announces 
her decision not to accept (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X-PLyxKSSRk).  
44 Shirin Shenassa’s cautionary note regarding critical approaches to mass culture in thinkers like Adorno, 
Horkheimer, Benjamin and Brecht is potentially relevant for Sarlo’s critique as well. The important differences 
between their approaches notwithstanding, Shenassa finds in each of the aforementioned thinkers an unwitting 
tendency to “separate the technology from an idealized user who, given sufficient enlightenment, can return to that 
technology to make better use of it” (Paz Soldan and Castillo 2001, 251). For Shenassa, critiques of mass culture too 
often remain caught up in an all-too-metaphysical understanding of technics as the instrument of a subject. While it 
is true that Sarlo argues that mass media technics represents a threat to the subject understood as the ground of 
political, ethical or aesthetic judgment, she nonetheless appears to adopt the view that the subject represents the best 
alternative to a world dominated by technics—the subject understood as one who has learned to use technics without 
ceding its own agency to technology. What she discounts in taking this position, meanwhile, is the possibility that 
the subject and technics in fact share a common history: modernity’s gradual subsumption of nature and the 
imagination under the logic of techno-science and capitalism; that is to say, the reduction of these former to what 
Heidegger calls “standing reserve” and/or to commodity forms.  
45 Among the best of Aira criticism are Contreras 2002 and Speranza 2006.  
46 “Sólo las vanguardias ofrecen una alternativa para salir del callejón sin salida en que ha quedado la literatura 
después de la profesionalización del escritor, responsable del congelamiento de la forma artística; sólo mediante la 
creación de procedimientos—la herramienta esencial de las vanguardias—el arte puede recuperar su radicalidad 
constitutiva” (Speranza 2006, 307).  
47 “La literatura del futuro se alza en nosotros, un alcázar de oro, el espejismo de los espejismos. Qué error pensarla 
‘buena’. Si es buena no puede ser futura. Lo bueno es lo que dio tiempo a ser juzgado, y caducó en el momento en 
que se lo dio por bueno” (Aira 1995, 30).  
48 “Yo vengo militando desde hace años en favor de lo que he llamado, en parte por provocación, en parte por 
autodefensa, ‘literatura mala’. Ahí pongo todas mis esperanzas, como otros las ponen en la juventud, o en la 
democracia; ahí me precipito, con un entusiasmo que las decepciones, por definición, no hacen más que atizar: al 
fondo de la literatura mala, para encontrar la buena, o la nueva, o la buena nueva” (“La innovación” 29). 
49 On the origins of the modern understanding of history as progressive chronology see Reinhart Koselleck, Futures 
Past (Koselleck 2004), especially Chapter One (“Modernity and the Planes of Historicity”).  
50 “Baudelaire, en efecto, inventó lo nuevo tal como lo conocemos, y lo hizo en una operación que parece 
paradójica. Lo que inventó, o descubrió, fue la vejez, la decrepitud, de la civilización en la que había nacido. Para él 
lo nuevo es un epifenómeno de lo viejo; la innovación comienza y termina con la creación de ese aburrimiento en el 
que al fin podamos desear otra cosa, y no podamos no desearla” (28).  
51 In premodern Western artistic traditions, for example, the respective sizing of different figures in a painting 
indicated not the figure’s relative proximity to the viewer but degrees of importance on a thematic, spiritual or 
social hierarchy.  
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52 See Willy Thayer, El fragmento repetido: Escritos en estado de excepción, especially the first two essays on the 
Chilean Avanzada (Thayer 2006). I discuss Thayer’s position in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
53 Materiality for de Man refers not to matter per se but to a non-phenomenal occurence in language that both 
conditions and resists cognition and understanding. For example, in Kant’s discussion of the sublime in the third 
Critique de Man finds an attempt to think materiality at the end of Book II (“Analytic of the Sublime”) in the 
“General Comment on the Exposition of Aesthetic Judgments” where Kant provides several examples of what he 
means by the aesthetic object in its presentation of a limit for conceptuality and teleology. In de Man’s account the 
thought of materiality emerges in the shift from one discursive mode to another: in this case, from a rhetorical 
language of tropes and cognition to a performative language of power. Materiality as de Man is trying to think it 
does not reside in one mode or the other but in the transfer between them. In the case of Kant this passage is 
produced as what de Man calls “the epistemological critique of trope,” where it is tropological language that first 
allows Kant to develop his understanding of critique and critical philosophy, and then in instances such as this one 
the critical enterprise finally turns against the hegemony of the trope (de Man 1996, 132-33). 
54 See Derrida’s discussion of the secret as limit that ruins the distinction between reference and self-reference in his 
reading of Baudelaire’s short story “Counterfeit Money” (Derrida 1992b).   
55 Or, as Brett Levinson points out in a brilliant discussion of marketing and accent, it may be that the market 
excludes—as in having no way of accounting for or putting to work—those elements of social life that stand in for 
language itself (Levinson 2004, 169).  
56 Ricardo Piglia suggests somewhere that Esteban Echeverría’s short story “El matadero” instantiates an Argentine 
tradition of representing barbarism through metonymy: a locus of barbarous outlooks and practices within the city, 
and so on. Aira’s novel could be seen as reproducing Echeverrían irony in a manner that is recoded for late 
modernity.   
57 I owe a debt of gratitude to Carl Good for helping me to see this point. 
58 “Una de las declaraciones más famosas de la Jueza, y de las peor entendidas, había sido que su única intención era 
dejar el mundo, al fin de su breve estada en él, enriquecido con algo que el mundo no hubiera tenido antes. Parecía 
una tontería, una de esas cosas que se dicen para salir del paso, pero tenía su complicación. Por un lado, poner algo 
nuevo en el mundo no es tan fácil: sería como traer una piedra de la Luna, salvo que tal y como están las cosas, la 
Luna ya está en el mundo. Y ella no se refería tanto a una combinatoria nueva de elementos ya presentes, o un 
cambio de lugar de una cosa, sino a algo de veras nuevo, un elemento nuevo, con el que, si alguien quería, podía 
hacer combinaciones viejas. Y por otro lado, era un deseo extraño en un magistrado; la justicia funciona como una 
suma cero, se diría que debe dejar la situación con la misma cantidad de elementos, exactamente, con que la 
encontró, y que ahí está la esencia de su trabajo. Lo de agregar algo nuevo es más propio del arte.”  
59 As Samuel Weber has observed, the English translation leaves out the crucial reference to the question of time 
(Zeit) in the German title (Weber 1996, 79). What Heidegger calls the time of the world picture is not simply one 
segment or duration taken from a longer extension of time; it is, among other things, a reinscription of time itself 
that transforms our very experience of historical temporality.   
60 For a discussion of what it means to be “in the picture” see “The Age of the World Picture” (in Heidegger 1977), 
especially pp.129ff.  
61 “Nadie capta el conjunto, sobre todo porque en realidad no hay conjunto”; “Nada tenía sentido, aun dentro del 
sentido.” 
62 The hegemonic triumph of neoliberalism in Latin America is commonly referred to as “the Washington 
consensus,” borrowing a term coined by the IMF’s John Williamson in 1990. Justification for neoliberal reforms 
frequently appeals to the idea that free markets and unfettered economic opportunity offer the closest possible 
approximation to freedom; the market, in this ideological vision, becomes synonymous with the end of exclusion 
and the advent of unlimited choice. “Consensus” would be another name for what I am calling the fantasy of total 
inclusion and complete coverage.   
63 I owe this term to Brett Levinson’s article “Dictatorship and Overexposure” (Levinson 2003). 
64 On the relation between technics and default, see Stiegler 1998.  
65 “En los canales la actividad era frenética. Ya habían encontrado fotos de Cabezas en sus archivos digitalizados, y 
las estaban intercalando en la emisión en vivo. Era una cara horriblemente deformada por la electrónica, una cara sin 
explicación. Cada segundo que permanecía en la pantalla se deformaba más. (…) Era otra vez el tema de la 
brevedad de la vida, en el mundo de las imágenes. La fantasía que sobrevolaba a los teleespectadores en ese 
momento era una exacerbación de la brevedad de la vida: un viajero intergaláctico que desembarcara en un mundo 
extraño, sin protección alguna (¿qué protección podía tener?), y en ese mundo las condiciones ambientales hicieran 
imposible la vida: estaba condenado, evidentemente, moriría en unas décimas de segundo, podía decirse que ya 
estaba muerto… Pero mientras tanto estaba vivo, estaba desembarcando en el mundo, en la realidad horrenda del 
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mundo. Y ese ‘mientras tanto’ era todo.”  
66 See, for example, Freud’s short “A Note Upon the ‘Mystic Writing Pad’” (Freud 1961, 226-32).  
67 Key contributors to this debate include Nelly Richard (Margins and Institutions [Richard 1986] among other 
works); Pablo Oyarzún (Arte, visualidad e historia [Oyarzún 1999]); Willy Thayer (“El Golpe como consumación 
de la vanguardia” [Thayer 2003; revised and republished in Thayer 2006] and “Crítica, nihilism e interrupción: La 
Avanzada después de Márgenes e Instituciones” [Thayer 2006]); Federico Gallende (“Esa extraña pasión por huir de 
la crítica” [Galende 2005a] and “Dos palabras sobre arte y factoría” [Gallende 2005b]); and Sergio Villalobos-
Ruminott (Soberanías en suspenso: Imaginación y violencia en América latina [Villalobos 2013]). 
68 As numerous critics have pointed out, the “economic miracle” touted by Friedman ignores a series of 
inconvenient facts, including a series of recessions in the 1970s and beyond as well as the dramatic rise in inequality 
throughout the 1970s and 80s.  
69 “…La creatividad como fuerza disruptora del orden administrado en el lenguaje por las figuras de la autoridad y 
sus gramáticas de poder” (Richard 1986, 1). 
70 “La toma de poder que ocasiona la fractura de todo el marco de experiencias sociales y políticas que la antecede, 
desintegra también los modelos de significación configurados por el lenguaje que nombraba esas experiencias; 
lenguaje ahora destituido en su facultad de designar o simbolizar una realidad por lo mismo en crisis de 
inteligibilidad” (2) 
71 “Sólo la construcción de lo fragmentario (y sus elipsis de una totalidad desunificada) logran dar cuenta del estado 
de dislocación en el que se encuentra la noción de sujeto que en esos fragmentos retratan como unidad devenida 
irreconstituible” (2). 
72 Under Allende it was announced that latifundios expropriated by the state would eventually be divided up and 
distributed to peasant groups, who would then become new owners. However, the land reform measures also built in 
an intermediate time in which the state was named as owner and the peasant communities were granted usufruct 
rights over the land. See Chonchol 1973 for details.  
73 In Dictatorship Carl Schmitt describes a commissarial dictatorship as suspending constitutional law in the interest 
of preserving the existing social and legal order against an external or internal threat. A sovereign dictatorship, 
meanwhile, imposes a state of exception in order to establish a new legal order (Schmitt 2014). 
74 The commission was called the Comisión de Estudios de la Nueva Constitución Política de la República de Chile, 
and was more commonly known as the Comisión Ortúzar. After its work was completed the first draft was then 
passed on to a newly-formed Consejo de Estado or State Council (1976-90), which prepared the final draft that was 
then formally adopted following a highly-controversial national referendum in 1980. 
75 On the distinction between Offenbarung and Offenbarkeit in Heidegger’s thought see Jacques Derrida in Kearney 
1999, p.73. 
76 Harvey 1990, Part II. 
77 For an illuminating commentary on the distinction see Alberto Moreiras, Línea de sombra, chapter 2 (Moreiras 
2006). 
78 “Y expulso de mi mente la escalada de mi atroz resentimiento, porque, después de todo, se trata de clientes que 
ejercen su legítimo derecho a maltratarme. Nuestros clientes son el lema obligatorio—no te olvides—que el cliente 
es el amo, el tutor absoluto de la mercadería” (Eltit 2002, 75). 
79 Virno’s distinction between speech and other performative acts may be problematic insofar as it appears to rely on 
a traditional, ontotheological classification of speech as self-presence and writing as the secondary order of copies 
and mere appearances. As indicated in Chapter One in the context of Lotario’s discussion of music theory, no 
performance of a musical piece could ever be reduced to mere repetition; a recital, no matter how rote its 
implementation may be, is necessarily also an interpretation. The same could be said of other forms of performance. 
By the same token, no speech—no matter how original or extemporaneous—could ever be purified of all repetition; 
in order to be understood and in order to have its effects (convincing, motivating, etc.), all speech relies on 
recognizable signs and turns of phrase.  
80 See Marx 1977, Chapter 1, section 4 of Capital, v.1: “The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret.”  
81 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (Butler 2006), especially Part 3, Chapter IV (“Subversive Bodily Acts”) and 
Charles Shepherdson, Vital Signs (Shepherdson 2000), especially chapter 3 (“The Role of Gender and the 
Imperative of Sex”).  
82 The clearest and most vitriolic account of this foreclosure of historicity in the Chilean transition can be found in 
Tomás Moulian’s Chile actual: Anatomía de un mito (Moulian 1997). For a highly visceral demonstration of the 
force of “forgetting” and the return of the repressed in post-dictatorship Chile see Patricio Guzmán’s documentary 
film Chile, la memoria obstinada (1997).  
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83 On the difference between “antagonism” and “dislocation” see Laclau 1990.  
84 I discuss this stigmatization of dissensus in the context of the Argentine post-dictatorship in Chapter One. For a 
helpful discussion of stigmatization in the Chilean context see Levinson 2003.  
85 I discuss the connections between Boca de lobo and the realist novel in more detail in Dove 2012. The villa 
miseria is the topos par excellence for the Argentine novela social, as exemplified in Bernardo Verbitsky’s 1957 
Villa miseria es también América.  
86 “En la República Argentina se ven a un tiempo dos civilizaciones distintas en un mismo suelo: una naciente, que 
sin conocimiento de lo que tiene sobre su cabeza, está remedando los esfuerzos ingenuos y populares de la edad 
media; otra que sin cuidarse de lo que tiene a sus pies, intenta realizar los últimos resultados de la civilización 
europea: el siglo XIX y el XII viven juntos; el uno dentro de la ciudades, el otro en las campañas” (Sarmiento 2008, 
91).  
87 As Paul Ricoeur has argued it is this Aristotelian juxtaposition of reversal (peripeteia) and recognition 
(anagnorisis) leading to catharsis that most decisively illustrates the connection between narrative poetics and 
temporalization. It is by way of the formal mechanisms of tragedy, in other words, that we first discover why there 
can be no pure phenomenology of time: the experience of time is always dependent on the supplement that is poetic 
or rhetorical mediation. See Ricoeur 1984, 31-51. 
88 Although first published as a collection in English in 1999, most of the essays included in Potentialities were first 
written in the early to mid-1980s.  
89 Benjamin includes the following assertion by Horkheimer within the text of the Arcades Project: “The 
determination of incompleteness is idealistic if completeness is not comprised within in. Past injustice has occurred 
and is completed. The slain are really slain….If one takes the lack of closure entirely seriously, one must believe in 
the Last Judgment…Perhaps, with regard to incompleteness, there is a difference between the positive and the 
negative, so that only the injustice, the horror, the suffering of the past are irreparable. The justice practiced, the 
joys, the works, have a different relation to time, for their positive character is largely negated by the transience of 
things. This holds first and foremost for individual existence, in which it is not the happiness but the unhappiness 
that is sealed by death” (Letter from Horkheimer to Benjamin, 16 March 1937, as quoted in Arcades Project, N8, 1; 
Benjamin 1999, 471).   
90 Eingedenken refers to a specific act of remembrance, as opposed to the faculty of memory. On the status of 
Gedenken and Eingedenken in Benjamin’s thought, see Rebecca Comway, “Benjamin’s Endgame” (Benjamin and 
Osborne, 1994) and Irving Wohlfarth, “On the Messianic Structure in Benjamin’s Last Reflections” (Osborne 2005).  
91 As an aside it is interesting to note that this association of historical remembrance with potentiality provides a 
stark contrast to Benjamin’s assertion, in the Theses on the Philosophy of History, that it is the memory of enslaved 
ancestors that infuses the working classes with political passion, and not the idealized portrait of the proletariat as 
future liberator of mankind (which is of course what the Social Democrats sought to instill as their own 
emancipatory discourse). 
92 As marker of social abandonment, orphanhood could also echo Peronism’s social strategy of transforming 
ideological signifiers of subjugation (“los descamisados,” “las grasitas”) into a language of social and political 
subjectivity. 
93 “Beatriz era alta, frágil, muy ligeramente inclinada; había en su andar (si el oxímoron es tolerable) una como 
graciosa torpeza, un principio de éxtasis” (Borges 1989, 1062).  
94 I owe a debt of gratitude to Moira Fradinger for pointing out to me the possible connection between Delia and 
Gradiva. The name “Gradiva” refers to Wilhelm Jensen’s 1902 short novel Gradiva: A Pompeian Fantasy, of which 
Freud produced his famous interpretation four years later (“Delusion and Dream in Jensen’s Gradiva,” 1907). 
Jensen’s novel tells the story of a German archaeologist, Norbert Hanold, who becomes obsessed with the figure of 
woman in a real-life bas-relief that he sees while in Rome. After returning home he obtains a plaster reproduction of 
the relief, which he hangs on his wall as an object for contemplation. His musings depart from his scientific training 
and tend increasingly toward the imagination. Hanold is convinced that the woman’s profile does not fit a bustling 
city such as Rome and he decides that she must have come from a smaller town. Soon he begins to associate her 
with the city of Pompeii and its unique raised stepping stones; this association then leads to a dream in which he 
finds himself in Pompeii at the time of Vesuvius’s cataclysmic eruption. In the wake of this dream Hanold travels to 
Italy, ending up in Pompeii where he encounters what he believes to be the woman he has been dreaming about. 
However, we finally learn that this woman is none other than a girl from his neighborhood in Germany, with whom 
he was infatuated at a young age and whose memory he had since repressed. Zoë Bertgang then proceeds to dissolve 
Hanold’s delusions and restore his capacity to confront the history of repression. While Freud reads Gradiva as a 
literary performance of a still-emerging psychoanalytical conceptual vocabulary of repression, delusions, symptoms 
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and dreams with Zoë embodying the role of the analyst, the surrealists—who came to Gradiva via Freud—find in 
her a figure of artistic inspiration. For Bretón, Masson, Dalí and Duchamp, Gradiva exemplifies the surrealist project 
of liberating the unconscious as a way of enabling new and emancipated forms of human expression.  
95 Note that in Borges’s text the problem described by the narrator is similarly reproduced—unavoidably, it seems to 
me—in the very description of the problem: while “simultaneity” attempts to describe what is irreducible to the 
sequential time of narrative syntax, it cannot help but postulate a single, overarching time in which all occurrences 
are contained. The very reference to “simultaneity” unavoidably presupposes an understanding of time as the Same.  
96 For a discussion of the event in its irreducibility to grammatical and rhetorical ordering procedures see Paul de 
Man’s Aesthetic Ideology (de Man 1996), especially the two essays on Kant’s third Critique.  
97 For a discussion of the groundless or reciprocally grounding analogical relation between paternity and logos in 
Plato’s Phaedrus see Jacques Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy” (Derrida 1981, 79-84). For a discussion of Hegel’s 
treatment of paternity as speculative instance par excellence see Mary O’Brien, The Politics of Reproduction 
(O’Brien 1981).  
98 In this respect it is worth noting the preponderance of words beginning with the prefix des- in this passage 
(desentrañar, desperdicio, destacar, descifrar), which typically bears the sense of denying or undoing something.  
99 See Hardt and Negri 2000, 289-94. 
100 “When [philosophers] first began to reason on the truth of things and the nature of all that exists, they fell upon a 
false track for want of a clue, and maintained that nothing at all could either come into existence or pass out of it; for 
they argued that, if a thing comes into existence, it must proceed either out of the existent or out of the non-existent, 
both of which were impossible; for how could anything ‘come out of’ the existent, since it is already there? And 
obviously it could not come out of the non-existent, for what it comes out of must be there for it to come out of, and 
the non-existent is not there at all. And so, developing the logical consequences of this, they went on to say that the 
actually and veritably ‘existent’ is not many, but only one” (Physics I, 191a25-33; Aristotle 1980, 85).  
101 Consider, for example, the following remarks by Alvaro García Linera concerning a possible correlation 
between work and politicization, which focuses on the Hegelian theme of subjectivity arising in response to the 
perception of a mark in the product; here it is the worker’s capacity to manipulate the quasi-sublime machinery in 
the industrial setting that establishes the idea of the workers, as Chejfec’s narrator puts it, as “sostenedores del 
mundo”: “[El] poder obrero sobre la capacidad productiva de los medios de trabajo industrial habilita no sólo un 
amplio ejercicio de autonomía laboral dentro la extracción o refinamiento, sino que, además crea la condición de 
posibilidad de una autopercepción protagónica en el mundo: la empresa con sus monstruosas máquinas, sus 
gigantescas inversiones, sus fantásticas ganancias, tiene como núcleo de su existencia al obrero de oficio; sólo él 
permite sacar de la muerte a ese sistema maquinal que tapiza [el lugar de extracción o producción]; sólo él sabe 
cómo volver rendidora la máquina…cómo distribuir funciones y saberes. Esta autoconfianza productiva, y 
específicamente técnica del trabajo dentro del proceso de trabajo, con el tiempo dará lugar a la centralidad de clase, 
que pareciera ser precisamente la trasposición al ámbito político estatal, de este posicionamiento productivo y 
objetivo del trabajador…” (García Linera 2008, 155)  
102 “The ‘coercive laws’ of market competition force all capitalists to seek out technological and organizational 
changes that will enhance their own profitability vis-à-vis the social average, thus entraining all capitalists in leap-
frogging processes of innovation that reach their limit only under conditions of massive labor surpluses. The need to 
keep the laborer under control in the workplace, and to undercut the bargaining power of the laborer in the market 
(particularly under conditions of relative labor scarcity and active class resistance), also stimulates capitalists to 
innovate. Capitalism is necessarily technologically dynamic, not because of the mythologized capacities of the 
innovative entrepreneur (as Schumpeter [argued]) but because of the coercive laws of competition and the 
conditions of class struggle endemic to capitalism” (Harvey 1989, 105).  
103 At the same time Nancy’s discussion of abandonment remains wary about the Heideggerian assessment of the 
“end of metaphysics.” It retains a critical view of Heidegger’s estimation of his own ability to distance himself and 
his thinking from the metaphysics of presence, and is skeptical about the linear historical time that would seem to be 
presupposed in Heidegger’s pronunciation of the “end.” 
104 “The image of the progress to infinity is the straight line, at both limits of which alone the infinite is, and always 
only is where the line—which is presence—is not, and which goes out beyond the non-presence of line, that is, to 
the indeterminate. As true infinity, bent back into itself, this image becomes the circle, the line which has reached 
itself, which is closed and wholly present, without beginning and end” (Hegel 1969, 149). 
105  On the market as bad infinity see Brett Levinson, Market and Thought, especially chapter 3.  
106 In the Part about the Critics Archimboldi is described as “el gran tiburón negro” (25); in the context of the first 
Part this metaphor generates an unavoidable literary comparison between the critics’ self-interested—and potentially 
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self-destructive—pursuit of Archimboldi and Ahab’s pursuit of the great white whale. As we discover later, 
however, this same citational allusion to Melville’s Moby Dick will also have served to foreshadow the presentation 
of evil in Bolaño’s novel. Melville’s account of the recently finished novel in a letter to Nathaniel Hawthorne of 
November 17, 1851: “I have written a wicked book” (Melville 1993, 212). I address the relation between Bolaño 
and Melville/Moby Dick more extensively in Dove 2014b.  
107 Elsewhere in Being and Time Heidegger discusses the key role of anxiety, or fear in the absence of any 
determinate object, in bringing forth the experience of world and being. While I am unable to explore here the 
question of anxiety as it is present in certain sections of 2666, the motif is connected to the kinds of questions I am 
raising here, especially in relation to Bolaño’s play with an aesthetics of indeterminacy or withdrawal, which in my 
view can be linked to Borges’s account of the aesthetic act as the “immanence of a revelation that does not take 
place.” I discuss the connection between anxiety, aesthetics and world in the first chapter, albeit in the context of 
Marcelo Cohen and not Bolaño.  
108 Note the parallel between this formal linking of the breakdown of instrumental relations and the disclosure of 
world with the discussion in the previous chapter of Heidegger’s illustration of sterēsis through the anecdote of the 
bicycle that has gone missing. In both cases it is an unexpected interruption, an absence or breakdown—or what 
Heidegger calls Abhandenheit, being-not-at-hand—affecting everyday circuits and habits, that leads to an awareness 
of the trace of Being as simultaneous disclosure and withdrawal. The experience of Abhandenheit plays a central 
role in Heidegger’s early efforts to distance himself from ontology, and it begins to recede in the seminars of the 
1930s as Heidegger becomes increasingly concerned with historically-specific modes of thinking and sensibility.  
109 On the katechonic restraining structure see below, p.269ff.  
110 “It’s always important to ask questions and it’s always important to ask yourself why you ask the questions you 
ask. And do you know why? Because just one slip and our questions take us places we don’t want to go....Our 
questions are, by definition, suspect” (Bolaño 2004, 553; Bolaño 2008, 442; translation slightly modified). 
111 I discuss the relation between the secret of literature and the secret of the world in Dove 2014a. 
112 Cuidad Juárez experienced a rapid population increase during the 1990s due to large influxes of migrant and 
immigrant workers seeking employment in the growing máquila industry. Exacerbated by the precarious nature of 
employment in that industry, this rapid population increase contributed to an environment of social anonymity 
among new arrivals. The vulnerability of precarious employment is intensified, especially for young, single women, 
through a combination of new and old forms of violence, including narco-capitalism, police corruption, and a 
traditional marrianista culture in which women—and most notably single women working outside the home—tend 
to be seen as morally suspect and as deserving of being “put back in their place” (González Rodríguez 2002 and 
2012). 
113 This is as good a place as any to acknowledge my debt to Alberto Moreiras for having first brought Galli’s 
groundbreaking essay to my attention, as well as to Gareth Williams and Edgar Illas (along with Moreiras) for 
having helped me to begin thinking about the implications of Galli’s argument, as well as its possible limitations, 
especially when it comes to Mexico and Latin America.  
114 Alongside Galli’s emphasis on the spatial logic of political modernity, or political geometry, it seems to me that it 
would be necessary to consider that a certain experience of time could similarly be understood as characteristic of 
modernity. But time and space may be more than just two sides of the same coin. For Galli, space is the product of 
political geometry, which also serves to regulate the tensions and antagonisms that accompany this production 
process. Time, one could argue, is similarly a product of modern temporalizing procedures. However, it is also clear 
that, from time to time, modernity gives rise to an experience of time that is not reducible to the dominant 
organizing logic of modernity, which has always conceived of time from the privilege of the present and as a 
chronologically ordered sequence of self-present moments. Alternatives to the modern experience of time, as 
Jacques Derrida has shown in Specters of Marx, can be found in Shakespeare, Marx, Heidegger, and Freud—and, I 
would add, César Vallejo and Borges. On the temporality of modernity see Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: 
Modernity and Avant-Garde (Osborne 2010). I will return to the question of time in the concluding part of this 
chapter.  
115 Schemata are mental maps or sketches that provide a concrete, geometrical impression of how a given concept 
relates to others. 
116 This is of course the classic account of the modern State found in Max Weber’s lecture “Politics as a Vocation.” 
See Weber 2004, 33.  
117 “This is a North American effort to take NAFTA, address the remaining friction points in the commercial and 
trade relationship to ensure that as our economies evolve that our trading relationships evolve and our regulatory 
regimes evolve so that we can actually facilitate the movement of goods and services across our borders, but also 
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understands North America as a shared economic space and that as a shared economic space we need to protect it, 
and that we need to understand that we don’t protect this economic space only at our frontiers, that it has to be 
protected more broadly throughout North America. And as we have worked through the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership to improve our commercial and trading relationship, we have also worked to improve our security 
cooperation. To a certain extent, we’re armoring NAFTA. We’re trying to show that this $15 trillion economy can 
be protected against a threat of terrorism and against a threat of natural disasters and environmental and ecological 
disasters” (Shannon 2008, np). 
118 “Tenía una casita de una sola planta, tres habitaciones, un baño completo más un aseo, cocina americana, un 
salón comedor con ventanas que daban al poniente, un pequeño porche de ladrillos en donde había un banco de 
madera desgastado por el viento que bajaba de las montañas y del mar, desgastado por el viento que venía del norte, 
el viento de las aberturas, y por el viento con olor a humo que venía del sur” (211). 
119 Note that the Spanish word for wood, madera, derives from the Latin materia, or matter.   
120 The fifth or parallel postulate states that “if a line segment intersects two straight lines forming two interior 
angles on the same side that sum to less than two right angles, then the two lines, if extended indefinitely, meet on 
that side on which the angles sum to less than two right angles.” By implication, if the two interior angles equal 
ninety degrees or two right angles, then the two lines will be parallel and—in a Euclidean space—will therefore 
never intersect.  
121 In Aristotle’s Physics, tuche refers to luck, chance or accident operating within human affairs, whereas 
automaton refers to chance at work in the non-rational world of nature (Aristotle 1980, 139-63).  
122 The tile falling on the head of a passer-by may be a reference to a dream analyzed by Freud in Chapter 5D of The 
Interpretation of Dreams; the image as reported by Freud was prompted by the analysand’s childhood memory of 
her mother, who was once hit by a falling roof tile (Freud 2010, 277). The “Person from Porlock” is an allusion to  
Coleridge’s account of an untimely interruption that allegedly prevented the poet from completing “Kubla Khan,” 
after having allegedly worked the poem out in its entirety during a dream (or perhaps an opium-induced trance). 
What was finally published of the poem is only 54 lines and is considered incomplete. 
123 “La primera impresión que los críticos tuvieron de Amalfitano fue más bien mala, perfectamente acorde con la 
mediocridad del lugar, sólo que el lugar, la extensa ciudad en el desierto, podía ser vista como algo típico, algo lleno 
de color local, una prueba más de la riqueza a menudo atroz del paisaje humano, mientras que Amalfitano sólo podía 
ser visto como un náufrago, un tipo descuidadamente vestido, un profesor inexistente de una universidad inexistente, 
el soldado raso de una batalla perdida de antemano contra la barbarie, o, en términos menos melodramáticos, como 
lo que finalmente era, un melancólico profesor de filosofía pasturando en su propio campo, el lomo de una bestia 
caprichosa e infantiloide que se habría tragado de un solo bocado a Heidegger en el supuesto de que Heidegger 
hubiera tenido la mala pata de nacer en la frontera mexicano-norteamericana” (152).  
124 In this light Johns’s self-portrait might be said to share one of the fundamental concerns of Duchamp’s “Unhappy 
Readymade”: i.e., of what gets elided in Romantic conceptualizations of artistic creativity as stemming from the 
subjectivity of the great individual artist.  
125 As Kate Jenckes notes in her magnificent reading of the avant garde in 2666 (Jenckes 2014), Johns’s masterpiece 
is set off against his earlier works, which are concerned primarily with “pain” and its absorption by a certain “void” 
(“El dolor, o el recuerdo del dolor, que en ese barrio era literalmente chupado por algo sin nombre y que se 
convertía, tras este proceso, en vacío” [Bolaño 2004, 76]). In contrast to that previous work, which was largely 
ignored by the art industry, the enthusiastic reception of Johns’s final self-portrait turns out to be mediated by a 
consumer desire for autobiography, a desire that remains constant despite a general decline in the prestige of 
humanistic inquiry in the world today, and which is consistent with the modern subject’s narcissistic need for self-
confirmation. If there is a ruptural potential in Johns’s work, Jenckes notes, it is to be found not in his final, 
grotesque self-portrait—the artistic success of which is predicated on the commercial appeal a work that reflects the 
subject back to itself—but rather in the all-but-ignored desolate renditions of London streetscapes. My own reading 
of the Johns episode is largely in agreement with hers. The primary difference in how we read these scenes, it seems 
to me, has to do with our respective points of emphasis. Jenckes contrasts the critical potential of the (largely 
ignored) earlier works with the commercial destiny of the final self-portrait, which is well received precisely 
because it offers reassuring confirmation instead of disturbing questions. I believe we both agree, meanwhile, that 
the distinction between the earlier works—of which the art institution wants to know nothing—and the critically and 
commercially acclaimed self-portrait illustrates a historical tendency concerning the status of art and literature in late 
modernity. This is a gravitational field that exceeds the merits and abilities of any specific artist or author, and from 
which no creative figure or text can easily escape. Johns’s prior works may well the avant garde tradition in their 
aesthetic composition and sensibility, and they may therefore participate in a search for rupture or interruption. But 
is such a composition still legible today? Can the ruptural sensibility still speak to us? And, if we answer “yes” to 
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those questions, could rupture still make a difference today? Those, in my view, are the truly unsettling questions 
posed by Bolaño’s 2666.  
126 The poet character is presumably modeled after the Spanish poet Leopoldo María Panero (1948- ), whose work 
has been associated with the neo-avant garde “Novísimos” movement of the 1970s, whose contributors included 
Manuel Vázquez Montalban, Perre Gimferrer and others, and whose work was associated with a forceful rejection 
of familiar accounts of what poetry is and what it is good for.   
127 In “2666 and the End of Interruption” Gareth Williams (Williams 2014) proposes a related but not identical 
reading in the context of what he describes as the dissociative madness unleashed by global capital. For Williams, 
2666 would stand as a formal testament to a time defined by the retreat or inexistence of the Lacanian big Other. 
Thus he finds himself in agreement with Levinson’s position that 2666 presents a totality in which, like post-
national capitalism, the relation between parts of the system remains unnamed and unsymbolized—resembling, I 
would add, a bad infinity more than a system. I am not as confident as Williams concerning what he calls the retreat 
of the “big Other,” understood either as the imaginary embodiment of social authority in a specific figure (the big 
Other qua “subject supposed to know”) or as the structuring authority of social and linguistic codes within the realm 
of intersubjective relations. While one could certainly argue that the weakening of modern social and political 
structures in the time of globalization and global war hastens the retreat of certain structures of meaning and 
authority, such a retreat does not necessarily mean that neoliberal order has managed to install itself in the absence 
of any ideology whatsoever. For example, as Wendy Brown has argued, it may be that the supposedly post-
ideological order of neoliberal globalization brings with it a certain residual ideology under the signs of self-
betterment for the market. I discuss this possibility at greater length in Chapter 1. In my view the notion of a “lack of 
lack” translates Levinson’s and Williams’s use of dissociation without going so far as to assert the withdrawal of the 
Other tout court.  
128 “Amalfitano had some rather idiosyncratic ideas about jet lag…He believed (or liked to think he believed) that 
when a person was in Barcelona, the people living and present in Buenos Aires and Mexico didn’t exist. The time 
difference only masked their nonexistence. And so if you suddenly traveled to cities that, according to this theory, 
didn’t exist or hadn’t yet had time to put themselves together, the result was the phenomenon known as jet lag, 
which arose not from your exhaustion but from the exhaustion of the people who would still have been asleep if you 
hadn’t traveled. This was something he’d probably read in some science fiction novel or story and that he’d 
forgotten having read” (Bolaño 2008, 188-89). Need one add that this “science fiction novel or story” that 
Amalfitano must have read and then forgotten having read is none other than Borges’s “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius”?  
